University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1992

The shift from rationality to irrationality in German aesthetic
theory : Kant, Schelling, Schopenhauer.
Gita S. Van Heerden
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Van Heerden, Gita S., "The shift from rationality to irrationality in German aesthetic theory : Kant, Schelling,
Schopenhauer." (1992). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1812.
https://doi.org/10.7275/cn68-za82 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1812

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

312Dbb

FIVE

0

2^7

^

COLLEGE

DEPOSITORY

THE SHIFT FROM RATIONALITY TO IRRATIONALITY
IN

GERMAN AESTHETIC THEORY:

KANT, SCHELLING, SCHOPENHAUER

A

Dissertation Presented

by

GITA

S.

van

HEERDEN

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
February 1992

Department of Philosophy

© Copyright by Gita

Satterlee

All Rights

van Heerden 1992

Reserved

I

THE SHIFT FROM RATIONALITY TO IRRATIONALITY
IN GERMAN AESTHETIC THEORY:
KANT, SCHELLING, SCHOPENHAUER

A

Dissertation Presented

by

GITA

Approved

as to style

and content by

S.

van

HEERDEN

:

c
1

( ^>

-

//

Gareth Matthews, Chair

£
Bruce Aune,

n^
Member

— 'VO
*

William M. Johnston,

Member

<M
Whn

6.

G. Robison, Department

^-''Department of Philosophy

Head

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I

wish

to

thank the Fulbright Commission

for their

the past

two

living in

Germany, has been an immeasurable help

years.

The opportunity

to research

IV

and write
to

me.

generous support during
this dissertation,

while

ABSTRACT

THE SHIFT FROM RATIONALITY TO IRRATIONALITY
IN GERMAN AESTHETIC THEORY:
KANT, SCHELLING, SCHOPENHAUER

FEBRUARY
GITA

S.

van HEERDEN,
M.A.,

B.A.,

1992

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

M.A.,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Ph.D,

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Gareth Matthews

This dissertation studies the shift that occurs in

between Kant's Critique

and Representation
forming the

pivot.

of

(1818),

Tudement

(1790)

with Schelling

This shift

is

7

s

it

what

it

means

Kant remains firmly rooted

to

functions.

regard the

human

unity with

all

larger

movement, and

I

have

German

philosophers delve deeper

be human.

in the rationalist tradition,

means

for the individual's response to a great

mind

much

(1800)

mirrors so well the changing focus of the essence of

successors both a foundation and the

the

as Will

System of Transcendental Idealism

the self which takes place as post-Enlightenment
into the question of

aesthetic theory

and Schopenhauer's The World

actually part of a

chosen aesthetic theory because

German

work

to

undermine

of art

which

it.

and provides

He

relies

gives

for his

an explanation

on an account

of

how

Schelling and Schopenhauer are deeply influenced by Kant, but

self as

containing some inexplicable mystery, an unconscious mythic

other selves, for Schelling, and an irrational desiring

v

will, for

Schopenhauer. Although Kant,

too, unwillingly points to the evidence

a non-rational basis for aesthetic response, as well as for
to avoid stating this result.

By

contrast, Schelling

which suggests

an account of the

and Schopenhauer make

self,

he

tries

this

inexplicable aspect a basic premise of their respective works.

In this work,

I

rely

mainly on the three primary

texts,

with the intent of making

the complex arguments, in particular those of Kant and Schelling, more accessible to

the reader.

I

examine

first

the cognitive theory of each thinker, and then study each

one's aesthetic theory in relation to their respective theory of mind. In this way,

show how

a decisive shift in focus has occurred in the period

addition,

refer to a cross-section of recent literature to clarify

I

I

under consideration. In

and support

my

position.

The conclusion
completely

1

new vantage

draw

is

that philosophic self-understanding attains a

point as the result of Schelling and Schopenhauer's work, a

perspective which irrevocably changes the lines of debate about the nature of the

vi

self.
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CHAPTER

I

A BRIEF HISTORY OF AESTHETIC PROBLEMS PRIOR TO
KANT'S CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 1790
(

A.

The guiding concern

human

being.

This

a

is

practically meaningless,

this

work

is

and what

it is

engaged in here

work

Forward
revolves around

it

means

and which must therefore be accompanied by

it is

not.

is

At

or has

an attempt

to

its

most ambitious,

become and why

uncover what

it

a highly theoretical exercise,

is

what

this

it

means

work

is

for

which

thinkers
British

I

I

I

am

of

list

what
to

has been so internally divided,
to

be a

What am

self.

unencumbered by

I

social or political

More

qualified.

trying to uncover the roots of the twentieth century European

self,

often use the shorthand and not entirely accurate adjective 'modern/ The

German, and

discuss are

their intellectual heritage

is

primarily

German,

and French.

The vehicle
aesthetic theory.

refers

a

an attempt

baggage, without which, of course, the validity of the result remains
specifically,

be a

to

statement covering a generalization so broad as to be

examine what philosophy
but primarily

of this

)

1

have chosen as the means by which

The

field of aesthetics

both to the range of

human

examine

this self is

occupies a unique interdisciplinary position.

expression revealed in works of

individual response to such works. In other words,

something makes us respond in certain ways, and
essentially unquantifiable

to

it

tries to

why we

art,

and the

explain both

how

respond. This response

and reveals something about the essence

of

It

what

it

is

means

to

2

how we view

the

human

being.

If

we

understand artworks as representing formal,

rational interpretations of a given subject,
rational creatures.

If

we view

In this work,

willful.

I

tend to view humans, at their best, as

artworks as manifesting a deep, unconscious truth of

the nature of the self or world,

and

we

we

tend to view

humans

as being, at bottom, irrational

claim that a fundamental shift in European thought takes

place at the beginning of the 19th century, and that this shift can be documented by

an examination of the change

During the course
clear to

The

me.

I

my

response to

my

large to do sufficient justice to

I

my

work

as

an introduction. To do

resisted this temptation

justice to

what

necessary required an explanation of the European historical and
especially the fragmented nature of

detailed examination of

German

and German

society.

it

to a study of the artistic

and

1820,

is

clearly

life

in

A

and

artistic life,

historical, political,

Germany, or even

way beyond

of Jena

as a

criticized for

needed introduction

to

political situation,

It

also required a

and the relationship
social

background

and Weimar, between 1790

specific

been the

and too general,

it

result.

this

work.

While

this

can also be viewed

an area which has often been passed over

language considerations of the history of European philosophy.
urge the reader to approach

began

the scope of this work. Restricting myself to the

being both too
to

I

viewed as

economic and

relatively short aesthetic theories of three philosophers has

work can be

I

what would become Germany.

intellectual

conflict.

same

claim, but at the

because of the constraints of space and time, but also because

regard the whole

between

grew increasingly

research became essentially one of

the need to expand the scope of the work.

felt

partially

all,

of writing this dissertation, several things

was almost too

topic

time

First of

in the nature of aesthetic theory.

It is

in English

in this spirit that

I

3

B. Dissertation Thesis

The fundamental

shift in focus of

around the turn into the 19th century,

how

is

European philosophy, which occurred

this shift manifests itself in the area of aesthetics,

whose

driving force

was German

thinkers,

and including Kant, one

rational foundation

on which models

to

come

to a clearer

and

art.

mind

thirty years,

will

and

(1790) to Schopenhauer's

is

have become the new foundation
of the change,

The reason why

I

late 19th

for

1

hope

and 20th

scope of the present work. Here, the

1790 to 1818, from Kant's Critique of judgment

The World

System of Transcendental Idealism

rules for art

however, the mystery of the

By examining the mechanism

this is outside the

time frame under consideration

as Will

(1800)

and Representation

forming the

(1818),

with Schelling

7

s

pivot.

have chosen these particular philosophers

is

that each of

places the aesthetic realm at the pinnacle of his view of the world: something in

aesthetic understanding enables one to achieve a

addition, each of

is

are constructed,

understanding of the forces which have shaped

century thought, although

them

aesthetic theories of three

finds a general belief in the existence of a firm,

unconscious and the capriciousness of the
theories of mind, conduct

concentrate on

measure the change,

I

by examining the

of the

and human conduct are based. Within

and

I

and Schopenhauer.

influential philosophers: Kant, Schelling

Prior to

work

the subject of this

them has

moment

exercised a major influence

on

of absolute truth.

later philosophers.

In

Schelling

the least well-known to an English-speaking audience, but within the community of

German-speakers, he
surprise of

many

is

generally given

more weight than Schopenhauer,

English-speakers, for Schopenhauer

is

to the

one of the few German

4

philosophers whose

work was made

readily accessible to

an English-speaking

audience.

The question which Kant,
is

the nature of the self? and

relation

between

self

Shelling and Schopenhauer pose

what

is

a dual one:

the nature of the world? In addition,

is

and world? Each of them

paradigmatic answer to the nature of

self

what

what
is

the

finds in the aesthetic experience a

and world, although

suggest that any of them come to a truly satisfactory or

I

do not mean

final conclusion.

to

The study

of

aesthetics cannot be isolated from other aspects of philosophical thought, for to

understand properly
definition of

is,

how one

how one

of course, the

a larger sense

interprets the nature of subjectivity.

main focus

it is

defines an aesthetic experience requires a prior

of

all

it

which

to aesthetic theory.

philosophers treats this problematic
philosophical thought as

it

of subjectivity

post-Enlightenment philosophical thought, so that in

this problematic

limiting the scope of

The nature

I

am

studying, but under the constraint of

The way

reflects the sea

in

which each

of the three

change underway

reformulates the nature of

its

in continental

subject matter in the

wake

of

the Enlightenment.

Kant represents the point of view that there

phenomenon
irrational

is

a rational, explicable order to the

of beauty; Schelling sees aesthetic objects as reflecting the unknowable,

mystery

at the center of the subject;

Schopenhauer shows that

all

events in

the world are inherently irrational, the physical manifestation of the capricious will

which

is

the ground of

all

being,

and only through

aesthetic

meaning can

a

glimmer of

truth be revealed. All three share a particular view of the aesthetic object, of

designate as 'beautiful/ which can best be expressed as Tart pour

1

art.

Or

what we

rather, the

5

artwork
genius,

is

there not so

much

purely for

own

its

sake but because

able to reveal to us the most essential truth of

is

who we

its

creator, the

are.

In order to have an appropriate framework, the question: "What

theory?" must be answered.

why

this

is

change

I

important? In short,

am

vacuum. The

of art, as

it

tries to

mean

it

why have

studying? Philosophy

place entirely in a

on works

What does

I

for

reflects one's

what

is

an underlying

set of beliefs.

It is

this

Aesthetics, as a philosophical field in

with Kant's Critique of Judgment
content of aesthetic theory,
aesthetic problems

I

.

begin

and the history

on

timeless about them.

we

which
its

to calibrate the

it

does not take

external standards,

The changing

consider beautiful, moves us,

interests

own

aesthetic

be beautiful, and

views of the world;

field of aesthetics clearly relies

explain

to

chosen aesthetic theory

explanations to a set conclusion: this thing, which
reveal

something

is

me.

right, irrevocably

comes

into being

For the reader unfamiliar with the history and

my

study with a review of both the nature of

of aesthetics before the late 18th century,

concentrating on classical sources and on the 17th and early 18th centuries. Without
this

background, limited as
7

Kant

s

must be given the

it

constraints of space, the novelty of

approach remains hidden. Without an adequate understanding of Kant,

who

synthesizes previous aesthetic theories in an innovative and masterful way, but at the

same time provides the

tools

with which his successors undermine his grand theory of

mind, ethics and aesthetics, the

efforts of Schelling

and Schopenhauer remain obscure

because both of them are responding directly to Kant.
After this review,

which

I

outline Kant's theory of mind, without a

knowledge

his aesthetic theory remains rather opaque, for the position held

within the

critical

philosophy

is difficult

to discern

if

one

is

by

of

aesthetics

unfamiliar with the terrain.

6

This

is

a pattern

follow in

I

my

treatment of Schelling and Schopenhauer,

first

reviewing their respective theories of mind, which are essentially theories of

then turning to their treatment of aesthetics. Only by

this

and

self,

kind of approach can one

form an adequate picture of the change under consideration.
Aesthetic theory

is

ostensibly about

interpretation of the nature of the

consider

is

more

works

of art, but

Indeed, the interest of

self.

directed towards understanding the

artworks, although this aspect of aesthetic theory

problem which plagues aesthetic
of

all

three philosophers

subject than to discussing

not entirely neglected. This

an area containing only unique examples. Consequently, the terms 'work

rare.

My

study

reflects this

unspecified great

human

my

art,

focus

I

how we view

of art.

is

a

It is

on what

of arf

examples of works of

it is

we can

that

the world, as a result of

art are

it is

that

we

learn about

how we

the change in this thirty year period of

being understands herself, as measured by her response

react to

how

to the artwork,

an

the

which

interest.

This

down,

I

is

a large topic, fraught with pitfalls.

To avoid getting hopelessly bogged

examine each philosopher independently, and

most germane.
other, but

latter

work

specific

approach. Rather than concentrating on what

can learn about particular works of
the nature of ourselves and

I

theorists, for they try to present a general explanation

and 'artwork' are used with great frequency, but

is

is

human

also about one's

it is

two

When

it is

illuminating,

I

limit

myself to the work

to Schelling to

certainly are responding to Kant, but

Schopenhauer

specifically

do not draw

a direct line

with Schelling in mind.

their differences,

which

is

It is

of interest.

find

point out where, and how, one reacts to the

from Kant

I

I

Schopenhauer. The
is

not wnting

that their final judgments are similar, despite

This,

however,

is

the subject of the conclusion.

7

IJMote on terminology:

aesthetics, philosophy of art

and the theory of beauty

Aesthetic theory covers a wide range of topics. So as to define the contours of

the domain, the distinction between aesthetics, philosophy of art and art criticism

needs to be made. These terms are often conflated, which leads
'Art criticism' refers to the critical analysis

and evaluation

genres of

art,

human

works of

art, for

functional.

that

of objects created

is,

by

to general confusion.

of specific

works

beings which are considered to be

example painting and sculpture, as opposed

to

something purely

(Of course, purely functional things are sometimes turned into

do not yet want

to get side-tracked into a discussion of

study of music and literature also belongs to

of art or

what

this category.

The

'arti is.)

By

'art,'

but

critical

contrast, the study of

the concepts involved in the judgments of art criticism belong to the philosophy of

The philosophy

The

aesthetic experience.

means, also

lies at

of art

is

a sub-division of aesthetics,

difficult

which

is

the study of

question of what aesthetic experience

the heart of this study. The nature of the beautiful

and was,

aesthetic experience,

defining element of

what

for

I

is

is,

art.

all

and what

it

a category of

most of the history of philosophical thought, the

aesthetic experience meant:

Die asthetische Reflexion hat sich nicht an der Erscheinung der Kunst, sondem
an der Erscheinung des Schonen entziindet; das ist das erste und
folgenschwerste Ereignis der Geschichte der Asthetik
1

When

one considers

between

aesthetic theories in the eighteenth century, the confusion

aesthetics as the study of beauty

and

aesthetics as the study of art

becomes

deeper. Because of the vagueness of the concept of beauty and the insufficiency of

1

Alfred Baeumler, Asthetik (Sonderausgabe aus

Miinchen und

Berlin: Verlag

von

R.

dem Handbuch

Oldenbourg, 1934,

p.3.

der Philosophic),

8

'beauty' to cover the growing realm of

what was considered

legitimate aesthetic

experience, theoreticians of aesthetics began to change and widen their focus, with the
result that: "Schonheit beschrankt sich nicht auf Kunst,

ausschliesslich das Streben

The

nach Schonheit

ist.”

wahrend Kunst

nicht

2

relation of beauty to art has not always

been mutually conditioned, but has

often been coincident. Until the beginning of the 18th century, this had been the

dominant

situation in the West, but

fragment for
is

a

now

the equation of beauty

wide range of reasons. This

not the main focus of

increasingly central

this present study,

among

aesthetic experience.

is

and

art

a significant problematic,

it is

begins to

and although

important to bear in mind.

It

it

becomes

Kant's successors as they struggle to define the nature of

The complicating

factor

is

that since the classical age, the study

of beauty has belonged to metaphysics, whereas the study of artworks belonged to

other disciplines. Literature, for example, belonged to rhetoric.

It is

the bringing

together of two different types of studies which leads to the complex
aesthetics.

Untangling the complicated interrelation between

proves to be a daunting
factors that

task.

have contributed

aesthetic theory, so as to give

Nevertheless,
to

I

new

aesthetics,

shall try to point out

field of

beauty and

some

of the salient

and influenced the interwoven tangle known

my

focus

on Kantian and post-Kantian

art

as

aesthetics a frame

of reference.

Theories of beauty cover a wide
refer to external or internal qualities, to

well as an aesthetic sense.

From

field of possible

man-made

subject matter. Beauty can

or natural objects, to an ethical as

the age of classical Greece through the Renaissance,

und
^atarkiewicz, Wlayslaw, "Asthetik," Europaische Enzvklopad ie zu Philosophic
Verlag, 1990),
Wissenschaft, Hg. von Hans-Jorg Sandkiihler, (Hamburg: Feliz Meiner
p.53.

9

the theories of beauty in Europe reflect a generally accepted view, called by

Tatarkiewicz the Great Theory of European aesthetics. 3

He

claims that:

...there have been few theories in any branch of European culture
which have
endured so long or commanded such widespread recognition, and few which

cover the diverse phenomena of beauty so comprehensively.

The essence

of the theory relies

on the assumption

proportion and arrangement of the
successfully covers almost

century,

when

"...the

all

parts..."

4

it

lost its

Great Theory was

dominant

finally

means

giving radical impetus to the

for the shift

new

is

not to say

means undergoes

it

disappeared,

a radical

which moves the emphasis from

from objective

aesthetics

to the subject, nevertheless maintains that

is

This

shift takes place

measure beauty. Shaftesbury (more

creating genius

5

Aspects

of beauty remain integral to aesthetic theory, but the view

no longer paramount,
to

art."

of beauty to the subjective nature of aesthetic experience.

harmonious view

itself is

ousted by the combined pressure of

the aesthetic experience

transformation in the 18th century: a

of the

of beauty

status.

What beauty and

an objective theory

The proportion theory

in.. .the

interpretations of the nature of beauty until the 18th

empirical philosophy and romantic trends in

but

that "...beauty consists

of

by

it is

whom

to subjective precludes the

later), for

example, while

shifting the locus of the

symmetry

in nature to

phenomenon

which the

responding. Gradually, however, the psychological reactions of the

viewer and the subjective response of the cognitive

faculties

come

to supplant

an

Tatarkiewicz, "The Great Theory of Beauty and its Decline,"
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXXI,2 (1972), pp. 165-180 (in future as JAAC).
1 rely substantially on the main thesis of this article.

^ee Wladyslaw

4

Both quotes from Tatarkiewicz,

tatarkiewicz, p.169.

p.167.

10

objective presentation of beauty. Rather than a general theory of beauty,
at the most

there

is

now

a general theory about

how

beauty

is

experienced:

Hitherto the central task had been to ascertain what properties in the object
determine beauty; now it became a search for certain properties in the mind of
the subject. And whereas classical theory had attributed the ability to discern

beauty to the reason (if not simply to the sight or the hearing), eighteenthcentury writers attributed it to die imagination..., to taste..., or, alternatively,
postulated a special and distinct "sense of beauty." And the new conceptsimagination, taste, and sense of beauty-were hostile to the rationalism of the

Great Theory. 6
Nevertheless, the founders of the Great Theory, in particular Plato and Aristotle,

had

a strong influence

on the

theoreticians of the 18th

and 19th century. In order

see both the continuity as well as the break, a brief review of their contribution

order before

I

examine the more

C.

1.

The influence

A

of classical aesthetics

certain issues or categories in

short

in

brief history of aesthetics

different focus than the aesthetic theories of the 18th

list

madman,

is

to

direct precursors of Kant.

Despite the fact that Platonic and Aristotelian theories about

A

still

works

would include

of art that are

and 19th

still

art

have

a

centuries, they identify

salient:

Plato's conceptions of the artist as the inspired

of art as a dangerous pastime, of artefacts as imitations of real things;

Aristotle's conceptions of the poet as a

maker, of an

art

work

as structured

analogously to a living organism, of the capacity of great art to

understanding of life.
ways we think about

Many
art,

deepen our

have become absorbed into the
no longer necessary to label them as

of these notions

so that

it is

specifically Platonic or Aristotelian ideas.

7

^atarkiewicz, p.175

Eva Schaper, Prelude to Aesthetics (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1968)
to problems of aesthetics
pp. 13-14. This book provides an extremely lucid introduction
not only in their Platonic and Aristotelian form, but also to how these problems
7

resurface in the late 18th century.
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Although Plato

is

his struggle to define

The
granted,

was

known

perhaps best

what

distinction

art

brings to light

is

between

art

some

generally acquired by

repetition of poetry

and

means

of a social heritage

stories, the difference

In

artists,

8

operative.

still

and knowledge, which we perhaps take

for

an age when knowledge

handed down through constant

between general ideas (which could be

and analyzed, which were philosophically manageable, so

clarified

and

art

basic assumptions

an important one which Plato adumbrated.

is

towards

for his hostile attitude

to speak)

and poetic

response was extremely murky. In order to achieve a clear level of discourse about the
nature of thinking or proper behavior, a distinct

what one could know and what
each

is

defined,

and how the

is

line

needed

outside that realm. Art

distinction

between the two

problems. Without considering these problems in any
recognition that there

is

such a distinction

is

to

not knowledge, but

is

is

be drawn between

drawn,

detail,

how

raises a host of

we can

say that the

an important contribution

to the

organization of our thought processes. The strong condemnation of the role of the
artist in

the Republic rests

distinction

is

denied.

How

on an assumption about what happens when
this critical distinction could

Schaper suggests, because Plato's

doubt on the very

earlier

examinations of

possibility of the distinction

satisfactorily to distinguish art

be affirmed

it

not explored,

in the Ion led

he considered

from knowledge

is

this

essential".

9

him

to "...cast

His inability

led Plato to suppress art as subversive

and untrue.

The rock upon which
founders

is

a positive Platonic interpretation of artists

that of mimesis, of imitation.

Plato's theory of

8

See especially the Republic Books 6 and

9

Schaper, p.21.

10.

and artworks

Forms regards

all

things in

12

the world as copies of an ideal,

all

things, that

degree imitations, copies of copies. Because an
imitation

is

solely for

its

own

sake and

it

by

down

this

Schaper notes that

art

work has no

cannot have

characteristics are regarded negatively

to posterity.

except artworks,

is,

own

are second

real function, the

Form. 10 These

whose condemnation

Plato,

is

its

which

of art

is

passed

unfortunate because:

own unfavourable conclusions, his insistence that art has no
proper function, that it is useless, and, when mishandled, positively harmful,
should be seen as one of the most powerful statements in the history of
aesthetics. It has provided the momentum for thought about art as play, art as
pure presentation, art without purpose and yet important, art as giving rise to
pure enjoyment, and art as peculiarly recalcitrant to systematic analysis. 11
...despite Plato's

These

qualities

Kant sees as

on which

Plato placed negative worth are precisely the ones

positive, as providing the

which

unique function which enables artworks

to

bridge the gap between nature and freedom. Plato decided against art because he

measured

art

by the standard

of

knowledge and found

found a positive interpretation

for mimetic art, in particular, poetry.

by Plato and negatively judged by him

Aristotle; they

them

are

"...the

nature of

artistic creation,

and

will

be seen

attributes

central issues

are interpreted quite differently

the structure of the

art."

tremendous influence on the development

As

The

continue to occupy an important position in aesthetic study.

character of the impact of and reaction to

10

inadequate.

while accepting in principle the major distinctions made by Plato,

Aristotle,

raised

it

it

later,

12

work

Aristotle's Poetics,

of aesthetic

Schopenhauer discusses

and

of art,

by

Among
and the

which has had

critical principles in

Plato's rejection of art at length,

to Plato's failure to recognize that the

work

of art mirrors the Idea,

not the specific object.
1

Schaper,

12

Schaper,

notes are

full

p.54.

p.57.

The
For a more detailed background, consult Schaper's book.

of information

a

and further bibliographical

references.

13

Western thought, addresses these

issues,

but from a fundamentally different

perspective, for:

...Aristotle

redefined the distinction between art and knowledge, drastically
meaning of 'mimetic/ and supplied a different conceptual

re-

interpreted the

framework

for his findings about the emotional effects of art. 13

approach

Aristotle's

to the world, including art,

is

an organic one, whereas Plato

sharply divides the physical world from the real world of Forms, an understanding of

which one can

attain only

through pure contemplation. Because

not have, for Plato, an analogue in the world of Forms,

any form

of truth

and

consigned

is

While he agrees that

this division.

to the irrational.

artistic

creation

14

is

it is

a

work

of art does

incapable of presenting

Aristotle does not maintain

very different from discursive

reasoning, this only shows that the types of knowledge which result from the two

One

activities are dissimilar.

is

practical

be rationally investigated. After

which

is

What

is

is

the

way

ultimately took the stand that art
qualities.

The

is

artist

is

in

theoretical,

work and not

but both can

the artistic process

central not only to Plato's

but to aesthetic theory for

disputed

is

available for rational analysis.

is

of mimesis, or imitation,

Aristotle's theory of art

mimetic

the finished

being investigated, and the work

The concept

years.

all, it is

whereas the other

which

at least the

this imitation is

and

next two thousand

understood. Plato

dangerous and damaging, primarily because of

copies something that

is

already a copy, producing

13

Schaper, p.58.

14

Plato's

condemnation of

art requires a

much more

extended discussion. Of

on myth-is the
particular interest to me~especially in light of Schelling's emphasis
in the
steeped
certainly
was
denigration of the irrational in art. Plato
apparent

religion/mythology of his day, which appears to

call

on some

sort of non-rational

not? This
that acceptable, whereas art, in particular poetry, was
scope of the present work.
fascinating topic unfortunately cannot be treated in the

power.

Why

was

its

14

something that

which

only derivatively real and not worthy of serious consideration, but

capable of manipulating

is

By

of society.
for

is

its

audience in ways potentially harmful to the good

contrast, Aristotle took imitation to be the heart of artistic endeavour,

provided the link of relevance between

it

imitates

is

art

life:

nature's productive activity." 15 The imitation

creation of something new. Since everything
find

and

no proper or unique method;

representation.

By

all it

contrast, only art

produce or present something as

if it

is

is

can do

not a

lifeless

mimetic for Plato,

is

copy but the

artistic

creation can

reproduce something that

mimetic for

were

is

for Aristotle, "...what art

Aristotle.

What

art

is

does

already a

is

to

real:

works alone present to us what convinces, not through likeness to what
already exists or has taken place, but because it might well be or have been.
They convince by the internal coherence with which they present a
fiction.. ..They succeed when they show something as if it had taken place, as if
...art

might be the case, as if it were real. In
copy sense, mimesis defines poiesis. 16

it

Mimesis

The

this

sense of imitation and not in the

refers not to the activity of imitating but to the character of the

Aristotelian artist

who

practices mimesis

is

a

imitates the possibilities of the world, not the world as

it is;

who

produces mimetic works has merely copied something

else.

analysis,

what

it

does do

is

is

an exceedingly cursory look

to introduce

some

of the

the Platonic artist

at the origins of aesthetic

main problems

problems with which Kant, Schelling and Schopenhauer
is

of art.

maker who produces mimetic work,

who

Although the above

work

all

of aesthetics,

struggle.

The 18th century

a turbulent time in the progression of aesthetic theory, as notions of beauty are

relativized

and

subjectivized.

15

Schaper, p.61.

16

Schaper, p.61.

Platonic and Aristotelian themes constantly resurface,

15

appearing in a remarkable array of disguises and mixtures. Some of the areas which

remain

influential in the

development of aesthetic meaning

in the 18th century,

and

thus directly affect Kant's struggle to re-interpret the nature of aesthetics, are as
follows.

Plato denies art works and artists a place in his ideal society because he cannot

kind of knowledge produced or revealed by works of

justify the

art.

In doing so, Plato

lays the foundation for the long struggle over the nature of the relation

cognitive and aesthetic knowledge which
theories.

Platonic

The
and

relation

a cardinal feature of later aesthetic

between imitation and creation

Aristotelian thought.

The Platonic idea

structure, a world of enduring perfection

influential

is

up through Kant, who

between

and one

is

another central feature of

that there

is

a dualistic world

of physical appearance,

divides his world into a

is

extremely

noumenal and phenomenal

realm. Both Schelling and Schopenhauer respond specifically to the Kantian division
of a

noumenal and phenomenal

world,,

and Schopenhauer draws

directly

on the

Platonic world of Ideas to support his theory.

The emotional
mentioned,

is

an area

reaction of the spectator,

which here has been hardly

that develops in importance in the 17th

and 18th centuries

as the

psychological and subjective reactions of the viewer become increasingly prominent in
the search for the meaning of an aesthetic object or an aesthetic experience. The

strength of this reaction, and the power which those
contributes greatly to Plato's determination that

the moral
that a

component which

work

of the art

is

of art can induce

work

who

artists are

attached to works of

can provoke
dangerous.

it

hold,

It

underlines

art, for it is clear, to

Plato at least,

bad or undesirable behavior. The Platonic interpretation

underscores
as not being necessarily useful or morally uplifting

two

16

aspects of

works

of art

which remain problematic. Kant succeeds

the artwork free from the requirements of

utility

and

didactic intent, but

unable or unwilling to eliminate completely the moral aspect of
Aristotle,

creative

by

making

of the artist unveils

means

to

understand what

to

be a maker of such things.
is

prominent

art,

as

even Kant

we

is

will see.

contrast, interprets the reaction of the spectator as confirming that the

some land

it

to

It

is

what

life

by revealing the

is intelligible,

what allows us

be that kind of thing, and by extension, what
gives us insight into ourselves.

an organic whole and the
in

meaning about

of

form of the work under consideration. The form

artwork

partially in cutting

relation

means

it

Both the idea that the

between form and content become

both neo-classical thought and the Romantic Movement. Neo-Platonism

and the rediscovery

of Aristotle in the

West bring these ancient

ideas to

again,

life

and

they form a complicated interference pattern on the surface of 18th century aesthetic
thought, making

it

difficult to see clearly the original

presence.

nevertheless attesting to

its

interest in aesthetics are

still

The

issues

source of the motion but

which occupy Plato and

lively in the late 17th

Aristotle's

and 18th centuries, and

consideration of the mainstreams of aesthetic theorizing in that age which

it is

to the

we now

turn.

2.

Neo-classical aesthetics (17th century France)

The most

direct influence

on Kant's thoughts on

Critique of judgement are the different views

Europe

in the 17th

nevertheless,

Kant, for he

1

and 18th

centuries.

shall generalize

skillfully

on

aesthetics as put forth in the

aesthetic questions

All generalizations

about the French,

weaves together the

British

propounded

in

have exceptions;

and German influences on

different strands to present a

new and

17
distinct theory of aesthetics.

the British and

Germans

French neo-classicism provides the material against which

react.

It

follows in the rational tradition of Tatarkiewicz's

Great Theory of perfect and proportional arrangement, and therefore does not provide
too

much

insight into

how

the turbulence in 18th century thought arose. Although

neo-classicism represents theories of beauty that are no longer considered acceptable or
of interest.the overcoming of this approach poses a challenge

The

British reaction against the neo-classical tradition

is

which needs

to

be met.

two-fold: intuitionism, as

presented by Shaftesbury; and empiricism, represented here by David Hume. These

Hume

movements had numerous other proponents

as well, but Shaftesbury

appear to have had the most

on Kant. The German emphasis on

direct influence

rational systematic philosophy

held in high esteem.

more

I

direct influences

is

by

aesthetic theory.

and

left a

Although he did not put forth an

distinct ideas, rigorous

all

hope

aesthetic theory,

deduction of concepts and the intuitive

influenced the neo-classical tradition of

This approach generally maintained that
classical writers, in particular Aristotle.

of Cartesian rationalism gave impetus

...the

Kant

powerful legacy for the humanities in general, not

his basic principles

models provided by

whom

on Kant.

just for epistemological thought.

certainty held

epitomized by the views of Baumgarten,

begin with a review of neo-classicism, and then turn to the

Descartes (1596-1650)

his search for clear

and

artists

should follow the

In addition, the influence

to:

that these rules could be given a

more

solid, a priori,

foundation by

deduction from a basic self-evident axiom, such as the principle that art is
the
imitation of nature— where nature comprised the universal, the normal,
essential, the characteristic, the ideal.

17

Monroe

17

C. Beardsley, "History of Aesthetics" in EP, vol 1-2, pp.24-5.
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Truth, beauty, reason and nature are but different expressions of the same thing,
of an
inviolate order of being revealed

immersing herself in the laws
understanding of

The

how

the parts are

strictly

function of the

science.

to art reflects a mechanistic

like a large clock

and no

Only

after

an

world view, in which

piece of the machinery

is

independent;

all

regulated by an exact and unchanging set of rules. 18 The

uncover these

conveys knowledge and should be used

Aristotelian

and natural

of nature can the artist begin to create, for without

approach

artist is to

understanding of

art

nature works, she cannot imitate the truth found there.

neo-classical

everything operates

through

art

is

imbued with

and Platonic

rules, for

it is

assumed

for didactic purposes.

a strong

that the

work

of art

This mimetic

moral component and

is

a mixture of

strains of thought:

This time-honoured

maxim

of neo-classical art theory

was

generally associated

with an imitative view of art which differed considerably from Aristotle's
interpretation of artistic mimesis. His theory had been mainly flattened out
into a theory of art as skilled reflection of nature in its general or universal
aspects, and of human nature in so far as this could be formulated in terms of
the typical. Furthermore, the view that art is the imitation of human nature for
instruction and delight placed a strong emphasis on the morally worth while
and even ideal aspects of that which was thought to be imitated. It could thus
maintain that art was capable of imparting a kind of knowledge which might
otherwise be missed. In addition, one of the Platonic senses of 'imitation' had

18

Heinrich von Stein describes

"Eine litterarische

und

this process poetically:

urspriinglich rein sprachliche Tendenz, die Richtung auf das

Tendenz des philosophischen Denkens, die auf feste prinzipielle
Normen dringende Vemunft: diese vereinigen sich, wie zwei gleich gerichtete
Wasserlaufe zu einem schiffbaren Flusse zusammenstromen. Diese Form der
Intelligenz, welche das denkende und schreibende Frankreich, als eine Erbschaft des
grossen Zeitalters, fur seine femeren Aufgaben mitbringt, nennen wir (nach Taine) den
Korrekte;

und

eine

klassischen Geist."

See Die Entstehung der neueren Asthetik (Stuttgart: Verlag der Cotta'schen
Buchhandlung, 1886) p.55. The chapter on "Der klassische Geist" gives both a good
introduction to this period and illuminates the relation between French and German

ways

of thinking.

19

strongly reasserted

itself: art

works were thought
and readers. 19

to appeal to the imitative

capacities of audiences, spectators,

The

circle is established that

good

art imitates that

which

is

turn imitate that which art teaches us. The function of art

morally good, and
is

to provide a

we

in

moral guide

for the spectator.

Most works
something which
Consequently,

of art of the neo-classical tradition imply

an underlying order,

imposed on the world and which

human

is

it is

assumed

that the

work

is

not

of art itself will

individual, subjective elements of the artist's personality.

creation the artistic impulse

completed

is,

have no traces of the

of course, subject-driven, but once the

is

imagination, but by a purely objective law, a law which the

must discover

in the nature of things.

powers of observation required by
Neither the

artist

The

nor the natural

work

is

not governed by the
artist

neo-classical genius

this strictly regulated

20

During the process of

possesses perfection and objective truth. Art

it

in origin.

is

does not invent but

marked by the keen

scheme:

scientist creates order;

they merely ascertain

To be bound to these existing forms and to be obliged, as it were, to
follow their laws, is no obstacle for genius; for it is only in this way that genius
is protected against arbitrariness and enabled to attain the only possible form of

what

"is."

artistic

freedom.

Neo-classical aesthetics

all

one has

19

to

Schaper,

do

is

21

fulfills

know

the role of being a corollary to true beauty and to truth;

the rules, and everything

falls

into place.

p. 121.

detailed overview, see Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the
Enlightenment, trans. Koelln and Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
approach include: Nicolas Boileau1951), pp. 275-297. Examples of the neo-classical
L'Art pogtique (1674); Alexander Pope, Essay on Criticism (1711); Jean

^or

a

more

Despr^aux,

Traits de l'harmonie rgduite a ses principes naturels (1722);
Charles Batteux, Tes Beaux Arts rlduits a un meme principe (1746).

Philippe

21

Rameau,

Cassirer, p. 290.

and Abb£

20

The

strict,

mechanistic neo-classical tradition comes under increasing criticism

during the progression of the 18th century.

It is

finally

superseded, as a result of

Kant's synthesis of the ever harsher attacks against the rigidity of the neo-classical
structure,

by

a

more organic view

of the nature of aesthetics. Three

main

alternative

interpretations of the nature of beauty or of aesthetics help bring about this demise,

two from Great
two
the

Britain

and the other from Germany. The

more

rival theories, is the

more

significant of the two, although

systematic formalism of the

now

3.

substantially serious

Kant

German approach.

British challenge, reflecting

one and

skillfully

It is

in this respect ultimately

weaves

it

together with the

the British contribution

which

I

examine.

British aesthetic

Two

thought

parallel

in the 18th century

movements

in British

thought influence the course of aesthetic

theory: the proponents of the 'inner sense' school and the empiricists. The

movements begin with

different

emphases and slowly

start to exert a reciprocal

authority on each other as the question of taste gains prominence.

an aesthetic

relativism,

some standard

of

If

one

is

measure must be found by which

the beauty of an object. The standard of taste, which

initially is

to avoid

to

gauge

understood as a moral

force, takes the place of the proportion theory of beauty,

whose standard was based on

the precise, strictly regulated arrangements of the parts.

I

begin with a review of

Shaftesbury and his doctrine of inner sense. Then, although the early empiricists

(Bacon (1561-1626) and Locke (1632-1704)) were predecessors or contemporaries of
Shaftesbury (1671-1713),

had

1

consider the later empiricist, David

a significant influence

on Kant

Hume

(1724-1804), and, additionally,

(1711-1776).

Hume

s

Hume

aesthetic

21

theory
174 7). 22

strongly influenced by Shaftesbury's successor Francis Hutcheson
(1694-

is

What

I

try to

show

and yet presents important
removing
a

taste,

huge advance

and

is

how Hume

differences,

takes from Shaftesbury (and Hutcheson)

which Kant

aesthetics in general,

in turn further develops

from the moral realm. Although Kant made

in the creation of an independent field of aesthetics, in the

unable to

resist

changing

role of the imagination

by

end he

is

the moral imperative and subordinates aesthetics to moral law. The
is

as important as the struggle to re-interpret taste.

This contribution comes primarily from the empiricists.

a.

Shaftesbury and the intuitionists

Shaftesbury,

is

credited with having

had

.

Anthony Ashley Cooper,

a great influence

on the development

aesthetics, in particular because of the notion of 'disinterestedness/

its

the third Earl of

which

first

of

makes

appearance in his writings. 23 Shaftesbury was certainly familiar with the

empiricist debates current at the time, for Locke himself

^ee

was

in charge of Shaftesbury's

William H. Halberstadt, "A Problem in Hume's Aesthetics," JAAC, XXX, 2,
and Carolyn W. Korsmeyer, "Hume and the Foundations of Taste,"

(1971), pp. 209-14;

JAAC, XXXV, 1

Hutcheson's influence on Hume. In the interest
of time and space, I do not concentrate on Hutcheson; although he refined
Shaftesbury's ideas, the latter still remains the source.
(1976), pp.201-15, for

Shaftesbury is credited by Jerome Stolnitz, among others, with introducing the
concept of 'disinterestedness.' See: J. Stolnitz, "On the Significance of Lord
Shaftesbury in Modem Aesthetic Theory," The Philosophical Quarterly 11,43 (April,
1961, 97-113; "On the Origins of 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness/" JAAC, XX,2 (1961), 131-

Some

Stages in the History of an Idea," Journal of the History of Ideas
XXII,2 (April-June, 1961), 185-204. While agreeing that Stolnitz offers a strong
contribution to the understanding of Shaftesbury, the following articles argue that

43;

"Beauty:

Stolnitz has exaggerated Shaftesbury's contributions

and has used them

in a

misleading fashion to further his own claims about the origins of modem aesthetics:
Dabney Townsend, "Shaftesbury's Aesthetic Theory," JAAC, XL1,2 (1983), 205-213;
David A. White, "The Metaphysics of Disinterestedness: Shaftesbury and Kant," JAAC,
XXXII, 2 (1973) 239-248.

I

try to thread a

middle course.

22

education,

24

but he was more interested in the question of morality and metaphysics.

Shaftesbury maintains that morality

is

independent of religion and that

are naturally virtuous; without the control of religion

Hobbesian war of
sense that

is

against

all

all

will ensue.

a guide to virtuous action.

it is

his writings

is

endowed with

a moral

on morality comes the

that in aesthetic considerations, one can respond positively with a feeling that
disinterested, although, of course,

interest.

25

While

this is

of 'disinterestedness'

from

is

one can

also

beings

not the case that a

Each individual

From

human

idea

is

respond with an appropriate

not the main focus of Shaftesbury's writings, the introduction
a

first

attempt to isolate what

will

become the

field of aesthetics

traditional notions of beauty.

In

many ways,

metaphysical view

is

Shaftesbury remains firmly rooted in

Platonic in

its

superstructure, with the

classical tradition.

mind superior

His

to

inanimate objects and Mind superior to individual minds:
ourselves are notable architects in matter, and can show lifeless bodies
brought into form, and fashioned by our own hands, but that which fashions

For

we

even minds themselves, contains in itself all the beauties fashioned by those
minds, and is consequently the principle, source, and fountain of all
beauty.

The

26

relationship

enough

between the Good and Beauty

to yield there

is

no

real

also basic to his position:

good beside the enjoyment

^See Elmar Sprague, "Shaftesbury, Third

Townsend's

is

Earl

opinion on the importance of

of

this

of beauty.

"I

And

I

am

ready

am

as

in EP, Vol. 7-8, pp.428-430.

concept for Shaftesbury

is,

that

way of
despite Stolnitz's "...sympathetic and often perceptive reading...it is
after him," (p.
assimilating [Shaftesbury's] writings to the thought of those who come
I follow Stolnitz's
however,
general,
In
Hutcheson.
205) viz. Burke, Addison, Alison,
essentially a

lead.

ed.

^Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Op inions, Jimgi,
Philosophical Rhapsody,
John M. Robertson (Indianapolis, 1964), "The Moralist, A

Vol.

II,

pp. 132-33.

All italics omitted.
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ready. ..to yield there

is

no

real

enjoyment beside what

is

good."

not consider aesthetics from the point of view of the work of
the answer to a question about character:

fashions the inward personal world?

and

truth,

and understands truth

He

what

is

27

Shaftesbury does

but rather as part of

art,

the nature of the law which

maintains an equivalence between beauty

as signifying the inner intellectual structure of the

universe. This can only be immediately experienced and intuitively understood by

means

of a disinterested internal sense.

or inductive experience.

can grasp

this

known

cannot be

It

The phenomenon

of the beautiful

solely

the

is

through concepts

means by which one

inner structure, and the discovery of this creative source allows for the

synthesis between subject and object, the

self

and the world, the human individual

and God.
Intuitive

understanding

is

considered by Shaftesbury to be superior to both

reason and experience, for only through
rather than the other
to

human

it

One

an emotional

the depths of the aesthetic world

feeling,

In order for

effect,

is

whereas the

form

pure

activity of the soul.

its

to

to the parts

made

emotional

accessible

effect

be understood

it

but

must

and thus distinguished from

intuit

intuition arises only

in

lie

object of aesthetic consideration

can sense the beautiful, and one can

passive but which

and

is

reveals the realm of form.

made an independent

its effect.

around,

by moving from the whole

comprehension. The value of beauty does not

in the fact that

be

way

it,

The sensation

it.

from

results in

a contemplation that

is

not

This distinction between mere sensation

between emotional response and pure

intuition,

is

the foundation of the

of
doctrine of aesthetic disinterestedness which will fundamentally change the nature

aesthetic theory, especially after

^Shaftesbury, "The

Kant reworks and

Moralist...," p.141

finishes

it.

Although

it is

left to

24

Shaftesbury's followers to elaborate

on

this doctrine

and

consequences, he can be

its

appropriately credited with providing the idea.

A

closer look at the concepts of 'taste'

and

which play such an

'interest/

important role in 18th century aesthetics, can help show Shaftesbury's pathbreaking
contribution to the change their respective meanings undergo. Until Kant gave

new

definition, taste

was considered

Shaftesbury' s reading of
for

Kant

virtue

it is

lie

comments

no

it

exception.

can also mislead

in the moral;

good

taste

a

be an element of moral education;

the basis of judgment) and

and beauty

aesthetic,

it is

to

it

us.

is

28

Taste

open

The

is

formed by judgment (whereas

to dispute.

While

it

can lead us

to

roots of taste, like everything else

must be learned and

controlled.

Townsend

that:

While taste remains more firmly tied to moral and aesthetic values and
judgments than in later theories, Shaftesbury has broken decisively with the
neo-Platonic tendency to remove beauty from contact with real emotions and
judgments. Real art-not the heightened artificialities of Renaissance neoPlatonism-is the object of good taste and thus of the moral man. And art itself,

and not

its rejection.. .is

a

proper subject for character.

29

Like taste, disinterestedness also refers to a moral (and thus aesthetic) sense. In

opposition to 'interest/ which can have the connotation of the private and self-serving,
'disinterest

that:

"A

7

is

man

more
is

a public sense

'disinterested'

and connotes

a selfless truth-seeking.

now, when he takes no thought

for

Stolnitz notes

any consequences

background on the history of taste see: Girgio Tonelli, "Taste in the History
253-357; and F.
of Aesthetics from the Renaissance to 1770," in PHI, vol. IV, pp.
Gadamer also
addition,
In
Schiimmer, "Geschmack," in HWP, Band 3, pp. 444^56.
by G. Barden and J.
gives a brief background in Truth and Method, translation edited
Cumming, New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1985, pp.33-39.

^For

a

Townsend,

pp.210-11.

25

whatsoever."

30

Townsend suggests

the term 'disinterested'

is "...the

that a primary motive for Shaftesbury in coining

refutation of Hobbes' claims that

all

actions are

interested in the sense of egoistic." 31

In general, though, Shaftesbury

is

more concerned with

'interest,'

precisely with true interest, with the important caveat that interest

our passions. What concerns him more than both
is

interest

and

more

separated from

is

disinterest

is

that there

a proper moral order:

We

are thus brought back to Shaftesbury's passion for a kind of moral order
self can discover for itself. Far from disinterestedness or taste being
the basis for such an order, they are only possible according to Shaftesbury as a
result of it. Art, soliloquy, self-expression, and the test of public criticism and

which the

experience are the only ways that this order can be discovered... 32

The

neo-classical

comes through

view of beauty

is

closely

quite clearly in most of

Likewise, disinterestedness

is

what Shaftesbury has

it

work where

aspects,

and

on the

to say

this

topic.

almost always presented with moral or religious virtues,

with moral character or geometric proof.
late

bound up with moral

aesthetic perception

is

Stolnitz,

not tied to

refers to scenes in nature, specifically a

however, can
all

cite

one passage

in a

the traditional baggage. Instead,

view of the beauty

of the ocean.

Stolnitz

states:

What

is

new

in the passage

is

that Shaftesbury opposes disinterestedness to the

desire to possess or use the object. This

way

of putting

it is

widely adopted in
may therefore be

thought and in modem aesthetics generally. It
worth pointing out that disregard for possession or use is only an inference
from or a specification of the broader proposition that the aesthetic spectator

later British

^Stolnitz,
31

"On

Townsend.,

32

Townsend,

the Origins of 'Aesthetic Disinterestedness," p.133.

p.211.

p.212.
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does not relate the object to any purposes that outrun the
itself.

Although

it

act of perception

33

seems

clear that Shaftesbury's successors did indeed play a

much

larger

role in disseminating the idea of disinterestedness, especially with regard to pure

aesthetic experience, his pioneering use of the term

thinking about aesthetics and

opened the gates

to a

new way

of

art.

Shaftesbury also makes a novel contribution in the concept of the genius.
Historically, 'genius' referred primarily to

It

was only

what we might

call

today a special

in the 18th century that the irrational aspect of genius

Tonelli notes that for Shaftesbury,

nature does: and nature

is

"...a

genius

is

a person

who

a revelation of the universal spirit.

is

was

talent.

34

stressed.

able to create as

Therefore a genius

is

considered as a second deity, or as a Prometheus." 35 Shaftesbury required that the

genius respect the rules of

art

and the requirements

What

simply be an uncontrolled, irrational person.
is

the shift

away from genius

of

is

good sense; the genius cannot

novel in Shaftesbury's approach

as a purely intellectual quality to

an

intuitive one.

Shaftesbury's vision of the genius as one capable of the intuitive understanding
of the organic unity of nature lets

artist,

33

in contrast to the form

Stolnitz,

"On

him promulgate

which

tried to

a

new form

of imitation for the

copy the surface appearance of things and

the Origins...," p.134.

^For a history of the concept of genius, see Giorgio Tonelli's articles: "Genie" in
HWP, Band III pp. 279-308; and "Genius from the Renaissance to 1770" in PHI, Vol.

II,

Rudolf Wittkower, "Genius: Individualism in Art and
quote from the latter article: "...[Ojne must be careful not to
confuse talent with genius. The qualities with which the term "genius" has been
invested ever since the mid-eighteenth century, such as spontaneity, outstanding
ingenium and the
originality, and exceptional creativity were not implied in the Latin

pp. 293-297. Also in
Vol. II, pp. 297-312.

Italian

PHI

Artists,"

:

I

ingegno, meaning natural disposition,

tonelli, "Genius..., "in PHI,

vol.

II,

p. 294.

i.e.

talent" (p. 305).
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which was censured by

Plato as disenfranchising art in the philosophical sense.

Cassirer explains that for Shaftesbury:

Art

is not imitation in the sense that it is content with the surface of things and
with their mere appearance, and that it attempts to copy these aspects as
faithfully as possible. Artistic "imitation" belongs to another sphere and, so to
speak, to another dimension; it imitates not merely the product, but the act of
producing, not that which has become, but the process of becoming. 36

The

characteristic of the genius lies in the ability to

The

role of the genius

it is

precisely the fact that the process

assumes

as the key to aesthetic value.

removed from
a

earlier

immerse oneself

a central position in Shaftesbury's aesthetic theory, for

To

is

hidden and must be

is

intuitive

which he views

praise the genius for her intuitive capability

reserved for the creative forces. The

rise of

intellect.

far

After Shaftesbury,

the so-called cult of the genius

strongly influences both the nature of the basic problems in 18th century
intellectual history,

is

views of genius. These tended to regard the quality of genius on

par with reason, and as limited to the realm of the pure

genius

in this process.

and the founders

of aesthetics as a field in

Additionally, the cult of genius has a tremendous impact

its

own

German

right.

on what becomes the

Romantic Movement.

The
it

relationship

between beauty and truth

is

not, for Shaftesbury, a causal one;

involves the essence of nature and art and not the temporal creations. Although in

his view, art

is strictly

confined to nature, this does not

limited to copying the world of empirical objects.

the creative

power from which

creation of the genuine

artist,

mean

that for him, art

is

Rather, the deeper sense of nature

is

the form and order of the universe are derived. The

the genius,

is

thus not merely a product of his subjective

genius
imagination but an expression of an inner necessity and law. The form which

^Cassirer, p.317.
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produces

is

the law of nature, with which

nature and truth within

and

itself,

it is

as long as

in complete

it

harmony. Genius contains

remains true to

itself will

always be in

contact with them. Shaftesbury thus maintains a principle of subjectivity in aesthetics
in contrast to the imitation of nature

of

what

a subject

also differs

is,

bundle of perceptions, a subject

demanded by

from that of the
is,

the classical school.

empiricists.

His conception

Rather than being a

according to him, an indivisible unity which gives

us immediate insight into the fundamental form of the cosmos. 37

Both the 'inner-sense' school and the

empiricists

approached aesthetic questions

from the point of view of the subject rather than the composition
just stated, they

do not share the same idea

empirical subject

is

not something that

of

tries to

what

psychology of

art

which she

is

and the emotional appeal

tries to

37

new and

exalted role.

art

it

reveals.

understand

has for the viewer

how

is

a

which the power

in

her mind

form of

this

of the

38

Kant was well aware of Shaftesbury's contribution

the truth

The

apprehending. The interest in the

practical consideration of the nature of the world, in

imagination plays a

constitutes a subject.

apprehend the unity of the cosmos

the world around her, but rather something that
creates the objects in the world

of the object, but as

to the concept of genius

and

Cassirer notes:

Shaftesbury's conception of truth implies this "nature in the subject" rather
than the mere objectivity of facts and things, and makes it the norm of beauty.

Kant in his Critique of Judgment defines genius as that talent (natural
which gives to art its rule, he follows his own path in his transcendental

When
gift)

exposition of this proposition; but with respect to content alone Kant's
definition is in complete agreement with Shaftesbury and the principles and

presuppositions of the latter's "intuitional aesthetics."
Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p. 327.
38

Among

those

who

discuss the imagination and the association of ideas see.

John Locke, Essay Concerning Hum an
Understanding (4th ed., 1700); David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40);
David Hartley, Observations on Man (1749).

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan

(1651);

29
b.

Hume

and the

empiricists

playing a role in

artistic creation,

from knowledge

claims.

.

but

The imagination had long been recognized
it

had been considered an

Francis Bacon, in

Advancement

inferior faculty,

Learning

of

memory and

the association of ideas

is

reason.

Initially,

remote

(1605), accelerated

the acknowledgment of the increasing powers of imagination by placing

the faculties of

as

it

alongside

the ability of imagination to bring about

regarded as a negative, almost pathological, tendency that

only leads to confusion. Certainly the Rationalists, led by Descartes, had no interest in
imagination. However, the unique ability to associate ideas gradually overcame the

deep

distrust, directed against the imagination,

century.

Whereas Hobbes and Locke

role for the imagination,

memory

of the

are

although

much more

in the 17th

discerns a powerful

same time repeatedly noting

and strong than those

Despite the more vibrant quality of memory,
faculty

Hume

exhibit this distrust,

at the

lively

which was prevalent

Hume

which guarantees the empirical evidence

that

ideas

"...the

of the imagination..."

39

considers the imagination as that

of causal synthesis:

evident that the belief arises not merely from the transference of past to
future, but from some operation of the fancy conjoin'd with it. This may lead
us to conceive the manner, in which that faculty enters into all our
../tis

•

reasonings.

40

For a short introduction, see "Imagination" in EP, vol.3-4, pp. 136-8. For a
lengthy analysis of the concept, see Richard Kearney, The Wake of Imagination
.

(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, vol.l,
Philosophical Works, ed. T.H. Green & T.H. Grose, vol
39

(reprint of the
40

Hume, A

new

edition

London

Treatise..., p. 437.

in:
1,

David Hume: The

Sdentia Verlag Aalen, 1964

1886), p.317.

For Hume's discussion on imagination, which he uses

interchangeably with fancy, and memory, see Book
especially sections 5-13 (pp.385-450); Part

4,

I,

Part

1,

section

section 2 (pp. 487-8).

3;

Part

3,
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Through the independence

memory

together in

to

of the imagination, individual experiences can be brought

form a coherent

picture, so that not only the

appearance of

causal connection but also the apparent continuity between the past and the future

can be maintained. Because of the

inaccessibility of the

mechanism

of this process for

consciousness, the imagination appears to possess objective validity, even though
origin

subjective.

is

making

Kant

in turn gives the imagination a

essential both to cognitive

it

knowledge and,

its

prominent position by

in a slightly different form, to

aesthetic knowledge.

This increasing prominence given to the imagination reveals the turn towards
the

human

things

is

subject as the source of knowledge.

no longer the lawgiver

being has superseded

answers

to the

it.

The inherent and obvious nature

of aesthetic objectivism, for the nature of the

of

human

This tendency towards subjectivism, towards finding the

world within the

human

self,

becomes the mode by which

epistemology and psychology as well as aesthetics seek further knowledge:

The mimetic paradigm

of imagining

is

replaced by the productive paradigm.

No

longer viewed as an intermediary agency--at best imitating some truth
beyond man-imagination becomes, in modem times, the immediate source of
its own truth. Now imagination is deemed capable of inventing a world out of
its human resources, a world answerable to no power higher than itself. Or to
cite

the canonical metaphor, the imagination ceases to function as a mirror

reflecting

some

external reality

and becomes

internally generated light onto things.

The problem which now comes

to the fore

is

a

lamp which

projects

its

own

41

how

aesthetics can be prevented from

sliding into relativism, for without a rational justification imposed from without there

is

a great difficulty in claiming general agreement, let alone universality.

count on

41

is

empirical evidence,

Keamey, The Wake

how

If all

can aesthetic judgments be explained?

of Imagination, p.155.

one can

31

The concept

of taste

is

brought in

objective justification of aesthetics.
of sense shared

Taste

When

by everyone.

primarily aesthetic meaning. This

is

to cover the gulf left

is

a

troublesome notion, referring to a kind

Kant begins
a

new

by the removal of an

he gives

his discussion of taste,

a

it

approach, for taste had historically been

treated as a moral standard:

...the

idea of taste

was

originally

more

a moral than

an aesthetic

idea.

It

describes an ideal of genuine humanity and its character is due to the effort to
take a critical stand against the dogmatism of the 'school'. It was only later

was

that the use of the idea

The establishment

limited to the aesthetic.

of taste as central to aesthetic judgments

which

aesthetic theorist to set

rules the artist

appreciate; instead, aesthetics has

are reflected and in

of perception.

in

which both

which they can recognize who they

of taste,

which

The concept

is

removes the power

of the

must follow and the spectator must

become the mirror

fundamental experiences. The reaction

phenomenon

42

are based

on

to this reflection is controlled

their

by the

something that cannot be learned but

of taste preoccupies Kant,

and

will

and spectator

artist

is

like a

pure act

be examined in

that chapter, as will the imagination, which, perhaps not surprisingly,

is

detail in

closely linked

to the concept of taste.

David Hume, whose epistemological argument on the problematic nature
causal connection had done so

much

to inspire

Kant

to rethink his Critique of

Reason, was also interested in the question of the standard of
aesthetic matters,

and can perhaps

Hume, not well-known
by

for his

a subjectivist aesthetics.

42

Gadamer,

p.33.

elucidate

some

taste as

it

of the problems posed

of

Pure

related to

by

taste.

views on aesthetics, clearly reveals the problems raised

On

the one hand,

Hume

claims that beauty

is

not a

32

property of objects but signifies the pleasure that

human

beings

feel in

given

circumstances, thus pointing in the direction of a relativism based on individual
feeling:

"Beauty

is

no

quality in things themselves:

it

exists

merely in the mind which

contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty"43 and:

To seek the

real beauty, or real deformity,

is

an inquiry, as

as fruitless

to

pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter. According to the disposition
of the organs, the same object may be both sweet and bitter; and the proverb
has justly determined it to be fruitless to dispute concerning tastes... 44

On

the other hand, he definitely considered certain tastes preferable to others,

indicating a standard of

some

sort:

natural for us to seek a Standard of Taste; a rule by which the various
sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least a decision afforded confirming
one sentiment, and condemning another. 45

It is

This hedging gives

rise to the oft-cited

"...had a refractory

tendency

worn highroad

comment by Katherine

to rejoin, after a short

of seventeenth-century reason

Gilbert that

independent journey, the well-

and neoclassic

taste.”

Korsmeyer argues that despite the apparent ambiguity present
Taste,"

To be

which

Hume
sure,

as

Sugg

is

However,

in "Of the Standard of

not advocating a purely subjective,

relativistic

approach

to beauty,

notes, from:

43

vol.

46

not simply masking a return to a neo-classical interpretation of beauty.

is

he

Hume:

David Hume, Essays moral,
(London, 1882), vol. 1,266.

political

^David Hume, Of the Standard

and

of Taste

literary, ed.

T.H. Green

and Other Essays,

&

T.H. Grose, 2

ed. J.W. Lenz,

(New

York), 1965, p.6.

^Hume, Of

the Standard.. ., p.5.

1961 [first
^Katherine GUbert and Helmut Kuhn, A History of Esthetics (New York,
Sugg, Jr., "Hume's
published in 1946], p.233. See also Korsmeyer, p. 201 and Redding S.

Search for the Key with the Leathern Thong," JAAC, XVI, 1 (195 7),

p.96.
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most radical mind of the eighteenth-century British empirical school....[wle
expect a radically empirical theory subverting received aesthetic values and
prophesying some which might be recognized as Romantic or modem. 47
...the

he

Instead,

trying to uncover a standard of beauty by

is

subjective but not relative, something inherent in

When
Korsmeyer

is

one considers Hume's
convinced that Hume's

Hume's

to his

more

of taste

which

is

persons.

aesthetics in light of the rest of his philosophy,
call for a

theories of aesthetics are

appendages

all

means

all

standard of taste

is

not arbitrary:

too often regarded as interesting

solid philosophy.

In fact,

one reads his "solid" works
one sees that the
feel alike" is shorthand for
if

looking for clues as to the sources of a standard of

taste,

answer "we are all constituted similarly, so we all
Hume's complex analysis of the whole human being.

A

look at this analysis

indicates that there are actually several related sources for a standard of
taste.

48

Despite the fact that rules of art cannot be codified, an examination of the closely

interwoven
of taste

social relations

which bind together human

emerge which favor the

art that

Korsmeyer claims

is

Sugg, P-96.
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Korsmeyer,

utility

and sympathy,

a standard

these categories are fully investigated,

if

not completely articulated by

this principle of association.. ..Beauty, then,

as utility or utilitarian pleasures, but

perception of these

^Korsmeyer,

When

of aesthetic qualities,

congruent with

same thing

47

that standards

that:

Such an analysis
surely

shows

most pleases human beings. Through the

three kinds of beauty which are related to usefulness,
of disinterested taste can be uncovered.

society

p.206.

p.209.

qualities...

49

its

source,

its

is

Hume,
not the

stimulus,

is

the

34

What Hume

has done

is

to provide a basis for aesthetic taste, closely

moral theory, which, while providing a standard

on something

sort of objective rules, but

This

is

for

integral to

judgment, does not base

human

a decisive challenge to those philosophers

the foundation

upon which

century philosophers

still

use

it

as the

all

measure of

on any

it

tended to view reason as

Since reason grounds logical

knowledge

all

his

nature.

who

their various theories rested.

thought and causal inference, on which depends

modeled on

of reality,

most 18th

philosophical disciplines. Taste

is

not classified as a logical process but has the immediacy of a pure act of perception.

By giving

taste the

autonomy

to

make

decisions of aesthetic judgment, feelings

longer have to justify themselves in terms of reason. Cassirer,

who

aesthetics as providing a radical shock to traditional philosophy,
of

interprets

sums up

no

Hume's

the essence

Hume's argument:

summoned

before the forum of sensation, of pure "impression," and
questioned regarding its claims. And the verdict is that all authority which
pure reason had wielded had been unjust and unnatural, in short, had been
usurped authority. Reason not only loses its position of dominance; even in its
own field, in the domain of knowledge, it has to surrender its leadership to the
imagination. Thus reason and the imagination have now changed sides in the
controversy surrounding the foundation of aesthetics. Whereas formerly
imagination had to fight for recognition and equal rights, it is now treated as
...reason

is

the fundamental power of the soul, as the leader and ruler to

mind must submit.

faculties of the

This argument and
Taste,"

where the

its

conclusions are

relation

whom

drawn

in

between reason and

Hume's

^Cassirer, p.305.

it

must be repeated

other

feeling

is

essay, "Of the Standard of

examined. The skepticism

incurred by the rejection of eternally valid universal and necessary norms
introduced, although

all

50

that there

still

is

are standards, only they

come

35

from within and are neither imposed from without nor

in

some way mirror what

is

to

be found in nature.
Skepticism in the rational sciences

a different position in the realm of feeling.

about objects, whereas in the
a subject

and an

object.

latter,

less

it

retains

In the former, judgments contain assertions

they contain assertions about the relation between

Since value judgements are always dependent on the mutual

much

determination of two terms, they cover a

demanding

a purely destructive principle, but

is

broader,

if

less rigorous, field;

than the logical judgment, the aesthetic judgment

is

by

in the position of

being able to achieve more. Because an aesthetic judgment makes predictions only

concerning the nature of the subject,
Still, it

reason
refers,

can always correctly judge the
is

prone

to error because

and not within

aesthetic judgment,

judgments

itself.

Hume

its

While

it

possesses validity only with respect to

state of its feelings (pace Freud).

standard
this

is

in the nature of the things to

Hume

it

seems

to be a certain similarity within

this as sufficient to

human
account

agreement among humans concerning aesthetic judgements,

not an a priori agreement.

When we

turn to Kant,

it is

clear that

inspires Kant's aesthetic considerations as well as his epistemological arguments.

What must
or, to

it is

which

apparently denies theoretical universality to

beings as members of a single biological species; he accepts

even though

contrast,

nevertheless maintains a practical universality for such

in light of the fact that there

for the apparent factual

By

itself.

be considered

first,

however,

is

the influence

on Kant from

be more precise, from speakers of his mother tongue.

his native land,
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4.

Baumgarten and the German approach

The philosophical emphasis
different

Germany during

in

the 18th century

from that of the twin areas of concentration in Great

intuitionism.

The

quite

is

Britain: empiricism

rational systematic theories of Leibniz (1646-1714)

and

and Christian

Wolff (1679-1754) dominated 17th and 18th century German philosophy. The thought
of British philosophers clearly influence Kant, but he also follows firmly in this
tradition.

Germany

in

It is

that the foundations for a systematic aesthetics

Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762)

Baumgarten, a

knowledge

that aesthetic

is

Baumgarten's metaphysics

credited with this accomplishment.

bring the individual

brilliant logician, tries to

beautiful into the systematic fold, but

is

phenomenon

unsuccessful. Instead, he

is

is laid:

is

of the

forced to conclude

fundamentally different from cognitive knowledge. 51
closely follows Leibniz's belief that

all

reality is essentially

one, and that differences are a matter of degree. Sensations are therefore considered
to be theoretically reducible to clear

are really confusedly

continuity

is

that

known

and

distinct notions: "...even

intellectual pleasures."

an autonomous

basis for aesthetics

sensations, including aesthetic experience,

cognition and

51

is

According

52

is

A

sensuous pleasures

result of this principle of

must be precluded,

since

all

theoretically reducible to intellectual

thereby no longer aesthetic.

to Wessell: "...Baumgarten did liberate' aesthetic theory

confines of rationalistic intellectualism
totality of his thought."

but only

from the

at the cost of consistency

See Leonard P. Wessell,

Jr.,

within the

"Alexander Baumgarten's

Contribution to the Development of Aesthetics," JAAC, XXX,3 (1972), p.334. The article
Baumgarten's contribution to
is on pp. 333-342. This is an excellent, clear exposition of
the formation of systematic aesthetics.
52

The

Philip P.

ed.
Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason in Leibniz: Selections,

Wiener (New York,

1951), p.532.
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Although Baumgarten remains true

to his rationalist metaphysics,

assume a Leibnizian universe ruled by the law

which

of continuity, according to Wessell, his

empirical psychology deviates from this system. Psychology, which
Baumgarten

considers the study of the soul, has both a rational and an empirical part. The
rational
part

"...is

unity.

It

concerned with problems of the metaphysical structure of the
will suffice to

soul, e.g.,

its

say that Baumgarten presents his followers with a Leibnizian

world of monads." 53 The empirical part examines the nature of sensible experience,

which extends

to aesthetic experience.

have two types

A

soul

is

posited with the possession of

faculties,

enabling

intellect,

which provides conceptual knowledge and forms

it

to

of cognition.

The superior

faculty

is

two

the

distinct perceptions of the

representations of things. The inferior faculty operates with non-distinct perceptions

and forms

sensitive representations of things.

While

this

object, enabling

appears to suggest that any unclarity

all

knowledge

lies

in the

to be reduced to distinct cognitions

were superior enough, Wessell suggests

that

mind and not
if

in the

only the mind

Baumgarten unconsciously breaks with

the Leibnizian tradition on this point:

Toward
end

the beginning of his major

of aesthetics

is

work on

aesthetics

Baumgarten wrote: "The

the perfection of sensitive cognition as such [qua

talis ]."

54

On

the face value of these words it would seem that Baumgarten has
recognized that there is something irreducible about the laws of aesthetics (both
as a theory of sensitive knowledge and as a theory of beauty). If this is so, he
has broken with his own metaphysics and ceased being a pure rationalist. This

Baumgarten to attempt a different type of explanation of sensate
55
order than the one open to rationalists like Leibniz or Spinoza.
fact allows

53

Wessell, p.335.

^Aesthetica (Frankfurt, 1750; Reprinted as 2 vols. in one, Hildesheim, 1961), §14.
55

Wessell, p.336
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What Baumgarten

tries to

do

examine the particulars of the universe as ends

is

in

themselves, not as manifesting some axiomatic principle from which they are
deduced.
It is

precisely the appearance

the sensory impact, to

which must be recognized

demand

as knowledge; to

application of the law of sufficient reason,

go beyond
is

to negate

the science of aesthetics. The confused nature of the perceptions of aesthetics are only

confused in the sense that the individual elements are fused together in an

harmonious whole and cannot be

particulars themselves, rather than

recognized as a legitimate,

if

from the

isolated

any

totality of the intuition.

abstract principle,

It is

these

which must be observed and

not a cognitive, source of knowledge. Cassirer

states:

The new science

of aesthetics strives for such recognition. It abandons itself to
sensory appearance without attempting to go beyond it to something entirely
different, to the grounds of all appearance. For such a step forward would not
explain the aesthetic content of appearance, but destroy it.

Baumgarten himself had given
Poetry (1735), the

first

aesthetics

its

own

legitimate sphere, in Reflections of

time this 'new science' has been named:

The Greek philosophers and the Church fathers have already carefully
distinguished between things perceived and things known. It is entirely
evident that they did not equate things

honored with

this

Therefore, things

name

known

with things of sense, since they

things also removed from sense (therefore, images).

known

are to be

known by the superior faculty as the object
known by the inferior faculty, as the

of logic; things perceived [are to be

object] of the science of perception, or aesthetic.

This

is

a clear

break with the

given an inferior status.

rationalist tradition,

What

even

for the first time has

57

if

this

new

aesthetic theory

been unequivocally stated

is

is

that

conceptual thinking and aesthetics occupy different spheres, and to reduce aesthetics

^Cassirer, pp. 343-4.

^ Reflections

Poetry, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's Meditationes
philosophicae de non-nullus ad poema pertinentibus, trans. Karl Aschenbrenner and

on

William Holter (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954), §116,

p.78.
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knowledge destroys whatever

to conceptual

gained from sensitive experience. Baumgarten
perceptual experience of sensation, which
the form

is

that

it is

is

is

unique about

this

knowledge

seeking knowledge about the

not chaotically perceived, but

which determines the organization

of sensations

is

ordered;

the key to his

is

investigation of sensitive knowledge. Further, aesthetics has to do not with the

emotional reaction of the viewer but with perfection of form.
Revealing his break with rational tradition, Baumgarten explains that the
science of aesthetics can be understood as an analogy of reason. Cartesian style

maintained that the same, and not analogous, epistemological method

rationalists

could be applied to different
that there

is

aesthetics."

fields

without affecting the method; an analogy

something the same and something

58
It is

true that

Baumgarten

sets

up

"...implies

different in the sciences of logic

and

a scale of the sciences according to

value and rank and places aesthetics, knowledge of the sensible world, at the bottom.

Yet despite
cognition,

logical

its

is

now

way, aesthetics
restrained

5.

permitted to be a philosophical discipline in

casts off the traditional logical

and metaphysical

own

right.

fetters

In this

which

of pre-Kantian status of aesthetic theory

What

I

have

of the problems

tried to

show

in the preceding pages

which were commanding the

to solve

them. The three thinkers on

^Wessell, p.337.

is

the nature and background

attention of philosophers

theorists during the second half of the 18th century,

made

its

of beauty, sensitive

previous attempts to attain the status of knowledge.

its

Summary

low ranking, phenomenologically the science

whom

I

and

aesthetic

and the attempts which were
have concentrated. Shaftesbury,

40

Hume

and Baumgarten, each contributed

method

in

which Kant

in turn

significant elements to the

manner and

approached the problem of the meaning of aesthetic

judgment.

Baumgarten provides the systematic form which Kant

Kant

uses.

tries to

bring

nature and freedom, reason and ethics together by means of judgment, in

specific

aesthetic judgment.

qualities

which

is

The

his hallmark,

logical architectonic

and the admission

knowledge, come from Baumgarten.

and the emphasis on formal

of aesthetics as a legitimate form of

Hume

brings several important ideas to the

Kantian synthesis. The empirical approach to beauty and

to taste calls for a subjective

rather than objective validity; Kant in turn struggles with the problem of

propose a subjective, yet universal,

a priori basis for taste.

connection between morality and aesthetics, for

By

contrast,

Kant

tries to

The emphasis

results.

production,

is

taste

Hume

still

how

to

maintains a close

has a distinctly moral component.

separate morality from aesthetic judgment, with mixed

Hume

places

on the imagination, the source

of creative

taken over by Kant and made the key for understanding his new, purely

aesthetic definition of taste.

The denial

of universal

and necessary norms

for

determining beauty in favor of a purely human, mind-created standard puts the entire
nature of philosophical debate on radically different footing.
Shaftesbury contributes the important concept of disinterested pleasure by

means

of

which Kant can

establish the a priori basis for taste,

and thus

for a universal

that
yet subjective aesthetic judgment. Here, too, Kant differentiates his theory from

of Shaftesbury

by

his attempt to

draw

a line

between moral and

aesthetic pleasure.

the
Shaftesbury also underlines the importance of the role played by the genius,

human

being

who

the true
serves as a vehicle for producing works of art which reveal
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nature of things. The genius

above and below

historical

is

responding to a standard which

example and

social expectation.

at the

same time

in turn

makes the

is

Kant

role of the genius central to the creation of the artwork.

The concepts

of systematic form, disinterested pleasure, taste, imagination and

genius, as well as the relation between the aesthetic and the moral, provide the basis
for Kant's "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment."

In this work, as

we

Kant

will see,

performs a tremendous synthesis, bringing together the diverse philosophical traditions
of Britain

way

and of Germany, along with

of understanding aesthetic

judgment

is

meant

allows for

human

human

to achieve because

the sole ground of

still

meaning and

things,

all

some kind

he

subjectivity.

will

It

human

human

of (divine) plan that has organized the world

subjectivity

is

of

subject as

Kant

radical steps in this direction;

beings need to uncover and illuminate. Making

the uniqueness of

new way

of

does not form the complete system

not or cannot accept the

even though he takes

new

phenomena. The Critique

artistic

as the capstone of Kant's critical philosophy, of a

understanding the power of

he was trying

their classical predecessors, to present a

this divine

and which

plan equivalent to

the task for his successors, notably Schelling

and, of course, Hegel.

D. Review of Kant's theory of mind and the role of
both pure and practical reason
In the section just completed,

I

have presented

a

rough outline

of the

problem areas which must be incorporated into the nascent philosophical
aesthetics.

What

conveyed the

is still

missing

fact that this

changes in response

to the

is

is

a simple definition of aesthetics, but

precisely the problem: the

changing definition of the

domain

self.

It is

I

main

field of

hope

to

have

of aesthetics constantly

only after a thorough
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examination of

how

the

meaning

of aesthetics shifts in response to

means, and can achieve, that one begins
aesthetics

how

almost mandatory to understand

in particular Kant's theory of mind.

work

ludgment

is

in the Critique of

The
thought

is

position

all

it fits

many

The approach might appear

Pure Reason

which Kant's

.

critical

philosophy holds in the history of Western

neck of an hourglass: Kant brings together and

after

Kant must

more pressing debates

on the other hand,
through the

circuitous, but the

the problems with which philosophers had been struggling for

and everyone

of the

it is

in with the bulk of the critical philosophy,

in

some way respond

accomplished. The Critique of Pure Reason
of

of

greatly reduced in significance without minimal preparatory

similar to that of the

synthesizes
centuries,

what the debate on the nature

to see

about. Before turning to a textual analysis of Kant's aesthetic theory,

is

Critique of

what philosophy

a radically

new

latter function, the

is,

to

what he has

on the one hand, an immense

synthesis

in the philosophy of Kant's contemporaries,

theory of mental

One

activity.

could say that

former problems are recast in such a

longer be problems of serious philosophical

interest.

This

is

and

light as to

no

not to suggest that after

Kant there are no more philosophical problems, but rather that the problems

are

now

of a different kind.

Kant's Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 marks the beginning of the

he

is

taking,

and the Critique

of

Pure Reason

59

of 1781

and 1787 completes

epistemological turn to a subject-conditioned objectivity. The

works was the Leibniz-Clarke Debate

initial

direction

this

impetus for these

of 1715-6 over the nature of time

and space;

New York.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith,
CPR.
as
to
referred
Martin's Press, 1965 (copyright 1929). Hereafter often
Emmanuel

St.

new
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Leibniz envisioned them as a continuity of monads, whereas Newton, and his

defender Clarke, saw time and space as absolute and independent of the existence of
bodies.

The debate

between the metaphysical view

also reveals the difference

of a

God-guaranteed pre-established harmony of monads regnant on the Continent, and
the mathematical philosophy dominant in Britain. This division broadly represents

what Kant

refers to as

Dogmatism, the continental

Cartesian assumption that
of our

we can have

knowledge being independent

tradition

which denies the existence

clear

and

realities,

of clear

rationalist tradition

distinct ideas,

which leads

and Scepticism, the

and

distinct ideas

in a position of agnosticism about the existence of objects.

based on the
to objects

British empiricist

and thereby

finds itself

Kant resolves these

differences by appealing not to the internal clarity of an object but to the nature of

its

origin:

Representations derived from sensibility reveal only appearance, no matter to
what pitch of systematic order and distinctness they are brought by logic.
Representations derived from intelligence, on the other hand, reveal things as
they are in themselves, even if only dimly and with confusion. ...To the former
[Kant] grants the validity of physics and geometry, but restricts their scope of
application to appearances (phenomena). To the latter he grants the validity of
the metaphysics of nomads, but denies that we have sensitive knowledge of

such substances as they are

in themselves.

60

This division of knowledge in the Dissertation into two distinct orders,

and noumena, provides Kant with the mechanism

phenomena

to resolve the differences

between

the Mathematical and Metaphysical philosophies but at the same time leaves him with
the lasting problem of the noumenal world. As Kant realizes in CPR, where he
redefines the nature of knowledge,

we can know nothing

about noumena; they are an

Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Activity, Gloucester: Peter Smith,
exposition of the historical background and to
I am indebted to Wolff's
1973, pp.16-7.

Robert

his analysis of

CPR

.
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article of faith.

In

achievement, which appeared to resolve the

fact, this initial

metaphysical problem of the nature of time and space by proposing an
appearance/reality division, leads to the train of thought which ends, in CPR, with the

destruction of metaphysics.
In the decade between the Inaugural Dissertation and the

CPR, Kant not only re-thought the problem
of a re-acquaintance with

Hume's work,

Hume

a priori reasoning.

noumenal

Kant,

who

realized that the

Kant

is

willing to

never based on

sceptical attack

if

he

abandon the noumenal world,

but wants to show that causal inference

matters of

is

point of the Dissertation

must answer Hume's

or metaphysical world,

is

an account

coincidental

of matters of fact

weak

but, as a result

to provide

was more than

it

had claimed that our knowledge

"save" the physical world.

at least,

that

appearance of

knowledge

he needed

realized that

show

of the necessity of causal connection to
contiguity.

of the nature of

first

both a

priori

is

was

the

to

in theory

and concerned with

In order to do this, Kant needs to re-think the relationship between

fact.

the understanding and sensibility, which he had considered independent from one

another. In addition,

Hume's

analysis

makes Kant

realize that the nature of space

time provides the proof of necessary causal connection. The result of
is

CPR, where the pure concepts

of a manifold of intuition. This

consciousness,

I

and

this re-thinking

of the understanding are the rules for the synthesis

means

that because

I

think, that

is,

have unity of

can construct and account for the whole world.

In order to grasp

what

and the imagination which

is

is

meant by the

free play

between the understanding

necessary for a judgment of

Kant postulates that the mind works

is

in order.

I

taste, a

review of the

will try to explain as briefly

clearly as possible Kant's theory of mental activity as

it is

way

and

of relevance to the Critique

45
of

Judgment, and also show where an obstinate problem

revolution
subject

begun by Descartes concerning

and

Descartes

object.

consciousness, but his

is

lies.

the nature of the relationship between

credited with discovering the problem of subjective

strict criteria

lead to

two serious problems: how

the possibility of non-trivial knowledge about the world, and

knowing

Kant completes the

how

to

demonstrate

to re-introduce the

subject into the world of objective existence. Kant recasts the nature of the

problems posed by Descartes and

Hume

by substituting epistemological

for

metaphysical considerations. By recognizing that there are different kinds of necessity

and by

shifting

from a theory of mental contents

to

an account

of mental functions, as

the result of the rule-analysis of concepts, Kant acknowledges that the
is

always primary. Bearing

which delineate the
Sensibility

which we are

and thereby

is

mind,

this in

relation

I

will start

between subject and

knowing

with some of the important terms

object.

the capacity for receiving representations through the

affected

by

objects; objects are thus given to us

yield intuitions.

The

subject

by means

intuitions are then reorganized

mode

in

of sensibility,

by the imagination

so that they can be subsumed under concepts. Concepts arise from the understanding,

which

is

a faculty of rules, as a result of being

which are pure concepts,

thought through

it.

The

categories,

are the forms of the contents of the understanding

and

provide the rules for empirical concepts, which in turn are rules for organizing a

manifold of sense perception.

understanding by

way

An

object

is

thus produced from sense perception in the

of a three-fold synthesis: apprehension in intuition;

reproduction in imagination; recognition in a concept. The understanding
sensible

and therefore cannot be

of concepts.

a faculty of intuition,

However, without the

is

non-

but yields knowledge by means

crucial activity of the imagination,

knowledge

is

46

not possible. The role that the imagination plays
of

all,

what

despite

its critical

central position in

Secondly, the imagination

it is.

is

is

problematic in two respects. First

CPR. Kant never

distinctly explains just

also central to Kant's theory of aesthetic

judgment, yet seems to operate in a different fashion in Critique of judgment than in

CPR. This second problem

summary

of

what Kant does

The notion
result of a

will

be considered

tell

of synthesis

later; for

us about the imagination

is

relevant.

is

essential to the Kantian project, for

running through and holding together,61 of

elements of the sensible manifold. As mentioned,
the sensible intuition; the third

first is

present purposes a brief

is

collecting

this synthesis

knowledge

is

the

and uniting, the
has three parts. The

the cognitive recognition.

Imagination

is

responsible for the transformation of the one into the other:

Synthesis in general.. .is the mere result of the power of imagination, a blind but
indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no

knowledge whatsoever, but
this synthesis to

concepts

of

is

which we are scarcely ever conscious. To bring
which belongs to the understanding

a function

and it is through this function of the understanding
knowledge properly so-called. 62
Kant operates with

that

a two-tiered system, a transcendental level

we

first

obtain

which provides the pure

or general rules or concepts, and an empirical level, which follows the guidelines of the

transcendental level so as to provide us with knowledge of the empirical world. Kant
is

trying to

show

the a priori foundations for knowledge, and

the transcendental level, which provides an explanation of

before anything

61

See A99

62

ff.

CPR, A78.

is

it is

how

or can be put through the process.

for a description of the procedure of synthesis.

this that requires

the

mind functions

47
In the subjective deduction,
"...pure

all

Kant explains that

it is

necessary to assume a

transcendental synthesis of imagination as conditioning the very possibility of

experiencel,]"

63

for otherwise there

is

no way

to get a priori intuitions, that

is,

the

representations of space or time, into an empirical form. Time becomes increasingly

important to Kanf s analysis of cognition, and the categories, which provide the rules
for concepts, are ultimately seen as

the important

if

modes

of time-consciousness.

Before explaining

this,

however, Kant gives

role of imagination in the objective deduction.

its

is

problematic source of the conversion of a subjective time order into an

objective time-order.

into

The imagination

his

account of the

here that Kant divides imagination

It is

productive and reproductive parts:

The transcendental unity

of apperception thus relates to the pure synthesis of
imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility of all combination of the
manifold in one knowledge. But only the productive synthesis of the

imagination can take place a
conditions.

Thus the

priori; the reproductive rests

all

all

a priori

allowed spontaneity. Reproductive imagination
empirical synthetic function
of the understanding.

Only

it

is

in

its

...since all

inasmuch

our intuition
as

its

is

synthesis

All 8.

is

it is

completely subject to the laws

transcendental capacity does Kant allow for the

but then

fails to

give

any indication

of

what

that:

sensible, the imagination...belongs to sensibility.
is

an expression of

determinative [bestimmend] and not,

CPR, A101.

in this capacity

absolutely determined, for in the

might mean except the tautological explanation

^ CPR,

the ground of the possibility

knowledge and

provides to cognition,

possibility of spontaneity in imagination,

63

is

knowledge, especially of experience.

Pure, productive imagination conditions

this

empirical

principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive)

synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception,
of

upon

spontaneity, which

like sense,

is

determinable [bestimmbar]

But

48
merely.. ..imagination

is to that extent a faculty which determines the sensibility
synthesis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories,
must be the transcendental synthesis of imagination.. ..In so far as imagination
is spontaneity, I sometimes also entitle it the productive imagination, to

a priori;

and

its

it from the reproductive imagination,
subject to empirical laws... 65

distinguish

whose

synthesis

entirely

is

Despite the disappointing dearth of information about what Kant really thinks the

imagination

is

or just

how

it

manifests

its

spontaneity, and though the imagination

clearly subservient to the rules of the understanding,

ground

for the explanation of

how

cognitive

chaos of sense impressions the world

word, for indeed
process

little

itself is left

of the process

shrouded

The imagination
for

into

which

is

synthesized out of the

Perhaps 'explanation'

explained;

it is

is

too rigorous a

rather accounted for.

The

in mystery.

problem of necessary connection,

diligently in order to refute the solipsism of the present

Hume

Analogy, where Kant

is

nevertheless provides the vital

knowledge

also provides the key to the

which Kant sought so

moment

offers.

it

is

had thought

finally

himself.

completes his

new

This problem

is

solved in the Second

interpretation of objectivity by

establishing the difference between subjective and objective time orders. The essential
twist lies in the double

way

in

which representations can be understood: qua mental

content (as objects of consciousness) and qua representations of empirical objects. The
subjective time order results from the

way

in

which representations qua mental

contents are apprehended by the intuition. These representations are then reproduced
in the imagination according to the rules of the understanding, are given

an objective

time order and are then recognized qua representations of an empirical object. Wolff's

explanation underscores the novelty of this subtle

^CPR,

B151-2.

shift in

meaning:

49
Subjective time order

When we

is the order of representations qua mental contents.
synthesize these representations, we reproduce them in imagination

according to a rule, and this reproduction produces an order of the manifold
qua representations. As already indicated by the analysis of synthesis and ruledirected activities, the succession in this new order is a necessary succession. It
therefore an objective order. Thus, the synthesis which produces the unity
of consciousness is nothing more nor less than the establishment of an
objective time order 66

is

.

This enables Kant to distinguish between necessary connection and mere subjective
association.

means

also points to the creativity of Kant's approach to explaining

for a thing to be necessary.

necessity

is

It

is

and what

objects are,

By changing

the

time-wom

what

definitions of

Kant has changed the parameters of

how

it

what

the world

regarded. But both his new-found necessity and the switch from object to

objectivity rest

on the function

of the imagination,

and

this

still

remains resistant to

analysis.

In the Critique of Judgment, the imagination occupies a

exalted role than

assumes

it

does in CPR, for through the free play in which

a position equal to that of the understanding.

sections of the critical philosophy a very powerful tool.

producing representations from
intuition.

itself; it

of consciousness, without

all

which

the concepts

with each other according

^olff,

p.264.

we

engages

It is

the mind's

is

it

in both

power

of

enables us to think the object of sensible

is

demanded by

the unity

could sense would be an incoherent manifold.

which come from the understanding must be connected

to a rule so that

their systematic completeness.

necessity in the relation

all

it

visibly

The understanding

The understanding performs the synthesis which

Consequently,

much more

we can

determine in an a

Empirical knowledge

between

all

knowledge and

is

its

priori

not possible unless
object, for these

manner

we

admit a

modes

of

50

knowledge must
of

an

object.

agree,

must

necessarily possess a unity

The unity which the

object

which

constitutes the concept

makes necessary can be nothing

else

than the

formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations, for

only after

we have produced

we know

that

synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition can

Thus

the object.

all

the manifold

comes from the understanding and
apperception possible.

What

is

is

say

determined by a unity of rule which

which make unity

limited to conditions

important to notice here

is

we

is

of

that Kant's explanation of

objects reveals a shift from a theory of mental contents to one of mental functions.

Only through
see

how

now

a cognizance of

powerful the

human

"the lawgiver of nature."

Kant admits that

this

experience or appearance

is

how

this

mental process works

subject has become, for the

is it

human

possible for us to

understanding

is

67

might sound exaggerated and absurd, but as
concerned

this claim

is

far as

fully justified:

understanding is something more than a power of formulating rules
through comparison of appearances; it is itself the lawgiver of nature. Save
through it, nature, that is, synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances
...the

according to rules, would not

exist at all (for

appearances, as such, cannot exist

outside us--they exist only in our sensibility); and this nature, as object of

an experience, with everything which it may contain, is only
possible in the unity of apperception. The unity of apperception is thus the
transcendental ground of the necessary conformity to law of all appearances
one experience.

knowledge

It is

in

only because the

human mind

is

capable of organizing and unifying the chaos of

the manifold of sensible intuition that any experience at

can be

objectified.

From

the fact that

through the law-giving power

67

CPR, A127.

^ CPR,

A127.

in

we

all,

including that of nature,

possess unity of consciousness, which arises

of the understanding,

Kant

is

able to build the

whole

51

physical world, as

it

were. This

is

not to say he ends up a

process which enables

me

knowledge

In other words, the

of myself.

and therefore as

it

which

is

have knowledge of the world enables

appears to

What anything
earlier,

to

really

solipsist, for

itself

mind

and not

as

noumena

as

it is

same

have

to

affected

by

itself,

69
it is.

might be brings us

the problem of

intuits itself as

me

the

problem mentioned

to the obstinate

opposed

to

phenomena,

themselves as opposed to appearances. Both pairs of terms refer

to

of things in

two

different

realms but do so in slightly different contexts. Appearances and things in themselves
are to be understood in relation to the being of something.
in

its

An

appearance

a being

being thought by us in accordance with our mode of thinking, whereas a thing

in itself

is

a

being independent of

its

contrast, refer to objects of intuition.

which

is

the sort of intuition with

appearance to

us.

A phenomenon

which our mind

is

Phenomena and noumena, by
an object of sensible

operates.

A noumenon

object of intellectual intuition or the object of non-sensible intuition, of

know

is

intuition,

the

which we

nothing.

Of

the three major faculties of the

reason, the

first

As the law-giver

and the

third belong to

to nature, the

phenomenal world, the world
three-fold synthesis occurs

object.

is

is

human

what

mind: understanding, judgment and

in the Dissertation

was

the intelligence.

understanding only has jurisdiction over the
of appearances.

Insofar as our sensibility

is

affected, the

and we end up with cognitive conceptual knowledge

This belongs to the realm of the understanding. Reason

is

is

an

than
extension of the understanding. Although the categories extend further

^See B69 and B276

ff.

an

not so limited, and

constantly trying to understand what the real nature of things are, but this

illicit

of

for Kant's refutation of a solipsistic idealism.
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sensible intuition because they can think objects in general without regard to the
sensibility) in

(i.e.

which they

are given, this does not

determine a greater sphere of objects. However,

it is

mean

mode

that they actually

a tendency of the understanding

to form:

...a

representation of an object in

itself,

and so comes

to represent itself as also

being able to form concepts of such objects. And since the understanding
yields no concepts additional to the categories, it also supposes that the object
in itself must at least be thought through these pure concepts, and so is misled
into treating the entirely indeterminate concept of an intelligible entity.. .as
being a determinate concept of an entity that allows of being known in a
certain [purely intelligible] manner by means of the understanding. 70

Kant spends great

effort trying plausibly to

the understanding to
it is

noumena;

it is

closely tied to the moral realm,

of

account for

some relevance

this problematic extension of

to

make note

of this effort since

and the moral realm does influence Kant's

aesthetic

theory.

The

relation

between understanding and reason has formal

similarity.

The

understanding creates unifying order in the sensible manifold by imposing concepts.
Reason, which

Without
is

is

also constantly seeking unity, imposes ideas

this regulative

(and not constitutive) function of the ideas, the understanding

as chaotic as the unprocessed sensible manifold.

understanding in order

on the understanding.

to

Ideas are imposed

compel the understanding

to strive

towards a more unified

grasp of the world, but the understanding, seeking knowledge,
limitations of sensible intuition. Judgment, the faculty of

governs the understanding, which

70

CPR, B307.

is

by reason on the

is

constrained by the

subsuming under

rules,

the faculty of rules. Judgment distinguishes

53

whether or not something stands under
rather than judgments,

is

a given rule. 71

The

faculty of principles,

the operative function of reason. Principles a priori both

contain the grounds of other judgments and are not grounded in higher, more
universal

modes

of knowledge.

judgments in general

is

The highest

principle or universal condition of

that they be not self-contradictory.

Reason

is

all

thus the driving

force behind this desire for unity:

Reason concerns

itself exclusively with absolute totality in the employment of
the concepts of the understanding, and endeavours to carry the synthetic unity,
which is thought in the category, up to the completely unconditioned. ...Reason
accordingly occupies itself solely with the employment of understanding, not

indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience.. .but
solely in order to prescribe to the understanding its direction towards a certain
unity of which it has itself no concept, and in such manner as to unite all the
72
acts of the understanding, in respect of every object, into an absolute whole.

Reason's drive toward the unconditioned which unifies

problems for the understanding and leads

raises

it

all

conditioned knowledge

into antinomies,

improper extension of the principles of the understanding

result in

where the
two apparently

contradictory yet self-consistent claims.

The

possibility of freedom,

which

is

essential

if

Kant

is

to

maintain a moral

realm where individuals are responsible for their actions, seems inconsistent with the
absolute determinism of the natural world. In the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason,

Kant shows that

it is

not inconsistent to maintain both freedom and necessity so long

this
Since judgment determines whether or not something stands under a rule,
which turns
appears to point to a fundamental relationship between the imagination,
judgment,
and
concept,
by
a
recognized
be
sensible intuition into something that can
71

While
which then determines whether this something stands under certain rules.
aesthetic
for
nowhere discussed in CPR, this relationship has interesting consequences

judgment.
72

CPR, B383.
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as

one

is

aware that they belong

to different realms, to different kinds of causality.

There are only two kinds of causality conceivable by
that from freedom.
state

Causality in nature

with a preceding

on which

state

it

is

us: that arising

from nature and

the connection in the sensible world of one

follows according to a rule, and

which

rests

on

conditions of time. Freedom, by contrast, contains the power of beginning a state

spontaneously and therefore cannot be determined in time but must be a pure
transcendental idea, containing nothing from experience and referring to an object that

cannot be given in experience.
For something to be
of sensibility.

73

free, for

Kant,

means

The problem with which Kant

is

that

it is

determined independently

then faced

is

how

to resolve this

transcendental idea of freedom with the necessity which prevails in the phenomenal

world as detailed in the Transcendental Analytic. This can only be accomplished with
the presumption of the existence of things in themselves.

appearances are merely

If

representations connected according to empirical laws, then they must have grounds

which

which

are not appearances,

are intelligible.

The

effects of

such an

cause appear, and can be determined through other appearances, but

not determined in

this

series of conditions

way

because the causality of the

intelligible

its

cause

which determine the appearance. Consequently, the

the intelligible cause

is

capable of spontaneously beginning

its

intelligible

causality

is

is

outside the

causality of

effects in the sensible

world; these effects in turn are always predetermined through antecedent empirical
conditions. That freedom

not the actual

T^See

reality of

CPR, B585

is

not incompatible with nature

is

Kant's primary concern,

freedom; freedom and necessity simply belong to different

55

The spontaneity

realms.

freedom

of

arises

from reason, as does the

strict

determinism

of causal necessity.

Speculative reason's drive towards unity

freedom of thought, as there
unity.

only

It is

we

world in which
principles,

instill

if

order.

It is

make sense out

we

may

critical to

of our sense perceptions

find ourselves trying to

in the world, rather

the latter

perhaps the purest expression of

nothing in the appearances themselves that account

is

try to

live that

an order

Even

chaos.

when we

is

for

and the

uncover or discover unifying

than assuming that everything tends towards

in fact be the case,

we

try

still

remember here what Kant

with

all

our might

to

stated in the Preface to the

Second Edition:
...even the

assumption-as made on behalf of the necessary practical
of my reason--of God, freedom, and immortality is not permissible

employment

unless at the same time speculative reason be deprived of

its

pretensions to

transcendent insight. For in order to arrive at such insight it must make use of
principles which, in fact, extend only to objects of possible experience, and
which, if also applied to what cannot be an object of experience, always really
change this into an appearance, thus rendering all practical extension of pure
reason impossible. I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in
order to
If

we want

this

make room

for faith

74
.

moral action,

to maintain the existence of freedom, thereby allowing for

freedom must be based on

freedom, but

we must

belief

accept this

on

and not on
faith;

The freedom about which Kant

is

we

certainty.

can never

talking

is

We

know

not so

can act as
if

we

if

we have

are free.

much freedom

of action,

because action in the world depends on the causal necessity of antecedent conditions.

Rather

it is

an inner freedom, the freedom of reason

understanding then can

beyond

74

its

try to prove.

knowledge which

CPR, Bxxx.

is

a

It is

to create ideas

this ability of

unique feature of the

human

human

which our

reason to reach

mind, but

at the

way
same

56

time

it is

of the

precisely this ability, which,

powers

of understanding

when

not properly regulated, leads to

which humans

When

possess.

false beliefs

false beliefs are

accepted as the truth, people begin to believe they have powers which do not properly

belong to them and which result in the curtailing of freedom.

what we can and cannot know

analysis of
call truly

that

we

can engage in what Kant would

moral behavior, for genuine morality requires the

freedom so that we may be responsible

The

practical extension of

Reason

of Practical

for the choices

possibility of thinking in

which we make.

pure reason to the moral realm

As already noted,

(1788).

it is

only by careful

It is

with respect

is

detailed in Critique

to the possibility of

morality that Kant needs to establish a transcendental realm and a transcendental
for a free

moral choice depends precisely on the

of appearances.

Although the argument here

the matter at hand;

what

important to note

is

fact that its

is:

"So act that the

is

the existence of a realm

maxim

of

as a principle establishing universal law."

judgment

establishes a clear precedent for aesthetic

considered

that

Kant

faces

is

then to show

of attention,

how

your

75

will.

will could

That

this

judgment

it is

not central

which

is

to

not

The fundamental law
always hold

at the

dictum of moral

will

become apparent.

the two differ; this will be

later.

Kant Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck,
MacMillan Publishing Co., 1956, p.30 (§7).
^I.

not in the world

worthy

same time

The problem

is

is

dependent on causal connection but instead on the human
of pure practical reason

ground

self,

New

York:

57
E.

What

I

Summary

have

of Kant's

show

tried to

work

prior to Critique of

in these past

few pages

is

Tudgment

the functional aspect of

Kant's cognitive theory as well as the essence of his moral theory so as to better
7

prepare the reader for Kant
this is

an

especial

s aesthetic

problem with Kant,

theory.

is

argument. The Critique of Pure Reason

The danger with

that they

is

do not do

all

summaries, and

justice to the

so difficult because everything

complete
is

interconnected to the extent that one feels the need to explain the whole in order to

make any sense

of the parts. Nevertheless,

1

have

tried to concentrate

imagination, on the understanding, and on the relation between

phenomena

so as to

show why Kant needs

to postulate a

on the

noumena and

noumenal world

if

he

is

to

allow for moral freedom. These ideas will be of particular relevance to an

understanding of the issues

at stake in the Critique of

judgment, and provide the

necessary background needed in order to grasp the novelty and creativity of Kant's
contribution to the nascent

field of aesthetics.

CHAPTER

II

THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT: AESTHETIC SENSIBILITY
AS BESTOWER OF A RADICALLY NEW INTERPRETATION ON
THE CONCEPT OF SUBJECTIVITY

A. Introduction to the Critique of

According to the Kantian theory of mental

Tudgment

activity, the faculty of

judgment

is

the cognitive faculty which provides the middle term between the faculty of

understanding and that of reason. Kant has examined these two
Critique of Pure Reason (1781/7)

reason

is

and the Critique

concerned with theoretical cognition a

concepts, that

is,

of concepts conditioned

by

of Practical

priori; its

sensibility,

Reason

realm

and

faculties in the

is

rests

(1788).

Pure

that of natural

upon

the legislative

authority of the understanding. Practical reason refers to the extension of reason

beyond the domain

of the understanding

which contain the ground
The Critique
critical

side,

of

theory,

judgment

is

of

all

and

is

concerned with concepts of freedom,

sensuously unconditioned practical precepts a
1

(1790),

which Kant intended

result of this mediating role, since

be the capstone of his

between understanding and nature on the one

to provide the bridge

and reason and freedom on the

to

priori.

other.

it is

It

presents a unique set of problems as a

not legislative and therefore has no recourse to

Kant, The Critique of judgment, trans. James C. Meredith, Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1952 (hereafter referred to as Cl). The references refer not to the
1

I.

page but
I

give the

to the

paragraph or original pagination numbers in the margin.

German

translation for a specific

word

or sentence; the

German

On

occasion,

edition

Hg. Wilhelm Weischedel, Frankfurt a/M:

I

am

Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft,
Verlag, 1974 (hereafter referred to as KID. Unfortunately, the
method and
pagination in the two editions do not coincide; the German uses the A,B
cited.
nowhere
is
which
but
the English appears to refer to an edition of Kants Werke,

using

is:

Suhrkamp Taschenbuch
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objective laws.

on an

Nevertheless, Kant intends to demonstrate that judgment also operates

a priori principle,

notion of 'subjective a

opaque quality

even

priori'

if

this principle is subjective

seems

to the unfolding

furnish a concept which
(cognitive), for then

it

it

to

The German

What

it

means

can then employ as a

rule,

would come under the domain

title,

The

objective.

be a contradiction in terms and lends a certain

work.

reason and would no longer provide

and not

is

that

judgment needs

to

but which cannot be objective
of the understanding or of

unique cognitive function.

its

Kritik der Urteilskraft, captures a

the translation: 'Urteilskraft' refers more specifically to the

nuance which

power

lacking in

is

or ability of

judgment, rather than the passive completed action implied by 'judgment.' This
important to bear in mind
into

two

when

types: determinate

and

is

considering Kant's argument. Kant divides judgment
reflective.

Determinate judgment

is

very

straightforward, and involves subsuming objects under the appropriate category. This

is

the activity of the faculty of judgment in the acquisition of cognitive knowledge.

Reflective judgment,

more than

that,

it

by contrast,

is

can be seen as the prerequisite for judgment in general and thus

providing the foundation for

all

direction but he never actually

human

makes

judgment could furnish the means
into a

the essential requisite for aesthetic sensibility, but

mental

activity.

this claim.

to critique the three critiques, to pull

attempt to unify conclusively the three cognitive
this

work, Kant

"supersensible realm" to ground his theory.

realm

Consequently, although

whole and provide the unity which he wants

philosophy and especially in

lies

Kant often points in

deep within the nature of

is

to achieve,

Kant

this

reflective

them together

fails

in his

Throughout the

faculties.

for

critical

forced repeatedly to turn to the

My

subjectivity,

contention

and

that

is

that this supersensible

Kant either

failed to see this

60

or refused to admit

it,

hence the ambivalent character of aesthetic

(reflective)

judgment.

What

intend to do here

I

is first

the 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.'
Beautiful' because

it is

I

taste,

which

Taste, the prerequisite for an aesthetic

how Kant

results to

which

is

concentrate especially on the 'Analytic of the

here that Kant establishes the premises necessary for the

transcendental deduction of

reveals

review and analyze both the 'Introduction' and

is

given in the 'Analytic of the Sublime.'

judgment

of beauty,

caught between the demands of

his thinking bring

is

a difficult concept

his critical

him and which he

and

philosophy and the

not yet prepared to accept;

is

these results are incorporated into Schelling and Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory.
After Kant concludes his examination of taste, which

any judgment

of beauty,

creator, the genius.

genius functions

is

An

he turns his attention

analysis of

revealing, for

to the

what makes

it is

these

is

a

the most theoretical aspect of

work

work

of art itself

and

to

of art beautiful

and

how

two mysterious things

the point of comparison and the continuity with those successors
to freeze the

moment

subjectivity.

Kant

the

that provide both

who

also

of artistic creation in order to uncover the essence of

tries to

its

have

tried

human

systematize this essence whereas Schelling and

Schopenhauer approach the nature

of art

and

aesthetic creation in quite a different

manner.

A

question whose answer Kant makes central in

has independent a
regulative.

priori principles

According

to Kant's

and

if

so,

this

work

whether they are

system of the

human mind

judgment

is

whether judgment

constitutive or

as detailed in Critique of

Pure Reason, and the innate moral structure of the mind as given
Practical Reason,

is

in Critique of

the middle term between understanding and reason,
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between cognition and

The former terms

desire.

prescribe a priori laws to the latter

terms, respectively. Does judgment analogously perform the same function for the
feelings of pleasure
faculty,

it is

and displeasure?

not unlikely that

If

contains

it

so,

how?

some

Since judgment

is

a cognitive

The problem

sort of a priori principle.

is

that this principle cannot be derived from a priori concepts because concepts are the

property of the understanding and judgment

is

only directed to their application. The

concept which judgment provides must therefore be one from which

we

get

no

cognition of a thing and one which must be applied as a rule, but not as an objective
rule, since

rule

were

if it

were

objective,

judgment would be required

to determine

whether the

applicable.

The

difficulty

aesthetic matters,

concerning the principle of judgment

which

is

to say in matters

having

subjective in the representation of an Object,
Subject, not to the object..."
side of a representation

2

it.

When
is

chiefly to be

do with

criteria, that

this feeling is

"[tjhat

constitutes

which cannot become an element

representation, Kant allows that this
3

what

i.e.

According to Kant's

or displeasure connected with

purposiveness.

to

is

its

found in

which

is

purely

reference to the

aspect of the subjective

of cognition

is

the pleasure

immediately linked to the

the aesthetic representation of finality or

This 'Zweckmassigkeif gains credence only in terms of the reflective

2

C]J 188.

Zweckmassigkeit and Zweck can be translated either as 'finality' and end
(Meredith) or as 'purposiveness' and 'purpose' (Bernard). Werner Pluhar, in How
3

to

"Zweckmassigkeit" in Kant's Third Critique, in Interpreting Kant, ed. Moltke
85-98, takes strong issue with the use of finality, seeing it as a
'

Render
Gram, pp.

S.

concentrates on four major ways that an incorrect use of
Zweckmassigkeit impedes research based on translation and then, citing specific
Although
examples, shows why the 'purposiveness' terminology is always superior.
is
terminology
the finality
'finalit/ appears initially plausible, "...the crucial defect of
mistranslation.

that

it is

He

ambiguous, indeed doubly

so" (p. 88).

The

article is

impressively documented,
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judgment, which brings the cognitive

from which

faculties into play

to construct objects; the object

formal purposiveness or

without giving them concepts

under consideration has

solely subjective

finality:

If.. .imagination (as the faculty of intuitions a
priori) is undesignedly brought
into accord with understanding, (as the faculty of concepts,) by means of
a
given representation, and a feeling of pleasure is thereby aroused, then the

object

An

must be regarded

as final for the reflective judgment. 4

examination of the free play between the imagination and the understanding

alluded to here, and
see

its

how and why Kant

judgment, and

to

relation to cognitive concepts

needs to draw a

what end

this division

strict line

formed by

rules, is necessary to

between determinate and

appears to lead.

I

reflective

will return to this point.

and

1 include one example, without the accompanying footnotes.
Pluhar has just
discussed the translation of Ende and criticized Meredith's ambiguous interpretation of
it as both purposive and temporal: "Kant's temporal Ende is found sometimes by itself,

but most often in compounds. As an example of the former, Kant's ohne Ende (i.e.,
"without end") is rendered by Meredith as "endless," but zwecklos (i.e., "purposeless")
comes out similarly as "without end," the important distinction between the two
having been erased. But the problem is most severe where these two senses of the
7
finality terminology occur in one and the same compound word, viz., in Kant s very
important term Endzweck (i.e., "[temporally] final purpose"). Although Meredith
refrains from rendering it as "end-end," he finds himself forced to do the next worst

he renders it as "final end." This extremely close juxtaposition of the temporal
and the purposive sense of this terminology results in a severely ambiguous erasure"

thing:

(p.89).

In a footnote, Pluhar notes that Meredith elsewhere translates zwecklos as

'meaningless' and 'senseless.'
Because I am using the Meredith translation (and Pluhar initially notes that of the
two standard translations, although both are poor, Meredith's is slightly better than
Bernard's) and despite the harsh and substantiated denuncation Pluhar makes of the
7

rendering of Zweckmassigkeit, 1 tend to use both interchangeably;
nevertheless, I agree with Pluhar that 'purposiveness' and 'purpose' is the better

'finality

translation.
4

CL

190.
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B.

The

The

relationship between Kant's critical philosophy and the
Critique of Judgment: Analysis of the 'Introduction'

'Introduction' to Critique of

Kant's intent in the present
the different parts of his

opposing forces
is

work

critical

He

crucial insight into

as well as his opinion of the interrelation

philosophy.

in his thought, for

under consideration, Kant

Tudgment provides

It is

between

here that one can clearly see the

although the hidden nature of the subject

incapable of openly admitting that this

is

both

is

is

what

his concern.

alludes several times to the underlying essence of subjectivity as indispensable for

knowledge, but he
discord

which

relies

arises

on an

is difficult

objective, externally

to analyze

Kant begins with an overview

5

of philosophy:

and

is

to explain this.

The

but provides the key to the problem.

organized. Philosophy as a whole contains
that concepts afford us of things,"

imposed form

"...the

what

it

means and how

it is

principles of the rational cognition

generally divided into theoretical and

practical principles according to the concept

by which the

principles of this rational

cognition get assigned their object. Logic, which contains the principles of the form of

thought in general regardless of the

object,

is

the tool by

which philosophy can be

analyzed. Concepts of nature allow for a theoretical cognition from a priori principles;

concepts of freedom allow for a practical cognition from a priori principles and

moral philosophy. Morally

freedom and although
laws of nature which

practical percepts are

is

called

based entirely on the concept of

their rules, like the rules of nature, are called laws, unlike the

rest

on

sensible conditions these laws rest

on what Kant

calls a

supersensible condition. The understanding prescribes laws in the theoretical sphere

by means of concepts

5

CL

171.

of nature; reason prescribes laws

by means

of freedom, but only

64
in the practical sphere.

would seem

Since both the understanding and reason are legislative,

that they are part of a unified system.

it

However:

...between the realm of the natural concept, as the sensible, and the realm of
the concept of freedom, as the supersensible, there is a great gulf fixed, so that
it is not possible to pass from the former to the latter....still the latter is meant to

influence the former-that

is

The only

possible

faculties is to

that

lies at

more

way one

can postulate the link between these two

assume that there must be

the basis of nature..."

7

"...a

imposing an objective,

examines just what
for

this supersensible

without an adequate account of

human

1.

of the unity of the supersensible

nature.

CPR,

closest

in his discussion of

definition

The

The

make any

faculty of

like

its

Although

in the other

176.

7

CL

176.

curious

is

that

Kant never

closely

harmony might be and how judgment

how

Kant comes

relates to

understanding, reason and judgment can

will

be unable to unify his grand theory of

to explaining this supersensible

noumena and

that they

of things in themselves.

One

realm occurs
simply cannot

claims about them; one can only believe that they are there.

understanding and reason,

is

also a cognitive faculty but

one

capacity as the intermediate faculty, apparently operates quite differently.

which, in

CL

is

on the world and

judgment

Judgment,

6

legislative order

What

be linked in the supersensible realm, Kant

by

legislative

important to bear in mind that Kant accepts

It is

are linked by a supersensible harmony.

in

ground

to

or less unproblematically the idea that both the understanding and reason are

faculties capable of

it,

freedom is meant
end proposed by its laws... 6

to say, the concept of

actualize in the sensible world the

two

critiques

Kant has "proved" the a

priori, legislative

nature of

65

understanding and reason, the claims of judgment appear

Kant maintains of judgment
...we

may

to be

much more

that:

reasonably presume by analogy that

special authority to prescribe laws,

still

it

may

likewise contain,

Kant maintains that there are three basic

third

have

a priori principles,

not a

8
.

capacities of the soul: the faculty of

knowledge, the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and the faculty of

and

if

upon which

a principle peculiar to itself

laws are sought, although one merely subjective a priori

first

tenuous.

one can

at least provisionally

Since the

desire.

assume that

this

might also be the case with the second and that judgment:
a transition

...will effect

from the faculty of pure knowledge,

i.e.

from the realm

of concepts of nature, to that of the concept of freedom, just as in

employment
These premises are

awkward

nature.

which

critique

fills

it

makes

essential to Kant's

From

inconsistencies.

whole argument and simultaneously

a parallel function to that of the

The

contained under the universal."

The two

the universal

8

CL

177.

9

CL
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10

CL

10

judgment which makes

sensibility.

179.

is

first

subjective yet a priori nature of

Kant defines judgment generally

of

9

illustrate its

two provides the unifying

this critique poses several disturbing questions, or

requires closer analysis; reflective judgment and

domain

logical

a purely geometrical point of view, the necessity of a third

At the same time,

synthesis.

its

possible the transition from understanding to reason.

different

There

its

judgment

realm

is

is

even

one area that

another.

as "...the faculty of thinking the particular as

is,

however, an essential division within the

possible the discussion of the nature of aesthetic

methods or types

of

judgment

are: determinate, in

given and the judgment subsumes the particular under

it

which

according to

66
a priori laws of the understanding (deduction);
is

and

reflective, in

which the

particular

given and the universal has to be found (induction). Determinate judgment

determines the particular under a

priori transcendental

laws furnished by the

understanding. The universal laws of nature which the pure understanding provide

have the limitation that they can be used

in judging only the general possibility of

In other words, they provide the unity of consciousness which enables

nature.

beings to

make coherent

human

sense out of the chaos of the manifold of sensory

impressions. The great multiplicity of individual objects and events in the world which
results

from

this act of

human

of determinate judgment.

judgment, whose job

it is

individual appearances.

and

it is

This multiplicity

is

handed over

to discover the "laws"

A

to the so-called "reflective"

which regulate the profusion

of

law, however, must be regarded as necessary on principle

the principle for the

to universal

understanding are not covered by the unifying nature

way

in

which

which must be sought. This

is

reflective

judgment moves from

particular

the impetus behind teleological judgment,

the search for purposiveness in nature. Since

what

is

sought

is

the establishment of

the unity of empirical principles, the principle in question cannot be empirical but must

be transcendental, a law which judgment gives from and to
principle

is

become an
fails to

object for our cognition

differs

is

the

is

represented a

way

in

Tudgment

.

is

priori.

transcendental
a thing can

The question which Kant

which the transcendental

from that of understanding or

the universal nature of laws? This
Critique of

A

one through which the universal condition under which

answer, or even to pose,

judgment

itself.

of reason.

Who

or

principle of

what determines

a key to understanding the ambiguity in the

67
2.

Reflective

judgment and

Kant centers

on

its

relation to purposiveness in nature

his search for (or proof of) the transcendental laws of

the concept of finality or purposiveness in nature.

He

judgment

has made the claim in

Critique of Pure Reason that universal laws of nature have their ground in our

understanding which then prescribes them

to a universal concept of nature so that

nature can become an object of our experience. 11

Now

he turns

to the particular

empirical laws, which:
...must be regarded, in respect of that

which

undetermined in them by
if an
understanding (though it be not ours) had supplied them for the benefit of our
cognitive faculties, so as to render possible a system of experience according to
is left

these universal laws, according to a unity such as they would have

particular natural laws.

It is

reflective

12

judgment which makes

judgment can give

finality

this a priori

assumption, for by means of

(Zweckmassigkeit) to nature in

its

it

multiplicity; otherwise

we

are faced with an utterly chaotic world. This finality has the remarkable characteristic,

according to Kant, that

ground

it is

as

if

God

or

of this unity of empirical laws.

general property of the

human

some higher understanding contains the
That

this unity,

pure and simple, might be a

mind, and not a function of some higher plan, seems

not to be seriously considered. Kant states that the subject

but his

belief prevents

pattern that

is

him from accepting

this result

is

the law-giver to nature,

on an individual

repeated consistently throughout Kant's work.

When

basis.

his

This

is

a

tremendous

capacity for thinking a problem through reaches an impasse, Kant tends to look up, to

the supersensible; his followers
the nature of subjectivity

in, to

”see CPR, A126/7.
12

Q,

180.

(e.g.

Schelling,

itself.

Hegel and Schopenhauer) tend

to look

68

Kant places the origin of the

finality of

a purely subjective capability cannot
this finality is

an

a priori concept.

nature in reflective judgment, which as

make any

objective universal claims even

Kant claims that the concept of a

belongs to transcendental principles according to

reflective

finality of

judgment, a

in our reflection

upon

nature

finality that

neither a concept of nature nor of freedom but "...only represents the unique

which we must proceed

though

mode

is

in

the objects of nature with a view to

getting a thoroughly interconnected whole of experience ," 13

which

see a unity because our minds are organized in a certain way.

He

is

to say that

we

then refers to

coincidence between our point of view and the systematic unity which

we

this

find as a

"lucky chance" ("ein gliicklicher Zufall").

That Kant here attributes the

mere chance
that

we

raises a

warning

flag, for in

our minds perceive unity in the world

to

the Critique of Pure Reason he has claimed

perceive objects as such because our minds process information in particular

ways, and he gives

this ability to unify experience into a

transcendental a priori validity
of

fact that

judgment he gives

in his

14
.

coherent form universal,

Richard Kroner, in the clear analysis of the Critique

two volume overview Von Kant

bis Hegel, concisely points

out the trap in which Kant finds himself but which he seems incapable of noticing:

Wenn Kant diese Einheit der Vemunft wie eine empirische Tatsache
aufnimmt und sie als einen "gliicklichen Zufall" preist, so zeigt sich nirgends
deutlicher als hierin die Grenze seines kritischen Denkens, das sich selbst

verkennt und zu einem bloss empirischen Finden und Feststellen herabsetzt,
indem es die Vemunftnotwendigkeit zu der Zufalligkeit eines
Zusammentreffens entgegensetzter Welten oder Spharen stempelt. Wo
iiberhaupt kann die Vemunft Notwendigkeit finden, wenn nicht in sich selbst?
....Wenn die Reflexion iiber das Zusammenstimmen der Erkenntniskrafte und
Erkenntnisspharen nur die Reflexion iiber einen gliicklichen Zufall ist, so

13

14

CL

184.

see

CPR, Transcendental Deduction.
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Deduktion der Kategorien

verliert die transzendentale

ihre Notwendigkeit,

The way

in

between

reflection

for

it

denn

which Kant presents the

to find the

means

Kant turns

to reflective

What he

selbst ihre Beweiskraft,
gar nichts anderes als diese Reflexion. 15

relation

and purposiveness,

reveals both the extension

bridge.

sie ist

is

and the

to cross the gulf

between

reflective

judgment and

unity,

an understanding of

this Critique

limit of Kant's critical thinking.

In his effort

central to

between the

sensible

and supersensible worlds,

judgment as the subjective yet transcendental and universal

fails to

see

that nature

is

supersensible ground but in the subject

and freedom come together not

itself,

and that the resulting

in

some

teleological unity

apparent in every aspect of our perception of the empirical world cannot be otherwise,
for this ordered

appearance

is

the result of reason's ceaseless striving for unity. Kant

appears to place priority on the objective, on knowledge based on concepts, which he
invests with universal a priori form.
of the subjective; they are

two

But the objective

sides of the

same

coin.

is

only

Kant

made

will

possible

by means

only go so far as to

say that the reflective judgment mediates between the sensible and supersensible
realms, but not that both these realms are a product of the

He

itself.

is

self,

confronted with the uncertainty that, while there

is

of reflective

a finality

judgment

both in

nature and in freedom, in trying to bring them together, to uncover the very nature of
this finality, a

"Zweckmassigkeit ohne Zweck," he loses the meaning and

the mere form. This

is

a

problem which

will

is left

with

be taken up later in the discussion of the

beautiful.

Although Kant's search
purpose,

15

is

for finality without

perhaps not wholly successful,

Richard Kroner,

Von Kant

bis

it

an end,

for purposiveness without

brings us to the essence of his

Hegel (Tubingen:

J.C.B.

Mohr,

1977) Vol.I, p.246.
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confrontation with aesthetic meaning and the nature of the beautiful. As mentioned,

Kant divides the

capabilities of the

by the understanding;

desire,

human mind

into three parts: knowledge, governed

governed by reason; and pleasure and displeasure,

governed by judgment. The questions which need

how

manifested?

is it

how

is it

related to

be posed

to

judgment? To answer

(Zweckmassigkeit) proves essential. However,

finality

it

what

are:

is

pleasure?

these, the concept of

must be pointed out

does not provide a definition for pleasure. Although the feeling of pleasure

foundation upon which

3.

we

all

know what

The nature

judgments of

Kant nowhere explains

beautiful, rest,

that

all

it is

and

will

taste, that

just

is, all

it

presupposed a

priori

empirical laws."

when we

16

"...adaptation of nature to

by judgment on behalf

of

way

pleasure.

feel

The understanding, however, knows

upon

that this

finality

is

faculties

it

it

possesses for the understanding

is

behind the order which we perceive in the world

not

is

is

according to

simply a

by the subject because

the subject cognizes the world but in fact not having this

sort of reality

assumed

It is

it.

our cognitive

reflection

its

contingent necessity, judged to have transcendental
the

the

of the beautiful

Kant claims that the

is

is

Kant

claims concerning the

what he means by

recognize

that

clear.)

finality.

The guiding

17

(What

principle

the feeling of pleasure which

derive from a unity of principle. As Kant says, the "...attainment of every aim

coupled with a feeling of pleasure."

we

is

At the same time, he notes the curious

exception of the ubiquitous case where perceptions coincide with universal laws of

16

CL
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17

Q,

187.

this
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nature, the categories. Here, pleasure does not result because the understanding

own

"...follows.. .its

nature without ulterior aim." 18 In other words, the fact that

we

can perceive objects brings no particular pleasure. What does cause a feeling of
pleasure in us even

if

we

are hardly

aware of

it is

the discovery

"...that

two or more

empirical heterogeneous laws of nature are allied under one principle that embraces

them

both...,"

experience
notice

it,

19

that

we

see order in the world

around

The most ordinary

us.

impossible without this feeling of pleasure, regardless of whether

is

for this pleasure has

longer aware of

it.

When we

become so fused with simple cognition
do stop and pay attention

to

we

are

no

our surroundings,

we

are

immediately aware of the apparently inherent order in them;

judgment

"...makes

it

imperative

upon us

of nature to our faculty of cognition."

According to

this

human. The challenge

way

how

judgment

reflective

is

is

to

how we

CL

187.

19

CL

187.

“CL
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the faculty which

make sense out

may

extend.

level there

of

it,

is

to

and the
it is

no imposed boundary

to

Kant's imposition of transcendental a
as a function of

without the striving towards unity and order

would be no reason

makes us

respond to the world. Since

at this

most

impose an unchanging, universal

order-producing mechanism on the understanding:

18

is

that brings order to the world, there

for

because our

principle of the conformity

on the understanding and reason can be seen

judgment,

fundamental

judgment

offered by the world

far this order-giving capacity

priori necessity

on the

this is

that

20

of thinking,

establishment of meaning and order
reflective

to proceed

we

72

Die Kategorien und mit ihnen die synthetischen Urteile apriori gelten, weil
ohne sie iiberall keine Wahrheit, d.h. keine Geltungsnotwendigkeit in der
Erfahrung ware. Aus dem Zwecke der Vemunft leitet sich alie Notwendigkeit

Vemunft Zweck ihrer selbst ist, weil sie durch den
Zweckgedanken sich mit sich vermittelt, sich in sich als notwendig reflektiert,
weil sie durch Reflexion auf den Zweck ihrer selbst in sich zuriickkehrt. Dieses

her, weil die

Sich-zuiiickwenden zu sich

ihre Notwendigkeit, wie es

ist

auch

ihre Freiheit

21
ist.

As

this

quotation from Kroner

and understanding and

the division between the powers of reason

illustrates,

that of

judgment

is artificially

imposed, for they are

all

manifestations of the same self-defining power of reason. Without the capacity of the
reflective

judgment, nothing

else

human

possible, thereby allowing for

our minds operate in

what

the essence of

tendency

to a lucky

means

to be a

chance or

namely that the capacity

for

to a

and

it is

to aesthetic

4.

instructive to see

judgment

human

God

human

universal, independent ability

this point,

cognition.

It

makes determinate judgment

We

see order in the world because

way. The way our mind cognizes the world belongs

a certain

it

can be realized.

subject.

To

attribute this ordering

denies the simultaneous claim Kant

beings to cognize objects in the world

essential to

why Kant

human

to

subjectivity.

thinks he needs to do

Before

this.

making,

is

is

a

we

return to

This brings us

as revealed in the beautiful.

Aesthetic judgment

The representation

of

an object has both a

cognized, and a subjective part,

its

element of cognition and which

is

with

21

it.

This aesthetic quality

Kroner,

1,247.

is

logical part,

aesthetic quality, that

is

by which

it

can be

incapable of becoming an

the feeling of pleasure or displeasure connected

linked to the notion of finality (Zweckmassigkeit), a

73
finality

of

which

prior to cognition of the object.

is

an object of

intuition, completely divorced

When mere

from

its

apprehension of the form

cognitive content, calls forth

pleasure, then this:

can express nothing but the conformity of the Object to the cognitive
brought into play in the reflective judgement, and so far as they are in
play, and hence merely a subjective formal finality of the Object 22

...pleasure

faculties

.

When

this

happens,

when

"...imagination (as the faculty of intuitions a priori)

undesignedly brought into accord with understanding,

means

of a given representation,

and

reflective

judgment, and can be

called beautiful.

now

(as the faculty of concepts,)

a feeling of pleasure

Kant claims that the object under consideration

is

to

is

is

by

thereby aroused ...," 23

be regarded as

final for the

This whole process will be discussed

to point out that

most aesthetic

in detail later.

It

judgments,

those based on the feeling of pleasure, do not result in an object being

i.e.

suffices for

(subjective)

designated as beautiful but rather as agreeable or good.

An

aesthetic

judgment on the

finality of

an object

the concept of the object, of any cognitive knowledge of
subjective)

judgment

for the reflective

in general

assumes that what

is

is

it.

completely independent of

An

under consideration has

judgment. The special case of the beautiful

an aesthetic judgment,

for

it

calls forth a

aesthetic (purely

pleasure that

is

is

finality

the purest example of

not even tinged with an

ulterior interest:

When

the form of an object (as opposed to the matter of

sensation)

is,

in the

mere

act of reflecting

upon

it,

its

representation, as

without regard to any

concept to be obtained from it, estimated as the ground of a pleasure in the
representation of such an Object, then this pleasure is also judged to be
combined necessarily with the representation of it, and so not merely for the

72

C\J 189 - 90
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Subject apprehending this form, but for all in general who pass judgement.
The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of such
a pleasure (and so also with universal validity)

called taste.

is

24

Unlike objects of cognition which depend upon sensation, the beautiful object

response not of sensation but of

feeling.

ihe Critique of Aesthetic Judgment7
to the unity of imagination

is

It is

and understanding
is

notion that will be examined at length for
it

the examination of this feeling to which

devoted. The pleasure that arises

anchored in concepts or in sensation but

can be accepted that there

in the subject; this unity

This

free-floating.

it is

the

critical

a

is

based on something absolutely fundamental to what
assert that the singular judgment, 'this

fact that

but merely to a response which

is

is

it

it

means

purely subjective.

Judgment and which

be examined in depth.

subject-object

How

the question posed in the

and object?

first

In both his cognitive

mechanism which governs

earlier:

where

and moral

the operation of the

is

This claim

is

possible to raise a claim

status, to a

the boundary between

human mind

can assume that everyone apprehends

the

same way, because everyone operates with the same

190.

human, can Kant

half of the Critique of

theories,

We

^CL

is

an objective response

to

is it

if

boundary

This raises a problem touched on
subject

not

somewhat confusing

to be

cannot be attributed

is

The

is

beautiful/ has a priori validity.

transcendental law? This

5.

in response

point of this study. Only

based on a subjective (aesthetic) feeling of pleasure to universal

will

is

such a thing as pure, disinterested pleasure that

is

immensely complicated by the

elicits a

Kant assumes that the
is

the

a physical object or a

same

for everyone.

moral imperative in

set of categories

which

75

provide the a priori rules or concepts for determining, and correctly subsuming, the

given raw material. The faculty of judgment determines, by means of concepts,
cognitive

and moral knowledge. But

cannot be the task of determinate

how judgment

to determine

(objective)

judgment, because

itself

all

functions

cannot belong

it

to

conceptual cognitive knowledge. Another kind of judgment, non-cognitive or
reflective

judgment, must demonstrate

how

the faculty of judgment possesses a non-

cognitive a priori validity. Reflective judgment must reveal
to the subjective process of judging, for only then

what

it is

that

is

essential

can determinate judgment find

its

universal foundation. Kant locates the purest example of reflective judgment in the
aesthetic subjective

judgment

of the beautiful,

which

a singular

is

judgment that

maintains a claim to universality. Although his examination of the beautiful and

subsequent transcendental deduction of

it

leads directly to the essence of

subjectivity as the source of reflective judgment,

judgment, Kant consistently refuses

to

in turn

grounds objective

admit openly that what he refers to as the

actually the mysterious heart of subjectivity.

supersensible realm

is

Kant avoids stating

explicitly that objectivity is

foundation for what

which

it

means

to

human

grounded

The reason why

in subjectivity

is

because his

be human, to have unity of consciousness,

the cognitive faculties; where they

come from

is

rests

not his primary concern. Gearly, his

thinking in C] leads him in another direction, and although he dutifully follows
path, he does not openly accept the conclusion to which he

For Kant, that which
object in respect of

its

the cognitive faculties,
finality,

by

is

contrast, occurs

is

this

brought.

purely subjective concerns the apprehension of an

form prior
it is

on

to

any concept.

When

a subjective finality of the

when

this

form

form of the

the concept of the object

is

is

in

harmony with

object.

given,

Objective

when judgment
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presents the object by giving the intuition a corresponding concept. Kant uses this
distinction to explain the division of the Critique of
teleological

Judgment into aesthetic and

judgment:

Natural beauty may, therefore, be looked on as the presentation of the concept
of formal, i.e. merely subjective, finality and natural ends as the presentation of
the concept of a real, i.e. objective, finality. The former of these we estimate by

by means of the feeling of pleasure), the latter by
understanding and reason (logically according to concepts ). 25

taste (aesthetically

The

difference

between formal

Kant the distinction needed

(subjective) finality

to let

and

real (objective) finality gives

him concentrate on the nature

of the beautiful.

It is

important to notice that Kant here chooses natural beauty as that which epitomizes
formal

finality, for in

the course of his examination of the beautiful his attempt to

isolate pure, disinterested

beauty begins with natural beauty but ends by calling into

question whether there can be such a thing as free beauty, as a pure judgment of
taste.

The formal
could not

feel itself at

our cognitive
impressions

ends

finality of

home

nature

that "...principle without

in nature ,"

26

receive from the world.

in the interest of reason

that

is,

which understanding

the principle which determines

is

formed

Through
to

fit

reflective

judgment, the concept of

the understanding so as to give nature

formal end. The capacity of judgment to estimate according to a rule raises the

question of

when

the object

is

to

be judged according to a principle of formal

purposiveness (aesthetic judgment) and

*£1, 193.

*0,

193.

how

with each other to create order out of the chaos of

faculties interact

we

is

when

it is

to be

judged according

to a

its

77
universal law of nature (teleological judgment).

When

a subjective finality of nature

is

represented in the form of a thing by a transcendental principle:
resigns to the aesthetic judgment the task of deciding the conformity
of this
(in its form) to our cognitive faculties as a question of taste
(a matter
which the aesthetic judgment decides, not by harmony with concepts, but by

It

product

feeling ).

27

Aesthetic judgment retains a special status in comparison to teleological judgment

because

estimates according to a rule, not according to a concept. While both of

it

them belong

to reflective

under which

a thing

is

former contains an a

The

a priori

judgment, the

latter

simply assigns determinate conditions

estimated after the idea of an end of nature, whereas the

priori principle as the basis of its reflection

element in aesthetic judgment

is

on nature.

determined by Kant

to be the

bridge between nature and freedom for which he has been searching. While
objects of nature

which are being judged, the perception

of these objects

by

it is

feeling,

not by cognition, and feeling' s independence from concepts and sensations, forms the
link

between the

sensible world of objects

Although judgment
aesthetic

judgment

in general

is

of freedom.

a regulative principle of the cognitive faculties,

constitutive with respect to feelings of pleasure or displeasure.

The spontaneous play

makes

is

and the supersensible world

of the cognitive faculties

which

results in the feeling of pleasure

the consequences of the concept of a finality of nature as determined by

judgment

"...a

suitable mediating link connecting the realm of the concept of nature

with that of the concept of freedom ."

28

While

this

sounds

like the

culmination of

Kant's search, the actual examination of beauty turns out to be somewhat less

27

Cl

194.

^Cl, 197.
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Kant

successful, as

is

tom between

the abstract idea of a pure, disinterested,

meaningless natural beauty and the demands of the

responding

to objects

We now

human

and determining whether or not they

subject, the vehicle

are beautiful.

turn to a more detailed analysis of the beautiful.

It is

important to

bear in mind the discontinuity which the aesthetic judgment of taste brings to Kant's
discussion of

its

position in the faculties of mind.

The judgment

of taste should

provide the synthesis, the smooth continuity, between nature and freedom. This

what Kant

is

looking for and which he finds, but which does not quite provide the

bridge he thought

it

would. By making understanding the objective, transcendental

law-giver to nature, he

Or

rather,

is

fails to realize

he does not go

far

enough

that this objectivity

is

grounded

in the subject.

in this direction to give a truly unifying

character to aesthetic judgment. Because Kant models the subjective judgment on the

mechanism
that

it is

of cognitive objective judgment, he

actually the reflective

judgment. Consequently,

needed

to

we

new ground

it

is

not to

belittle

what Kant does accomplish,

of taste, the nature of the beautiful, breaks

less

The 'Analytic

its

much

of the Beautiful'

impressive than the actual content of Kant's thought

it:

breakdown

is

the elaborate

the architectonic of the system of mind, morals and,

turns out, aesthetics. While providing a needed frame,

exact in

for

in the field of systematic aesthetics.

structure he designed to house

as

basis for cognitive

are left with three critiques without the subjective glue

judgment

C.

No

never able or willing to determine

judgment which provides the

bind them together. This

his study of the aesthetic

is

of functions into threes

it is

at times suspiciously

and fours and twelves,

a criticism to

79

which Kant

is

quick to respond

as, for

example, he explains the number of basic

categories:

This division
faculty of

is

developed systematically from a

judgment (which

is

the

same

common

principle,

as the faculty of thought).

namely, the
It has not

arisen rhapsodically, as the result of a haphazard search after pure concepts,
the complete enumeration of which, as based on induction only, could never be

guaranteed.

The Critique

of

29

judgment presents no exception

to this impressive superstructure, yet

the basic argument seems more at odds than ever with the imposed form. To
the argument

more

accessible,

I

by Kant and then show where

On

make

will first sketch the outline of the Critique as presented

I

think the essence of his argument

the surface, the Critique of ludgment

is first

lies.

neatly divided into

the critique of aesthetic judgment and that of teleological judgment.

We

two

parts,

are here only

concerned with the former. 30 The lengthy introduction establishes Kant's thoughts on
the nature of philosophy as a whole and explains
in

its

teleological

picture.

He

and

especially aesthetic forms

is

why

a study of reflective

judgment

essential to a completion of the

then turns to the 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgment' which

is

(unevenly)

divided into an analytic and a dialectic, the former being subdivided into an 'Analytic
of the Beautiful'

and an 'Analytic

of the Sublime.'

The argument

itself,

however,

is

not

^ CPR.

A81. Cf. Wolff: "Kant's own papers, in which he can be seen working up
the doctrines of the Critical Philosophy, reveal that he tinkered endlessly with lists of
Judgments and Categories before hitting on the principle of four sets of three.

Furthermore, in contradistinction to the order of argument of the Metaphysical
Deduction, Kant quite evidently adjusted the Table of Judgments so that it would
the desired Table of Categories"
30

As seen

yield

(p.62).

in the "Introduction," teleological

judgment explains how we see

organization in the empirical world in general. It is also a product of reflective
judgment but is subservient to aesthetic judgment in that the latter, as we will see,
discovers or responds to the pure a priori form of judgment whereas teleological
judgment empirically applies this form, in a way analogous to the manner in which
the transcendental use of the understanding governs the empirical use.

80
quite as neat.

It

seems embarrassingly easy

namely the search

for

what

it

means

to claim: "This

subjective

judgment which

in the

feeling be

shown

priori validity?

have a

to

Kant begins the 'Analytic

end

CPR

he points out in a footnote, what he
taste,

is

is

at stake here,

How

beautiful."

can

This

is

the task at hand.

greater importance, however, will be

Moments

of the

doing in these Moments

is

it is

"...the

must be reserved

judgment of

possible.

They

As

taste.

examining the

is

discovery of

what

for the analysis of

is

Of

required for calling an

judgments

rich in information

of taste."

31

about the

nature of the beautiful pose, but do not answer, the question whether a

judgments are

modeled on

the "faculty of estimating the beautiful."

These Moments are primarily descriptive and while

aesthetic

a personal,

based on something so insubstantial as a

the four

:

having assumed that

object beautiful [which]

is

what

of the Beautiful' with a structure roughly

the Table of Judgments found in

concept of

to lose track of

priori

do, however, provide the premises for the

transcendental deduction which will decide this question.
This problematic

is

taken up in the somewhat inappropriately

of the Sublime.' While the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' does, in

itself to

its

the nature of the beautiful, the Analytic of the Sublime

Sections 23-29 discuss the sublime, which

is

named

'Analytic

22 sections, confine

is

not so unified.

henceforth almost completely ignored.

Sections 30-40 return to the difficulties presented by aesthetic judgments of the
beautiful

and here provide

priori necessity of

the moral

judgments

component

of

CL

§1:203FN.

of taste.

judgments

discussion of fine art and

31

a significant part of the transcendental deduction of the a

its

Finally, in sections 41-54,

of taste

Kant

and then launches into

first

makes

a detailed

relation to genius, which, while quite interesting, in

clear

81

on genius, seems

particular the discussion

quite at odds with

its

given place in the

architectonic scheme.

The Analytic

now

somewhat haphazardly completed, and Kant

part has thus been

turns to the very short Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment. In sections 55-57 he

and then solves the antinomy

outlines

morality, explaining

why,

despite

of taste; in 59-60

he returns to the theme of

the arguments given in the 'Analytic of the

all

Beautiful' for the importance of the disinterested nature of the beautiful,

nevertheless an essential function of taste that
In this next section,

I

it

7

the relationship between beauty and taste. First

which contain

Then

I

s

exploration

will

of,

and argument

for,

examine the Four Moments,

insights of great importance for post-Kantian students of aesthetics.

will discuss the

I

has a strong moral component.

be following Kant

will

it is

antinomy

of taste

and

its

solution,

and

finally

transcendental deduction for the a priori validity of judgements of
theoretical study of the relation

between beauty and

turn to the question of the work of

art

and

taste

I

will sketch the

taste.

After the

has been completed,

will

I

of genius, so as to illustrate Kant's practical

application of taste.

Before a fruitful examination of the text can be undertaken, several terms need
to

be illuminated, as definitions of them are essential to an understanding of what

Kant

is

trying to formulate. First and foremost, the imagination

central task,

much

Here, however,
precise nature

as

it is

is left

it

also

now

was

required for a

crucial to the unity of apperception detailed in

considered as a

unclear.

is

The

full

CPR.

equal to the understanding, but again

activity of the

imagination

is

its

important to watch in

process.
the hope of gaining an insight into Kant's hidden thoughts about the

82

Other terms
'taste'

essential to
7

(Geschmack);

and the difference between

Only with

Gefiihl).

or 'purposiveness' (Zweckmassigkeit); 'to be disinterested'

'finality

(uninteressiert sein);

und

comprehension of the argument are the following:

a

'sensation'

working understanding

of

and

'feeling

7

(Empfindung

what these terms mean and how

they interact with one another to form the basis of Kant's aesthetic theory can one
grasp both the importance and the novelty of Kant's thought.

have already been mentioned:

'aesthetic' (asthetisch)

and

Two

additional terms

'pleasure'/'displeasure'

(WohlgefaUen/Missfallen). 'Aesthetic' refers to judgments which are wholly subjective;
all

judgments

of beauty

adjective (asthetisch)

of objects

makes

for judging

all

is

into this category.

and not the noun

connotation. Aesthetics

understands what

fall

is

It is

noteworthy that Kant uses the

(Asthetik), for the latter has a different

certainly based

on

essential to aesthetic experience, the idea of applying

little

sense.

'Pleasure'

is

one

aesthetic experience, but until

the feeling

it

to a

body

which provides the foundation

claims about the beautiful. Kant considers this feeling to be self-evident

and nowhere describes what
As anyone
of technical terms.

it is

or

how one

familiar with Kant's

work knows, Kant

The terms above are

no way an exhaustive

list

feels.

of such terms.

uses a highly specialized set

specific to the Critique of

However, they are some

judgment and
of the

are in

most

important ones to pay attention to in any attempt to understand Kant's intentions.

Rather than expanding on their meaning here, these terms

will

the course of the analysis about to be undertaken; the study of
will

make

their

meaning and

be addressed during

how Kant

uses them

application clearer.

the 'Analytic of
In keeping with the architectonic superstructure, Kant models

the Beautiful'

on CPR's Table

of

Judgments (A70,B95), which

list

four headings:

83

Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality, each containing three
moments. His attempt
to

model the judgment

of taste

on

this

format

systematic structure than clarity gained.

quantity and quality, explaining that
32

And

"...this is

is,

however, more useful in terms of the

oddly, in C[ he inverts the position of

what

aesthetic

judgment on the beautiful

looks to in the

first

which we

be working, the parameters of the beautiful as derived or drawn from

the Four

will

Moments

instance."

So as

to

show

as clearly as possible the material with

are defined as follows, with the original

German

to

be found in the

footnotes:

Moment: Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of
representation by means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest. The
First

object of such a delight

is

called beautiful

Second Moment: The beautiful
universally.

is

33
.

that which, apart from a concept, pleases

34

Third Moment: Beauty is the form of finality in an object, so far as perceived in
apart from the representation of an end.

it

Fourth Moment: The beautiful is that which, apart from a concept,
36
as object of a necessary delight.

is

cognized

32

CI, §1 :203FN. For more detailed discussion on this aspect of the architectonic, see
Crawford, Kant's Aesthetic Theory. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1974,
pp.15-17. Crawford provides a detailed comparison of the two tables and shows
precisely how Kant fails to achieve any sort of parallelism, except in the barest outline.
33

CI, §5:211.

Geschmack

ist

das Beurteilungsvermogen eines Gegenstandes oder

einer Vorstellungsart durch ein Wohlgefallen, oder Missfallen,

Der Gegenstand

alles Interesse.

eines solchen Wohlgefallens heisst schon (KU, B16,A16).

^CI. §9:219. Schon

sie,

ohne

ist

das,

was ohne

Begriff allgemein gefallt (KU, B32,A32).

^CT, §19:236. Schonheit ist Form der Zweckmassigkeit eines Gegenstandes, sofem
ohne Vorstellung eines Zwecks, an ihm wahrgenommen wird (KU, B61,A60).

“CL

§22:240.

Schon

ist,

was ohne

Begriff als

Wohlgefallens erkannt wird (KU, B68,A6 7).

Gegenstand eines notwendigen

84

Much
here

has been written and claimed about these four Moments. 37 What

summarize the claims Kant

is

is

making so

as to

the transcendental deduction of the judgement of

1.

The

First

The

show more

first

Moment

of the

judgment

first

of taste, that of quality, sets out to

Kant

will

from the agreeable and from the

three sections respectively establish the subjective, and thus aesthetic,
taste;

the essential element of disinterested pleasure in judging

be beautiful; and the distinction between sensation and

to

faculty of estimating the beautiful,"

"...the

clearly the steps of

Moment

nature of judgments of

something

do

will

taste.

differentiate the beautiful, the pure object of pleasure,

good. The

I

attempt to

fix,

in the

manner

38

seems

to

Taste, as

feeling.

be a very slippery notion which

of a photographer fixing a negative, so that the

resulting picture remains true to the original shot and does not fade, distort or vanish.

In this

Moment, however,

beauty

sufficient to establish that

subject

and not the

something which

is

object,

is

referred,

is

is

is

not of such great importance.

a feeling

and that the

beautiful

To decide whether
consideration

taste itself

and not

a sensation, that

delight or pleasure

which

not tinged with the slightest

or not something

is

It is

it

here

refers to the

is elicited

interest.

beautiful, the representation

by way of the imagination,

by

to the subject

and her

under
feeling of

pleasure or displeasure. The cognitive faculties play no direct role in the judgment

37

A

note on secondary literature: In comparison to the

first

two

critiques, the

is meager.
what is
However,
degree.
browsed on it to a certain
It is nevertheless substantial, and I have
footnote it. The
only where directly rely on an argument put forth elsewhere do I
bibliography.
rest of the supporting work appears in the

secondary literature on
I

^CL

§1:203 FN.

this critique, especially

available in English,
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being made because the representation in question has to do solely with
feelings

occupy a

feelings;

special place, for they are the only reference of a representation

which are incapable

of being objectified.

Their response to the representation

is

a

purely subjective (aesthetic) one. Judgments of taste compare the representation in the
subject with

all

the representations the

appropriate one.

A

pure judgment of

something

is

beautiful, has

something

is

beautiful,

in the real existence of

its

no

mind

is

capable of feeling and choose the

taste, that

is,

one which determines whether

interest in the real existence of the object, for

actual existence

an object implies

not impartial. The delight which

is

is

of

desire

called forth

no importance
and
by

is

to

when

our response. Delight

not a pure judgment because

it is

must be

a beautiful object

completely disinterested. Kant's incorporation of 'disinterestedness' into his aesthetic

theory

is

a novel contribution to systematic aesthetics.

As shown

my

in

chapter, the disinterested aspect of the beautiful has been stressed by

predecessors, in particular Shaftesbury; Kant, however,

the

is

introductory

some

of Kant's

build this notion

first to

into a systematic analysis of the nature of the beautiful.

Another

distinction

between sensation and
for

which

feeling.

is critical

to Kant's project here

is

the distinction

Sensation denotes an objective representation of sense,

example the coldness and whiteness of snow. Feeling

refers to the subjective

response, in this case the pleasure taken in viewing a winter landscape, regarded

purely as an object of delight.
"...absolutely incapable of

39

CT. §3:206.

A

critical distinction

between the two

forming a representation of an

object."

39

is

that feeling

is

Since the beautiful

This covers the objection which might be raised by a dream, for
what one dreams might not have a correlation to a physical object, but

example, where
just having a feelingthat one can form a representation of the object (rather than
sound of it,
counter-intuitive
the
Despite
response to the object) is the key criterion.
has
sensation
of
manifold
sensation can refer to imaginary objects for as soon as the
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evokes a feeling of pleasure, Kant investigates the different kinds of pleasure,

one very

can

specific kind

elicit

or delight (Wohlgefallen) and

the response "this

its

opposite

is,

is

beautiful."

The

for only

feeling of pleasure

in Kant's view, the only reference of

representations which cannot become objective. While these feelings might seem to us
to

be only a very narrow interpretation of the feelings which emotions

assumes that the various degrees

which they are bound
coupled with

interest,

of pleasure

actually covers

it is

all

and displeasure and the

possible feelings.

When

call forth,

interest

Kant

with

a feeling of delight

is

agreeable but not beautiful. Similarly, the beautiful cannot

be good, because the good always implies an end (usually a moral one). 40 Of these
three kinds of delight which Kant discusses (from his point of view this covers the
completely): the agreeable, the good and the beautiful,

"...that

of taste in the beautiful

be said to be the one and only disinterested and free delight."41

may

disinterested nature of our feeling of pleasure in the beautiful
original contribution

clear

marker

to

by Kant

show how

to the

this section the disinterested

7

and

later the influence of morality in

weightier

is

study of the aesthetic realm.

the emphasis of Kant
free nature of

s

The

an important and
It

also provides a

theory of the beautiful

beauty

is

field

shifts, for in

repeatedly stressed whereas

determining the beautiful plays an increasingly

role.

been formed into some
40

Despite the

strict

sort of recognizable thing,

division here

it

enters the objective realm.

between beauty and morality, Kant appears

to

undergo a curious reversal in parts of the Third Moment, the Analytic of the Sublime
and the Dialectic, where he contends that "the beautiful is the symbol of the morally
Kant's ultimately unsuccessful but
I will claim that this is due to
good"
(§59:353).

nevertheless admirable attempt to bridge the subjective-objective gap.
41

C1, §5:210.
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2.

The Second and Fourth Moments

The Second and Fourth Moments,
universality

and necessity which the beautiful

absence of any concept.

judgment

respectively, address the claims of

It is

of beauty, despite

in these

its

two Moments

that

concept-less characteristic,

is

nevertheless an

communicable statement. In the Second Moment,

maintains

inevitable that

independent of

interest,

then

when one
all

human

is

who moreover

it

can only be inferred that

people and that everyone

about the beautiful

feels

it

this delight rests

The

Moment

relation

of quality

between
is

is

not based on any interest on the

on something

will accordingly react in the

would then be the good;
taste

logical

If

is

must be present

judgment,

its

were founded on

it is

the beautiful.

Moment

in the

of quantity, for

Kant needs

are in turn linked to the notion of taste.

based on sensation,

it is

limited to the agreeable

therefore a matter of individual liking or disliking. The beautiful, however,

mere claim

of individual liking but

lack of agreement signifies

want

demands

of taste.

by means of

a

is

and

is

not a

that everyone agrees with this judgment;

Whereas the good,

too,

has claim to

concept and concepts play no role in judgments

universal delight,

it is

on the

Kant does point out that the universal voice

beautiful.

all

universality cannot

and beauty which has been addressed

which

in

same way. Because judgment

this universal delight

further explored here in the

Insofar as delight or pleasure

that

in the absence of the concept

to clarify the different types of delight,

is

completely free in taking delight in the object,

spring from concepts but must be subjective.
a concept,

Kant

beings will likewise consider this object as

an aesthetic and not a

is

that of quantity,

conscious that one's delight in an object

containing a ground of delight. Since the delight
part of the subject,

in the

Kant makes the case that the

interpersonal,

it is

made

claims that are

elicits,

of the

judgment

of taste

88
is

only an idea which imputes agreement to every one;

it

everyone agrees. Even though something designated as
universally so, this agreement

is

an instance of the

rule

may

not be the case that

'beautiful' is considered to be

which

is

confirmed by the

concurrence of others, and not from concepts.
In the final section of the Second

key

Moment,

to the critique of taste lies in solving the

feeling of pleasure in a

judgment

representation, the result

would only have
...the

of taste.

would be the

private validity.

It

42

section

Kant maintains that the

9,

problem of the
If

the pleasure

relative priority of the

is

antecedent to the

feeling of agreeableness to the senses

must therefore

and

be:

universal capacity for being communicated incident to the mental state in

the given representation which, as the subjective condition of the judgment of
taste,

must be fundamental, with the pleasure

consequent.

But what does

this

in the object as

its

43

"mental state in the given representation" mean?

It is

clear that the

only things which can be universally communicated are so by means of cognition,

by representations
subjective, that

is,

of objects.

If

the determining ground of the judgment

independent of

a

is

to

e.g.

be

concept of the object, and yet universally

communicable, then, claims Kant:

42

This section provides commentators with widely divergent interpretations. I
first
follow Crawford's argument here (pp. 66-8); he sees this section as providing the
two steps of the transcendental deduction. For the complete opposite view, see Paul
Guyer "Pleasure and Society in Kant's Theory of Taste" in Essays in Kant's Aesthetics,

Guyer's aim here is to show "...how the section
it...[and]
which should unlock Kant's theory of taste instead throws an extra bar before
managed
why, in the very place where he should have been most clear, Kant actually

eds.

to

Cohen and Guyer,

(pp. 21-54).

become confused over

^CL

§9:217.

the implications of his

own

theory" (p.22).

89
...it

can be nothing

relation of the

else

than the mental

representation to cognition in general

Because these cognitive powers are not
are here engaged in free play,

is

for a cognition in general ."

tries to

mutual

they refer a given

44

any given

restricted to

powers

state called forth

rule of cognition, they

by

this state of affairs

of representation in a given representation

45

explain this by

first

comes about, and then using

object

far as

.

and the mental

a "...feeling of the free play of the

Kant

state that presents itself in the

powers of representation so

this

reviewing

how

cognitive

knowledge

model, minus the object, to

means. For a representation of an object

to

become

of

illustrate

an

what he

a source of cognition, the

imagination brings together the manifold of intuition and the understanding provides
the unity of concept in

When

the

what can be considered

judgment under consideration

is

7

'free

play of the cognitive faculties.

determinate,

it

mediates between the

imagination's reworking of sensible intuition into a form which can then receive a

concept from the understanding. Determinate judgment ensures that the product of
the imagination

is

properly subsumed under the appropriate category or concept. In

determinate judgment,

'free

play

7

is

simultaneously determined, for the cognitive

faculties interact according to the rigid

laws required by

represented by means of this interaction,

it

objectivity.

When

an object

must be universally communicated:

...because cognition, as a definition of the Object with which given
representations (in any Subject whatever) are to accord, is the one and only

representation which

44

Q,§9:217.

45

4fi

CL§9:217.

CL§9:217.

is

valid for

everyone

46
.

is

90
If,

however,

this process of universal

communicability

is

not tied to a definite concept,

as in the case presented by judgments of taste, then Kant maintains that

what

"...nothing else than the mental state present in the free play of imagination

understanding."47

Kant has

of taste in that he has

now

shown

its

is left is:

and

provided one of the foundations for the judgment

communicability. The case here

made

for the

universally communicable mental state prerequisite for pleasure in the beautiful and

the fact that this state
the

first

is

two premises

One

based on the free play of the cognitive

of the transcendental deduction of the

judgment

of the key assumptions in Kant's cognitive theory

function in the exact same

way when

faculties will

that

is

become

of taste.

all

minds

operating properly; this assumption allows him

here to suppose that a subjective (aesthetic) response to a representation of an object

must be antecedent

From Kant's

point of view,

deems

beautiful,

object forming part of

though, of course,

it

beautiful; nor can

is

now

presented with

as necessary as

if

CL

§9:218.

^CL

§9:218.

is

that in a

an

the beauty were

object,

"...a

beautiful.

judgment
which

of

he,

quality of the

inherent determination according to concepts..."

of the

judgment

even

a priori rule that

of taste, that of modality, tries to establish

delight.

everyone

This cannot be a theoretical

will feel delight in the object

I

think

be a practical necessity which would make delight the

consequence of an objective law stating that one ought

47

something

call

has nothing to do with objective concepts.

an

it

when we

called forth in response to

an object of necessary

is

objective necessity,

is

are

feel

48

its

The Fourth Moment
that the beautiful

which we

what we

pleasure which

taste, the feeling of

for example,

to the pleasure

to act in

such a

way without

91

an

ulterior object.

assent of

all to

a

49

formulation."

someone deems

Instead,

it

must be an exemplary

judgment regarded

It is

one ought

judgment

of

common

subjective principle

is

mean

the

more

common

sense

traditional notion of

understanding (gemeiner Verstand). 50 The

common

understanding

the principle of the concept

approve of an object which

to

here that Kant brings in the notion of

(Gemeinsinn), by which he expressly does not

sensus communis, defined as

necessity of the

"...a

as exemplifying a universal rule incapable of

In other words, every
beautiful.

necessity:

is

always by concept and never by feeling even

obscure, whereas the judgment of

which determines pleasure only by means

universal validity. Without this presupposition of

common

perhaps be better termed "common

is

feeling," there

no

common

of feeling

sense,

basis for

if

sense has a

and with

which would

assuming

a

judgment

of taste.

Kant gives
predicated

The

on the

a detailed justification for the existence of a

fact that

common

sense,

every one's mind operates in precisely the same fashion.

subjective condition of the act of

knowing

is

precisely the mental state

which

allows for universal communication and cognition. Without this subjective foundation,

knowledge could not

arise.

to the subjective nature

aware

This claim,

underlying

all

made

briefly in passing, points

objective judgments.

Kant

is

unambiguously

quite clearly

that:

cognitions are to admit of communication, then our mental state.. .from
which cognition is to result, must also admit of being universally
...if

49

CL

§18:237.

^See Gadamer, Truth and Method (pp.19-29), for a brief history
communis' and the changes it undergoes between Vico and Kant.

of the term 'sensus

92

communicated, as without this, which is the subjective condition of the
knowing, knowledge, as an effect, would not arise 51

act of

.

The underlying design

must be

means

universal.

of

what

is

essential to the mental activity of

Kant then expands

of a simple ratio.

Since

beings

this explanation for cognitive universality

knowledge

all

human

arises

by

out of differing ratios of action

(depending on the object) between imagination and understanding, as the one
arranges the manifold of sense and the other the unity of concept, there

corresponding relation between these two

is

a

faculties for cognition in general,

which can

only be determined by feeling and not concept:
Since...this disposition itself

hence also the feeling of

it

must admit
(in

of being universally

communicated, and

the case of a given representation), while again,

the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense: it
follows that our assumption of it is well founded. And here, too, we do not

our stand on psychological observations, but we assume a
sense as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of
our knowledge, which is presupposed in every logic and every principle of
knowledge that is not one of scepticism 52

have

to take

common

.

Since "...we tolerate no one else being of a different opinion

something as

beautiful, this

as a public sense.

fundamental feeling

Not everyone

will agree

beautiful, but the operative element here

is

thus an example of

common

norm provided by common
accordance with

it, is

sense

is

with

is

CL

§21:238.

52

CL

§21:239.

53

CL

§22:239.

when we

describe

introduced not as a private one but

my judgment

that something

that everyone ought to;

endowed with exemplary

judgment

validity.

The

is

of taste

ideal

sense serves as a presupposition for a judgment that, in

to be converted into a rule for everyone: the subjective principle

hereby assumes subjective universality. This universality

51

" 53

is

another foundation for the

93

judgment

of taste

and

provide the turning point for the conclusion of the

will

transcendental deduction, even though in this
describe the function of

common

sense.

and the

original faculty, or only

an

is

content merely to
is

a regulative principle

related question concerning

artificial

is

Whether common sense

principle of the possibility of experience or
principle of reason,

Moment Kant

whether

one, will be examined

later.

a constitutive

by

a

taste

At

still

is

higher

and

a natural

this point

Kant

is

not yet completely willing to allow such a subjective basis for judgment to stand as an
a priori universal rule.

3.

The Third Moment
The Third Moment,

that of relation, presents us with

complicated aspects of Cf, and

is

some

of the

more

the most ambitious of the four Moments. The

lengthy discussion about the form of

finality or

purposiveness (Zweckmassigkeit)

is

of

great importance to Kant's attempt to define the nature of the beautiful. In this
section,

Kant

first

provides a definition of finality and then argues for the key position

of finality in mediating

between

taste

covered by

and

this

between

taste

perfection; finally

Moment

and beauty. Next he discusses the relationship
he addresses the

taste.

The

sections

(§§10-17) can be seen as a significant part of his rather

fragmented central argument, namely the

judgments of

ideal of beauty.

justification of the universal validity of

94

Kant begins by establishing

An end

is

respect of

Object

its

we

When

through a concept.

The

will

is

"finality:”

ground

is

finality

of

it

possibility);

(forma

finalis).

and the

regarded as the cause

is

causality of a concept in

54

imagine a purpose or end in an object, by which Kant means the

real existence of the object

also tied to the

and

the object of a concept so far as this concept

of the object (the real

In other words,

definitions for "end"

human

and not
a

just

purpose

action

is

our cognition of

it,

which can only be thought

tied to the rule-giving

which supplies the concept and thereby

the faculty of desire insofar as the faculty of desire
7

concepts; by 'concept

is

meant

or purpose. However, there

nature of a concept,

is

is

to

human

it is

will.

determinable through

that the representation acts in accordance with an end
a very important exception to this:

But an Object, or state of mind, or even an action may, although its possibility
does not necessarily presuppose the representation of an end, be called final
simply on account of its possibility being only explicable and intelligible for us
by virtue of an assumption on our part of a fundamental causality according to
ends, i.e. a will that would have so ordained it according to a certain
represented rule. Finality, therefore, may exist apart from an end, in so far as
we do not locate the causes of this form in a will, but yet are able to render the
explanation of its possibility intelligible to ourselves only by deriving it from a
will.

That

is

55

to say, the formal organization

can be sufficient

action to be considered purposive even

when, so

far as

for

an

object, state of

we know,

it

mind

or

does not have a

purpose. The purposiveness can be based on the formal pattern alone, regardless of

whether the object

actually has a purpose.

Kant has hereby shown

how he

arrives at

Zweck der Gegenstand eines Begriffs, sofem dieser als die
Ursache von jenem (der reale Grund seiner Moglichkeit) angesehen wird; und die
Kausalitat eines Begriffs in Ansehung seines Objekts is die Zweckmassigkeit (forma

^CL

§10:220.

"...so ist

finalis)" (B32,A32).

In light of the difficulties of and differences in translation of "Zweck" and
"Zweckmassigkeit" discussed in detail above (FN 3), I have given the German so as to
show more precisely how Kant himself uses the terms.
55

C1, §10:220.
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the famous phrase of "Zweckmassigkeit ohne Zweck," of purposiveness without

purpose. The 'Zweckmassigkeit/

it

must be

stressed, refers to the form.

It is

not

purposiveness in general but that of form which can be observed by means of
reflection in objects

Now

that he has

unaccompanied by
taste.

without being accompanied by a purpose.

shown how

a purpose,

possible to have purposiveness

it is

Kant uses

this as the

foundation of the judgment of

Taste can rest neither on objective cognitive grounds nor on purely subjective

grounds, for such a source of delight would imply

interest.

Only the

or purposiveness of bare form unaccompanied by any end can

elicit

subjective finality

a delight

which

is

universally communicable apart from any concept. This delight, which accompanies

the judgement of taste, rests

on

a priori

grounds simply because

purely internal interaction between different

faculties,

it is

a result of a

and has nothing

to

do with

external experience:

The consciousness

of

mere formal

finality in the play of the cognitive faculties

of the Subject attending a representation

pleasure

itself,

because

it

in respect of the quickening of

causality (which

is final)

whereby an

object

is

given,

is

the

involves a determining ground of the Subjecf s activity
its

cognitive powers, and thus an internal

in respect of cognition generally, but without being

limited to a definite cognition,
finality of a representation in

and consequently a mere form
56
an aesthetic judgement

of the subjective

.

Plainly put, apprehension of the bare finality of form

is

the pure

judgment

of taste

which determines beauty.
Judgments

of taste exemplify pure aesthetic

however, empirical aesthetic judgments which judge sensations and are

There are

also,

material.

Only beauty, the pure

judgment

of taste proper.

“CL

judgments and are formal only.

§12:222.

aesthetic judgment, can be considered the formal

Beauty as a pure judgment of

taste is completely

removed

96

from both emotion and charm;
as well as that of perfection.

and perfection

is

it is

also

The good

independent of the representation of the good
is

the external objective finality of an object

the internal objective finality of an object.

estimated on the ground of a subjective formal

By

contrast, beauty

finality, a finality

'Zweckmassigkeit ohne Zweck/ As a subjective formal

finality,

is

the absolutely disinterested delight produced by the

apart from an end,

beauty involves no

thought of a perfection of the object because the only thing that
subject

is

is

being

harmony

felt

by the

in the play of

the mental powers. Kant here links these two very important concepts, that of
disinterested delight (uninteressiertes Wohlgefallen)

purpose (Zweckmassigkeit ohne Zweck). This

is

a

and purposiveness without

major contribution

to the

systematization of aesthetic theory, and will be examined in more detail
In order to clarify our perspective, another

division of beauty into the categories of free

new

contribution by Kant, the

and dependent, must be reviewed. Free

beauty presupposes no concept of what the object should be and

What

belongs to

it

are the purest examples of the

judgment

is

self-subsisting.

Dependent

of taste.

beauty presupposes both a concept and an answering perfection of the
conditioned beauty and covers everything related to

Having made

beautiful.

this distinction,

any

object

which contains meaning

also presents a certain northeastern
birds, designs

with no (apparent)

are free beauties.

humans

human

Kant then proceeds

he means, revealing the extreme formality of
since

is

his aesthetic

fit

is

it is

deemed

its

pure form,

consigned to a lesser sort of beauty.

meaning

all

a

examples of what

to give

He

flowers, brightly-plumaged

represent nothing and therefore

In general, things of nature which appear to have

are considered to

object;

beings which

system in

European parochialism:

intrinsic

later.

no

utility for

the requirements needed for a pure judgment of taste.
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All

human-related beauty, which presupposes a concept of the end that defines what

the thing has to be, and therefore a concept of

dependent beauty, an

Kant

is

now

its

perfection,

is

to be considered

inferior sort.

own

caught in a trap of his

making, another example of the

breadth of his vision coupled with a foundation too narrow and formal to

accommodate what he

is

really trying to unveil.

beauty generated by the pure judgment of

how

beauty can have a

dependent,

it is

The

taste is

priori universal validity.

abstract formalism of the free

empty

When

which

arises

taste gains in the sense that

respect to final objects

it

when

the delight

beauty

is

considered

based on a concept. In

is

has rules prescribed for

which contain

a perfection

i.e.

of the beautiful with the

good ." 57

it

and thus becomes

answering

sure, these are not rules of taste but rather are rules

become an

meaning but does explain

because the pure aesthetic delight has become mixed with an

intellectual delight,

with reason,

of

which

this case,

fixed with

to the concept.

establish

"...a

To be

union of

taste

This can enable the beautiful to

intentional instrument with respect to the good.

Even though,

as

he has

painstakingly shown, beauty does not gain by perfection, nevertheless:

The truth

is

rather this,

when we compare

the representation through which

given to us with the Object (in respect of what it is meant to be) by
means of a concept, we cannot help reviewing it also in respect of the sensation
in the Subject. Hence there results a gain to the entire faculty of our
representative power when harmony prevails between both states of mind.^

an object

is

After having insisted

on the

desirability of completely free, untainted beauty,

almost surreptitiously admits to the value of adding

human meaning

to

Kant

now

something

considered beautiful. In this way, he attempts to bridge the subjective-objective gap.

57

Cl

§16:230.

^CL

§16:231.
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Of

course, the whole

work attempts

to cover the

gap between nature and freedom,

understanding and reason, object and subject, but there are two different approaches
to this challenge.

taste,

through

of objects

its

The

first is

the stated goal: to

pure disinterestedness,

and the world

of freedom,

is

show how

the aesthetic judgment of

the intermediary between the natural world

by virtue

of the feeling of pleasure elicited

by the

free play of the cognitive faculties as they

respond to the 'Zweckmassigkeit ohne

Zweck'

described as beautiful.

in the form of the object

The second approach
often alluded
subject

itself

grounds the

to,

is

object.

I

subject-object gap can only be bridged within the

maintain that Kant's reversal here (and in other places) can only

latter

Kant almost subliminally

force with

approach. The dry, completely formal definition of beauty
it

completely avoids any sort of

meaning

for

audience, judgments of taste cannot provide the all-encompassing unifying

which Kant wants

capabilities are

to

endow them. To be

grounded

in the subject,

which Kant had hoped

Taste

is

an

is

beautiful.

calls

all

human

taste

study of

to achieve in his

no

faculties

and

cannot provide the
this cognitive faculty.

objective rule of taste

which defines

Nevertheless, there seems to be a universal

communicability of delight or aversion that
products of taste which Kant

how

sure, they can formally hold the

judgments of

original faculty; there can be

by means of concepts what

own

is

human meaning and

realizes that, unless a beautiful object contains

structure together but, unless they demonstrate

synthesis

is

because the subject, and not some transcendental noumenal world,

unsatisfying precisely because

human

is

the one Kant never explicitly mentions but which

namely that the

be explained by the

its

which

exists

without concept, for there are

'exemplar/ (exemplarisch). Each person has in her

consciousness an archetype (Urbild) of

taste,

an

idea, against

which

all

other

99
objects of taste are measured.

The idea

is

a concept of reason; ideals represent

individual existence which are adequate to a given idea. The question which then
arises

how an

is

ideal of the beautiful arises

from the indeterminate idea of an

archetype of taste (Urbild des Geschmacks). To begin with,
free

beauty but must be fixed by
...where

an

ideal

is

to

a

concept of objective

it

cannot be an ideal of
This implies that:

finality.

have place among the grounds upon which any estimate

formed, then beneath grounds of that kind there must lie some idea of
reason according to determinate concepts, by which the end underlying the
internal possibility of the object is determined a priori... .Only what has in itself
the end of its real existence-only man that is able himself to determine his ends
by reason.. .among all the objects in the world, admits therefore, of an ideal of
beauty, just as humanity in his person, as intelligence, alone admits of the ideal

is

of perfection

59
.

Although Kant has made
disinterested

quite clear that a pure

it

and thus could not be

ideal of the beautiful,

judgment of

related to the good, that

which can only be found

in the

is,

human

taste

to

had

moral

to

be

interest, the

figure, "...consists in the

expression of the moral, apart from which the object would not please at once
60

universally and positively ."

What we have

at the

end

of this

Immediately after having shown that

Moment

human

is

several paradoxical conclusions.

beauty

is

moral, Kant defines beauty as derived from the Third
in

an

object, so far as perceived in

it

inextricably linked with the

Moment

as "...the

form

of finality

."
apart from the representation of an end

61

This again reflects his distinction between dependent and free beauty. Free beauty,

it

that
turns out, might be the more systematic and formal, but Kant unwillingly realizes

W CL

§17:233.

^CL

§17:235.

61

CL

§17:236.
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it is

empty

of meaning, hence the exception of beautiful things related to

human

ideals.

This distinction between free and dependent beauty also illuminates Kant's attempt to

bridge the subjective-objective gap discussed above. Through the extreme formalism of
his analysis of free beauty,

and

which must universally

elicit

both a disinterested pleasure

a feeling of purposiveness without purpose, the latter arising

from the

the imagination and the understanding, beauty can be objectified in

Because

this pleasure arises

all

free play of

but name.

from a purely subjective procedure, precisely from the

free

play of our cognitive faculties, the basis for the a priori universal feeling which allows

us to recognize the beautiful must be subjective. However, since
the cognitive faculties have their interaction in

determines the dominant faculty changes,

judgment accounts

for

an

this free play,

a priori subjective foundation,

the understanding and reason gives

rise to

the theoretical existence of free play, there

Once

common, although

an
is

which
is

the

the ratio which

in the faculty of

same

free play

a priori objective foundation.

no accounting

for

between

relations

all

any land

which

in

Without

of knowledge.

again, Kant's theory of beauty points to the absolute priority of the subjective in

determining the objective.

D. The 'Analytic of the Sublime'
In the 'Analytic of the Sublime'

been trying

to

unpack

in the

we

can see more clearly what

Four Moments,

it is

for in the 'Deduction of

that

Kant has

Pure Aesthetic

Judgments,' specifically in sections 30-40, he retraces the mental path he has been
following,

if

somewhat haphazardly,

remarks in Critique of Pure Reason

The explanation
objects

I

Four Moments. As Kant

:

which concepts can thus
transcendental deduction; and from it

of the

entitle their

in his discussion of the

manner

in

relate a priori to
I

distinguish

101

which shows the manner in which a concept is acquired
through experience and through reflection upon experience, and which
therefore concerns, not its legitimacy, but only its de facto mode of

empirical deduction,

origination.

62

That an aesthetic judgment claims universal
principle

which

in turn

must be

able to be

must be grounded on an

validity

a priori

deduced transcendentally. The empirical

deduction has already been established in the Second Moment:

judgement of taste, with its attendant consciousness of detachment from
must involve a claim to validity for all men, and must do so apart
from universality attached to Objects, i.e. there must be coupled with it a claim

...the

interest,

all

to subjective universality.

63

But to believe that something lays claim to universality and
that this

is

the case are not the same thing. The judgment of taste

what needs

to

be proved

64

the form of an object."

A

is

which expresses

beautiful')

to necessity

is

subjective finality of

Proving

this is

cognitive

all

objects.

In the

first

knowledge and

and second

is

('this is

an empirical representation of

complicated for several reasons.

a necessary

peculiarities of the

in

such a judgment everyone must

thing of beauty, as

convince

me

this

if it

of the beauty of

CPR, A85,B117.

CL

m CL

an

judgment

§6:212.

§31:281.

how

feel the

quality;

object, for

apparent contradiction,

62

63

were an objective

is it

my

is

the

element for the comprehension of
of taste (§32-3),

outlines the difficulty in deducing the a priori nature of judgments of taste.

one hand,

prove

in that

major problem revolves around the use of the term 'concept/ which

basis for

Given

to

unusual

the universal validity of a single judgment
"...the

and

same

Kant

On

the

disinterested delight in a

on the other hand, no proof can

response

is

personal and subjective.

possible to prove that the

judgment

of

102
taste

is

based on an a

whose purpose

to

is

show how

must

this contradiction

judgment

priori principle?

first

In order to effect a transcendental deduction,

a priori principles are essential to

be removed. Kant does

of taste (§56-7), located

this in the

in the T>ialectic of Aesthetic

judgments

of taste,

antinomy of the

Judgment/ However,

in terms of the coherence of the argument, the a priori nature of taste can be

more

easily

if

shown

the antinomy has already been resolved: hence the antinomy will be

considered next.

1.

The antinomy

A

of taste

Kantian antinomy

is

an apparent

conflict of reason, a set of

arguments where

each begins with an accepted and necessary premise and yet the conclusions contradict
each other. Arguments about the nature of
there are

own

two

taste'

grounds

basic

and

commonplaces held

'there

for the

is

taste

show

be true concerning

to

no disputing about

taste.'

In the

agreement of others since the judgment

second case, although an objective determining ground
into a dispute

when

arguments about

may be

first

taste are a fact, the

it

one has

case, there are

his

no

purely subjective; in the

is

is

taste: 'every

implied,

definite concepts are there to be disputed.

dispute about taste, one cannot reduce

"...there

a manifest contradiction, for

to a definite concept.

second commonplace

is

one can only enter

Since one cannot

However,

since

better expressed as:
65

contention about taste (although not a dispute)."

This claim

is

the

intermediary between the two above-mentioned commonplaces, namely that everyone

has her

«CL

own

taste

§56:338.

(B233,A230).

and that there

"...iiber

is

no disputing about

den Geschmack

taste (the

determining ground

lasst sich streiten (obgleich nicht disputieren)

103
is

objective but not reducible to concepts), although

the

commonplace,

first

agreement. Kant

now

for

it

it is

at the

same time contrary

to

holds out the possibility of coming to some terms of

has the antinomy clearly before him:

1. Thesis. The judgement of taste is not based upon concepts; for, if
it were, it
would be open to dispute (decision by means of proofs).
2. Antithesis. The judgement of taste is based on concepts; for otherwise,
despite the diversity of judgement, there could be no room even for contention

in the matter (a claim to the necessary agreement of others with this

judgement). 66

He

solves

once

this

it

is

by showing that 'concept7

is

not used in the same sense in the two claims;

correctly understood the illusion of contradiction can be seen for

what

it

is.

When

one makes the claim

concept as well, for without a concept

it

to claim necessary validity for everyone.

judgment

of taste, the

way

understand what

to

would be impossible
But

if

is

a concept,

meant by

of taste refers to a concept does not imply that

Even though the judgment
non-cognitive,
private

it

in that

feeling of pleasure"

67
:

67

CL

§57:339.

for the

judgment

proof.

one assumes that there

'concept.'

it

it is

of taste

a concept at the base of a

is

So as

to

more

Simply because a judgment

must be proven from

a concept.

of taste applies to objects of sense, since the

judgment

It is

is

a purely

a "...singular representation of intuition referable to the

everyone has her

taste contains "...beyond

§56:338.

is

implied and hence a

does not determine a concept for the understanding.

judgment

“CL

there

is

judgment could then be determined by cognitive

account for the unavoidable existence of

than one

an object

'this is beautiful,'

own

taste.

However,

since the

judgment

of

doubt an enlarged reference on the part of the representation

104
of the Object (and at the

same time on the

part of the Subject also),"68

presupposes that such judgments necessarily extend

to everyone.

immediately obvious, partially because

on any

it

cannot

rest

it is

Why

this

this

is

which
so

not

is

sort of logical proof.

Kant,

however, bases his claim of the necessity of the enlarged reference presupposed by the

judgment

of taste

upon some

sort of concept:

such a concept as does not admit of being determined by intuition, and
no knowledge of anything. Hence, too, it is a concept which does not
afford any proof of the judgment of taste. But the mere pure rational concept

...but

affords

of the supersensible lying at the basis of the object (and of the judging Subject
for that matter) as Object of sense, and thus as phenomenon, is just such a

concept.

means

For unless such a point of view were adopted there would be no

of saving the claim of the

The concept cannot be one

judgment

of taste to universal validity.

of the understanding, for then the

be subject to empirical proof, would be cognitive. The only
cognitive concept that has a universal validity
singular,

is

to

the concept of

assume

that the determining

what may be regarded

The antinomy
thesis claims that the

is

which

ground

of taste

possibility for a

would

non-

nevertheless subjective and

of the concept

"...lies,

perhaps, in

as the supersensible substrate of humanity."

70

then easily solved by qualifying the nature of the concept: the

judgment

antithesis claims that the

of taste

judgment

is

not based on determinate concepts; the

of taste

is

based on an indeterminate concept,

namely the supersensible substrate which underlies

which the

is

judgment

69

all

phenomena. The only way

in

riddle of the faculty of taste can be solved, the "unique key" ("der einzige

Schliissel der Entratselung"

“CL

§57:339.

^CL

§57:340.

70

CL

71

KU, B238,A235.

§57:340.

71
),

must be the

"...indeterminate idea of the supersensible

105

within us,"

72

what Kant

calls

the subjective principle.

antinomies in CPR, the only possible solution
sensible, for only in the supersensible can

where reason

faculties,

is

lies

beyond the boundaries

one postulate the

brought into harmony with

attempts to the contrary notwithstanding, Kant
that the essence of

human

subjectivity in

the interaction of our faculties.

What

In other words, as in the

is

a priori

This

itself.

union of

human

to say that,

all

repeatedly forced to the conclusion

some mysterious way provides

of particular note here

is

is

of the

is

that

the answer to

Kant does not

simply refer to the supersensible in general, but to the supersensible within us, an

unambiguous acknowledgment

some

that the supersensible realm

is

in itself

no more valuable than

both are ultimately grounded on the

human

not meant to allude to

Simply because one gains cognitive knowledge from

external metaphysical level.

a concept

is

mind, morals or aesthetic

aesthetic or subjective knowledge, since

faith that there

sensibilities

assumption, a cognitive judgment

is

of

is

an ordered system

work. Without

this

no more value than an

2.

some

to the

aesthetic judgment,

some

common

sort of substrate

of the

judgment

of taste

antinomy makes the grounds

common

to

CL

all

sense (sensus communis), but

antinomy. The question which Kant

72

§57:341-

and

the structure

is

of the transcendental

deduction easier to follow because the unifying thread of the deduction
of

the

external proof.

The transcendental deduction

The solution

how

underlying

both are equally capable of being universal, since what they depend on
of the self rather than

to

is

humanity. This
it is

is

perhaps best

posing in the

first

is

the notion

what Kant means by

illustrated as

and second

it

appears in the

peculiarities of

106

the judgment of taste (§32-3)
critical

How

philosophy:

judgments of
displeasure,

none other than

a

form of the general problem of

are synthetic a priori judgments possible?

from the

arises inevitably

is

peculiarities (and the antinomy), for

This question

on the one hand

cannot be proved but are based on disinterested pleasure or

taste

and on the other hand the claim

for universal validity

would imply

a

conceptual foundation. In other words:

How

judgement possible which, going merely upon the individual's own
an object independent of the concept of it, estimates this
as a pleasure attached to the representation of the same Object in every other
individual, and does so a priori, i.e. without being allowed to wait and see if
73
other people will be of the same mind?
is

a

feeling of pleasure in

That judgments of
of the object

is

taste are synthetic

a feeling.

But

how

is

are they to be

Kant has already covered much

judgment
there.

clear, for the predicate joined to the intuition

shown

to

be a priori?

of the proof for the a priori nature of the

of taste in the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' but has not explicitly organized

The presentation

and the deduction
notes the

critical

All that

it

in the 'Analytic of the Sublime'

itself is

extremely short

(§38).

is

not

much

In the 'Remark'

it

better organized

on the deduction, he

assumption:
[the deduction] holds out for

is

that

we

are justified in presupposing

judgment which we find in ourselves are
universally present in every man, and further that we have rightly subsumed
74
the given Object under these conditions.

that the

same

subjective conditions of

By combining the information given
antinomy

^CL
74

CL

of taste,

§36:288.

§38:290.

it is

in the 'Analytic of the Beautiful'

possible to reconstruct

how

the deduction

and

in the

would look had Kant

107
carefully

enumerated the steps instead

of mulling

them over

in the rather formless

fashion in which they are presented.

There are three basic premises to his deduction

judgment

of taste.

third in the Third

Premise

1:

75

The

first

Moment,

2:

Moment and

are to be found in the Second

the

as well as in the 'Analytic of the Sublime':

Pleasure in the beautiful must be based on a universally

communicable mental
Premise

two

for the a priori nature of the

A

state.

communicable mental

universally

state

must be based on the

cognitive faculties being harmoniously related in free play.

Premise 3: The harmony of the cognitive powers must be based upon the mere
formal purposiveness of the object.

Once
to

this

much

judgments

meant

a

has been granted, Kant can conclude that thefe

of taste

which

concept-bound

is

based on the notion of

human

common

is

an a

sense,

priori validity

by which

is

not

understanding but rather a public sense:

Conclusion: The pleasure in the beautiful is thus based on that subjective
element (common sense) which we can presuppose in all men, since it is
necessary for all possible cognition.
This sensus communis, which Kant wants to translate as "gemeinschaftlicher Sinn," a

sense based on the community of humankind, reaches beyond the subjective or
personal considerations of the individual;

it is

the

same

as the "supersensible substrate

of humanity" alluded to in the resolution of the antinomy.

conditions of the possibility of a cognition in general"

with judgments of

am

taste.

In fact,

Kant maintains

76

this characteristic

that:

here following Crawford's reconstruction of the transcendental deduction.
,

CL

contains "...subjective

and shares

For his summary, see Kant's Aesthetic Theory pp.66-68.
76

It

§39:292.
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We

might even define

what makes our feeling
communicable without the mediation of a

taste as the faculty of estimating

in a given representation universally
concept....

Taste is, therefore, the faculty of forming an a priori estimate of the
communicability of the feelings that, without the mediation of a concept, are
connected with a given representation. 77
Taste has

now become

identified

with the universal communicability of the feeling of

pleasure based on the underlying public sense which

shown

has

to his satisfaction that

perfectly justified in

same

the

someone
will

He does

an object

beautiful, that

beings share. Kant

claims that something

human

all

human

beautiful,

is

he

is

beings will also agree with him and

feel

leave open the possibility that, although

judgment has been

incorrectly

subsumed and

not receive universal acclaim. This leaves a significant amount of leeway in

judgments of

taste, for

disinterested?

The

how

one

is

to

Kant does not address

his elaboration

3.

assuming that

disinterested delight.

calls

when he

all

relation

on the

relation

between

taste

know when
this.

her feeling of pleasure

is

truly

Instead, he further obfuscates the issue in

between beauty and morality which he now

gives.

and morality

Kant shows in sections 42 and 59-60 how the

feeling of the

judgment

of taste

is

exacted from everyone as a sort of moral duty. For the purpose at hand, that

argument
is

will

not be considered in depth.

What

is clear,

however,

is

that

Kant himself

not consistent about the kind of objects which are judged beautiful. Whereas

initially

only things bearing no relation to

were examples

human

beings (that

of free beauty, in the ’Analytic of the Sublime

longer such a thing as free beauty, for anyone

^C], §40:295-6.

who

takes

is,

it

objects of nature)

seems as

"...an interest in

if

there

is

no

the beautiful
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in nature

can only do so in so

far as

he has previously

set his interest

deep in the

foundations of the morally good." 78 The sticking point which Kant always has to
return to
beings.

is

that whatever might be considered beautiful

Since the moral component of what

element of

human

it

means

free play of the

understanding and imagination which

nature, and since

it is

this supersensible

validates the a priori nature of judgments of taste
taste are inextricably linked

now

Kant has

an

a priori

is

is

realm in which the

common

based,

it is

to

all

and which

thus inevitable that

with a moral sense even though, as Kant

On

is

the

disinterested.

completed what might be considered a

volte-face.

In the Third

of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' he stresses the purity of free beauty as the

epitome of the

free play of the cognitive faculties.

dependent and impure. Only natural beauty can
delight

is

does not imply that the beautiful has an interest in the good.

contrary, true beauty

Moment

human

human

action and belongs to that supersensible substrate that defines the

human

stresses, this

judged so by

to be

very essence of

judgments of

is

on the

part of the spectator.

Human-related beauty
elicit this

Now, however,

it

Kant

judgments of

considered

completely disinterested

appears that only one

already has what might be called a good moral disposition
in nature;

is

is

who

capable of seeing beauty

states that "...the delight in beautiful art does not, in the pure

taste,

involve an immediate interest, as does that in beautiful nature..."

79

This inconsistency results from the inherent difficulty of the subject matter~Kant
himself hopes

may

"...that

the difficulty of unravelling a problem so involved in

serve as an excuse for a certain

78

79

C1, §42:300

Cl

§42:301.

amount

its

of hardly avoidable obscurity in

nature

its

110
solution..."

80

Paradoxical as

all this

sounds,

not inconsistent with other central

it is

aspects of the critique, most notably that of 'Zweckmassigkeit

problem

arises

because Kant

is

can expand into a universal, a

work by moving

only

trying to explain

noumenal

called the

The discussion on the judgment
interaction

and

is

human

Kant must

is,

the creator, the

work and

of

work deserves

4.

The work

to

first

of fine art

and the

is

nature

is

it is

art

it is

that a

judgment
'fine art

7

of taste

made,

is

(schone Kunst)

namely the genius. Being the systematic

common

Now

taste.

and how

it

thread which pulls together

he can begin

comes

to

is

a product that has

to isolate

what kind

be created.

been created through an

a product of forces not under the control of

a free act based

abstract, focussing

role of the genius

Art, in contrast to nature,

will;

remained quite

an object representing

discover the

the judge:

be called fine

and can

realm of the supersensible, what

of taste has

creator of such a work,

thinker that he

logically impossible,

required in order to respond appropriately to a

his attention to the criteria of

to the

is

realm.

Once Kant has determined how

beautiful object.

he turns

which

a disinterested, subjective feeling

The task

priori system.

to a supra-logical realm, the

Kant has in other works

on the mental

how

ohne Zweck/ The

on reason, and

a

work

of art

is

human

will.

An

act of

act of will

thus a production through freedom.

Art (Kunst) must also be distinguished from science (Wissenschaft); the former

human
This

is

ability, a practical faculty

not to suggest that the division

of art to

80

(Konnen) whereas the

have a compulsory character,

C], Preface 170.

is

latter is

absolute, for indeed

"...a

a

is

knowledge (Wissen).

it is

essential for a

mechanism, without which the soul

work
[Geist],

Ill

which

in art

must be

and evanescent." 81

free,

and which alone gives

Kant divides

art into

possible object to the cognition of

which

life

mechanical
it is

to the

art,

adequate..."

work, would be bodyless

which
82

tries "...to actualize a

and aesthetic

which

art,

gives rise to an immediate feeling of pleasure. Aesthetic art can then be sub-divided
into agreeable

and

fine art arises not

fine art

(angenehme und schone Kunst). The pleasure induced by

from organic sensation but from

reflective

judgment. Kant defines

fine art as:
...a mode of representation which is intrinsically final, and which, although
devoid of an end, has the effect of advancing the culture of the mental powers
in the interests of social communication. 83

In this case,

what

is

the pleasure which

Now

meant by

social

communication

is

universal communicability of

is elicited.

that fine art has been separated from other forms of

the relationship between nature and fine

art.

This

is

art,

Kant investigates

of particular interest because of

the confusion between nature, art and morality alluded to earlier: in the 'Analytic of
the Beautiful'

it

had seemed

as

if

only nature could exhibit pure, free beauty, but

this

contention became increasingly cloudy with the introduction of the moral to

judgments of
interest.

84

taste,

whereupon Kant claimed

Kant approaches

this interrelation

that only beautiful art

from

CL

§43:304.

82

CL

§44:305.

83

Q/

§44:306.

^See CL

§42.

earlier contention

any

clearer:

Vorstellungsart, die fur sich selbst zweckmassig ist, und
dennoch die Kultur der Gemiitskrafte zur geselligen Mitteilung

"...eine

obgleich ohne Zweck,
befordert" (B178/A176).

untainted by

a fresh angle, completely leaving

out the moral aspect which does not, however, make his

8,

is

112

A product of fine art must be recognized to be art and not nature.
Nevertheless the finality in its form must appear just as free from the constraint
of arbitrary rules as if it were a product of mere nature.. ..Nature proved
to be
beautiful when it wore the appearance of art; and art can only be termed
beautiful, where we are conscious of its being art, while yet it has the
appearance of nature. 85

By having the appearance
intentional,

of nature

must not seem

as

if

Kant means that

must not appear

fine art

the artist has been following rules of form.

The

free

play of the cognitive faculties as they apprehend the final form of the object under

consideration must not be hampered by any trace of the

although recognized as

art,

human

presence of the

artist;

the finality of the product "...must be clothed with the

aspect of nature..." 86

There
fulfills

is

only one kind of person

these qualities: one

who

is

who

is

capable of producing an artwork that

endowed with

genius. Kant defines genius as

innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to
This clear statement once again raises the question: what exactly

everything that

way we

is

is

art."

is

not human, and, as already seen, appears organized because of the

basic impulse of our reflective judgment.

it

87

nature? Nature

cognize the world and because of the striving towards unity which

Occasionally

"...the

But what

it

really

is

cannot be

is

the

said.

shines through our ordered cognition and stops our thinking as

we

recognize some fundamental pattern of the world, but the essence of nature cannot be

put into words. Since fine

art, as a

product, must presuppose a rule, and yet

judgments of beauty cannot be derived from a

85

CL

§45:306.

^CL

§45:307.

^CL

§46:307.

rule

which

is

determined by a concept
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(that

is,

an

essential

object),

harmony

happen through

a

Kant draws the conclusion that
of the cognitive faculties,

human

vehicle

who

it is

nature, as manifested in the

which gives the

acts or creates

without knowing

have entered her head: the genius. Genius produces that
can be given, and
art

and not

is

original;

science.

is

exemplary and not

rule to art.

for

imitative;

Genius cannot be learned. The greatest

would eventually happen because they

which no

This can only

how

the ideas

definite rule

can only be attributed

to

scientific discoveries

are waiting to be uncovered, but true poetry

can never be taught:
In matters of science, therefore, the greatest inventor differs only in degree
from the most laborious imitator and apprentice, whereas he differs specifically

from one endowed by nature

for fine art.
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In deference to great scientific achievements, Kant maintains that scientists are superior

whereas science continually advances towards ever greater perfection

to geniuses, for

in

knowledge,

"...genius reaches a point at

limit

imposed upon

limit

has in

all

it

which

probability

it

which

cannot transcend."

been long since
is

genius as there

Whatever the

of science.
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must make

He

attained."

every individual so endowed
is

art

a halt, as there

is

a

then curiously adds: "This

Since genius

is

not

serial, in that

unique, there cannot be an ever increasing product of
rule

is

which genius

furnishes,

it

can only

serve as a model which can be followed and handed down, whereas a scientific rule
serves as a foundation

upon which

ever larger edifices can be

built.

This

is

not to

suggest that the products of genius are completely free-floating, for the material
furnished by genius must then be

mechanical or academic training.

^CL
89
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hewn

into form,

and

this elaboration requires a

14

1

In order to

judge a beautiful object,

natural beauty and fine

genius

is

art.

The

leads Kant to

make

is

a claim

Schopenhauer, namely that

which
in

while

latter, for

a beautiful

needed. This

is

manifold

art lies a

in a

thing."**’

judging the beauty of

concept of what the thing

By contrast,

1

is

because

this

and

to be,

to appreciate

be pleased by the pure form. Here again,

we

This differentiation

it

at the

"...the

as

beauty

in

its

foundation of a

agreement of the

end constitutes the

nature one need only

to

keep the one

formal so as to give to the other the means to express whatever
tell

a beautiful

see Kant struggling with the distinction

between natural and human-created beauty, trying

trying to

that

the perfection of the thing

art,

thing with an inner character belonging to

perfection of the thing."’

is

is

be strongly disputed by Schelling and

must be taken into consideration. Kant maintains
product of

of beauty

beauty of nature

"[a]

representation of a
will

the case for both

is

between these two types

difference

required to produce the

thing; beauty of art

taste

it

is

free

and purely

that nature

is

us about ourselves and our relation to the incoherent world behind the

ordered appearance.

l'„

Conclusion:
of the

In this

Two

meaning

different interpretations

of the

work

examination of the nature, power and

of art

limits of

judgment undertaken

in

to the
the Critique of ludgment, Kant points unequivocally in the direction which leads

establishment of the reflective judgment as the basis for
also as the unifying force

^CL

§48:311.
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all

judgment, and therefore

between the subject and the natural world, between

art

and
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Kant, however, has been trying to establish a bridge between nature and

nature.

freedom, the

latter

term referring

moral realm. Consequently, any

specifically to the

thing which might represent this bridge must be in conformity with the moral law,

which

is

fulfills

these qualifications:

a result of freedom.

The

faculty of taste, the

means

of judging the beautiful,

Taste makes, as

it were, the transition from the charm of sense to habitual
moral interest possible without too violent a leap, for it represents the
imagination, even in its freedom, as amenable to a final determination for
understanding, and teaches us to find, even in sensuous objects, a free delight
apart from any charm of sense 92
.

Rather than seeing

Kant

is

more

reflective

interested in

judgment

the world can be discovered by

ways

all

human

showing how the moral law imposes

Both these ways of interpreting

cognitive ability.

these two

as undergirding

means

of the

work

of art

of regarding the

who we

work
is

of art.

are

its

cognitive ability,

form on

and how we

The

difference

all

human

relate to

between

one of emphasis. Although the

elements required for both standpoints are to be found in the Critique of judgment,

Kant chooses

to introduce moral considerations as

an integral part of the work

of art,

thereby undermining the radical aspect of the claims about the nature of subjectivity

he

is

simultaneously making.

What

is

clear

is

the related nature of aesthetics and of the moral, for both are

rooted in a realm about which

we can know

nothing, but which

providing the essence for our beliefs about what
in the introductory chapter,

predominantly moral.

He

uphold the existence of

92
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a

Kant regards

has

shown

this

it

means

to

we

designate as

be human. As explained

noumenal realm

of

freedom as

a consistent effort in his critical

noumenal world

precisely so that

he can

philosophy to

justify the
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coterminous existence of both determinate causal necessity in the world of appearances

and the freedom

of choice necessary for

making moral judgments.

It is

not surprising

therefore, that the aesthetic judgment, the bridge

between nature and freedom, should

display a strong moral component.

is

The

situation

impetus behind the Critique of Pure Reason

Kant

.

somewhat analogous
initially

wanted

to the

an

to find

intermediary position between metaphysical claims and empirical claims but ends up

responding primarily

between nature and freedom
solution, a synthesis

As

I

direction in

have

Here, Kant wants to bridge the differences

to empirical claims.

which

(that

is,

nature and morality) and ends up with a moral

reveals the overarching influence of the moral law.

tried to indicate

throughout the analysis of Critique of judgment, the

which Kant's thinking

is

taking

him

leads to the conclusion that the

nature of subjectivity, the very essence of reflective judgment, grounds not only

determinate judgment and thereby both our

tendency

to organize the

however one wants
the

work

world

teleologically,

to interpret the

it

as

an underwater

but also our striving for freedom,

where the essence

means

to

reading on this a priori nature; the result

much

cognize objects and our

consequences of freedom, moral or otherwise.

of art, the product of genius,

the a priori nature of whatever

ability to

of subjectivity

be a subject. Kant needs to impose a moral
a disturbance in the

is

rip tide disturbs the

smooth flow

result of a completely disinterested feeling of pleasure or

the

moral framework,

it is

clear that

mind works, and thus how one can

lies in

the

noumenal realm,

It is

revealed,

is

thought process,

of the surface current.

Despite the ongoing battle over the nature of the beautiful, whether

arises in a

all

whether such

Kant believes he can

feel

it is

the

a feeling only

logically

prove

how

beauty. Since the basis for his conclusion

in the realm of unsubstantiated ideas,

Kant commits the
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warns against

error he
belief.

wants

in

CPR, namely accepting

This happens because Kant
to believe that,

feelings,

with enough concentrated

Something inexplicable within the

judgment, enables the subject
but does not believe

it

to

is

changing view of the

intellectual

a question

and continues

he does not answer.

legitimizes

it

and opens the

beautiful.

if

which he

power

he had not said

is clear,

is

but

why

field to

it is

those

that

The conclusion

the heart, irrational, whereas Kant

human

is

He

arrives speak

of reflective

it.

essentially states

That the world

is

our minds should work

this

unacceptable, or perhaps merely
inexplicable.

who

will dig

makes us

feel

Kant both

deeper into the workings of the

the

way we do when we

of his successors, Schelling

would have been dismissed by Kant. The model

rationality of

at

aesthetics into a systematic philosophical enterprise,

mind, to try to discover what

something

as

It is

uninteresting, that our tendency to order

By making

subject, the

self.

as

power, everything, even

make determinate judgments. Kant

ordered because out minds impose order

way

of a

can be cognitively explained. But the actual results

differently.

this,

on the cusp

is

what one can only accept

as fact

of the

human

call

and Schopenhauer,
being they imply

is,

the last true believer in the fundamental

beings and their belief structures. His path-breaking work on

aesthetics testifies to this.

at

CHAPTER

III

SCHELLING'S SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

(

1800 ):

THE WORK OF ART AS REFLECTION OF THE ABSOLUTE AND
AS HERALD OF A NEW AGE
A. Part
1.

One

Introduction

Kant7 s immense

and

effort to rethink

and

articulate

anew

the nature of knowledge,

his tripartite division of philosophical problems into cognition, ethics

aesthetics, activated

an immediate and engaged response. In

legitimation of the aesthetic realm conferred
so-called

Romantic Movement

especially in the

wake

by the Critique

is

particular, the

of

Tudgment provided the

in the early 19th century with philosophical justification,
7

of Schelling s reinterpretation of Kantian thought.

Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) occupies
thought and

and

a pivotal role in

German

Friedrich

idealistic

often described, along with his early mentor Fichte, as being a

transitional figure

between Kant and Hegel. This easy

dismissal,

however, does

Schelling a disservice. In particular, Schelling' s unique vision of the role of art

important key to understanding not only the concurrent
later philosophers, for

In this section,

work

movement but

an

also

example Nietzsche and Adorno.
I

concentrate almost exclusively on Schelling' s most complete

work. System of Transcendental Idealism
this

literary

is

1

(1800)

.

In order to understand the position

takes in the evolution of Schelling's thinking,

some personal and

trans. Peter Heath
^.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800),
to as STL The
referred
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978). Hereafter
German edition which I use is: System des transzendentalen Idealismus (Hamburg.

Felix

Meiner Verlag,

1957).
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philosophical background

is

necessary.

It is

Schelling differentiates himself from Kant,

also important to see in

and what

his goal

is

what way

in doing this.

Finally,

the primacy which he gives to the philosophy of art and to the artwork
provides a

novel and unique interpretation of the meaning of philosophy in general.

was

Schelling

a brilliant

young

student.

He

entered the Tubinger

Stift at

the

precocious age of fifteen and spent five years studying philosophy and theology in the

company

of Hegel

and Holderlin, among

French revolution and the philosophical
of immediate

and burning

Kant7 s work were

also

interest.

The

others.

effects of the

and Hegel

in Jena

examined and discussed in great

and Weimar was unique; the

and worked

lived

Kantian revolution were topics

Fichte's self-proclaimed attempts to complete

Tubingen. In 1798 Schelling received a professorship

atmosphere

political implications of the

other with a stimulating and

exchange of

at Jena.

7

s earliest

The

intellectual

Goethe

ideas.

Schelling thrived both

prolifically.

published works are strongly influenced by Fichte's identity

philosophy but he soon showed an increasing independence of thought and,
irritation of his

century.

2

to the

mentor, broke intellectually with Fichte around the turn of the

To go

his

own way,

however, meant that he needed

Kant himself, and not

Fichte's interpretation of Kant.

problem

and even more so

2

at

one another and provided each

personally and intellectually in this climate, and published
Schelling

by the students

Schlegels, Novalis, Schiller,

in close proximity to

critical

detail

to the reader

"Vom

come

to terms

with

Schelling presents a certain

to the non-reader of

Fichte's influence can clearly be seen in

to

German. He

is

accused

Ich als Prinzip der Philosophic"

Schelling had turned his attention to philosophy of nature; "Ideen zu
einer Philosophic der Nature" and in 1799 "Erster Entwurf eines Systems der
(1795).

By 1797

Naturphilosophie."
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by some

of constantly changing his focus but this apparent transmutation
can also be

interpreted as the manifestation of the breadth of his investigations into the nature
of

being,

which take him from

nature, to a philosophy of

a Fichtean principle of self-identity, to a philosophy of

art, to a

new mythology and

interpretation of the world, as he seeks to find a

way

finally to a theological

to unify

philosophy of the

natural world with philosophy of mind. While generalizations are always suspect,

with Schelling they are particularly problematic.
after 1812 Schelling published

ideas,

and

no books

When

combined with the

fact that

of length, instead using lectures to espouse his

that:

...the

early writings,

though extensive and to some extent very original, were in
by the work of Hegel, and were in any case more or

certain senses superseded
less

it is

repudiated by the author himself in his later period[,] 3

clear that there
/

Schelling

s

is

no

philosophy.

4

easily accessible

Schelling,

way

neatly to encapsulate the essence of

however, does provide us with one unique

interpretation of the nature of being and the purpose of philosophy, and this
radical claim

about

is

his

art.

Schelling's philosophy of art,

and more

specifically his

appear in System of Transcendental Idealism from 1800,
Schelling remained in Jena from 1798 until 1803, and

thoughts on the philosophical importance of

is

it is

views on

the focus of this study.

during

art coalesced.

art as they

this time that his

With the exception

of his

System, however, most of his ideas on art were presented in lecture form and are

to

be

Julian Roberts, German Philosophy: An Introduction (Atlantic Highlands:
Humanities Press International, Inc., 1988), p.123.
3

4

compounded by
known work, STI, was only

This problem

His best

is

the dearth of English translations of his writings.
translated in 1978. While the last decade has

in translations, a
witnessed a growing interest in Schelling with a concomitant increase
great deal remains only available in German or French.
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found scattered through

a

number

of publications. 5

The most

Philosophic der Kunst, contains lectures from 1802/3 but

posthumously, published by
completed

this lecture series,

of the absolute he

his

German

had once thought, and he needed
at

Schelling' s relation to

title,

only appeared

art

had the revelatory powers

to investigate the

problem anew.

hand, namely the investigation of aesthetics in

philosophical thought, the focus will remain

a.

sounding

son in 1859. Clearly, by the time Schelling had

he no longer believed that

Consequently, for the purpose

it

likely

Kant

.

on

Schelling's thought

from 1800.

In the Critique of judgment. Kant tried to bring

together freedom and nature by positing the idea of a "Zweckmassigkeit ohne Zweck"

which

is

to

be found in the

beauty. His attempt

grounded

reflective aesthetic

was not wholly

this unity in the

judgment

successful, as

unknowable

called forth

by the object

of

shown, because he consistently

thing-in-itself; his successors,

however, were

greatly interested in exploring precisely the possibility of the existence of an ontological

foundation for the unity of freedom and nature. The search
1790's

and the turn

of the century,

marks the generation

for this synthesis, in the

of Romanticism, with

Schelling considered the resident philosopher. The System of Transcendental Idealism

can be regarded as Schelling's attempt
that the cognitive

and the

to rewrite Kant's three critiques in

aesthetic are brought together in

what he

such a way

calls intellectual

intuition.

"Philosophische Briefe iiber Dogmatismus und Kritizismus" (1795); "Das alteste
Systemprogramm" (1796/7); "Vorlesungen iiber die Methode des akademischen
"Bruno" (1802); "Uber das Verhaltnis der bildenden Kiinste zu der
Studiums"
5

In:

(1802);

Natur"

(1807).

in aesthetics

is

While

art receives

longstanding.

an exclusive position only

in

STL

Schelling's interest
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Before turning directly to this work, two essential differences between Kant and
Schelling

must be mentioned. The

aesthetic response, for
of beauty

for the

aesthetic response.

this

response

is,

the problematic terminology of beauty and

though Kant operates almost

and the beautiful

new. Schelling

first is

object, the ideas

which he

most part drops the use

it

putting forth are completely

is

7

of the term 'beauty

The question becomes more

and what

exclusively with the old concepts

one

directly

of

,

and

what

refers only to

the essence of

means, issues with which Kant was concerned but which

he expresses exclusively through the notion of beauty. The second major difference
concerns the nature of reflective judgment. Kant divides
aesthetic

and

Teleological

teleological

object

judgment provides us with an organizing

respond universally

itself.

aesthetic

judgment

into

judgment, and makes clear that they are not the same thing.

objective basis for natural science. Aesthetic

ability to

reflective

judgment becomes

subjective

without basing our judgment on the

and inspiration

teleological

we can have an

judgment provides us with the

to a beautiful object

Schelling's contribution

so that

ability

is

to unite the two, so that

for us the true nature of the

and iUuminates

world. In order to reach this conclusion logically, he divides his system differently

than Kant divided
Schelling's

his.

System

is

much

other things, the difference in their ages and personalities. The
Critique of Pure Reason

was completed when Kant was

judgment when he was

66.

By

contrast, Schelling

published System of Transcendental Idealism
carefully argued claims, Schelling

enthusiasm, at times perhaps

among

shorter than Kant's and the style reveals,

.

a

expense of

mere 25 years

as exuberant

clarity.

version of the

and the Critique

Whereas Kant's

comes across

at the

was

47,

first

old

of

when he

Critiques are somber,

and bursting with

This tendency

is

exacerbated by
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his intention,

which

is

much

to reveal, as

conscious and unconscious

as possible the unity in the absolute of

Although as we have seen

activity.

in C],

being driven back to grounding aesthetic judgment, and
by extension

an overarching unknown, he
he can to retain

no such

his footing

resists this force

with his

on the firm foundation

full

Kant keeps
all

judgment, in

strength, doing everything

of rational argument.

Schelling has

inhibitions, instead flinging himself gleefully into the whirlpool
of the

unknown. As Mary Wamock
It is all

drily notes:

too easy to lapse with Schelling into a gasping sentiment of the

profound which for many people is still what they believe philosophy ought
bring them. But though it is, to my mind, extremely desirable to avoid such
floundering, yet there
It is

precisely this possibility

direction taken

by

a

is

a real point in being

which

is

aware

of

it

important to examine for

to

as a possibility. 6

it

provides a key to the

major branch of post-Kantian philosophy. This

will

be discussed

at a later point.

Schelling

makes the bold and

original claim that the philosophy of art

universal organon of philosophy-and the keystone of

Kant the

critique of

judgment was the keystone

this position is a different matter.

In order to

its

entire arch..."

show how

more

detailed analysis of parts five

and

important to understand both in what

and how

his

six.

way

Mary Wamock, Imagination

7

SH

for

Schelling reaches this

I

first

provide the reader

four parts of STI, in preparation for a

There are two reasons for

this.

First,

it is

Schelling differentiates himself from Kant

system provides for the unique and powerful position of

6

p.12.

first

While

to his system, to place art directly into

conclusion and what the consequences of such a view are,

with a somewhat lengthy overview of the

7

is "...the

art.

Second,

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p.70.
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Schelling's thought

is

likely to

be unfamiliar to the English-speaking reader;

an

this is

attempt to introduce the reader to the basic terminology and concepts with
which
Schelling

is

operating so that she can understand the significance of Schelling's turn

towards the philosophy of
its

moment

art as the

Without

of truth.

way

to reveal the unconscious

turn towards

this

conscious form of the world. Since

we

who we

moment

are.

Only through the

art

is

we

are

left

what

in ignorance as to

we

it is

gain a

of genuine insight.

its

as he uncovers his system of philosophy

is,

complicated line of thought, relatively straightforward. The essential matter

the elucidation of

we become aware

human

of

it?

consciousness or self-consciousness: what

an understanding of

how

never uncover the secret of

its

its

mechanism, and

vast territory of the unconscious

is

and how do

self

must go through

is

a strict reliance

it

to forego the

means

to

uniquely

come

in order to

thought processes work. Consciousness by

alone results in an extreme limitation of what

choice that

is it

This involves a theory of mind which favors the creative

imagination and a detailed analysis of what the
to

only have access to the limited

work, according to Schelling, can

The path which Schelling follows
despite

we

are incapable of consciously or rationally

understanding the true nature of the world,

and

art,

world of being in

itself

on conscious

can

activity

be human. To disregard the

human

ability to

make

a

based on freedom:

Anyone.. .for whom in all the activity of the mind there is nowhere anything
unconscious, and no region outside that of consciousness, will no more
understand how the intelligence can forget itself in its products, than how the
artist can be lost in his work. For him there is nothing other than the ordinary
moral bringing-forth, and nowhere any producing in which necessity is united

with freedom.®

8

STI, p.75.
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freedom with necessity, of subject with

precisely the unification of

It is

object, of the

conscious with the unconscious, that Schelling seeks.

The System

of Transcendental Idealism

is

ostensibly divided into six parts,

prefaced with a Forward and an Introduction. This framework does not adequately
reflect the divisions

The work

organization.
first

system

within the

is

Schelling

of equal length

and

a

7

s

is

work but

rather serves to obscure Schelling's

actually a composite of

original contribution

much

and

through the Second Epoch) analyzes the nature

The

third part (Parts 5

and

relation

between teleology and

art,

6)

first

is

two

long parts

relatively

part (Parts 1,2 and Part 3

of subjectivity

The second part

refers to as transcendental philosophy.

nature.

consists of

The

shorter third part.

analyzes the nature of objectivity and

two superimposed systems. The

and

is

what

(the rest of Part 3

Schelling

and Part

4)

a recapitulation of Schelling's philosophy of

brings the

first

two together by means

and represents the union

of the

and

of transcendental

nature philosophy in an all-encompassing system of transcendental idealism. The

second system

is

modeled on Kant's three

interpretation of them.

reason, that

is,

first

and the

judgment. Schelling

As

Schelling's re-

part (Parts 1-3) corresponds to the analysis of pure

is

third part (Parts 5

and

a result,

it

6) to

teleology

attempting to explain or deduce that

product of a dynamic, self-contained system that
forces.

and represents

of the nature of knowledge; the second (Part 4) to the analysis of

practical philosophy;

is,

The

critiques

is

all

and

existence

The inherent problem
arbitrary point of departure.

on the other

for

in trying to articulate a complete

What have done
I

is

is

the

the unification of mutually opposed

does not matter whether one begins by trying

subjectivity or objectivity, because each relies

aesthetics, that

its

to explain

own

system

identity.

is

to

choose an

simply to follow closely Schelling's
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path, so that to a certain extent

method

I

give a direct gloss

of the system of the transcendental

Schelling's system.

whose purpose

to present a series of deductions,

is

on

method over

all

of this process

construction of the

and explains

prove the superiority

to

previous philosophic attempts to

provide an intellectual explanation of the world. Schelling

mechanism

is

Schelling's

first

elucidates the

advantages; he then deduces the

its

consciousness, freedom, intelligence, intuition and time.

self,

I

begin by explaining the method which Schelling uses, and then unravel what Schelling

means by

which make up

the key terms

his system.

This

is

somewhat complicated due

to the heavily interrelated use of the concepts in question, but

understanding of the two
art.

final sections of the

is

essential to

an

work, on teleology and philosophy of

Schelling's radical interpretation of the seminal role played

by the artwork and the

revealing the true nature of the world requires careful preparation in order to

artist in

present, in a rational way, an idea that

is

fundamentally

irrational.

Consequently,

I

devote considerable space to preparing the reader for Schelling' s remarkable revelation.

Without

this build-up,

remains unclear

it

how

Schelling seeks to differentiate himself

clearly influenced

by the

latter's Critique of

from Kant,

for while Schelling

he goes

beyond Kant's comparatively tame conclusions about the work

2.

far

Schelling's 'Forward'

is

judgment,

of art.

and 'Introduction'

Schelling appropriately uses the 'Forward' and 'Introduction' to STI to outline
his intentions

and

to introduce us to the difficult concepts

he assumes as

common

transcendental
currency. The crucial relationship between nature philosophy and

philosophy

is

alluded to in his opening statement, as

intends to bring the two together, namely

human

is

the tool through which he

self-consciousness:
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Now the purpose of the present work is simply this, to enlarge
transcendental idealism into what it really should be, namely a system of
all
knowledge....The means...whereby the author has sought to achieve his aim

of
extent, consist in presenting every part of
philosophy in a single continuum, and the whole of philosophy as what in fact
it is, namely a progressive history of self-consciousness,
for which what is laid
down in experience serves merely, so to speak, as a memorial and a

setting forth idealism in

document.

its full

9

Neither transcendental philosophy, which

mind, nor philosophy of nature, which
itself sufficient to

a diametrically

is

the theoretical analysis of intelligence or

the analysis of the empirical world,

opposed twin explanation so as
is

to allow

cognition, that

by

system through which he attempts
is,

both forces to unify in a

intentionally differentiating himself from

and more importantly from Kant, because he

priority to the

is

give a complete account of the whole world; each needs the other as

complete (aesthetic) intuition. Schelling
Fichte

is

is

not going to give absolute

to explain the

mechanism

of

human

the system of transcendental philosophy. As he points out:

The author's chief motive
coherence, which is really

for devoting particular care to the depiction of this

raises itself to the highest

power

a

graduated sequence of intuitions, whereby the
of consciousness,

was

self

the parallelism of nature

he has long since been led, and to depict it completely,
neither transcendental philosophy nor the philosophy of nature is adequate by
itself; both sciences together are alone able to do it, though on that very
account the two must forever be opposed to one another, and can never merge

with intelligence; to

into one.

this

10

Schelling's views

on the philosophy

of nature

were already

available to the public, so

he begins his system by elaborating on the transcendental philosophy of mind, that

on

the essence of

9

STI. p.1-2.

what

it

means

to

be a subject. As

That Schelling and Hegel shared

1

have already pointed

is,

out, in the

a certain systemic philosophical

view

Spirit appeared only in 1807.
is apparent. Note that Hegel's Phenomenology of
his ideas as
Hegel's later popularity embittered and infuriated Schelling, who regarded

stolen.
10

STI, p.2.
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first

part of this

work (roughly

Parts 1-3), the emphasis remains

on the

intuitive or

subjective side of the argument, with primary emphasis given to
consciousness as

slowly becomes aware of

Schelling presents an exact analysis of each stage

itself.

which consciousness goes through
unified whole, the point

it

in

its

journey towards comprehension of the

where transcendent philosophy and nature philosophy

united to form the system of transcendental idealism.

It is

this process

are

which we now

examine.

One might wonder who

who

it is

consciousness, since presumably someone
required level of awareness and
the transcendental philosopher.

is

now

It is

examining

is

(e.g.

this process of self-

Schelling) has already reached the

recounting

it.

The examiner

is

referred to as

important to bear in mind the relation Schelling

postulates between the consciousness which

going though

is itself

this process of

increasing self-awareness, and the philosophic observer, or transcendental philosopher,

who

has already gone through

the philosophic observer
Schelling a
relief a

is,

to

this process

my

and

is

mind, never properly explained, but

means whereby he can provide an Archimedean

system which otherwise, due

later section

I

will discuss in

more

to

its

detail the

for the subject

who

is

role of

does give

point so as to place into

is

guiding the process
is

is

duly noted.

something which needs

to be

examining the world, since only through the mechanism

of intuition can such objects be constructed.
objects that can be considered real,

philosophy.

it

The

problems raised by the transcendental

existence of determinate external objects or things

proven

it.

nature, can never properly be grasped. In a

philosopher, but for the present that such a being

The

now commenting on

is

What

intuition

is,

and

how

it

constructs

thus an essential element of transcendental
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a.

Subjective and objective knowledge

stating that

subjective ."

”[a]ll

11

knowledge

He

defines that

nature, and that which

way

is

of putting this

is

is

Schelling begins his investigation by

.

founded upon the coincidence of an objective with

which

in

our knowledge

is

a

'objective' as pertaining to

'subjective' as pertaining to the self or intelligence.

to call the objective side, the form, natura naturata

Another

and the

subjective side, or intelligence, natura naturans, an imaginative force which shapes the

form. Each side needs the other to complete
intrinsically

opposed

to

and

is

intelligent; this

the objective
to

is

how

primary over the other. The

the attempt to

is

is

two aspects are

yet these

each other. Nevertheless, in every knowing there must be a

concurrence of the two. The problem

whether one

itself,

show

to explain this,

first

a necessary tendency

way

is

the

and

how

domain

whereby nature

is

to decide

of natural science,

rendered

the subject matter of nature-philosophy. The second way, in which

must be derived from the primary

be called transcendental philosophy, that

is,

subject,

becomes the domain

the study of

how one

of

what

can make nature

out of intelligence, as opposed to intelligence out of nature. Transcendental

philosophy provides an intellectualized explanation of the world as

through an individual
materialistic

whole which he

n

SH

of

itself;

object, intelligence

believes

modem

it is

brought forth

nature philosophy provides a purely

account of the world. What Schelling does

between subject and

alienation

self's intuition

and nature, so

is

to establish a dialectic

as to try to regain the unified

philosophy has destroyed through the increasing

between mind and nature which had reached an apex with Hume.

p.5.

is
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The transcendental philosopher must begin with
reality of the objective, since

she holds the

self to

everything else can be explained. This doubt

fundamental of
Herein

lies

human

all

prejudices,

is

a general

doubt as

to the

be the sole principle through which

placed in juxtaposition with the most

namely that there are things outside

of us.

the goal of transcendental philosophy:

The

which by nature cannot be
and groundlessly as one that is so,
incapable of resolution by the transcendental philosopher, save on the
presupposition that this principle is not just covertly and as yet
uncomprehendingly connected with, but is identical with, one and the same
with, an immediate certainty, and to demonstrate this identity will in fact be
contradiction, that a principle

immediately certain

is

yet accepted blindly

is

the concern of transcendental philosophy. 12

This identity

proposition

one which equates the existence

is

'I

exist;'

demonstration of

one guarantees certainty

certainty of the

this identity

is

of external objects with the

The

of the other.

complicated due to the difference between

transcendental and ordinary cognition. Ordinary cognition assumes the existence of
real external objects,

and the existence

and does not mark

a separation

between the existence

of the self

Transcendental cognition, by contrast, understands

of these objects.

the appearance of external objects to be a mere prejudice and at the same time gives
priority to the existence of the

make what
can be

is

subjective the immediate object of her cognition,

called a

meta-knowing, that

knowing. Parts
explaining

how

This

The transcendental philosopher must therefore

self.

1

and

2,

of

knowledge

ST1, p.8.

what

of Part

3,

are devoted to

works.

knowing goes

against the grain of the

our world: the transcendental mode of apprehension

12

to

of the purely subjective process of

and through the "Second Epoch"

this process

way

is,

which leads

is

an

way we
artificial

ordinarily perceive

one.

Ordinarily,
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we
an

think in terms of concepts. Transcendentally,
act, that is,

what

the concept of a concept

we

think in terms of the concept as

In other words,

is.

we

are constantly

analyzing the process of our thinking:

which in all other thinking, knowing, or acting escapes consciousness
and is absolutely nonobjective, is therein brought to consciousness and
becomes objective; it consists...of a constant objectifying-to-itself of the
...that

subjective.

The challenge
duality

13

of the transcendental

between the

act of thinking

discovering

what the absolute

understand

how

all

way

of thinking

and the concept

is

to

be aware

at all times of this

of being thought.

certainty of subjective existence

is, is it

Only by
possible to

other certainties are mediated in order to account for the existence

of the external world.

This

is

Schelling's initial assumption,

which he then proceeds

to

clarify.

The question from which the unfolding
is

knowledge? Without an adequate

to start

definition of knowledge,

making claims about the nature

objects

rests

is

what

first is

is

on the same assumptions

we

is

less basic

what we

13

conform

ST1, p.9.

to

well-nigh impossible

self.

see out in the world as

see are the things in themselves.

The second and "no

from an ordinary point

what

of understanding the nature of

This view

which

less basic conviction,"

of view, but perhaps not for a philosophic

point of view schooled in the Cartesian and Kantian tradition),
objects

simple:

that are required for theoretical philosophy,

investigates the possiblity of experience.

(which

ways

the empiricist view that

out there; the things

it is

is

of the world or the nature of the

Schelling maintains that there are two basic

knowledge. The

of the system devolves

our concepts. Presentations (Vorstellungen)

is

essentially that

"...arising freely

and
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without necessity in us pass over from the world of thought into the

can attain objective

reality."

14

possibility of free action, for

Buried in this second conviction

we can

is

real world,

the ground for the

freely generate a presentation in ourselves

determines the objective. Schelling locates the solution to

and

which

this counter-intuitive claim

in the realm of practical philosophy. 15

The problem the (transcendental) philosopher
opposed assumptions

dominance of the
both

"...our

exist

some

(the

ideal, or

primacy of the

real

faces

is

how

to resolve these

two

world over our presentations versus the

thought, world over the world of sense) for

knowledge should contain truth and our

volition reality..."

sort of resolution, the discovery or proof of

which

is

if

16

we want
there

that

must

the job of the

transcendental philosopher. Schelling claims that this resolution can only be
discovered on a higher plane than that of either theoretical or practical philosophy,
that

is

to say, in

some pre-determined harmony from which

the original unity of these

opposed ways of understanding the world has sprung. This can only be the case

if

in

essence both ways of viewing the world are identical.
Schelling proposes that this identity can be discovered by assuming that free
action

is

consciously productive, whereas that action which brings about the world

unconsciously productive:
Nature, both as a whole, and in its individual products, will have to
appear as a work both consciously engendered, and yet simultaneously a

14

SJL

p.ll.

philosophy,
Schelling follows the Kantian division of theoretical and practical
of the
think
which has always seemed to me somewhat confusing. Whereas I
will theoretical, the
investigation into nature as practical and that concerning free
15

meaning
16

is

the exact reverse.

ST1, p.ll.

is
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product of the blindest mechanism; nature is purposive, without
being
purposively explicable. -The philosophy of natural purposes,
or teleology,
thus our point of union between theoretical and practical
philosophy. 17

working out

In a nutshell,

this

complicated and somewhat counter-intuitive claim

the goal and purpose of the system which

asked

is

where

this principle of activity,

nature or in ourselves. Only
that

is,

as being in the

philosophy

is

self,

if

whether conscious or unconscious, belongs:

this identity

can be demonstrated as

it is

and how nature stands
is

in relation to

is

the attempt to

non-conscious activity are simultaneously exhibited in the
consciousness

itself.

which provides the

From
link

between subjective and

transcendental philosophy

to

it.

not

self will

There

will

still

all

is

is

is

objective,

the subject or

self,

conscious and

the subjective,

self;

two things must be kept

in

the organ of this

inner sense. In other words, to uncover the nature of

to demystify the subject; the

be uncovered

show how

the start of this investigation of the overarching unity

mind: the object under consideration

is

principle,

trying to uncover the unitary principle underlying

The unifying theme throughout STI

subject

own

knowledge.

all

is

its

in

can the system of knowledge which transcendental

be a duality, whereas Schelling

knowledge

is

before us. The essential question to be

trying to uncover be regarded as completed. Otherwise, the

be able to determine what

things and

lies

is

through

means by which the construction

intuition.

The

of the

activity of transcendental

philosophy requires that one must both be constantly producing or intuiting

acts of

the intellect, and then reflecting on these products. Schelling postulates that the

means

17

to this

STI, p.12.

end require switching from an

intellectual

mode

of intuiting the process

zweckmassig, ohne zweckmassig erklarbar
Kant's 'Zweckmassigkeit ohne Zweck' which, as shown, is

The German

reads: "sie

zu sein." This is, in effect,
one of the most important concepts

ist

in C].
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of finding unity in opposition to an aesthetic

mode

of intuition: at

its

deepest or

highest level, philosophy cannot explain the essence of the relationship
between nature

and the

self,

but only show

it:

depends as much as art does on the productive capacity, and the
between them rests merely on the different direction taken by the
productive force. For whereas in art the production is directed outwards, so as
to reflect the unknown by means of products, philosophical production
is

...philosophy

difference

directed immediately inwards, so as to reflect

proper sense by which

aesthetic sense, and that

philosophy

However,

to

it

in intellectual intuition.

The

this type of
is

why

philosophy must be apprehended is thus the
the philosophy of art is the true organon of

18
.

understand properly

just

how

this

comes

to pass

one must

first

follow the

self-discovery of consciousness.

Schelling begins his investigation of the nature of knowledge, which he has

defined as the coincidence between a subjective and an objective, by looking for a
universal mediating principle to provide the sole ground of knowledge.
that our

knowledge

principle of

a self-supportive, internally self-consistent system, the absolute

which must

the science of
also be

is

all

one that

lie

within knowledge

knowledge and
is

is

we

seek

is

Since transcendental philosophy

is

purely subjective, this universal principle must then

is

objective.

At

this point,

it

seeking belongs exclusively in the realm of epistemology

in metaphysics: "There

being....what

is

itself.

completely abstracted from what

appears that what Schelling

and not

He assumes

is

no question

an absolute

at all of

an absolute

principle of knowledge."

14
*

principle of

The question does

not concern the ultimate ground of knowledge in general, but rather the ultimate

ground

in

our knowledge

itself.

This primary knowledge, which can be considered the

135
object of the subjective,

is

knowledge

of oneself, or self-consciousness.

Schelling

senses that this universally mediating principle will be found at the boundary of our

knowledge. Since
to

it

have knowledge,

never becomes an object but functions as a

we

are never

aware of

might be a modification of some form of
the present investigation. As

emphasis
cusp,

on knowledge

is

we

Whether or not

rather than

on

being, Schelling

to

it is

irrelevant to

notice that although the

is

actually operating

on the

determine each other. Whereas Kant was

one could only have knowledge about cognitive and not

experience, Schelling tries to push the boundary
distinction

we

thus enabling us

self-consciousness

intelligence independent of

progress through STL

where being and knowledge seem

of the opinion that

it.

limit,

much

farther

between metaphysics and epistemology becomes

attempt to recast the solution (or lack thereof) of the

critical

intuitive

back so that the

Through

unclear.

his

philosophy, Schelling

brings back the indistinctness Kant had been trying to banish from philosophy.

b.

The science

of the self

.

Schelling' s

problem

now

is

how

to

prove that he can

derive a science from something as ungraspable as the inner workings of the

has the content, but

The

inconsistencies?

answers as

"...a

science based

body

on

how
first

is

he

to postulate the

question to be posed

of propositions

this principle

self;

form without getting caught up
is

'what

is

a science?

under a determinate form."

20

,

A

must determine not only the content

he

in

which he
system of

of the science, but

also the form.

Philosophy, which possesses a systematic form, presents a problem not

found in other

sciences: while other sciences presuppose their

it,

the object of philosophy

^ STl,

p.19.

is

form without deducing

the very possibility of such a form, and hence the form
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must be deduced. This

leads to

an

infinite circle, for a "...science of

knowledge

is itself

already a science, and would thus require a science of knowledge
concerning
itself..."

21

The question which must be resolved

according to Schelling,

can only be explained

it

how

is

if

to

account for

this circle,

and,

the original form of knowledge

presupposes the original content, and vice versa, so that they mutually condition
one
another. In order to accomplish

this,

some

act of primordial cognition

must be

discovered which would be the point both where content and form are generated, and

which

is

identical with the principle of

all

knowledge. This point would be considered

as a first principle of philosophy.

This raises the issue of logic, because by assuming a

first

conditioned or not, the laws of logic are invoked. While logic
Schelling points out that

it

would be

is

principle,

mutually

an important

tool,

a mistake to take the principles of logic as

unconditioned:

The

A = A

presupposes the synthesis A. So it is evident that no
formal principle can be thought without presupposing a material principle, or a
material without presupposing a formal one....logic can only arise as such by
abstraction from determinate propositions. If it arises in a scientific manner, it
can do so only by abstraction from the highest principles of knowledge, and
since these, as principles, themselves on the other hand already presuppose the
logical form, they must be such that in them both factors, the form and the
22
content, reciprocally condition and involve each other.
analysis

In other words, logic

is

at the

same time conditioning and conditioned. Transcendental

philosophy, or the science of knowledge,

adheres to logical laws.

and

at the

21

both the foundation of logic and yet

must be both the most

same time completely autonomous

STI, p.19.

SH PP- 20-21.

22

It

is

in

perfect

embodiment

of scientific

form and content. To reach an

form
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adequate understanding of

how

this

can be

is

the challenge

which Schelling intends

to

meet.
Schelling wants to begin his deduction of the highest principle of

know by

claiming that

must be unconditioned. At the same

it

which we can know unconditionally must be within the

time, the only thing

subjective.

This leads directly

problem of analytic and synthetic knowledge. The only thing about which we

to the

can claim unconditional knowledge

is

an analytic statement, an

identical proposition.

But identical propositions (A = A) contain no knowledge claims,
tautological; only a synthetic proposition,

can lead to a knowledge claim.

an unconditional
to

what we can

wherein the object

A knowledge

is

for they are

outside of the subject,

claim can only be certain

if it is

based on

certainty such as self-identity which, however, contradicts the claim

knowledge. The way out of

this contradiction, suggests Schelling, will

be to back up

another step to where the synthetic and identical are one and the same:

in

This contradiction would be soluble only if some point could be found
identical and the synthetic are one, or some proposition which, in

which the

being identical,
identical.

That there
faith

is

is

at

once synthetic, and in being synthetic,

such

a point

by pointing out that

is

either there

is

not

is

an

infinite regress,

infinite,

and

be convinced that the absolutely true must

not based on an

23

SU p.22.

once

at

some point

infinite regress

but

at

is if it is

exist is to

his leap of

which leaves us with no
starts

of absolute truth, from a proposition that cannot be denied.

can attain certainty from a synthetic proposition
to

at

perhaps questionable, but Schelling here makes

firm footing ever, or the series

moment

is

23

forward from a

The only way we

absolutely true; the only

way

assume that our knowledge

some point must have an end.

It is

the

is

covert

138
feeling" (das

dunkle Gefuhl) of the certainty of

to uncover.

In his later writings, Schelling tends towards a religious interpretation of

the world. In 1800, the religious aspect

What

Schelling does here, though,

is

is

this

end that

not so overt but

something

radically

the task of philosophy

is

nevertheless present.

it is

new. For whereas God as

creator has always been outside or above the world, Schelling transfers this original

human

creativity to a point within the

mind cognizing and thereby
which

Absolute truth

is

the

at the

it is

no longer

a question of the

same whereby the world

it

in the

knowledge

identical;

contain absolute truth, then

even though

is

which Schelling unpacks

basic creative act

It is

human

"creating" the world; rather, the act of artistic creation

consciousness

calls forth

self.

must

same time

at

is

work under

synthetic.

If

is

created.

this

consideration.

knowledge

some point spring from an

synthetic.

It is

is

ever to

identical cognition,

At some point, that

is,

the object and

its

concept (or presentation) must be originally one:
...There

no explaining how presentation and object can coincide,
knowledge itself there exists a point at which both are originally
task, in a nutshell, consists of finding the point at which subject and
absolutely

is

unless in
one.. ..the

object are immediately one.

24

This can only possibly occur within self-consciousness, because only here can an act of

thinking (for example an identical proposition, in which a thought
itself)

become an

object to

itself.

By self-consciousness

whereby the thinker immediately becomes an
consciousness for Schelling
reader,

and

it is

^SJL

p.24.

^ STI.

p.24.

is

Schelling

important to bear

this in

mind.

It

has

it is

many

compared with

means

object to himself..."

quite a different thing than

is

25

"...the act

Self-

for the post-Freudian

different levels, but in

its

139

simplest form

it

assumes that one

is

able to "...discriminate oneself as a thinker

thought, and in so discriminating, again to acknowledge oneself as
realization that

one can think

a

thought

an

is

act of self-consciousness

nothing to do with psychological behavior. What
of self-consciousness

freedom:

an

it is

is

act to

that,

is

according to Schelling,

which one can be

Every act of thinking gives

concept, which

is

26

as

The

and has

uniquely important about the act

an

it is

exercise of absolute

directed but not compelled.

rise to a

determinate concept, which

the thinking process and cannot exist independently of
rise to a

identical..."

and

it.

is

the result of

Self-consciousness also gives

that of "becoming-an-object-to-oneself."

27

This

is

where

Schelling places the original identity of thought and object, or of appearance and
reality:

simply has no existence, prior to that act whereby thinking becomes its
and is thus itself nothing other than thinking becoming its object,
28
and hence absolutely nothing apart from the thought.

The

own

self

object,

Empirical consciousness

one

is

is

aware of oneself as

quite different from self-consciousness, for in the former,
a subject of presentations, as

presentations, whereas in the

determinations. The reason

latter,

why

simple stage of self-consciousness
are able to reflect

object.

The path

upon what

p.24.

^ STl,

p.25.

^ STI,

p.25.

a great

is

is

aware of oneself

number

originally,

with no

of people never reach

even

arises in themselves as a result of

and the many

it:

the thought as

different levels within

.

The German

this

that they neither perform this act in freedom nor

of self-consciousness,

focus of most of STI

* STI,

one

one of many other

reads: "der Begriff des Selbstobjektwerdens."

it, is

the
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In this distinction

between empirical and pure

both makes a clear reference

which

system

his

is

to the

markedly

identity of the subject

among

(or self-) consciousness, Schelling

Kantian influence and yet

different.

The proposition

think' arises

'I

way

illustrates the

in

from the

presentations and, as Kant points out, accompanies

its

all

presentations and preserves the continuity of consciousness between them. 29 While

Kant

clearly maintains that there

he attributes

intuition,

fits

it

is

something non-empirical prior

to thought,

namely

to the transcendental unity of consciousness, a concept

in neatly with his division of things into empirical existence

and

which

things-in-

themselves. But since one cannot say anything about this non-sensible realm, there
little

point in discussing the nature of this transcendental

splits his

notion of the

It is

this

'I

self into a

think'

thinking

self

which accompanies

and

all

a

Schelling,

self.

being

by

is

contrast,

self:

presentations and preserves the

continuity of consciousness between them. -But

if

we

free ourselves

from

all

presentations, so as to achieve an original self-awareness, there arises— not the

proposition
proposition.

I

think, but the proposition

The words

'I

'I

am', which

is

beyond doubt

a

higher

think' already give expression to a determination. ..of

the proposition 'I am', on the contrary, is an infinite proposition since
one that has no actual predicate, though for that very reason it is the locus
30
of an infinity of possible predicates.

the

self;

it is

must be possible for the T think' to
accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in
me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the
representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. That
representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition. All the
manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same
subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation is an act of
^Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B131-2:

"It

cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it pure
apperception, to distinguish it from the empirical apperception, or, again, original
apperception, because it is that self-consciousness which, while generating the
representation.
representation 'I think'...cannot itself be accompanied by any further

spontaneity, that

is, it

likewise entitle the transcendental unity of selfarising from
consciousness, in order to indicate the possiblity of a priori knowledge

The unity

^ STI,

of apperception

p.26.

1

it."
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By immersing

oneself in the nature of being, one can learn a great deal about the

nature of thinking, for unless one has some sort of awareness of

fundamental phenomenological aspect of what
to gain

any

it

means

to

be a

most

this

self,

one cannot hope

self-consciousness.

Despite the fact that Schelling

system

insists that his

relies

not on questions of

being but questions of knowing, one cannot understand the nature of knowledge

without

examining

first

its

ontologic base. Schelling

which separates one from the
Because the
object for

self

itself,

other,

can be nothing
but

is

else

and

is

is

walking along the

fine line

thus part of both as the limit of each.

beyond

its

own

thinking,

it is

not a thing.

not originally in the world of objects, and hence

is

It is

an

infinitely

nonobjective. All other things are objects for intuitants outside; they are something

known, never
into

an object

no other

a knower.

for

itself:

Only the

self

becomes an

"The character of the

It

31

by making

inside,

very

fact,

In other words, the

that

it

self is

itself

has

the

cannot be found in any thing, for things are objects of knowledge

whereas the

self is

an

knowledge

object of

from

self consists in this

predicate than that of self-consciousness."

unconditioned.

object

the principle of

all

knowledge. The

originally, or in itself,

self "...can in

no way become

but only through a specific act of

freedom ." 32

c.

how

it is

Intellectual intuition

possible to

for the self

31

32

is

.

The problem with which we

have any kind of knowledge

pure act and, as the principle of

ST1, p.26.

STI, p.26.

all

of

are

now

something that

knowledge,

is itself

confronted

is

is

not an object,

non-objective.
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Schelling
of

daims that the type

of

knowing must be completely

absolutely free, that

an

in essence

producing of

different

not arrived

is,

intuition.

its

knowing through which

at

In addition,

from ordinary knowledge.

it

must be

a

knowing

and product are one and the same." 33 In contrast
and which

the intuiting process, Schelling

Knowledge
it

knows

of

is

marked by the

calls this

a

knowing

it

itself,

will

"...is

7

opposed

object

must be

"...simultaneously a
in

which producer

whereby

fact that the intuited is distinct

knowing

the organ of

all

from

'intellectual intuition.'

it

arises

out of the

itself

fact that

as object.

transcendental thinking..." 34

be the guide to be followed during the investigation of the system of

understanding of Schelling
It is

It

to sensory intuition,

transcendental philosophy. The idea of intellectual intuition

rational.

is

and

that simultaneously produces

Intellectual intuition, says Schelling,

As such,

type of

that

of the self exemplifies intellectual intuition, for

itself; it is

become an

by way of proofs or inferences, and consequently

object-an intuition freely productive in

objects are perceived

the self can

s

system. Despite the rational sound of

intellectual in the sense that

to nature or object.

stage of the system.

It

is critical

It is

to

it

to

an

it, it is

rather pre-

has to do with mind, with the subject, as

be contrasted with the aesthetic intuition in a

has no analogue in Kant's theory of mind, for

it

later

would be

considered part of the unknowable thing-in-itself, a distinction Schelling does not

make.

The concept

of intellectual intuition

transcendental thought can be illuminated:

33

ST1, p.27.

^ STI,

p.27.

is

the only

way by which

the nature of
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...[transcendental thinking] sets out to objectify to itself through freedom, what
otherwise not an object; it presupposes a capacity, simultaneously to produce

is

and so to intuit that the producing of the object and the
are absolutely one; but this very capacity is that of intellectual

certain acts of mind,

intuiting
intuition.

Without the

itself
35

ability to

engage in

intellectual intuition, the attempt to

transcendental philosophy will be

fruitless, since intellectual intuition is to

transcendental thought what the objective world

Without the
intuition

ability to

know

of

itself,

Since this becoming an object to

dependent on
is

is

to ordinary (empirical) cognition.

the self as an object ceases to

for [transcendental philosophy] precisely

is

a proof,

understand

itself is

what space

an absolutely

is

free action,

exist: "...intellectual

for geometry."

it

36

cannot be

but must be demanded and hence only postulated. In short,

it

impossible that philosophy be put entirely on a scientific basis, for there can be no

objective

means
else

of

first

principle

from which

it

Instead,

starts.

which the subjective becomes

objective.

but a producing that becomes an object

intuition[,]"

The

37
is

self is

Schelling set out to find which

demonstrates that there

37

SIL

This claim, that "[t]he

to itself, that

is,

an

self is

nothing

intellectual

thus both producing and produced, which leads us back to the

synthetic since, although identical,

36

proceeds from a free act by

central to Schelling's system.

identity formula of self (producing)

^ STI.

it

is

is

=
is

self

(produced) but which in this case

at the

same time not

the principle of

in identity a

all

fundamental

identical.

This

is

is

the point

knowledge and which
duality.

This principle

is

at the

p.27.

p.28.

stl p.28. The German reads: "Das
Objekt werdendes Produzieren..."

Ich

ist

nichts anderes als ein sich selbst

zum
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same time the ground
principle that

both form and content of knowledge;

becomes an object

make

object can

for

itself

into

an

Only something

to itself.

time

all

time and

is

is first

to things,

self is

which means

that

is

a

not originally an

is

act lying outside of time,

and by

it

cannot be considered

to

be

has none of the predicates which are attached
self exists.

One cannot

say this

"being-itself":

which we call self, is that which
needs no other being to support it;

eternal timeless act of self-consciousness

gives

The

it

one cannot say that the

all

things existence, and so

bearing and supporting

and

self,

Empirical consciousness, by contrast, arises in

not a thing,

precisely because the self

The

38

is "...an

fixed within the succession of presentations;

Because the

free.

constituted."

the

becoming one. Pure self-consciousness,

object, thereby

the state which yields empirical consciousness,

which

that

it is

itself,

itself

rather,

it

appears objectively as eternal becoming,

subjectively as a producing without limit.

definition

which Schelling

gives for being

system, the explanation of which

is

is

39

"freedom suspended." The entire

the task of transcendental philosophy,

is

different

forms of being, or in other words, different forms of congealed freedom. The
suspension of freedom does not here signify

must only

realize

what

it

actually

means

to

its

downfall but instead

have freedom,

for to

its

ubiquity; one

have freedom means

to relinquish being.

From

the above overview of the aim of this system of transcendental idealism,

several terms appear repeatedly,

and indeed are

crucial to a further

the system. To begin with, the whole nature of the

what

it is, is still

^ STI.
39

p.32.

ST1, p.32.

somewhat murky. And

in order to

self,

where

come

it

understanding of

comes from and

to a clearer vision of

what
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ScheUing means by the

self, its

mode

of intellectual intuition,

and

its

relationship to the

opposed pairs of freedom and necessity and consciousness and unconsciousness,
needs
to be

made somewhat more

explicit.

In addition, the role

transcendental schema must be reviewed.

way

And

finally,

which time plays

in this

with a glance towards Kant, the

Schelling treats the thing-in-itself needs to be examined. After the attempt to

clarify

and simplify the main body

and aesthetic

of

STL

I

will

show how

intuition as providing the foundation for

Schelling

any

comes

to see art

sort of philosophic

understanding.

3.

Deduction of the nature of the

self

some

Schelling has introduced us to

now he

sets

argument
of the

of the essential

out to deduce the nature of the

self.

for the existence of self-consciousness,

growing self-awareness

I

components

will briefly

cover Schelling's

and then examine the

of self-consciousness,

which he

of his system;

different stages

refers to as epochs.

of the reason for closely following the construction of Schelling's system

clearer

what Schelling means by some

'intellectual intuition/

Fichte

'freedom/ 'time/

and Kant, but the

result

us,

and

which

is

I

to

try to simplify

understand

it

his

is

from those of Fichte or Kant. At
detailed,

of the key concepts

own;

times, the

as

why

'thing-in-itself.'

much

his

system

first

needs

to

which he repeatedly

He borrows

liberally

as possible, bearing in

how

uses:

from

based on different premises

mind the goal before

Schelling turns to aesthetic intuition as the

to explain

make

argument becomes quite confused and very

through which the nature of being, the absolute,
Schelling

is

is

Part

is

mode

revealed.

transcendental idealism

is

neither

transcendental philosophy nor nature philosophy, but rather the unification of the two
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into

something more than the sum of

deduced from the

The

T

fact of self-consciousness,

Transcendental idealism can be

which

and most fundamental deduction which

first

appears:

their parts.

what

am/ As he has
Once

existence.

and where does

is it

it

is

based on the existence of the

Schelling

come from? He begins with

already explained, in being thought, the

in existence, the self

must prove

is

then

real for itself

self is

is

how

self.

the self

the ontological claim

brought into

and becomes the grounding

point for a system of idealism, which refers to the formal laws imposed by the mind.
Schelling states that:
the proposition T am'

...if

be any

The problem

reality save

is

what

is
is

the principle of all philosophy, there cannot indeed
equivalent to the reality of this proposition. 40

that at this stage, the self

system of philosophy based on the
reality of the self in general:

and

real aspects.

product of

its

It is

own

real

rather a

only for

itself.

momentous

is

must deduce the

of the self needs to treat both

claim to maintain that not only

thought, but that the entire system of

Schelling intends to do.

In order to construct a

idealistic claim of being, Schelling

an investigation

the objective world and so forth,

what

is

also posited

self.

Kant's essential starting premise in

consciousness; given that, he could account for

all

is

human knowledge:

through the

the

self a

history,

Nevertheless, this

CPR was

cognitive knowledge.

goes further, for from a self-reflecting ideal awareness of one's

ideal

its

self,

is

unity of

Schelling

he intends

to

prove

the real existence of the entire world.

To explain the world, one must thus
described the nature of the
activity as

^ STI.

it

self:

the self

continually produces

p.34.

itself.

is

first

explain the

self.

Schelling has already

not a thing; the original

Only by becoming an

self is infinite

object to

itself,

by
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imposing

limits

on

itself,

can the

self

consciousness. In other words, the

product
of

is

restricted.

showing

an

essential requirement for self-

self as infinite activity is unrestricted,

must be necessarily both

transcendental philosophy
is

finite,

Schelling maintains that the only

that the self

seamless whole,

become

itself is

but as

way one can go about

restricted

and

the task

unrestricted, as

both practical and theoretical philosophy united in a

through freedom:

Freedom

is the one principle on which everything is supported, and what we
behold in the objective world is not anything present outside us, but merely the
inner limitation of our own free activity. Being as such is merely the
expression of an impeded freedom. It is our free activity.. .that is fettered in our
knowledge. 41

Schelling needs to uncover the essence of the self so as to lay bare

Because he interprets the one as simply

one

will paradoxically

is.

form of the other, an explanation of

a limited

enable us to understand

what freedom

its

direct opposite.

Freedom appears

be the situation of the world or universe before anything has come into being, that

become an

object,

when

everything

is

pure potential.

42

Since

it is

as a finite being to return to this infinite original state, the most

close

one can come

The way
self to a

in

to achieving

an awareness of what

it

higher level of understanding, to lead

it

to ever

is

is,

virtually impossible

one can do

must have been

which transcendental philosophy operates

to

is

see

how

like.

constantly to raise the

deeper levels of

self-intuition.

This continual self-questioning has the goal of ultimately leading one back to the
original free

41

and conscious

act of self-consciousness, the point at

which the

self

ST1, p.35.

Schelling considerably revised his interpretation of freedom in succeeding years,
and by 1809 with the publication of Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human
Freedom had, as the title indicates, switched to a more personal idea of freedom. In
42

meaning.
the present work, however, freedom has an abstract and impersonal
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becomes aware

of

its

existence.

This step-by-step method leads back to the beginning,

where:
the self

If

originally infinite activity,

is

it is

therefore also the

For if a ground of reality were to
infinite activity would be initially restricted. 43
principle, of all reality.

The

not only produces

self

as product; this

is

the original

the self limits

itself,

self's limitation,

itself

moment

The system

itself.

lie

ground-and inner
outside

its

it,

but at some point also becomes aware of
of self-consciousness.

In

of transcendental idealism

becoming aware
is

itself

of

derived from the

from the premise of self-consciousness. Only by combining the

idealism of theoretical philosophy, which postulates the infinite activity of the

self,

with

the realism of nature philosophy, which operates in the world of being, can the
unified, holistic system of transcendental idealism in

which everything

is

interrelated,

arise.

a.

activity

Deduction of transcendental idealism

and becoming

the ideal and real

So as

to

self;

understand

a

.

The

phenomenological object

the

this,

critical

I

is

relation

is

the concept of boundedness.

review the deduction of

transcendental idealism with which Schelling operates, for otherwise
follows remains quite mysterious. This deduction

Wissenschaftslehre, but

and

will refer

I

am

is

infinite

analogous to the relation between

element of division

will as briefly as possible

between being

much

of

what

consciously modeled after Fichte's

assuming that the reader

is

not familiar with that work,

only to Schelling's interpretation. For someone oriented to an analytic

deduction
or rational progression of ideas, the highly abstract nature of Schelling's

may seem

43

almost nonsensical, a

SH,p.36.

lot of

sound and fury signifying nothing. This does
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him

a disservice for

Schelling

is

what he wants

pre-judges

it

to achieve.

trying to reintroduce the wholeness,

As already

stated,

which had been destroyed and

banished by his predecessors, back into philosophy. His ideal world

is

Greek

that of

philosophy; the unity found in the thought of antiquity remains for him the model of
a lost golden age.

The

overcome, but

can only occur

this

the destructive

language, there
Schelling

is

alienation of the individual from

mechanism
is

if it

happens

no chance

of

overcoming

modem

often in danger of sounding chaotic.

who

reader needs to practice patience. The
unified whole, can

seem

far-fetched.

it

is

comes about through freedom, the

bits

and

Bearing

arises as to

self

object

opposed

is

to

in that

Some

of his ideas are expressed with

pieces, considered apart

this in

it

from the

mind, what follows

becomes an object

is

a

for itself

summary
from the

is,

that

is, it

is

which

to itself.

Two

propositions

only an object for

itself;

and that the

self is originally

not an object,

must be unlimited

activity.

it

must be

The question then

the (limited) condition of self-consciousness can be thought. To begin

In other words,

positing

one speaks

fragmentation. As a result,

with, the self as unlimited activity must set a limit to

self.

as

becomes an object

not an object. Since the

what an

how

soon

beyond

that through the act of self-consciousness,

are inherent in this original one: that the self

to

abstract, theoretical level

once was.

The necessary proposition

self is originally

nature needs to be

has envisioned something indescribable, and the

of the birth of self-consciousness in the self as

infinite activity

an

of rational analysis, for as

the breathless exuberance of one

opposed

at

God and

it

must oppose something

both identical and synthetic. The

itself

so that

it

can come forth as

to itself, thereby ensuring that

(infinite) self

and the

its self-

self-as-object are

each other in the manner of positive and negative quantities. The

self-as-
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much

object can only attain as
"...the self

solely

as self

what

is

limited only in that
44

activity of the self

must

insofar as

it is

unlimited."

To begin
it is

limited,

it is

with, the self

becoming. Since becoming

and

infinite

to

is,

shown

be

become

is

how

it is

is

finite,

everything

it is

only for

But in intuiting

itself, it

only thinkable under limitation, the

is

acts

is

boundary

this

in that

not part of the action of the

only have become real by an action from the

boundary's independence of the

boundary would not be noticed

How,
knowledge

then, does this

limited for

limited,

by the

activities

self.

which

itself.

It

self.

If

it

self.

self,

can be

infinite for itself,

finite;

self

it is

infinite

must therefore

on

it,

it

stretches to infinity.

and

it

can only act on

The boundary must be

real,

^SJL

p.38.

it if

and can

thereby demonstrating the

as such.

ideal, that

Only by being aware

is,

how

does the

self

gain

of this limitation can the self

can become ideal solely through being intuited, and thus

To account

constitute the

for this, Schelling postulates

self:

an

two

diametrically opposed

infinitely outreaching, centrifugal activity,

discovers a real boundary (the objective action); and a non-objective, opposing,

“STI, p.37.

can

self

the self did not act against the boundary, the

boundary become

of this limitation?

become

self

unlimited and limited. The boundary of the limited

The

the boundary

If it is

becomes

self in that

can only extend

qua

limited as a self only

itself.

only be a condition of the unboundedness of the
self

the originally infinite

finite: "...the self

and conversely, that

simply and

is

45

infinite for its self-intuition.

be both

cancelled out in the self-as-infinite-activity:

intuits itself as such, for a self

it

limit itself, that

unlimited only insofar as

is

What needs

for itself."

it is

reality as

which
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illimitable, centripetal activity

comes knowledge or

which

is

ideal (the subjective action),

intuition of the limitation.

These

presuppose each other, and the entire mechanism of the
reciprocal presupposition.

boundary,

how

reality of the

objective.

and

self

ideal activities mutually

must be derived from

this

Theoretical philosophy explains the ideality of the

the limitation comes to be intuited; practical philosophy explains the

boundary,

how

Only through

the originally purely subjective limitation becomes

the mutual action of both idealism

practical philosophy, does the complete

What remains
this original

and

real

through which

union of

to

be investigated

ideal

and

real

is

is

and

realism, theoretical

system of transcendental idealism

how

this

boundary

is

arise.

posited as an act, for

only thinkable as an absolute

act,

and what

influence this positing has on the nature of consciousness. To begin with, the original
act of self-consciousness

there for us.

self is

is

both ideal and

The boundary

is

real, in principle ideal,

posited through self-consciousness alone, for

within self-consciousness are the two opposed

Beyond

activities of limiting

or before the act of self-consciousness, the self

Schelling calls

"...the

one and only

precisely, non-objective,

subjectivity,

and

this

in-itself there

pure

this original,

46
is."

is

and being

limited.

"pure objectivity," which

Pure objectivity

is,

more

something indefinable. Objectivity can only be contrasted
state is

to

antecedent to the existence of subjectivity; only

through self-consciousness does the

To

but real in that the

self

purely objective

gain subjectivity:
activity, that is limited in consciousness, there

which cannot, on that very account, itself
become an object. --To come to consciousness, and not to be limited, are one
and the same. ...The fact of limitation must appear as independent of me, since I
stands opposed the limiting

46

SJL

p.43.

activity,

can discern only
posited

The

my own

limitedness, never the activity

47

self arises

limiting action,

from neither the limiting nor the limited action taken

which does not come

to consciousness,

subject, but "...the self of self-consciousness

object together."

48

The

limited activity

is

engendered through

compound
As

This
is

a

is

activity,

a third activity

that

is

which

a

way

is

why

itself a

is

else

is

object,

and

synthetic act."

and

artificial.

all

this to

how

is

self-consciousness

between the two: "The

necessary for

infinite activity

nothing

Through this
within the self, and with

infinitude.

self of

which seems

quite self-confident about

The outgoing, by nature
reverting activity

it is

in isolation.

The

the activity of the pure

a paradox of centrifugal

of thinking

confused about just

expressed, although he

is

is

which becomes an

oscillates

and self-consciousness

stated above, the self

beyond doubt

little

it is

not the pure subject, but subject and

purely objective element in self-consciousness. The

a

whereby

.

it

the

is

self is

thus

4Q

centripetal activity.

That Schelling himself

come about

is

clearly

happens:

the objective in the

self;

the

self-

but the striving to intuit oneself in that

action as such, the inner and the outer are divided
their separation

is

posited a conflict in the self that

only the necessity of self-consciousness can explain.

Why

the self should have

become aware of itself, is not further explicable, for it is nothing
but self-consciousness. But within self-consciousness a clash of opposing
50
directions is necessary

originally to
else

.

In the clash

between these two opposed

neutralization, for then the self

opposition in and of

itself.

It

directions, there

would be abolished, nor

continues because

it is

can be neither a mutual
a continuation of the

necessary to do so, because the

153

ongoing

identity of the self results

unification; this can only

from

this clash.

come about through an

No

single action can result in a

infinite series of actions: the self is

an absolute synthesis. Since the subject and object are absolutely opposed, they
cannot be
is

real

become

to

rise to

"...a

famous

because they are absolute: in their opposition they are

real,

ideal.

If

the self

the subject and object must lose their absolute character and give

third activity of the self, that

triadic pattern

wavers between them." 51

which marks so much

which idealism influenced.

of idealist

We

see here the

thought as well as thought

Schelling, like Kant, sees this tendency as

more than pure

coincidence:

This advance from thesis to antithesis, and from thence to synthesis, is
therefore originally founded in the mechanism of the mind, and so far as it is
purely formal. ..is abstracted from this original, material sequence established in

transcendental philosophy.

As

a final

word on

52

the origin of the self as an act of self-consciousness,

Schelling underscores that, whereas objective activity within self-consciousness
limited, subjective activity

is

not,

unfree with regard to matter
activity

51

52

is

the basis of

all

it is

and

is

in fact "absolutely illimitable ;"

free in

its

form:

"...this illimitability

construction in theoretical philosophy."

54

53

is

whereas

it is

of the ideal

Since

self-

STI, pp.46-7.

STI, p.47.

architectonic.

As mentioned, Kant placed strong emphasis on the importance of the
In C] he defends himself against his critics by noting: "It has been

thought somewhat suspicious that my divisions in pure philosophy should almost
always come out threefold. But it is due to the nature of the case. If a division is to
be a priori it must be either analytic.. .and then it is almost always twofold. ..or else it
synthetic.. ..[T]o meet the requirements of synthetic unity in general, namely 1) a
condition, 2) a conditioned, 3) the concept arising from the union of the conditioned
with its condition, the division must of necessity be trichotomous" (197FN). QED.
53

STI, p.49.

^ STI,

p. 50.

is
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consciousness has an infinite
constructed out of this act

work

limiting his

to

is

conflict, the task of revealing

also infinite.

how

the entire world

is

Schelling simplifies this herculean labor by

what he considers the

essential philosophic

epochs that constitute

the history of self-consciousness, thereby showing that the task of theoretical

philosophy,
explaining
limited."

55

"...to

explain the ideality of the boundary,

how even
Otherwise

the ideal activity, hitherto assumed to be illimitable, can in fact be
stated, Schelling intends to

and events must be premised on the existence

b.

The epochs

equivalent to that of

is

show how

the real world of objects

of the ideal world.

of the history of self-consciousness

.

Through

a recapitulation of

the events of each of these epochs, the terms mentioned above: 'intellectual intuition/

'freedom/ 'time/
Schelling

'thing-in-itself/ are illuminated.

means by

these concepts, so as to see

Again,

why

he

intuition provide the solution to the mystery of being.

it is

important to grasp what

feels that art

The

titles

and aesthetic

of the three epochs

reveal their respective contents: "From Original Sensation to Productive Intuition;"

"From Productive

Intuition to Reflection;"

At times the

Will."

level of discussion

and "From Reflection

to the Absolute Act of

becomes quite complicated, and

avoid getting caught up in the details of the

many arguments,

I

will try to

painting the picture

instead with broad strokes.

Two
to the

basic divisions are here being

completed system. The

philosophy. In the
idealism, of

55

SJL

how

p.50.

first

the

first

woven

division

is

two epochs, Schelling

mind

constitutes the

self,

that

together, both of

between

which are

theoretical

and

limits himself primarily to

and of what

is

integral

practical

an analysis of

taking place solely within
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consciousness

itself

as

it

moves from

a self-image of product to that of producer.

In

the third epoch (and Part IV, "The System of Practical Philosophy
According to the
Principles of Transcendental Idealism") the focus has switched to
the relation of

consciousness with the world, to action in the

shows how

the (philosophical) self

is

real world.

itself.

are in the position to explain

what

the third epoch, consciousness

is

In the

is

here that Schelling

responsible for the formulation of the external

world. The second division which needs to be unified

observers and consciousness

It is

first

is

that

two epochs,

between the philosophic

it is

who

these observers

happening within consciousness; beginning with

reaching the point of self-awareness, where

discoveries are beginning to coincide with

its

what the philosophic observers already

know.

i.

the

The

First

self's relation

Epoch

with

consciousness. The

.

The

itself

first

as

stage

first

it

is

epoch contains three

it is

which focus on

struggles to reach a free and conscious act of

self-

that of the most primitive self-consciousness, in

the self comes into being by limiting
the activity in which

distinct stages

itself,

which

but without having any understanding of

engaged. This action

is,

for the self, neither free

nor

conscious:
In the original act of self-consciousness the self strives to

object to

itself,

but this

very process a duality.

it

cannot do without

become just a sheer
becoming in that

(for the observer)

56

This raises the issue of the philosophic observer:

why

does Schelling repeatedly

call

on

her or him to point the way? Perhaps the path of self-consciousness which he
postulates

is

simply too counter-intuitive to imagine without the concurrent knowledge

^STI. p.51.
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that

is

we

are both subject

clear that

conscious
is

the

if

way

and

but just need time to realize

object,

self's calling itself

into being

of explaining this fact.

For

philosopher

postulated.

not aware that

it

itself

has posited

itself

as being in a state of limitation, but

this limitation,

and hence perceives

subject.

The

objects.

These objects are actually the negation of the

is

it

unconscious, there needs to be some

is

this reason, the existence of the

In the second stage, the self intuits
is

any event,

In

this.

intuiting

merely sensing

observer

is

is

its self

manifested as sensing opposition to

in the

form of

its

able to understand this in a

Here

for the first time

we may

suspended

way

becomes
Although the

knows
and

The intuiting

clear.

perceive very clearly the difference between

its

sole

philosophize,

in the intuitant or

such does not and cannot know

self as

it is

itself

the cause of

that the cause of sensation (of objects) in the self

thing-in-itself,

who

ground

this, as

now

57

not aware that

self is

self

the self cannot:

that the limitation of the objective has

subjective.

and thus the

The philosophic

activity.

the philosopher's standpoint and that of his object. We,

know

as pure

the form of

itself in

self's activity,

itself

it

which, for Schelling,

is

what was

its

is

limitation, the observer

the duality between self

there before the self as such

came

into existence.

Schelling

is

constructing matter concurrently with the conscious

stage of the development that the self undergoes

is

meant

self,

for

each

as a parallel stage in the

construction of matter. This second stage, for example, which explains the nature of

sensation for the intelligence,

dual construction

is

is

analogous

at best far-fetched,

Schelling' s attempt to find a unity in

57

STI. p.54.

all

to the existence of electricity in nature.

and

This

certainly illustrates the creative nature of

aspects of the world.

Unfortunately, the
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general effect

but

this is to

is

too chaotic, and provides grounds to dismiss Spelling's
contributions,

throw the baby out with the bath. While

exaggerated attempt

at

is

one finds an

world-unity, in general Spelling's effort to rework

perceives the history of philosophy, and indeed
in philosophy,

in certain places

commendable

in that

it

how one

what should be considered important

tries to

provide a

new

order for an

increasingly fragmented world.
In the third stage, the sensing-self

with the third and

identical

final

becomes an object

to itself

and has become

phase of the creation of matter:

This product, namely matter, is thus a complete construPon of the self, though
not for the self itself, which is still identical with matter. If the self in the first

objep and

it now becomes
objePfied in the third act as both at once-for the philosopher, of course, not
for itself. For itself it is objePfied in this act as a subject only. That it appears
merely as matter is necessary, since in this act it admittedly is a subjePobjep
58
but without intuiting itself as such.

act

Matter

is

is

intuited only as

not conscious of

conscious of

itself,

for

it

itself

it is

suspep Spelling
natural

is

self as

clear that this a priori

forestalls

matter

is

also not

Until this happens,

itself.

incomplete and the need for the philosophic observer

construPon

of matter appears as

mticism by pointing out that

phenomena can never be

can therefore

and thus the

has not yet become an object to

transcendental philosophy
remains. While

as such,

in the second only as subject,

"...the

somewhat

ultimate causes of

investigated by the aid of experience"

and

that one

either:

knowing them altogether,
or else... discover them a priori, which
...renounce

remaining

^ STI,

p.91.

^ STI.

pp.92-3.

to us apart

or.. .invent
is

from experience.

them

as atomistic physics does,

the sole source of

knowledge
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That

this a priori discovery is so

modem

strikes the

very different from the "inventions" of the physicist

reader as amusing, and indeed

grand synthesis in the way he intended
stated,

am

I

epoch

on

art.

To return

but in

its

its

waged, the

ii.

result

is

self,

such and be congealed as

The Second Epoch

.

The major problem
it is

must

In order to

first

to

defend Schilling's

is, literally.

Instead, as

make

see that at the

been elevated

end

of the

to the level of

and unconscious:

it

can only act

as primary opposition, continually seeks to

If it

identity,

and

as long as this conflict

is

should end, the intelligence would cease

The second epoch

to

we

how he comes

object.

to exploring

is

how

be overcome here

devoted to showing

how

the self learns to intuit

is

that once the self

the self

itself

in the

becomes aware

rather difficult to apply, or find, the needed limit so that the

can achieve the necessary distance

object.

blind

is still

and absolute

productive intuition.

of itself as producing,

self

The

original state of pure

becomes consciously productive,
product.

to that process,

productive capacity

as intuitant, not yet be intuited.

to exist as

be taken, that

in the history of consciousness, the self has

intelligence,

return to

to

do not seek

attempting to recreate the chain of his thinking so as to see

to his original views

first

it

I

to intuit itself as subject in the

product as

the leap from intuition to reflection, however, this boundary

be discovered and explored. In

this section, Schelling

begins to struggle in

earnest with the Kantian system. Before plunging into the matter at hand, he stakes
his claim:

Since our whole philosophy proceeds from the standpoint of intuition, not
that of reflection, occupied, for instance, by Kant and his philosophy, we shall
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now incipient series of acts of the intelligences as acts,
say, as concepts of acts, or as categories. 60

also derive the

As shown

in the analysis of Critique of judgement, reflective

and

judgment provides Kant

with the means to establish the basis for cognitive knowledge. Schelling intends
this point of origin

one step further back;

something upon which one can
that thing.

With

this in

of the thing-in-itself

reflect,

whereas

intuition

is

of time.

So as

to see

the

initial

more

clearly

original

one

is

with, there are

two types

both the nature

how
is

Schelling

is

in order.

self.

The

or

first

posited through ideal activity, or through the thing-in-itself, which

limits the real or objective self; the

emphasized that Schelling' s
Kant.

of restriction within the

is

perception of

illustrates,

distancing himself from Kant, a cursory glance at these two concepts

To begin

to put

reflection already presupposes that there

mind, Schelling redefines, and then

and the nature

not,

For Kant, the

self is

second one

thing-in-itself

Ls

limits the ideal self.

It

must be

not quite the same thing that

an appearance whose true ground

is

it is

for

the transcendental ego

or thing-in-itself, a definition which leaves unclear just what the thing-in-itself actually

is.

Schelling solves this problem of the nature of the

question of whether the
absurd.

It is

self is a thing-in-itself

not a thing at

all,

with one sentence: "The

or an appearance

is itself

neither thing-in-itself nor appearance."

not yet answer what the thing-in-itself
certainly has a definite

self

meaning

is,

for

whether or not the

in Schelling's system.

61

intrinsically

This does

self is related to

For Schelling, the

self is

it, it

simply

the result of a self-conscious limitation of endless activity, and the question at hand

concerns the level of development of

“ STl,
61

p.95.

STI, p.32.

this self-consciousness.

The

thing-in-itself,

160

however, does play a

role.

As already seen, Schelling defines

it

which

as that

is

there

before the entrance of self-consciousness, or as the unlimited activity of the
not-yet
self.

This

hardly more enlightening than Kant's vision but does contain a crucial

is

difference, for

an object or

Kant assumes the

7

dialectical.

s

understanding of the relation between

They cannot both

Instead, there

is

limited self that

be in existence simultaneously with

only unknowable for our kind of cognition. 62

self,

Schelling

thing-in-itself to

exist at the

a constant oscillation

is

same

itself,

and

self is

time, for they are in pure opposition.

between the two

constantly producing

thing-in-itself

states,

and which

is

which

results in a

both real and

This

ideal.

gives rise to a complicated explanation about the kind of intuition required to grasp

moved beyond

the type of self under consideration, for once the self has

the simple

stage of self-consciousness and has

begun producing,

cannot be limited by a purely

boundary. Consequently there must be

restriction, in

which the

ideal

it is

ideal self or the thing-in-itself

is

both ideal and

limited

by a

real

and

real,

a

second

boundary.

Schelling has already stated that:

The

thing-in-itself

is..

.nothing else but the

shadow

over the boundary, which is thrown back to the
63
extent itself a product of the self.

of the ideal activity,

self

by

intuition,

and

now
is

to that

what has been an inadmissible fact for Kant, even
repeatedly returns, especially in Q:
Kant
which
though it is a point to
By the thing-in-itself, which he introduced into philosophy, Kant has at least
provided the first impulse which could carry philosophy beyond ordinary
consciousness, and has at least shown that the ground of the object that
62

Schelling perceptively notes

appears in consciousness cannot itself again Lie in consciousness; but he never
even considered clearly, let alone explained, that this ground of explanation
activity,
lying beyond consciousness is in the end no more than our own ideal
merely hypostatized into the thing-in-itself (STl p.99).
play of the cognitive
This ideal activity comes close to what Kant referred to as the free
faculties in
63

Q.

SU p.68.
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Again, this
self

is

becomes

not terribly

explicit,

but

it

does establish that the process by which the

a self, or limited infinite activity,

The concept

of

boundary

is

essential to

thinldng, for the entire system rests
exact line, but

is

is

on

productive.

an understanding

of Schelling

A boundary

this indefinite notion.

is

the product of an infinite oscillation between a product and

7

s

never an
its

opposite or negation. Because this does not rely on clear-cut definitions, the only
to reach

an awareness

hypothesis that the

of this

self

boundary

is

has an intuition of

through
itself

in

Schelling assumes the

intuition.

its

producing. Then, since the

intuition of a producing self requires the intuition of a non-producing

establishes the necessity of both a simple (non-productive)

intuition which, in order to be opposed to

concept, for else there

would be no

that both are intuitant; the

Schelling explains the

way

ground

self,

he

and complex (productive)

one another, must coincide

relation

way

in a higher

between them. 64 The higher concept

of difference

is

that one

is

simple,

of intuiting the self from the thing-in-itself

is

one complex.

by means

of

an

inner (simple) and an outer (complex) intuition.

The
intuition.

self itself is

It

resides within the

intuitive activity has

the

the object of simple intuitant activity and

both

self

boundary posed by the
and

boundary between the two;

outer intuition

is

the

same

thing-in-itself as object,

it is

as that

ideal

self.

is

called inner

The compound

and thus

partially oversteps

outer intuition. The boundary between inner and

between

self

and

thing-in-itself:

^Schelling follows this triadic pattern throughout, which he states most concisely
...one simple, one
in explaining the necessity of having three activities in the self:
compound, and a third which divides them from each other and relates them together"
the rather confusing reason that
(ST1, p.96). This third activity is also a simple one, for

were it not so "...it could not distinguish the combination for what it is"
das konnte sie die zusammengesetzte nicht als solche unterscheiden).

(...denn

ohne
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Outer sense begins

at the point where inner sense leaves off. What
appears to
us as the object of outer sense is merely a boundary point of inner sense,
and
hence both of them, outer and inner, are also in origin identical, for outer sense
is merely inner sense subjected to a limit. Outer sense is
necessarily also inner,

though by
While

and

it

is

not necessarily also outer. 65

might seem that the terms are reversed

'self'

(i.e.

should be simple

'thing-in-itself'

complex), there cannot be any reference to the thing-in-itself without the

for only the self

is

contrast, inner

can

strive to return to

complex and the passive
It is

its

pre-limited status.

self,

Therefore, the active self

self is simple.

at this point that Schelling brings in time

and

space: the self as inner sense

becomes an object

to itself

through the intuition which

is

time; the self as outer sense

becomes an object

to itself

through the intuition which

is

space.

forces the self into a state of self-awareness, for in opposing

is

trapped in the present and becomes aware of

arises as a limit.

Once

the

in time, the outer intuition

self's

its

commitment

becomes aware

of

it

object to

itself

the self

to the object: time

The axes

in space.

his first critique.

He

finally

then, in a matter of

covers the nature of causality which gave Kant so
idealist,

intuition of time

inner intuition becomes aware of the opposed object

world are thus composed of time and space: Schelling has

from which Kant begins

an

The

much

the fact that the succession in a causal relation

unconscious act of producing and not in any cognitive

is

trouble.

of the objective

reached the point

two or three pages,
For Schelling and the

necessary

lies

in the

act:

as inseparable from the appearances, just
themselves
as inseparable from the succession. For
as the appearances present
experience, therefore, the result is the same, whether the succession be linked

The succession must come before us

to the things, or the things to the succession.
is merely that both are absolutely inseparable.

The judgment

of

common

sense

thus in fact completely
while the
intelligence,
the
of
act
illogical to attribute the succession to an
least we should
At
objects, by contrast, are held to arise independently thereof.

65

ST1, p.98.

It is

163

proclaim both, the succession no

less

than the objects, to be equally

independent of our presentations. 66
This

is

a direct attack

on Kantian

causality, in particular as

Analogy. Kant attributes objective appearance

to the

essentially states that the objective appearance of

law of

an object

appears in the Second

it

causality,

which

of experience

is

a product

of unity of consciousness; one initially perceives the object in a subjective time
order,

but through the three part synthesis (apprehension in intuition; reproduction in
imagination; recognition in a concept) the object gains universal (objective) validity. 67

For Schelling

it is

not a question of

human

cognition providing the law to

nature, thus giving rise to the objective world. For him;

The

self is neither originally productive, nor is it even so by choice. It is a
primary opposition, whereby the essence and nature of intelligence are

constituted.

68

This opposition between ideal and

real,

which

(Schelling

drives the

whole universe.

between
is

intelligence

by no means

and matter,

is

the motor

a scientist in the

sense, but the idea behind his equation of intelligence with matter, depending
level of ideality or reality,

Einstein's equivalence

is

seeking a unified

is

curiously similar in concept (no

between energy and mass.

field

Having the mathematics

In his

math

own

modem
on the

involved!) to

primitive way, Schelling

theory, the necessary interrelation of the entire universe.
to substantiate one's position

is

crucial to appearing serious to

66

SH p.108.

67

See CPR B233-256. E.g.: "...the understanding by virtue of the unity of
apperception, is the a priori condition of the possibility of a continuous determination
of all positions for the appearances in this time, through the series of causes and
and so render
effects, the former of which inevitably lead to the existence of the latter,
the empirical knowledge of the time-relations valid universally for
therefore objectively valid" (A211).

^ STI,

p.113.

all

time,

and
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a

Western audience; otherwise one runs the

for this

being branded a

system to function, Schelling needs to establish two

one, which

and

risk of

and

one which

in time;

individual.

eternal

is

Without

is

timeless,

and

a real one,

which

flake.)

In order

distinct spheres,

an

ideal

rooted in everyday reality

is

absolute self and absolute intelligence, and one which

this basic opposition, there

is

can be no organized or coherent

system in which the apparently chaotic forces of living beings are brought together,
it is

precisely this opposition

which imposes

intelligent order

for

on an otherwise shapeless

mass.
It

must be noted

that Schelling' s

two spheres

are not the

same

noumenal and phenomenal world; Kant could say nothing about
for

it

was not

intuitable

restraint in talking

by human cognition. Schelling has no such

about the ideal world, for he considers

world as matter. Schelling

knowledge but

is

the

is,

after

all,

it

as

much

as Kant's

noumenal world,
feelings of

a part of the real

not trying to establish the basis of cognitive

searching for the absolute truth of being, a quest which, in Kant's

view, would be a return to the discussion on metaphysics and would rest on pure

would counter

Schelling

speculation.

with physical

reality as

Kant

is,

and that Kant has not

objective world, because he has provided

which Schelling

believes he reveals:

69

69

STI, p.122.

not the

human

no

real

sufficiently

motor

"One may say

most obvious proof of transcendental
intelligence."

by pointing out that he

this

tendency

means the

to see order in the world.

concerned

accounted for the
It is

this

that organic nature furnishes the

idealism, for every plant

'intelligence' Schelling

just as

to drive the life force.

While Kant also believes that organic unity

By

is

is

is

a

symbol of the

a result of divine

basic stuff of the universe,

and

165
rationality,

what we

actually see

a result of our type of cognition,

is

and not proof

of a

cosmic order.
In the

the

The

self.

Second Epoch, Schelling has recreated
interaction of the real

boundaries and

limits

is

products of
free

Will,"

unconscious

upon

The Third Epoch

and the product,

objective world.

self,

but for

creates the

but also the nature of time and

it is

to this

reflection

can the

self

problem which Schelling

The Third Epoch, "From

a separation

The

self,

products; they are simply there, the

Only through

activity.

.

its

documents the conscious separation which

self,

the

itself,

it

at this point clear to us, the philosophic observers.

and conscious production, and

iii.

or

is

incapable of reflecting
its

ideal actions of the self as

which determine not only

space and organic unity

however,

and

for us the productive intuition of

engage

now

in

turns.

Reflection to the Absolute Act of

takes place

between the

which guarantees the existence

intelligence,

of the empirical,

Until this point, the philosophical observer has recounted the story of

itself

the self has been both subject and object together, without

separating these two aspects. Here

it

achieves the breakthrough. In addition,

Schelling continues his confrontation with the Kantian system, for he uses

same concepts which Kant uses but he

gives

many

them completely new meanings,

of the

e.g.:

'concept/ 'object/ 'schematism/ 'categories' and the relation between a priori and a
posteriori.

Schelling has created a completed self that has been arrived at by a series of

synthetic acts; these acts

now form

although synthetically complete, and therefore the
consciousness forth in the

self,

The

a closed circle.

must be

self is

not yet conscious,

act of reflection,

analytic, for

which brings

no new knowledge

will

be gained
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that

is

not already (unconsciously) present. The intelligence, which

the coming-into-being of the

self,

must

first

differentiate itself

from

is

its

the force behind

product:

be unable to arrive at any intuition of itself through the
products until it has separated itself from the products; and since in itself it is
nothing else but the determinate mode of action whereby the object arises, it
will be able to arrive at itself only by separating its acting as such from that
...[the intelligence] will

which

arises for

it

in this acting,

or.. .from

the items produced. 70

This separation of the acting from the product leads to the concept of the product, the
first

sign of the emerging consciousness of the

an object
object in

is

the result of our

itself.

mode

of cognition, since

The concept provides the

manifold of intuition, which then gives
--That

which

arises for us,

For Kant, the concept

self.

we have

we can know nothing about

of

the

rule for the reproduction in imagination of a

rise to

when we

an

object.

Schelling finds this

artificial:

separate the acting as such from the

The question as to how our concepts conform
no meaning from a transcendental viewpoint, inasmuch
as this question presupposes an original difference between the two. In the
absence of consciousness, the object and its concept, and conversely, concept
and object, are one and the same, and the separation of the two first occurs
71
with the emergence of consciousness.

outcome,

is

called the concept.

to objects has therefore

Kant's mistake, Schelling

conscious

self,

is

saying,

is

that

by

limiting his analysis of objectivity to the

the original identity behind the apparent conformity between concept

and object remains hidden, rendering any explanation
Despite

this,

of this conformity incomplete.

Schelling tends to slip into Kantian language

which makes the

difference he

is

trying to establish

when

using these terms,

somewhat hazy.

Schelling continues with his unfolding of the working of the conscious

following Kant's lead but reinterpreting the terminology. This
into a detailed comparison

70

71

STI, p.134.

SH

p.135.

and contrast

of Kant's

is

and Schelling

7

s

self

by

not the place to enter
respective

167

development of cognitive theory. At the
7

briefly present the gist of Schelling

become
is

separated, a special act

judgment, which

"...is

s

risk of

argument. To explain

which opposes them

and then
This

intuition.

one

side

in turn relating

is

them

to

first

it

a specific object

able to equate

is

required.

This

each other, a process which occurs through

object.

Schelling c alls this type of

can only be learned from one's inner experience. The schema
all its

can be brought

an intuition with

aspects, but merely
73

latter

an

intuition of the rule

Through the schema, judgment

is

The schema has both an empirical and

a

forth."

a concept.

can be brought forth empirically, the

abstraction

only

concept and object

in consciousness

transcendental level, the former being the "sensorily intuited

whereby an

will

separating the concept from the

on the concept and on the other on the

not a presentation determinate in

whereby

how

I

not productive intuition, however, but an intuition which borders on

intuition 'schematism/

"...is

injustice,

not a comparison of concept with concept.. .but of concepts

with intuitions." 72 Judgment takes place by
object

doing both an

rule,"

whereby an

being the "sensory intuition of the

object

rule,"

74

object can be brought forth as such, or transcendentally. Transcendental

is

postulated as the condition of empirical abstraction, which in turn

is

the

condition of judgment; consequently, every judgment rests on a transcendental
abstraction,

72

which Schelling

states

is

the

same capacity

as that for a priori concepts.

SU p.136

^STI, p.137.
trying to express by using these
"sinnlich." In any event, it is
different adjectives, for the German in both cases is
sense, an empirical
a transcendental schema can be intuited via

74

two

STI, p.143.

not obvious
function.

It is

not clear to

me what Heath

how

Another of Spelling's mysteries!

is

.
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The task remaining
the intelligence.

itself in

for Schelling

to

is

Only by breaking

show how consciousness can

recognize

the enclosed circle of ordinary

consciousness, which at most reaches the level of empirical abstraction, can
the
elevate

above everything objective and consciously recognize

itself

This recognition

is

closely

knowledge. The capacity
self-consciousness
this capacity.

is

actually

itself..."

75

although

this

as intelligence.

the relation between a priori and a posteriori

for a priori concepts

To reach awareness

no longer

abstraction,

bound up with

itself

self

is "...as

necessary to every intelligence as

does not mean that every

self will realize

of transcendental abstraction or a priori

a function of theoretical philosophy;

it is

and therefore cannot be explained by any other

an

knowledge

act of absolute

acts in the intelligence.

Schelling elaborates:

...there

remains

demand: there

in regard to [this act of absolute abstraction] only the absolute

shall appear

such an act in the intelligence. But in so saying,
its boundary, and crosses into the domain of
76
practical philosophy, which alone posits by means of categorical demands.

theoretical philosophy oversteps

Before turning to consider practical philosophy, Schelling
relation

between

intelligence

itself.

a priori

and

a posteriori concepts,

it is

beyond ordinary consciousness."

77

capable of transporting

By opening up not only

the unconscious realm to investigation,
analysis of the world and the

76

p.148.

ST1, p.149.

^ STl,

p.151

self:

it

is

needs to

clarify the

which he claims originate

Transcendental idealism can demonstrate

theoretical philosophy because

^ STl,

still

this

in the

concluding enquiry of

itself "...into a

region lying

the conscious, but also

possible to complete a thoroughgoing

169
In that we project the origin of the so-called a priori concepts beyond
consciousness, where we also locate the origin of the objective world, we

maintain upon the same evidence, and with equal right, that our knowledge
originally empirical through and through, and also through and through a
priori

78

.

In other words,

from

all

knowledge

everything

is

concepts, and this

kinds of knowledge
consciousness!,]"

80

is

to abstract

is

we

are

unaware

79

The only way we can become aware

a priori.

from everything material

The only genuine

"...is

whose

Philosophy according

distinction

made simply and
task

Freedom and the

to the purely formal

it is

will

.

which

between these two

to retrace the origins of the self

and world.

This brings us to Part Four, "System of Practical

to the Principles of

Transcendental Idealism;" the subject matter
is

willing.

to ordinary, everyday, determinate acts of will, but to

or.. .the

exists

solely in regard to philosophic

the actions of the conscious intelligence, which

determining,

of this producing,

action that does not take place automatically "...but by a special

is

exercise of freedom."

is

a priori to the extent that the self produces everything

and nothing

a posteriori

of this act of producing

c.

is

but at the same time as long as

itself,

original act of freedom."

81

"...a

Schelling

is

transcendental

not referring
self-

This transcendental willing

is

closely

linked to freedom, and freedom's relation to necessity. In order to illuminate the

abstruse concept of freedom,
intuition,

78

which plays such

STI, p.151.

^ STI.

p.152.

“STT, p-154.
81

STT

is

p.156.

I

first

want

to return to the concept of intellectual

a large role in this work, because through

it

we

gain a

170

means

of access to the notion of freedom

conscious

and

its

bond with the

individualized, self-

self.

The

relation

between

intellectual intuition

and consciousness

understanding of Schelling' s system because of the true nature of the
neither object nor thing but

knowledge,

all

the

cannot be objective, for knowledge of objects only

it

action of consciousness.

self's

because ordinary knowledge

and

not

is

and

intuitive,

produces the
objects.

it

is

is

of

knowing which can know

is

which

is

the principle of

arises as a result of

self to

be known, the

is

independent of

its

the self must be both

not dependent on inferences or proofs and thus essentially

cannot be independent of

object.

self,

an

from that of ordinary knowledge,

different

about things. Ordinary knowing

The type

free.

absolutely free, that

which

Consequently, in order for the

knowing must be completely

type of

object

instead infinite activity. Since the self

is

central to

is

its

object, since the

Knowledge about things

Knowledge about the

self is

results

knowing simultaneously

from the sensory intuition of

gained through a different kind of intuition,

is:

...freely

productive in

itself,

and

in

which producer and product are one and the

same.
In contrast to sensory intuition, which does not appear as a producing of its
object, and where the intuiting itself is therefore distinct from the intuited, an
intuition of the above type will be called intellectual intuition.

Knowledge

of the self

is

simultaneously produces

organ of
self to

82

all

itself

as object.

transcendental thinking[,]"

be able to objectify to

ST1, p.27.

83

thus gained through intellectual intuition:

STI, p.27.

itself

that

83

Intellectual intuition

which

which

is

is

is,

82

it is

a

knowing

consequently,

that

"...the

the kind of thinking needed for the

not an object.

It

can only do

this

171

through freedom. The
it

comes

self is intellectual intuition, for

through

its

knowledge

of

itself,

into being.

Another way

to explain intellectual intuition

inner and outer sense, where
to a limit."

This

and hence the
restrictions."

84

is

it is

claimed that outer sense

proof, says Schelling, that

objective world

is

to recall the discussion

is

"[a]ll

is "...inner

intuition

between

sense subjected

in principle intellectual,

is

merely the intellectual world appearing under

Schelling's use of the term 'intellectual' might, to a

modem

reader,

conjure up ideas of rational, logical thought. This would be completely misguided, for
'intellectual'

here refers to the intelligence, the basic matter of the universe, which

either active as intelligence or passive as matter,

awareness of
its

its

infinite

productive activity.

possessor to get in touch with, or

meaning

in the world,

intuit,

and

What

is

determined by the

intellectual intuition

is

self's self-

does

is

enable

the absolute, the underlying sense or

which can never be done through

a purely individual

knowing:

Die intellektuale Anschauung als intuitives Wahrnehmung des Absoluten ist
keine inhaltlich bestimmte Erkenntnis, da eine derartige Erkenntnis schon
wieder auf der Distanzierung des erkennenden Subjekts vom erkannten Objekt

beruhen wiirde. In der intellektualen Anschauung aber sollen Subjekt und
Objekt, Anschauender und Angeschautes gerade eins sein. Sie ist ein Zustand
der Unmittelbarkeit jenseits des Denkens und Sprechens: ein mystischer
Zustand, der das absolut Identische reprasentiert.
Intellectual intuition enables the individual,

by an

85

act of absolute abstraction, to

transcend her individuality, to understand what the absolute
intelligence

knowing

“ STI.

is,

and

in turn, to

understand the relation

or intuition must be absolutely free, which

self

and absolute

to the individualized self.

means

in this case not

This

dependent

p.98.

Jochen Schmidt, Die Geschichte des Genie-Gedankens in der deu tschen
Philosophic und Politik 1750-1945 Band parmstadt: Wissenschaftlich
85

1

Buchgesellschaft, 1985).

Literatur,

on any other form

what

it

of

knowledge. This returns us

means and how
The

it

on freedom,

can be explained only through a

determining act of the intelligence upon

itself,

which

as already stated,

self-

is

the original

In order to account for this act of freedom, Schelling posits the

existence of a pre-established harmony, by

which he means the

indirect reciprocity

within an act which must be explicable from something that simultaneously
not a producing of the intelligence.

unconditioned,

On

it

must appear

On

as lying outside of the intelligence

The problem

able to explain the nature of freedom.

is

and

the one hand, since the act of freedom

the other hand, since the intelligence only contains

reciprocity, in

to

can be obtained.

act of absolute abstraction

act of freedom.

to the discussion

is

what

it

and thus

produces,

is

is

inexplicable.

it

must be

solved through this indirect

which:

of free self-determination must be a producing on the part of the
although the negative condition of this producing must lie outside
it;. ...since the intelligence is but an act, [this negative condition] will have to be
86
a nonaction of the intelligence
...the

ground

intelligence,

.

This relationship

imaginable

is

"...only

only conceivable through a pre-established harmony, a harmony

between subjects

of equal reality ,"

87

which

is

to say

it

must

proceed from another, external intelligence. This raises several complicated questions

about the determination of individuality,
individualization possible.

individual poses

is

for only

through a

restriction of

The most important question which the

freedom

is

self-conscious

the following:

influence of rational beings upon me is posited through a negation of
of
free activity in myself, and yet that first influence, which is the condition

For

if.. .all

173

consciousness, can come about before I am free (for freedom only arises
with
consciousness), the question is, how then can freedom be restricted

me even

in

before

I

am

The answer simply

conscious of being free? 88

from the

posits that,

unconscious nonacting, by which

were not

originally suspended,

is

start,

meant

would be

prevented from becoming conscious of

it

there

"...the

free."

as

89

an

negation of an activity which,

Because

activity

oneself, simply because this free negation of activity

one as an individual does not operate
even

if

this

freedom

is

suspended,

is

at a

in the individual a free but

is

conscious

is

it is

which

suspended, one

if it

is

integrally belongs to

unconscious; that which defines

level.

That the individual

necessary so that Schelling can establish

is free,

"...not a

moral philosophy of any land, but rather a transcendental deduction of the thinkability

and

explicability of

moral concepts as such!,]" 90 which

practical philosophy.

but to

show

His concern

that such a code

What, however,
but

is

remains elusive.

it still

is

is

both possible and necessary.

meant by being

free?

There

is

a great

emphasis placed on

Paradoxically, one cannot understand

a mystery that Schelling calls

"...the

As we have already seen, the

self

series of limits.

to say the basis for a

not to establish rules for a moral code of conduct,

without understanding what necessity

through a

is

is,

for in

end

effect

supreme problem

of transcendental philosophy."

real

this ability to limit

is

SJL

89

ST1, 170.

^ STI.
91

p.169.

p.155.

ST1, p.204.

formed

come from?

the beginning of his deduction of self-consciousness, Schelling states:

88

is

they are one and the same,

and everything individual and

Where, however, does

what freedom

it,

In

91

The action that is cause of all limitation, and can no longer be explained by any
other, must be absolutely free. But absolute freedom is identical with absolute
necessity.. ..Such an act is the original act of self-consciousness; absolutely free,
it is determined by nothing outside the self; absolutely necessary,
since
proceeds from the inner necessity of the nature of the self. 2

since

Freedom

is

inherent in the very nature of the

...the

one

principle

the objective world

way

things are, and

is

it

indeed:

on which everything
is

is supported, and what we behold in
not anything present outside us, but merely the inner
free activity....This necessary coexistence of a free but

our own
and an illimitable

limitation of

activity in one and the same identical subject must,
be necessary, and the deduction of this necessity appertains to
that higher philosophy which is both theoretical and practical at once 93

limited,
it

exists at

if

all,

.

Only through

a grasp of the

whole

of transcendental idealism can this relation

between freedom and necessity become
appear

it

laws and

must manifest
is,

itself

Otherwise, in order for freedom to

clear.

as a natural

phenomena, and then

subject to natural

it is

qua freedom, abolished.

This abstruse relationship between freedom and necessity can be more clearly

put into language

we

can understand by placing

between conscious and unconscious
different manifestations of the

same

it

in the context of the relationship

action, for both pairs of opposition are essentially

relationship:

and necessity freedom. But now in contrast
to freedom, necessity is nothing else but the unconscious. That which exists in
me without consciousness is involuntary; that which exists with consciousness
is in me through my willing.
To say that necessity is again to be present in freedom, amounts,
therefore, to saying that through freedom itself, and in that believe myself to

Freedom

is

to be necessity,

I

act freely,

without

something

my

consent.

I

94

do not intend

is

to

come about unconsciously,

i.e.,

175

This explains the experience of

much

of the

human

condition;

it

expresses

transcendentally the relationship "...between freedom and a hidden necessity, at times
called fate

to

and

at times providence."

be elucidated:

how

is it

95

The nature

of fate or providence

is

that through free, conscious action, something

what needs
happens

which we never intended and which would not have happened had we not

acted?

Schelling derives a grand theory of historical inevitability and of moral and
religious order

from

this

which serves

to illustrate that there necessarily

must be an

absolute identity of subject and object, freedom and necessity, conscious and

unconscious in order to account
as

"...a

for the lawfulness in the world.

He

interprets history

progressive, gradually self-disclosing revelation of the absolute..." 96 which can

only reveal

itself partially, for

were

it

ever to

appearance of freedom would be abolished:

come

it

forth in

its

completeness the

would be the same

as predetermination.

Likewise:

The opposition between conscious and unconscious activity is necessarily an
unending one, for were it ever to be done away with, the appearance of
97
freedom, which rests entirely upon it, would be done away with too.

Only by means
all

Unconscious

things.

without

of postulating this opposition can

its

activity

is

we

grasp the interrelated nature of

thus crucial to the transcendental system, for

unseen presence there could be no accounting

Intellectual intuition, the special

and cognizes

itself,

intuits

knowing by which

and reproduces the

for the self

and the world.

the self both constitutes

infinite self in a finite form.

This

revealed
finitude prevents intellectual intuition or intelligence from being fully

95

SJL

p.204.

%ST1,

p.211.

^ STI,

p.210.

and
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prevents self-consciousness from becoming fully self-aware. Self-consciousness, which
arises

through intuiting and producing,

is

the result of a continual translation from

unconscious

to conscious activity

existence.

If

the opposition achieved the unity

more

Consequently,

self.

mediation

we

we

and needs

this opposition so that

it is

it

striving for, there

can approach the

It is

would be no

possess a fragmented consciousness at best, but through
lost

wholeness by thinking our way back

original act of opposition: the task of the transcendental philosopher

mediation.

can come into

it is

to

to chart this

is

the unconscious nature of the producing self that drives Schelling to

the necessity of postulating an aesthetic intuition as the true basis for

and

to the

an examination of

this

which we

finally

now

turn.

all

philosophy,

177

Two

B. Part

1.

Teleology

The

final

two

version of the Critique of Tudgment
it is

System of Transcendental Idealism are Schelling

sections of the

7

The terminology has

.

s

a familiar Kantian ring, but

used to present an alternative vision of the relationship between the individual

and the world. Schelling
aesthetics

and teleology

7

s

focus

to effect a

nature of reflective judgment,
7

Kant

s

mode

view,

we

is

although he, too, uses the domain of

different,

grand synthesis. In

first its

aesthetic

Q, Kant has examined

and then

its

teleological aspect.

regard nature as exhibiting organization but this

of cognition.

1

Therefore,

all

constitutive function to teleology.

we

can do

The

is

is

the
In

as a result of our

assign a regulative and not a

critique of teleological

judgment ends by

presenting a moral proof of the existence of God; Kant again reaches to something

beyond our cognitive

capabilities to

prove the order in the world. Schelling

approaches the matter from a diametrically opposed position.

At the most obvious
teleology

and then

art.

2

As

level, Schelling

his

has reversed the order,

segue from the

first

first

discussing

four parts into the last two parts

See Cl, 361: "For we are bringing forward a teleological ground where we endow
a conception of an object--as if that conception were to be found in nature instead of
in ourselves— with causality in respect of the object, or rather where we picture to
ourselves the possibility of the object on the analogy of a causality of this kind-a
causality such as we experience in ourselves-and so regard nature as possessed of a
capacity of its own for acting technically; whereas if we did not ascribe such a mode
!

of operation to nature

its

causality

would have

to

be regarded as blind mechanism.

Schelling rarely uses the term 'aesthetic/ except to qualify intuition. He
object.
primarily talks about art, and never refers to the work of art as an aesthetic
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of

STL he

distinctly refers to

one

judgment, giving us a hint as
But

now

to

of the key concepts

how

from Kant's analysis of aesthetic

his interpretation will differ:

conscious activity is purposive, this coincidence of conscious
activity can evidence itself only in a product that is purposive,
without being purposively brought about. Nature must be a product of this
sort, and this, indeed, is the principle of teleology, in which alone we may seek
for the solution of the problem posed above [viz. the original identity of
if all

and unconscious

unconscious with conscious

Kant made

this

absolute,

and are

Kant

not go this

bridge between

it

to nature as such.

assumes that the two are

relation to the self

will

3

purposiveness without purpose the criterion for the judgment of

beauty, but did not apply
its

activity ].

related to each other

all

principles that has

far,

instead relying

to

irrational.

has

little

Five

is

to

He

same

different manifestations of the

on the power

aspects of the universe. For Kant,

been able

and

through the hidden wholeness of the universe.
of reason to account for the

it "...is

only reason by

its

moral

produce the conception of God..."4 Schelling's view of

the universal and of the mutual relationship of

and

Schelling's interpretation of nature

all

things

is,

by contrast, both anarchic

intends to reveal the interconnection between everything, but this

do with morality or with teleology

in the

way Kant understands

Part

it.

called "Essentials of Teleology according to the Principles of Transcendental

Idealism;" the essentials here referred to are quite different from previous teleological

explanations.
Schelling's explanation of

how

closely connected to the relationship

shown, freedom

3

STI, p.214.

is

CL

447.

between freedom and the conscious

be found in the absolute identical

The German

hervorgebracht zu
4

to

nature can both be and not be purposive

sein."

reads: "...das

zweckmassig

activity

ist,

self.

which we only

ohne zweckmassig

is

As
see in
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its

divided form, where

appear;

we

conscious

it

has become both conscious and unconscious, so that

only perceive freedom in

self is

proof that the infinite

freedom. Nature, by contrast,

which

lies

its

is

what

suspended form, where the existence

self willed itself into existence

a product that

is

can

of the

through an

act of

Schelling understands by necessity, as that

before or beyond this separation and

Nature appears as

it

is

purposive, but

brought forth without freedom.
its

production

is

not in accordance

with any purpose:
of nature rests upon this, that in its mechanism, and although
nothing but a blind mechanism, it is nonetheless purposive. If I take
away the mechanism, I take away nature itself. All the magic which surrounds
organic nature. ..rests upon the contradiction, that although this nature is a
product of blind natural forces, it is nevertheless purposive through and
through. 5

...the peculiarity
itself

Organic nature

is

the unification of freedom and necessity in the external world;
6

"das Seiende im Ganzen."

contradiction which

cannot be accounted
original identity,

exacts a

heavy

Man

we
for

The natural product

both

free

and necessary,

a

can deduce through transcendental principles but which

by means of a

teleological explanation.

which has taken place

price.

is

it is

for the

The separation

of the

purpose of the appearance of the

self,

Unlike natural products:

forever a broken fragment, for either his action is necessary, and then
not free, or free, and then not necessary and according to law. The complete
appearance of freedom and necessity unified in the external world therefore
is

yields

5

me

organic nature

only...

7

ST1, p.215.

Dieter Jahnig "Die Schlusselstellung der Kunst bei Schelling" in Manfred Franks
Materialien zu Schellings philosophischen Anfangen, " (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp
6

Verlag, 1975), p.337.
7

SJL

p.216.

While

it

appears to us as

if

nature

is

a

producing that has become objective and

therefore seems free, according to the duality established in transcendental philosophy,

nature

is

also

As

an unconscious intuition of producing and

a result of

its

is

thus a blind producing.

synthesizing capabilities, Schelling claims that only the system

of transcendental idealism can account for the seeming contradiction that a product

both blind and purposive, that
postulate that either matter

it is

both unconscious and conscious.
or that matter

itself is intelligent,

intelligence has put purposiveness into

its

form

(this is

aimed

is

inert

All

is

other systems

and an outside

at Kant).

Both of these

explanations, according to Schelling, are faulty, and neither can account for the

apparent logical contradiction of transcendental idealism, which
constitutive basis of the world.

with

all

Teleological

modes

true explanation of nature..." because

corresponds to the conscious

activity tak[es]

corresponds to the unconscious activity ."
a relatively superficial level,

it

8

"...the

is

actually the

of explanation in fact "...do

purposive concept that

precedence over the object that

Because teleological explanation operates

completely misses the true nature of things;

precisely the true nature or ultimate

away

harmony

of subject

at

it is

and object which the

transcendental philosopher has set out to establish, not so

much

for herself, but for the

self itself.

The transcendental philosopher knows

harmony

is "...that

that the principle of this underlying

ultimate in ourselves which already undergoes division in the

primary act of self-consciousness ."

9

Although nature represents the

original identity
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of conscious

and unconscious

activity,

it

has not convinced the

self that

the self

itself is

the ultimate ground of this identity:

Die Organisation der Natur

und

ist wohl der Vereinigungspunkt von theoretischer
praktischer Philosophic, aber ein Vereinigungspunkt ausserhalb des

Bewusstseins, so dass das objecktive Ich zwar Analogiebeziehungen zwischen
dem philosophischen Identitatspostulat und der Natur feststellen, aber nicht
erkennen kann, dass der letzte Grund des exoterischen Vereinigungspunkts "im
Ich selbst

This

moment

ultimate

liegt."

10

of recognition

harmony between

is

the goal of transcendental idealism: to

product, becomes an object for the

which

it

was once

part.

which

subject and object,

self itself,

What needs

to

so that

is

show how

the

revealed in the natural

can recognize the wholeness of

it

be found for the intelligence

is

a special

intuition:

...whereby in one and the same appearance the

once conscious and
unconscious for itself, and it is by means of such an intuition that we first
bring forth the intelligence, as it were, entirely out of itself; by such an
intuition, therefore, that we also first resolve the entire [the supreme] problem
of transcendental philosophy (that of explaining the congruence between
subjective

and

objective).

1

In contrast to intellectual intuition,

self,

self is at

which was

both conscious and unconscious

activity

limited to consciousness of the inner

become

objective in the

same

intuition.

This intuition, claims Schelling, can only be the intuition of art because of the
extraordinary role which art plays in revealing the true nature of things. This
point towards which Schelling has been meticulously building, and he
into

an exposition

of the

phenomenal

abilities of

both the

art

Hans

Freier,

Die Riickkehr der Gotter (Stuttgart:

Verlagsbuchhandlung,

n

SJL

pp.217-8.

1976), p.161.

J.B.

the

launches

product and the producer

of art, the genius.

10

now

is

Metzlersche
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2.

Art and aesthetic intuition

The aspect

7

of Spelling s

most excitement and which has,

System of Transcendental Idealism which caused the

been most

in certain circles,

"Deduction of a Universal Organ of Philosophy,

or: Essentials of

according to the Principles of Transcendental Idealism." In
section, Schelling establishes the art product as that

and

subject

becomes objective

same time

art a position of highest importance, a

members

of the

contemporary

Before engaging in a
STI,

12
I

present a

first

critical

Part Six:

the Philosophy of Art

complicated and dense

closes the

gap between

activities

which

create the

gives both the producers and products of

ranking which was enthusiastically greeted by

literary

movement known

analysis of Schelling

summary

is

This completes the circle of transcendental

for the subject.

idealism for Schelling, and at the

the

which

this

whereby the opposition between the two

subject

object,

influential,

of this final part.

7

s

generally as Romanticism.

philosophy of

art as

it

appears in

Schelling divides his study of art

into three sections: deduction of the art product; description of the art product;

between

relation

the genius,

a.

product

is it

art

and philosophy. Only through understanding the

possible to see the relationship

Deduction of the

is

art

product

to discover the intuition

aspects of the

self,

and

to

do so

in

.

The purpose

art

and philosophy.

of the deduction of the art

which unites the conscious and the unconscious
such a

way

As mentioned, Spelling's writings on

12

between

pivotal role of

that the self

itself

becomes conscious

of

throughout a number of
study almost exclusively to STI.

art are scattered

works. For the sake of simplicity, I have restricted my
Werner Beierwaltes,
For further reading on this topic, the Reclam anthology edited by
to Spelling's
Texte zur Philosophic der Kunst, provides an excellent introduction
writing on art in the decade 1797-1807. (Reclam 5777)
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One might

this identity.

not an entirely mistaken assumption. But only the transcendental philosopher

this is

can recognize
this intuition

other
both."

think that this was the task of the intellectual intuition, and

upon
13

this theoretical unity;

must

on

it

the one side

needs to be made objective. The product of

upon

the product of nature,

the product of freedom, and must unite in

Only

subject in

"...verge

now

in this

way can

an object which the

product which

is

itself

and on the

the characteristics of

Schelling account for the unification of object and
self

can in turn understand as

its

own

product. The

here being sought must share with freedom the condition that

it is

consciously brought forth, yet share the unconscious element which determines the
natural product.

Whereas the natural product, although unconscious, had always

appeared conscious and purposive, the exact opposite
activity will.. .be reflected

unconscious (objective)

now

takes place:

"...the

conscious

out of the product here under consideration as an

one[.]"

14

In contrast to the organic product,

which begins

with unconscious, non-purposive production and ends with a conscious purposive
product, the product here under consideration reflects a conscious, productive activity

which ends with
production

a non-purposive product determined

itself is

purposive but the product

transcendental philosopher

is

to find a

way

is

not.

by the unconscious; the

The task which now

falls to

the

to explain this to the self itself; this task

has been the goal of STL In other words, the

way

in

which unconscious

activity

can

be consciously explicated, in particular that point where the conscious and the
unconscious, subjective and objective, freedom and necessity attain identity with each
other,

13

14

must be deduced.

STI, p.219.

ST1, p.219.
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The

problem concerns the

first

forth with consciousness, because,

without consciousness." 15

arises

consciousness, then in effect

between the two
order to appear

is

it

by

If

possibility of

something objective being brought

definition, ”[t]he objective

is

simply that which

the unconscious activity operates through

becomes

identical with consciousness

abolished: the activity appears necessary. As

and the

we have

difference

seen, in

conscious and unconscious activity can never be absolutely

free,

identical, for in absolute identity the object

becomes necessary and not

how, then,

free;

does one account for the element of freedom in the product? The object of the

must be
as

infinite (that

soon as

Schelling

it

is

never reaching the point of identity of subject and

attains finitude,

intent

determined.

is,

He

on solving

conjectures

it is

is

no longer

how an

how

free

free act

object), for

but determined. The problem which

object can be both simultaneously free

and

that takes place:

Now

that which was utterly impossible through freedom is to become possible
through the act here postulated, though as the price of this the latter must
cease to be a free act, and becomes one in which freedom and necessity are

absolutely united.

16

This leaves, however, a second problem:

what now needs

to be explained

is

how

conscious and unconscious activity can be both united and thereby identical, and
the

same

identical.

time,

if

the self

is

to

at

be conscious of their production, separate and not

Without separation, there

is

identity, to

be sure, but not for the

self itself.

Schelling solves this contradiction by admitting that while the two activities

must be separated

for the appearing or the

the actual product they are united:

15

STI, p.219.

16

ST1, p.220.

becoming

objective of the production, in

185

The

two was to be abolished only for the sake of consciousness,
is to end in unconsciousness so there must be a point at
which the two merge into one; and conversely, where the two merge into one,
the production must cease to appear as a free one. 17
identity of the

but the production

Production must absolutely stop, for the condition of producing

between conscious and unconscious; when they coincide
conflict

has to be eliminated,

one which

Just

how

being more

the point

action

This

explicit.

lies

happens
is

obvious, and to one

it, it is

It is

this

is

within

itself,

not quite

"blessed"

by

and
this

is, it

will completely intuit itself.

and Schelling appears incapable

the type of recognition where, to one

who

intelligence

as necessary.

union and

that

clear,

has not,

is

it

divided from

As

who

is

itself,

is

of

has experienced

sounds somewhat crazy and quite

necessity meet: self-intuition

complete identity expressed in the product
self-intuition

"...within the intelligence all

completely recognize the identity expressed

self will

where freedom and

whereby the

the opposition

contradiction reconciled." 18 At this point, Schelling

all

maintains that the intelligence or
in the product as

is

unlikely.

the result of the free

establishing the dialectic; the

recognized by the intelligence as

its

own

a result of this recognition, the intelligence will feel

will regard

it:

...in the light of a bounty freely granted by a higher nature.... [which is] none
other than that absolute [the primordial self/das Urselbst] which contains the
common ground of the preestablished harmony between the conscious and the

unconscious.

It is

this absolute

19

which

is

radiated back from the product, and which the intelligence

regards as something above the product. In contrast to freedom, this absolute

an element of the unintended

17

SJL

18

19

p.220-1.

STI, p.221.

STI, p.221.

to that

"...brings

which was begun with consciousness and

186

intention
of

." 20

7

This invokes for ns Schelling

we

things, for

all

are

now

s

metaphysical view of the interrelatedness

allowed momentary flashes of the truth, a truth that

cannot be completely revealed without congealing

One can

at

most

live at the

all

action into absolute necessity.

nodal points, catching an occasional glimpse of the

absolute behind the appearances. This element of the unintended can never attain to

consciousness for these reasons, and instead must radiate

its

unconscious message

back from the product:
producer precisely what destiny is for the agent, namely a dark
which supplies the element of completeness or objectivity to the
piecework of freedom; and as that power is called destiny, which through our
free action realizes, without our knowledge and even against our will, goals
that we did not envisage, so likewise that incomprehensible agency which
supplies objectivity to the conscious, without the cooperation of freedom, and
to some extent in opposition to freedom.. .is denominated by means of the
obscure concept of genius.
The product we postulate is none other than the product of genius, or, since
genius is possible only in the arts, the product of art. 21
for the

...[it] is

unknown

With

this

force

statement Schelling concludes his deduction of the

wonder what

We

exactly he has in

are also left

since there has been

mind

as

an example of such

little

the artistic activity

The

a

us to

remarkable object.

wondering how we suddenly discovered the product

of art,

preparation for this solution, aside from several comments in

the introductory sections. Schelling initially offers rather

is

art product, leaving

which

is

weak arguments

the source of ultimate truth.

fact that all aesthetic

He

as to

why

states inductively:

production rests upon a conflict of

activities

can be

justifiably inferred already from the testimony of all artists, that they are
involuntarily driven to create their works and that in producing them they

merely

20

satisfy

SIL

p.222.

SJL

p-222.

SJL

p-222.

21

22

an

irresistible

urge of their

own

nature ...

it

22

s

At the completion of

which apparently

this creative act,

is

contradiction between the conscious and unconscious, the
of

an

infinite

personal
nature.

harmony." 23 The

ability,

set in

motion by the

artist

experiences a

artist attributes this feeling of

harmony not

to a

but to something higher, to a bounty which has been granted by her

Schelling regards artists as exceptional in the fullest sense of the word, for

they are able to access that which

is

ultimate in themselves through a free

through the contradiction between conscious and unconscious. Once
is

"...feeling

set in

motion, however,

it

takes

uttermost contradiction within

b.

The product

groundwork

for a

which has been

of art

more

on

us.”

a life of

its

own

until

it

act, that is,

urge

this artistic

resolves the

"...final

and

24

and the

role of genius

.

Schelling

is

laying the

detailed presentation of the abilities of the genius, a concept

of increasing importance throughout the 18th century.

But Schelling'

explanation of and praise for the genius, and in particular the product of genius, goes
further than other philosophers

is

who

are proponents of the cult of the genius.

neither conscious nor unconscious, but

is

that

which presides over both. What

ordinarily called art refers to the conscious aspect, to

what can be learned and

The unconscious element, which cannot be learned or
calls "...the

element of poetry in

identically, for poetry

without

art."

art

25

Genius

practiced but

Both are needed

is

is

taught.

inborn, Schelling

to operate simultaneously or

engenders only dead products and

art

without
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poetry, although

somewhat more

successful, can only give rise to a semblance of

poetry and a superficiality. Schelling concludes that

it is

clear:

since the identity of the two can only be innate, and is utterly impossible
and unattainable through freedom, perfection is possible only through genius,
which, for that very reason, is for the aesthetic what the self is for philosophy,
namely the supreme absolute reality, which never itself becomes objective, but
...that,

is

Here

the cause of everything that

where we

is

to understand

it,

find the link

is so.

26

between philosophy and

art,

but

the nature of both the artwork and the genius

clearly, in

first

order for us

needs to be

studied.

The

basic character of the

synthesis of nature and freedom.
to the artwork, the artist

fruitfully

it; it

of art

is

of

In addition to

an unconscious

what she has

has depicted an infinity "...which no

capable of developing to the
quality about

work

27
full."

This

is

why

a

infinity that

by contrast, copies only the

a superficial purpose

and

the genuine artwork

is

p.224.

Freier

rule.

One

an object

is

genuine work of

art

is

has a timeless

artist's

merely

lies in

art

is

that

it is

the artist or only in the work; an

conscious activity and therefore contains

reflects

on the

object of imitation, whereas

for intuition, a contemplation that

can only end in

is arguably the most important
between the transcendental system and art. He

of the opinion that this

sentence concerning the relation
elaborates

understanding

finite

contains an infinity of meaning and purposes and can always be

impossible to determine whether this infinity

^ STI,

the

intentionally contributed

approached anew. The unique aspect of the true work of

imitation,

is

on the meaning:

Ausdruck, dass die Objektivitat des Schonen ebenso wie die
Objektivitat der Natur einem nicht- objektivierbaren Prinzip entspringt, das als
archimedischer Punkt in der unzuganglichen Tiefe des Selbstbewusstseins die
auf der Erscheinungsebene auftretenden und scheinbar unversohnlichen
Er bringt

zum

Gegensatze zur Einheit zusammenbindet

^ STI.

p.225.

(Freier, p.171).
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The essence

the infinite.

of a true

and gives an outward expression

work

the artwork.

is

the resolution of infinite contradiction

of calm, silent grandeur

A problem which becomes

matter.

of art

obvious by omission

no matter what the subject

what

is

exactly

is

meant by

Although in Philosophy of Art Schelling spends time discussing

artworks, in general and certainly in STI, he remains at an abstract

descending to the concrete work of
difficulty faced

by the philosopher

art for confirmation.

specific

level, rarely

Schmidt explains the

of art:

Es kann hier nur angedeutet werden, welchen Schwierigkeiten diese
Konzeption der Kunst als einer nicht begrifflichen, sondem symbolischen
Reprasentanz des Absoluten ausgesetzt ist. Vor allem kann Schelling nicht
angeben, welche Struktur ein Objekt haben muss, um Kunst zu sein....Jede
Philosophic, welche die Kunst in eine wesensmassige Beziehung zur Wahrheit
28
stellt, hat diese Unzukommlichkeit.
This raises the question, to be considered

later, of

why

it is

art

which

fulfills

the need

of a concrete example of the absolute.

Schelling designates beauty as one of the basic features of a

Beauty has been an increasingly problematic concept

in aesthetic theory.

contribution places the quality of beauty in the center of the
theory,

where

it

infinite finitely displayed,"

Kant meant. Whereas Kant
non-emotional

” ST1.

p.225.

29

which

is

of art.

Kant's

field of aesthetic

faculties.

by the

Schelling defines

not quite the same thing as what

clearly placed the response to

level, Schelling

^J. Schmidt,

new

refers to a disinterested feeling of delight called forth

"Zweckmassigkeit ohne Zweck" interplay of the cognitive

beauty as "the

work

an object of beauty on

views the emotional response as integral to the

Die Geschichte der Genie-Gedankens..., p.394.

a
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experience of beauty. Engell explains the problems

of,

and response evoked

by, the

term:
All Romantics inherited the word "beauty," which became something of
deadweight around their necks. With too many common connotations,
"beauty" could not convey the combined aesthetic, moral, and philosophic

a

was expected

of it. Hampered with this unfortunate term, poets
attempted repeatedly to explain it until their special meanings, meant
to be clarifications, became confused, and people fell back on the lowest
common denominator, beauty as something agreeable or pleasing to the

sensibility that

and

critics

senses...

For Schelling, beauty in an object frees in the psyche a total and harmonious
itself may be called beauty.. ..All elements of the self,
according to Schelling, are called on together and are unified by a
corresponding harmony in the external object. The senses, understanding,
reason, moral feeling, judgment, and emotion all focus on one end. This end,
or beauty, is a cipher or code. ...It reveals the organic interconnection of the
universe and symbolizes the world's processes. It suggests, embodies, and

response, a feeling which

and relations in concrete and specific form, so that the
once be aware of what would otherwise be a multiplicity of

reveals these processes

psyche can

at

experiences.

and fuses nature with experience. The
beautiful object dissolves any barrier between the subjective self and the
objective world. Beauty is thus a product of genius and of the creative
Beauty focuses,

imagination.

Beauty

is

It

distills, intensifies,

realizes the latent potential for synthesis that

economy and shows

nature and

all

faculties in

man

relationships with each other.

Schelling

is

exist

it

with the

He

itself

finite display of the infinite,

terminology rather than that of beauty, for the
extraneous baggage.

in the psyche.
in

30

very careful not to use the term 'beauty'

having equated

is

most concentrated way that all things
and owe their identity to their many

in the

too often. In

he prefers

latter carries

with

fact, after

to use that

it

too

much

does mention the division of the beautiful and the sublime,

The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to R omanticism
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp.325-6. The length of the quotation is
due to my opinion that Engell has expressed so clearly the problems inherent in this

^ames

Engell,

indefinite yet crucial term.
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since this has

become such

a standard feature of aesthetic theory and, following Kant,

designates the sublime as the aesthetically less important concept

The

essential characteristic of a beautiful

work

of art

is

31
.

thus the resolution of

the subject and object in an object understood as a product of the subject.
The

which conscious and unconscious
between

a

work

of art

are united in this process

and an organic product,

shows the

is

in

distinction

for the former exhibits that

united after a separation, whereas the latter displays that which

way

which

is

originally

unseparated: the artwork proceeds from consciousness and thus from infinite
contradiction,

whereas the organic product proceeds from unconsciousness, where no

contradiction yet exists.

In Schelling' s interpretation,

not provide us with principles of
rather,

we judge

perfection in

is

natural beauty does

not the case that art imitates nature;

nature to be beautiful because

in

which the

artifact is that the

artist herself,

which

it is

call

it

conforms

is

to be distinguished

to the principles of

art.

The way

common

art, for

what we

whereas the

aesthetic product

artwork

common

is

from the

created from a contradiction that

artifact is created

lies

from a contradiction, but one

outside of the producer, and therefore always has a goal outside

pour Tart

is

within the

itself.

L'art

the hallmark of the aesthetic product:

This independence of external goals

is

the source of that holiness and purity of

which goes so far that it not only rules out relationship with all mere
sensory pleasure, to demand which of art is the true nature of barbarism; or
with the useful, to require which of art is possible only in an age which
supposes the highest efforts of the human spirit to consist in economic
discoveries. It actually excludes relation with everything pertaining to morality,
art,

31

Even though Kant does not spend much time discussing the sublime, by

larger part of C] appears to be devoted to an analysis of

it.

far the
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and even leaves

far beneath it the sciences. ..simply because they are always
directed to a goal outside themselves... 32

Art and science, despite their opposed tendencies, are, according to Schelling, in

essence the same at the highest

level,

which

if

science should ever reach

Following Kant's dictate about the place of genius, Schelling maintains that

into art.

there cannot be genius in science, for everything
also be solved mechanically:

through genius." 33 Genius
of the parts,

"Only what

is

which could be solved by genius can

art brings forth

is

simply and solely possible

present only where the idea of the whole precedes that

where what one says and maintains

understood; where something

is

is

not and cannot be entirely

asserted with apparent consciousness, but

only have come from the unconscious. Although

happens

this, too,

technique eventually catches up with theory and the point
This can never happen in art because the truth

Through
which
art,

is

is

abstract.

Indeed, for Schelling,

genius which

is

STI, p.227.
ST1, p.228.

^ STI.

p.228.

on

which can

in science,

proved mechanically.

behind appearance.
skill,

a "...contradiction

soluble absolutely and otherwise by nothing else."

making comments on her powers

33

is

genius, in contrast to mere talent or

Schelling does not elaborate concretely

32

would merge

specific

34

is

resolved,

As with the work

of

examples of the genius beyond

of resolution; the concept remains almost completely

it is

not so

much

the genius herself but the product of

so important. Kant envisioned the genius as

"...the

innate mental
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aptitude (ingenium) through

which nature

gone beyond Kant's conception of genius,

gives the rule to

art."

35

Schelling has

as Freier explains:

Griindet die Geniekonzeption, transzendentalphilosophisch betrachtet, in einer
Leerstelle des begrifflichen Wissens, namlich in der Unfahigkeit der Philosophic,
die Einheit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit theoretisch zu beweisen, so bestand
der aus ihr zu schopfende praktische Gewinn fiir Kant darin, an Giinstlingen

der Natur exemplarisch zeigen zu konnen, dass die Idee eines intelligiblen
Substrats der Natur, die doch nur in praktischer Absicht legitimierbar ist, in der
Kunst eine unverhoffte Unterstiitzung findet.
Fiir Schellings Rezeption ist indessen ein anderes Motiv, das Motiv der
Streiterfahrung, wichtiger geworden, weil er schon mit seinem Entwurf eines
transzendentalen Wissens urspriinglich-synthetischer Einheit den Boden
verlassen hatte, auf dem Kant gestanden war. 36
Certainly Schelling, like Kant,

saw the genius

as bringing forth a truth that

lies

beyond

cognitive knowledge, but whereas the genius satisfied Kant' s desire to reveal a non-

cognitive yet intelligible substrate of nature, Schelling uses the genius to reveal the

nature of self-consciousness, the "Urselbst," that which

anything which

lies

outside consciousness.

is

completely independent from

Schmidt finds in

this shift of

emphasis the

signs of fetishization of the genius, for instead of a living, creative restlessness there

now

is

the stillness of completion:

Dass das denkerische Bemiihen nicht mehr der Problematik des Genie- und
Kunstbegriffs gilt, wie noch bei Kant, sondem umgekehrt der Genie- und
Kunstbegriff zu einem Vehikel des Philosophierens gerat, zeigt eine Krise des
Denkens an und zugleich das Stadium einer Dogmatisierung von Genie und
Kunst. Und dass es Schelling dabei weniger auf das Genie und seinen
Schaffensprozess
Fetischisierung.

^CL

307.

^Freier, p.163.
37

Schmidt, p.396.

37

als

auf das fertige "Genieprodukt" ankommt, deutet bereits auf
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Before examining the

crisis of

thinking which Schmidt detects in Schelling' s view of

genius, the rest of Schelling' s theory of art needs to be explored before a
judgment

about his role

in the history of aesthetic theory

For now, what

is

important

is

can be handed down.

remember

to

that

producing has an

all

unconscious component, but only genius can resolve the

infinite contradiction

between

conscious and unconscious which results in aesthetic producing. The term 'aesthetic/
the term 'beauty/

like

is

not always so easy to define. Engell here also provides a

useful clarification:

The word "aesthetic".. .comes from the Greek meaning to perceive truly or
clearly, and what Schelling means by art is not the fine arts alone but an
aesthetic perception, in the most profound sense, of the universal process. 38

how

This enables us to perceive more clearly

system as he moves from the

c.

intellectual to the aesthetic.

.

Now

how one

and

that both the nature

of the genius has been brought into

relief,

this relationship rests

characteristics of the true

even

if it is still

on the nature

to,

can

finally

art.

meaning

work

of art

unclear what a true

and

work

of

be examined. The importance of

of complete identity,

philosophical investigation; an understanding of this

the true

of art, and the role of

recognizes a genius, the relationship between art and philosophy,

which the system has been building up

all

organizing the layers of his

is

The relationship between philosophy and the work

mythology

art is or

Schelling

of the vehicle of the absolute,

As shown, Schelling assumes absolute

which

is

is

the

essential

if

first

one

principle of

is

to grasp

which Schelling unveils as the work of

identity as the original premise and, with

the aid of intellectual intuition, constructs his system of transcendental idealism.

^Engell, p.323.

Now

195

he

how

raises the question as to

absolutely identical, that

how

other words,

way

can

is

intellectual intuition,

to say

which has as

something completely nonobjective,

intellectual intuition

become

object the

its

is

objective for us, for

possible.

In

there

no

if

is

of appealing to experience:

How. ..can it be established beyond doubt, that such an intuition does not
upon a purely subjective deception, if it possesses no objectivity that is
universal and acknowledged by all men? 39
The answer

is

that the universally

acknowledged

art itself: "...aesthetic intuition simply

The work of

moment
This

is

is

objectivity of intellectual intuition

the intellectual intuition

art reflects the absolutely identical,

which

becomes conscious, and provides proof

it

Schelling

phenomenology
The

7

s

major contribution

between

art

40

objective.”

self

the

of the first principle of philosophy.

more

specifically to the

and philosophy which Schelling

view of what philosophy

distinct

approach. Rather,
it

divided for the

to aesthetic theory, or

neither the Platonic division of one and

from which

is

become

is

of the artwork.

relationship

presupposes a

rest

it is

an endless

originally came.

is

and why we study

many nor

series of duality,

In this sense,

it

now
it.

details

It

reflects

the multiplicity of an Aristotelian

each striving towards the unity

could be argued that Schelling

is

presenting a neo-Platonic vision of the world, but the postulation of an infinite
dialectic,

which

is

the only

way

objectification

can

arise, is novel.

Philosophy

is

not a

serene discipline, where sufficient clarity of thought and the help of the razor of logic

can lay

all

life itself

39

mysteries bare. Rather,

as this

ST1, p.229.

^ STI.

p.229.

life

it

reflects the bubbling, struggling infinite activity of

force seeks to find rest in a unity

which

it

can never attain and

1

simultaneously remain

from an

infinite

Without the presupposition that "[p]hilosophy

dichotomy of opposed

However,

to fathom.

alive.

if

activities...,"

one grants him the

initial

41

Schelling's

whole

sets

project

%

out

hard

is

division of the absolute identity,

then his argument no longer appears so extraordinary, instead offering a

new

vision of

the nature of the philosophic enterprise.
Schelling claims that this infinite duality or dichotomy

is

not only the basis of

philosophy but also the basis of every aesthetic production. The most obvious
difference

between the two

is

that the removal of this opposition in philosophy

productive (intellectual) intuition

whereas

in art

...is

it is

the

actual.

is

theoretical,

The power

same whereby

based on the claims of the philosopher,

of productive intuition in philosophy:

art also achieves the impossible,

infinite opposition in a finite product.

It is

the poetic

namely

gift....It is

to resolve

poetic gift (Dichtungsvermogen)

places the

full

to think

42

Schelling's location of the creation of philosophy,

It

an

one and the

same capacity that is active in both, the only one whereby we are able
and to couple together even what is contradictory-and its name is
imagination.

by

and

and indeed

of the world, in the

in imagination (Einbildungskraft)

weight of creation on 'Einbildungskraft/ which

but also rescues philosophy from

its

"...not

is

a radical step.

only permits

personal and metaphysical subjectivity.”

43

Imagination plays an important role throughout ST] and appears in several
different forms as the self gains in self-consciousness.

imagination that

41

"...activity.. .which

STI, p.230.

42

STI. p.230.

43

EngeU,

p.322.

In general, Schelling calls

wavers in the middle between finitude and

art

44

infinity .”

But as there are different manifestations of

kinds of imagination, each of which

is

to as productive intuition (produktive

in

finitude, so are there different

some way productive; they

Anschauung). The

layer of imagination

first

sensory intuition and belongs in nature philosophy; the second

and

is

the

intuition

power

in transcendental philosophy; the third

and provides the uniting

are also referred

intellectual intuition

is

and highest

force of transcendental idealism.

is

aesthetic

The true

creative

imagination implicit in aesthetic intuition enables the complete unification of the

and the

ideal;

it

produces both

consciousness, as
art ."

45

activity,

but the

Only

work

in the

we can

see

it,

somewhat

But in

real

to us outside the sphere of

it,

as ideal, or as the world of

world are brought forth through the same

one originates from outside consciousness, whereas the other

is

this

eternal, unresolvable difference

moment

of dual creation

brought

between the two.
to a standstill,

where

it.

same opposition, and

insofar as

ideal

marks the

of art

The dual claim

a

and

real

fact that

comes from within

which appears

and that which appears within

real,

Thus both the

"...that

is

that both the world of art

that

all

art, this

real

world

arise

from the

the individual products of art depict the infinite, leads to

difficult conclusion.

it is

and the

Outside the conscious realm, the opposition

is

infinite

exhibited in the objective world as a whole, never as individual objects.

opposition

is

infinite

with regard to every single object. This apparent

contradiction leads Schelling to postulate that:

...if

aesthetic production proceeds from freedom,

and

if it is

precisely for

freedom that this opposition of conscious and unconscious activities is an
absolute one, there is properly speaking but one absolute work of art, which

may

indeed exist in altogether different versions, yet is still only one, even
it should not yet exist in its most ultimate form 46

though

What

.

precisely Schelling

mythic view that

it is

means

is

we

not satisfactorily explained, and

are

left

with a

possible that everything, even natural products, could be

works

of art. After hinting about this pantheistic view of artworks, Schelling pulls back, for

such a view no longer leaves the genius in a privileged
original identity

between the unconscious and conscious elements

never be depicted by philosophy in

its

thus needs art in order to make

original unity visible.

aesthetic intuition

that art

is

at

He

position.

its

external

(i.e.

in producing can

non-intuitive) form; philosophy

Once one

grants that

the objective form of intellectual intuition, then

is

repeats that the

"...it is

self-evident

once the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy ..."47

Only through

art

can

all

the divisions in the world be healed. The mythological and

religious

language which Schelling draws on

between

art

and philosophy points not only
7

but also to where Schelling

s

true interests

to present his

account of the relation

to the inexplicability of the subject matter

lie,

in explaining that

which cannot be

explained.

Through

aesthetic creation, Schelling has

his system, to bring the

which

radiates out

end back

found the means by which

to the beginning.

from the artwork, the

self

Through the absolute

has completed

its

to close

identical

journey and

now

stands where the philosophic observer stood at the beginning:

The ultimate ground

of

all

harmony between

subjective

and

objective could be

original identity only through intellectual intuition; and it is
ground which, by means of the work of art, has been brought
forth entirely from the subjective, and rendered wholly objective, in such wise.

exhibited in

its

precisely this
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that

we have

gradually led our object, the self itself, up to the very point where
ourselves were standing when we began to philosophize. 48

we
Caught up

in this unifying rhetoric,

which we gain

identity

conclusion, based

on

and carried away by the thought

his claim that "Philosophy

the infancy of knowledge." The circle has

when

the sciences

all

then they

medium

which

will all "...flow

of a

of art, Schelling

was

now been

bom

back

like so

many

final

in

completed for philosophy, and

by philosophy

attain

it,

individual streams into the universal ocean

their source."

mythology whose creation

draws the

and nourished by poetry

are guided towards perfection

from which they took

of poetry

work

access to through the

of the absolute

will

49

This will

happen through the

be authored by a

new

race,

sometime in

the course of future history.

Before considering the implications of a

between
art

art

the relationship

and philosophy must be properly understood. Schelling has

the true

is

new mythology,

document

of philosophy, but this does not imply that art

is

stated that

superior to

philosophy:

Zwischen

und asthetischer Anschauung herrscht demnach kein
von Hypothese und Beweis, sondem ein Komplementaritatsdas sich darin ausdriickt, dass beide Anschauungsweisen als Weisen

intellektueller

Verhaltnis
verhaltnis,

des Reflexionswissens bestimmt, also beide mit dem Charakter des Wissens
ausgestattet und nur medial unterschieden werden. Nur die
Komplementaritatsthese erklart denn auch, warum Schelling behauptet, das
Prinzip der asthetischen Anschauung, das Genie, sei fur die Asthetik dasselbe
wie das Prinzip der intellektuellen Anschauung, das Ich, fur die

Transzendentalphilosophie.

48

49

SJL

p.232.

SJL

p.232.

^reier, p.154.

50
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Only

art

can complete the philosophic synthesis of mind and cosmos; only philosophy

can explain the significance of the
artistic

moment

is

integral to both, because both philosophy

of the one, the absolute.

The moment

philosophical idea of intellectual intuition
art,

3.

imaginative creation. Philosophic reason and

imagination are different sides of the same coin. The concept of imagination as

Tn-Eins-Bildung'
the

artist's

the product of genius.

is

the

attempt to freeze

same

as that present in the

work

of

and poetry are united.

Concluding remarks
a.

'General Observations on the

conclusion of his system. As

if

Whole System'

.

he were not completely

which he

satisfied

aesthetic intuition:

for his object,"

51

"What

First,

the reminder of the relation

intellectual intuition

the object being the

universal currency in the

and provides

original unity

question.

work

it

clarity of its

System,' in

self.

between

Three things

intellectual

and

for the philosopher, aesthetic intuition

how

philosophy, which as

requires a special cast of mind, can find a

all

human

beings so that they can gain access to the

their self-consciousness springs.

This raises an interesting

Schelling states that:

—Philosophy

attains, indeed, to the highest,

only.. .the fraction of a

51

Whole

reached the

of art, for the latter objectifies the subjective intellectual

a mirror to

from which

is

This explains

self.

such can never gain a wide following since

intuition

with the

recapitulates the different stages of the self-intuition of the

should be remarked upon.

now

Schelling has

progression, however, he offers a 'General Observation on the

is

art

of unity present in the ultimate

in this sense that philosophy

It is

and

SU p.233.

but

it

brings to this summit

man. Art brings the whole man,

as he

is,

to that point,
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namely

It is

as

if

Lisa or

art

is

knowledge of the highest, and
and the marvel of art.

to a

difference

this

is

what underlies

the eternal

the democratization of philosophy, that an encounter with the

Oedipus Rex

will bring

enlightenment to whoever happens by. But

Mona

this is

not

the case, as Freier points out:

Die Autonomie, die dadurch dem transzendentalen Wissen, dem
erkenntniskonstituierenden Handeln des Philosophen zugesprochen wird,
schliesst ein, dass die Genieproduktion nur noch der Selbsterkenntnis des
objektiven Selbstbewusstseins zu dienen hat. Das aber bedeutet, logischimmanent betrachtet, dass das objektive Selbstbewusstsein, in dem doch die
Allgemeinheit reprasentiert sein soil, zum Kunstler werden muss, da weder die
Beschreibung noch der Genuss der kiinsterlischen Produktion die
Selbsterfahrung des Kiinstlers ersetzen kann, von der allein die vom
Transzendentalphilosophen geforderte Einsicht zu erwarten ware.
Schelling hat diese Konsequenz nicht mit der gebotenen Deutlichkeit
herausgearbeitet....Wenn die Selbsterkenntnis jenes Ichs an die Erfahrung des
Kampfes und an die Erfahrung des Sieges gebunden ist, die der Kunstler mit
seinem Werk macht, dann ist sie ebeso wie die des Philosophen nur einigen
wenigen Auserwahlten vorbehalten. Wird die Philosophic durch die
asthetische Produktion objektiv, so noch nicht einmal fiir das ohnehin sparliche

Kunstpublikum, sondern eigentlich nur

Only

the philosopher or the artist

intuition, for only she

is

Because of the extreme
art or a

is

fiir

die Kunstler selbst.

capable of grasping this

properly prepared to intuit what

it

difficulty of the subject matter, the

53

moment

means

in

of the highest

its fullest

sense.

nature of the absolute, an

philosophy (or even a religion) that purports to reveal the absolute cannot be

universalized without being trivialized, or at least not at our present stage of collective

awareness.

The leads

to the

second remark, which concerns the nature of

unity, of the absolutely identical

52

STI, p.233.

53

Freier, p.164.

which

is

the

first

proposition of

all

this original

philosophy:

202

(What the identical may be, abstracted from and, as it were, prior to this act
[where the identical first becomes at once both subject and object, i.e. a self]
simply cannot be asked. For it is that which can only reveal itself through selfconsciousness, and cannot anywhere part company from this act.) 54

One

has to assume that there

some kind

is

of universal material,

Being, intelligence, the unconscious or whatever, out of which

whether

all

It is

always tempting

to fall

about the nature of the world, but

one can approach

what

investigate

conscious;

it is

for

is

is

already in

back onto pure metaphysical speculation

such claims there can be no proof. The

to obtaining evidence of the ultimate nature of things

lies

be God,

knowledge

formed, but one can only talk or write or philosophize about that which

knowledge.

it

is

closest

to

on the border between being and becoming, unconscious and

precisely the

work

of art

which captures

this

congealed

moment

of

being, of absolute identity.

The
intelligence

on the

third

remark concerns freedom, with that which

from nature.

Two

existence of freedom: "...freedom,

theoretically demonstrated),

same type

of assumptions

of freedom,

activity

accompanied by consciousness."

^ STI,

p.234.

STI, p.235

SIL

p.236.

which

is

act of will

First,

one can only speculate

(though that

superior.. .to nature."

one rapidly ascends, by way

freedom presupposes the

56

must be

if it exists

on which absolute

identity with the objective,

55

things are of note here.

differentiates the

identity

is

55

it

does

so,

cannot be

Freedom thus shares the

based.

Assuming the

existence

of willing, to the activity of choice, of

56

When

choice

is

intuited in

its

"...free

original

impossible through freedom since, paradoxically,

which

divides the self into subject

and

object, the

203

highest

power

of self-intuition

for this highest

power

is

obtained.

This brings us to the second thing of note,

of self-intuition:

it already lies out beyond the conditions of consciousness,
and is indeed
the consciousness that creates itself ab initio, must appear, where it exists,
as absolutely contingent; and this absolute contingency in the highest power of

...since
itself

what we designate by means

self-intuition is

of the idea of genius

57
.

Absolute identity, freedom and genius are the three essential ingredients for Schelling/ s

system of transcendental idealism, and

beyond the boundaries

of

all

have in

common

the fact that they exist

what human beings can know or understand.

This leads back both to Schelling's mysterious final sentence that

mythology
but of a

is itself

new

to arise,

which

shall

race, personifying, as

it

is

is

and

to his hint at the

and underline the

not satisfied with the current conclusion of his system.

not self-contained enough, because

n58

Both statements point in the direction of

later philosophy, a religious-mythical search for revelation,

he

it is still

It is

where the

self

gain consciousness of
...[the rise to

fact that

it

an individual experience. This reminds

must postulate the existence

itself

his

self-contained, but

us of Schelling's step-by-step reconstruction of the fully self-conscious
that stage

new

be the creation, not of some individual author,

were, one single poet[,]

existence of only one absolute artwork.

"...a

self,

in particular

of other individuals in order to

as subject:

consciousness]

is

possible only

the self becomes objective to the self

if

that purely objective element in

itself.. ..But

outside the individual,

i.e.,

But [according

to the
independent of him, there is
itself
restrict
mechanism deduced] the intelligence itself, where it exists, must
into individuality. Hence the ground we are looking for outside the individual
59
can only lie in another individual

only the intelligence

.

^ STI.

p.236.

^ STI,

p.233.

^ STI,

p.235.

itself.
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Somehow,

this individualization

that everyone can share in the

The

which takes

knowledge

place needs to attain a higher level, so

careful process undertaken to uncover the

expected end, for Schelling already

tells

from whence they came.

of the absolute

work

of art has not reached

us that the system must have a

still

its

hidden

mytho-poetic culmination.
Critics of Schelling,

and the

later Schelling himself,

emphasis placed on the artwork as explicated in
maintained an equivalence of

art

and philosophy

attempt to find the point of ultimate unification

good reason

for Schelling to

ST1,

have emphasized

is

denounce the exceptional

but though Schelling only

for a short time, this

invalid.

Jahnig

is

not to say his

insists that there is a

this role of art:

Doch gerade

diese Lage liesse auch eine ganz andere Vermutung zu, namlich
instrumentale Funktion der Kunst nur darum im Fortgang, unter
den neuen Fragen der Philosophic, so wenig mehr zur Diskussion stand wie
vor dem Transzendentalsystem, weil ihre Aufgabe eben in der Erwirkung jenes
die, dass die

Wendepunktes bestand. Die Kunst konnte dann in den
folgenden Stadien der Philosophic als "Organon" eben darum nicht mehr
60
gebraucht worden sein, weil sie diese Aufgabe erfullt hatte.

geschichtlichen

Jahnig goes on to suggest that perhaps the meaning of the organon function of

been misunderstood because the meaning
misunderstood, and that one

philosophy of

art

is

of transcendental philosophy itself has

faced not so

much with

61

Schellings in der Geschichte der Philosophic."

61

has

been

a question about the

but a question concerning the history of philosophy: "Die Frage nach

der Rolle der Kunst in der Philosophic Schellings

jahnig, "Die

art

Schliisselstellung...", p.336.

Jahnig, p.338.

fiihrt

auf die Frage nach der Rolle
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b.

Schelling

7

s

theory of

art:

A

bridge between two worlds

This

.

is

an

appropriate question with which to draw some conclusions about System of

Transcendental Idealism because

two

this

work, written in 1800, bridges two worlds and

different interpretations of philosophy

and

its

aims:

Written at the turn of the century, it belongs to two different epochs. Its origin
lies in the classic calm of the philosophy of consciousness which dominated
European thought from Descartes through Kant; its impulse is toward the

uneasy philosophies of will which were to dominate the nineteenth century
and which define man, not in terms of the infinite reach of the concept
timelessly attained in theoria, but in terms of a dialectic of striving, need and
finite fulfillment.

Vateris

comment

thread of ST1, for

neatly captures the essence of the problem

it is

in this sense,

found

in

CPR.

we

modelled on the organization of Kant's

deductions for each of
is,

62

its

doomed

Wamock

arguments, and yet what
to

fail; its

it is

face in following the

critiques, provides

deducing

arguments are not comparable

sees this type of philosophy,

where one

is

beyond

logic

to the rigorous

is

and

mode

faced with

"obscure, dark and perhaps profound" statements, as symptomatic of a "...tremendous
deterioration in the rational climate," and gives the reason for this change as the fact

that:

sharp distinction which Kant had drawn between what could and could
not be known, between legitimate thought, and impossible, empty metaphysical
...the

speculation,

had been done away with.

Engell interprets the approach to philosophy which Schelling takes quite differently.

While admitting that Schelling

is

often abstract to the point of being murky,

speculative than empirical, nevertheless:

62

Michael Vater, "Introduction" to

63

Wamock,

Imagination, pp.63-4.

ST1, p.xv.

more
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and virtues capture those fresh and wonderful years of
when the Enlightenment flowered into
Romanticism. He combines the best of both worlds. He attempts what every
great philosopher must: he confronts the basic puzzles of life. He asks why
there is something instead of nothing. He combines science, philosophy,
...Schelling s strengths

philosophy, science, and art

religion, art.

64

Schelling wants to discover the truth that can rejoin

back

to the

man

with nature, to find the

wholeness which he sees as marking the world of antiquity and which has

been forever

lost in its original form.

To regain

rediscover

thereby healing the

between nature and

it,

been driving

apart; the

way

to

split

do

this unity,

this is either to

engage

one must somehow

man which

aesthetic intuition,

by

philosophy has

in transcendental

and, through intellectual intuition, recognize the whole, or to grasp

it

7

s efforts to

a response to the art product of genius.

repress them.

The transcendental approach

issue of the transcendental observer

unity.

who

aids consciousness as

subjective illusion.

in

to

is

returns to

its

original

The artwork

is

is

not based on

concrete proof that the original unity, the absolute,

its

object,

the subject, to the conclusion theoretically, and the artwork helps the subject

concretely.

it

raises the unresolved

divided state, the cause of individual being; the philosopher helps

its

which

it

in STI, despite

Schelling has proposed the relationship between intellectual and aesthetic

intuition as proof that the path of the transcendental observer

is,

philosophy

through

The problems posed by both these methods crop up repeatedly
Schelling

way

Freier asks

an

essential question

about

this relationship

between the

philosopher and her object:
der Transzendentalphilosoph vorgibt, mehr zu wissen als sein Objekt,
und wenn er dieses Wissensgefalle kraft der Kunstanschauung auszugleichen
trachtet, dann gibt er zu verstehen, dass er der Kunstanschauung nicht im
gleichen Masse bedarf wie das von ihm entwickelte Selbstbewusstsein. Er

Wenn

“Engell, p.303.
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unterstellt hiermit, dass die vollstandige Selbsterkenntnis des objektiven Ich

ein anderes

Medium gebunden

an
wohl auch im
der nichtobjektivierbaren Ansehauung des

ist als

Medium

seine eigene, die sich

der Anschauung, aber in
inneren Sinns vollzieht.
Warum aber soli das objektive Ich, um sich die Sehweise des
Transzendentalphilosophen aneignen zu konnen, einer anderen Anschauung
bediirfen als der Transzendentalphilosoph selbst? Ware es nicht auch moglich
gewesen, den Gang der transzendentalen Entwicklung, die Annaherung der
Sehweise des objektiven Ich an die Sehweise des Transzendentalphilosphen, so
zu konzipieren, dass das objektive Ich am Ende ebenfalls bis zur intellektuellen

Anschauung

Why

indeed

is

gelangt?

65

aesthetic intuition set equal to intellectual intuition,

intermediary step to the achievement of the
Schelling thought he had discovered the

latter?

and not seen

The answer which

I

offer

is

means through which everyone had

as

an

that

the

potential to realize the absolute in herself, to gain full self-consciousness of the

unconscious element
case, that

something

awakening, and

this

in her being, only to realize that this actually could not be the

else

was needed

to prepare

everyone appropriately

could only happen through a

new mythology.

for this cosmic

Art does not quite

provide the universal source of enlightenment for which Schelling had hoped.

Schmidt reserves harsh

criticism for Schelling' s attempt to discover the rules of

the absolute:

Was

in der

Ankniipfung an Kants transzendentale Fragestellung noch den

Anschein erkenntnistheoretischer Legitimation

hat,

Theologie. Die transzendentale Fragestellung wird

Etablierung von Transzendenz.

ist

verkappte
Instrument einer

idealistisch

zum

66

In other words, Schelling has committed the sin of openly attempting to gain

knowledge about
is

not quite

65

fair,

that

for Kant's

Freier, pp. 145-6.

^Schmidt,

which Kant

p.400.

set

views on

beyond our cognitive boundaries. This

art

and on genius border dangerously

criticism

close to
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theology, arguably even closer than Schelling's. But

what

really plagues

Schmidt

the

is

idealism of Schelling, for Kant never put the individual before the creations of God:

Wie kaum

eine andere Formulierung

Selbstaffirmation"

auch

macht Schellings schopferische
Genie-Denkens

die innere Problematik des radikalen

Denn ein Schopfertum, das aus blosser Selbstaffirmation besteht,
scheint nicht so sehr auf Produktion als auf sterile Selbstreproduktion

deutlich.

hinzudeuten. Unter diesem Aspekt is auch Schellings "Genieprodukt"--so nennt
er ja das Kunstwerk-wesentlich eine Reproduktion. Ja, es drangt sich die Frage

ob diese vollig abstrakte Konzeption des Kunstwerks mit ihrem
Absolutheitsanspruch iiberhaupt noch die Pluralitat verschiedenartiger
Kunstwerke vorstellbar erscheinen lasst und nicht vielmehr ein blosses
Stereotyp darstellt. 67
auf,

Schmidt condemns Schelling7 s most creative solution as a
this

does Schelling an

injustice.

about the unifying power of

Schelling

art are

is

sterile self-reproduction,

himself aware that, as

it

stands, his claims

not yet conclusive, but that does not

has changed his mind about the absolute and

its

mean

is

able to intuit this relationship, the product of this intuition

and

is

not

which

sterile.

how

Schelling gives

of art?

genius will be recognized by

work

of art

artist is

which

is

not at

all

can one

know when one

no examples and
all.

is

placed on the

evident at the time of

itself,

work

we have no

Schmidt, p.401.

leaves

Often, however,

expressing some unconscious truth.

for the self

67

this criticism indirectly points to

its

It is

it

is

new

work

what might be considered
all

the

more so

point that, for

all

of art as the objectified unification of subject

concrete example of

what

work

mythology,

for granted that the

weak

the

in the presence of a genuine

completion,
a

is

as

another problem, one

not satisfactorily answered and perhaps, without the aid of a

is

can never be answered:

work

But

that he

As long

relation to the individual.

the individual
of genius

but

Schelling means.

of

a great

if

the

the value

and object
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Schelling

s

System

of Transcendental Idealism

the roots of the nature of being.

It

takes as

its

is

a

tremendous

effort to reveal

starting point Kant's division of

cognitive and aesthetic judgment and attempts to unify them. Kant had hinted at
the
critical role

of reflective judgment, as that

which enables cognition

to

come

into being.

Schelling extends this logic to account for the individuation of the absolute. This effort

cannot be considered successful, but
than to the system

itself.

ultimate revelation

is,

this is

The question

due more

as to

why

to the impossibility of the task

Schelling chose art as the source of

according to Schmidt, simply historically determined:

Dass aber diese Postulat nach einer symbolischen Manifestation des Absoluten
sich gerade auf die Kunst richtet, lasst sich historisch aus dem iiberragenden
Stellenwert erklaren, den die Kunst im 18. Jahrhundert erhalten hat und der
68
erst vom Genie-Gedanken her begriindet wurde.

The

fact that Schelling

about the work of
the

same

force

needed

art, a

to postulate a

mythology

which leads

in

new mythology

which the unity

of the individual

to the synthesis of society, is also

response to the current historical situation, an

artificial

to support his claims

idea

comes from

seen by Freier as a

which evaporates:

...in diesem Zirkel zur Schimare: zur id£e fixe einer Philosophic, die, den
Zwangscharakter des in der Franzosischen Revolution zur Herrschaft gelangten

Rechtsbewusstseins reflektierend, die geschichtsphilosophische Idee einer
universellen Rechtsverfassung mit der Vorstellung einer gesellschaftlichen
Synthesis uberbieten mochte, die Rechtsbeziehungen in religiose
Solidaritatsbeziehungen und Gattungsgebote in Gegenstande des inneren
Triebes verwandeln wiirde.

Beyond doubt, one

is

69

partly a product of one's historical position but this does not

that one's interpretation of the world

mean

^Schmidt,
69

p.394.

Freier, p.174.

is

inevitable.
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Schelling
result of the

historically

means

would

moment

of freedom in

which one

However

wills oneself into being.

determined the subject matter might be which one chooses as the

which one

of

certainly see the individual's understanding of the world as the

reflection of

chisels out

an interpretation of one's world,

it is

tool,

by

nevertheless a

both the general intellectual climate and the uniquely individual attempt

to create a foundation.

From

one can then explore the meaning behind the

this base,

appearances, which in and of themselves are unable to answer the questions of

meaning which philosophy
of being reflects a time

breakdown

Schelling's effort to reconstruct the enclosed system

poses.

which both

of divine order

fears a loss of

and yet maintains

meaning

a faith that a

be discovered. Schelling's radical contribution

is

access to through a congealed

the unconscious from

c.

its

moment

new

philosophical exploration.

level.

wholeness inside the

it

radiates the veiled truth of

.

Schelling has

Kant legitimized aesthetics as

Now, through

there to

of art.

Aesthetics and the philosophical enterprise

within aesthetics to a

is still

and which she can only gain

explore,

work

of a

on an unconscious foundation

of the absolute, as

revelation in the

wake

wholeness

to posit this

individual, to view the conscious individual as resting

which she can neither control nor consciously

in the

a

moved

the debate

proper subject for

the vehicle of aesthetics, Schelling questions

the whole nature of the philosophical enterprise. Philosophy no longer can be the

domain

of carefully delineated explanations, of precise models of the

nature. Before Kant, the idea of

philosophical systems; the

God

human

or a divine order

was

called

mind and

upon

of

to justify

being, the rational animal, occupies a top rung

the ladder of creation. Kant establishes separate spheres for

most

on

what we can know and

211

what we can only

speculate about, and envisions the aesthetic realm as providing a

bridge between these domains. Schelling turns this triad on

Only

in the aesthetic realm

can

between the

into the relation

we

real

directly grasp the

and the

of our unconscious being; in other words,

the world.

One

The

ideal.

it is

head, so to speak.

its

world as

it is,

by attaining insight

aesthetic realm

our unconscious

can come to an intellectual understanding of

self

is

a direct product

which brings

this process

forth

through

philosophical thought, but the process can only be intuited as a whole in the finished

work

of art.
7

Schelling

s

analysis of aesthetic sensibility shares with Kant's that, at the end,

the reader has at best a vague idea of
is

how

this

of art

This

itself.

not surprising, however, for both Kant and Schelling have focussed on the nature of

the reaction of the individual. The assumption
there,

which move

us.

We

work, a feeling that time
of

work

determines the

is

is

that there are great

feel a particular sort of

pleasure

when we

works

of art out

encounter such a

suspended and that we have suddenly realized something

which we were previously unaware.

Why

do we

feel this

way, and what have we

seen?

Kant deciphers our

feeling

by hypothesizing

explains his transcendental vision by detailing the

how

our minds work. Schelling

mechanism

recognition of this

mechanism dawns when we encounter

being, Schelling

saying, possesses the mystery of

is

which philosophy
nothing beyond

tries to

this

all

a

being.

of the nature of things;

work
This

of art.

is

The human

the mystery

explain intellectually, and which art reveals directly. There

unconscious world, neither

God nor

hierarchy; everything

determinable from within. Schelling' s aesthetic theory takes philosophy in a

new

direction

by reinterpreting the very nature

of the

human

being.

is

radical,

is

CHAPTER

IV

THE WORK OF ART AS ESCAPE FROM THE WORLD:
SCHOPENHAUER AND THE WORLD AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION

A. Part

1.

(

1819 )

One

Introduction

The problematic
characterizes idealism

of the relation of objects to a

taken up

is

knowing

subject

anew by Schopenhauer, who

which

finds Kant's

work

path-breaking but not complete, and the contributions of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel

thoroughly insufficient

if

not downright contemptible. Schopenhauer shares with

Kant and Schelling, however unwillingly, the
are the source of

truth

which

glimpse.

model

is

some moment

work

of ultimate truth about ourselves

of art

and the genius

and the world,

a

otherwise (with the notable exception of the saint) impossible to

However, whereas Kant

of the mind,

Schopenhauer

belief that the

finds that the object of beauty confirms his rational

and Schelling sees

finds the

work

appears as phenomena in

it

as illuminating the ecstatic unity of

of art to reveal the true nature of the will,

its restless,

all

things,

which

ceaseless, ultimately directionless striving.

Schopenhauer's genius sees through the individual striving

to the essential nature

and

enables us to catch a fleeting glance at the truth of the world before returning to the
vagaries of the

will.

Schelling

and Schopenhauer share the view

conscious and comes from within, but whereas for Schelling
unity of the multiplicity of

phenomena which one

it is

that truth

is

pre-

precisely the joyful

glimpses, for Schopenhauer

it is

the

213

This chapter

is

constructed along the following

Before turning to a

lines.

detailed examination of Schopenhauer's interpretation of the world, so as to better

understand the

man

family background.

behind the work,

Then

I

overview of the principle of

begin with a general introduction to the work, and give an

to his

first treatise

main work. Next

Schopenhauer and Kant,

Schopenhauer assumes that

sufficient reason;

readers are familiar with this

an introduction

provide a brief account of Schopenhauer's

I

I

for

he

insists that his dissertation

discuss the relationship

in particular the Appendix,

the Kantian Philosophy." Finally

I

all

own

be read as

between

which presents

turn to Schopenhauer's

his

his "Criticism

on

interpretation of the

world, as divided into will and representation. After studying what this means, the
role of the genius

and the work

of art are examined, for they provide the

above the everyday world. This can
completely ascetic
western, and
theory,

it is

I

lifestyle in

will briefly

Danzig

review

this

is

entailed

of saints

to a successful

merchant

to rise

through attaining a

and holy persons, both eastern and

but for the purpose at hand, namely aesthetic

I

will discuss the relationship

between

art

by Schopenhauer' s view.

Relation to contemporaries

Hamburg when
after

manner

the

not of great importance. Lastly,

and philosophy which

a.

also be accomplished

means

.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was

family.

In 1793, his father

Prussia incorporated Danzig.

moved

bom

in

to the free city of

Schopenhauer began

his schooling there

having spent two years with a French family in Le Havre. Rather than following

the traditional route of attending

Gymnasium, Schopenhauer spent the years from

1800-1804 travelling with his parents through Europe with the intended goal of

preparing for the business

life.

The

result of his travels

and observations was

...eine

214

seinen

Soon

Stdl

kennzeichende Vielsprachigkeit...und eine weltbiirgerliche Gesinnung." 1

after the return to

mother and

between
desires,

Tieclc

Hamburg

sister left for

his father's

Weimar. 2 Schopenhauer remained

wish

for

him

and immersed himself

The

pull

responsibility,

towards the

to study medicine.

Schulze,

who

to continue

intellectual life

left for

was immatriculated
It

was

in

was

with business and his

soon dominated

Weimar

came

and

his

own

intellectual

Wackenroder and

his feelings of

filial

to prepare himself for university.

at the university in

there that he

killed

Hamburg, tom

in the writings of Matthias Claudius,

and Schopenhauer

In 1809 he

in 1805, Schopenhauer's father

Gottingen, where he began

into contact with the philosopher G.E.

introduced him to Plato and Kant. In 1811, Schopenhauer

Berlin to study philosophy, ostensibly with Fichte

moved

to

and Schleiermacher. Their actual

presence changed his admiration to scorn, and in 1813 he returned to Thuringen and

wrote

Relations with his mother,

his dissertation in Rudolstadt.

Weimar, were not good. She found
around. Through her social
readers of the dissertation,

circle,

titled

his presence depressing

however, he met Goethe,

"On

who

still

lived in

and did not want him

who was one

of the

first

the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient

Reason," and was impressed with the young Schopenhauer,

who

in turn

became

’Wolfgang Weimer, Schopenhauer (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,
1982), p.ix.
2

Royce suggests that the circumstances of the father's death "...strongly indicated
an insane suicide" and notes that Schopenhauer's ancestry "...was somewhat
burdened. ..in respect of nerves..." His mother by contrast was "...indeed personally
quite free from noteworthy nervous defects, unless heartlessness be reckoned as such.
By all accounts, Johanna Schopenhauer's treatment of her son was appallingly callous
and did little to provide him with a positive view of the world. The above quotes are
rpt. New York:
to be found in: Josiah Royce, The Spirit of Modem Philosophy (1892;

Dover

Publications, Inc., 1983), p.241.

Additional biographical information

from: Walter Abendroth, Arthur Schopenhauer

mit Selbstz eugnissen

Bilddokumentation (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag,

1967).

und

is

taken
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involved with Goethe's work on color theory, publishing his
1816.

At

this

same

Friedrich Majer,

time,

Schopenhauer was introduced

an event which had

1814 Schopenhauer

moved

to

a

own

contribution in

to Indian

profound influence on

all

philosophy by

his later thinking.

Dresden and began work on The World

as Will

In

and

Representation, which he finished in 1818 and handed over to Brockhaus to publish.

Schopenhauer shares with Schelling the external
major work of philosophy

at a

facts that

he completed a

very young age, and that he was clearly influenced by

the poets and writers of the Romantic movement. 4 But whereas Schelling

world and

its

future in primarily positive and optimistic terms, Schopenhauer has

already crossed the threshold into the
terms; for those

who have

modem

world and sees the world in negative

who

have,

for 'Schopenhauer.'

This

not read his works, and even for some of those

the adjective 'pessimistic' has practically

is

saw the

become

a

synonym

too simplistic a reading of Schopenhauer, however, and betrays not only a clear

prejudice in favor of a belief in the rational self-improvement of the Enlightenment's

bequest to Western thought, but also several misconceptions about what

Schopenhauer means;

this will

be examined

later.

it is

that

Like Schelling, Kant strongly

influenced his thinking and Schopenhauer, too, sees himself as completing Kant's

Uber das Sehn und die Farben Unfortunately, this did not result in a warm
welcome for Schopenhauer:
Goethes Deutung hat Schopenhauer tief bewegt. Er musste bald genug die
Einsamkeit und das Zuruckverwiesensein des schopferischen Menschen auf
sich selbst erfahren, als er seine Farbenabhandlung, das Werk, das er als
Dankesdienst an Goethes Farbenlehre und ihre wahre Vollendung ansah, von
3

.

Verehrten mit kiihler Hoflichkeit zuriickgewiesen sah.
"Das Genie bei Schopenhauer," Zeitschrift fur Asthetik
Hiibscher,
See Arthur
all gemeine Kunstwissenschaft, 18 (1973) p.108.

dem

4

und

See A. Hiibscher, "Der Philosoph der Romantik," Schopenhauer-Iahrbuch, 34 (1951-

2) 1-17.
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thought. Schopenhauer appears to the reader as extremely self-assured,
even arrogant,

eager to
all

name names

of his contemporaries,

who

and Kant,

Plato

b.

and

he considers incompetent. These include nearly

practically

all

Background information on The World

Representation

5

The

and appeared

his self-assurance

first

in 1819.

edition

original work,

find nothing to retract;

myself

am

his earlier thinking,

protect the

first

my

he

when he was

6

five years later, in 1844, a

first

volume was

states that

"...1

am

Schopenhauer

is

and indeed chooses the format

from

"...the

second edition was

essentially a reprint of the

almost exclusively on the

In the

glad that after twenty five years

more than ever
of a

carping criticism of old age."

criticisms

first

.

thirty years

fundamental convictions have been confirmed,

concerned."

Kant have substantial

5

in 1818,

and the second volume contained supplementary chapters.

"Preface" to the second edition

1

scorn.

and Representation

as Will

was completed

Twenty

no

throughout The World as Will and

published, this time in two volumes. The

as far as

western philosophers with the exception of

also receive their share of criticism but

Schopenhauer reveals

old,

whom

of those

I

any

7

Only

in the

do not want

rate

agreement with

supplementary volume

been incorporated into the original

volume because

in

at

I

to

Appendix on

text.

I

concentrate

to stray too far

away

trans. E.F.J. Payne
Volume 1 is
two
volumes:
consists
of
work
The
(New York: Dover Publications, 1969).
the almost unchanged original from 1819; Volume 2 is the added commentary from the
second edition of 1844. I use volume 1 almost exclusively, and hereafter it is referred
The German edition which
I1.
When volume 2 is cited, it appears as
to as
Diogenes Verlag,
(Zurich:
volumes,
I use is: Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 4

Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation,

WWR

WWR

-

1977).
6

WWR,

7

WWR,

p.xxi.

p.xxii.

217

from the

intellectual climate of the turn of the century;

from

possible the shift

rationality to irrationality in

I

want

German

to

examine

as closely as

which

aesthetic theory

occurs within this thirty year period from 1790 to 1818. Only with reference to the

on the

discussion

On

art

work do

I

also consider the later edition.

the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason,

published in 1813 and served as Schopenhauer's dissertation,

book, with the least of his genius in

and

8

While

it."

interests of his predecessors, especially in

which was

is "...his

most technical

exhibits the philosophical concepts

it

Germany,

it

does not

has come to expect from Schopenhauer, namely the fundamental

reflect

reality of the will as

the Kantian thing-in-itself. In essence, the principle of sufficient reason
that there

is

a reason, that

is,

an explanation,

for

any

other words, everything in the phenomenal world
relations

which determine

its

existence.

is

fact or existent

of

all

things

dictum

is "...the

whatever."

tightly knit into a

The explanation

what one

web

is

9

In

of

divided into

four principles: physical, logical, mathematical and moral. The physical explanation,

which examines change
explains

human and

in the physical world,

and the moral explanation, which

animal action in terms of their motives, and which

depth in his essay on the freedom of the

will, are

is

treated in

the real contribution to philosophic

thought. The other two modes of explanation are obscure at crucial points and play

Schopenhauer's

no great

role in

Taylor

of the opinion that:

is

later

thought even though he does not abandon them.

Schopenhauer's analyses of causation and kindred concepts, which he quite
rightly considers to be involved in the Principle of Sufficient Reason as it

8

Royce, p.249.

‘fcichard Taylor, "Introduction,"

Reason, trans.

E.F.J.

Payne (La

On

Salle:

the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient

Open Court

Publishing Co., 1974),

p. lx.
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all change in the physical world, surely rival and probably
surpass in
depth and brilliance the more celebrated discussions of David Hume on

applies to
their

same topic. Where Hume grossly oversimplified these problems and left
them riddled with paradoxes, Schopenhauer disentangled them and on many
crucial points shed light on what had before seemed hopelessly dark 10
the

.

In particular,

one of Schopenhauer's most

important point of contention with Kant,

fertile

suggestions, and one

his claim that perception

is

the understanding and not of sensation, a claim which for

which

is

an

is

the product of

him provides proof

of the a

nature of causality. Because cause and effect take place within the world, there

priori

can be no

first

cause or

last effect,

and hence no such metaphysical

entity as

God.

All

things are merely changes of state of matter, which neither increases nor decreases.

These basic tenets of Schopenhauer's view of causality appear repeatedly in

WWR,

if

not in the neatly categorized form presented by his dissertation. Although

Schopenhauer remarks that

work needs

his

superfluous information, at times one
story

is

retold

many

point were missed

work

and contains no

Wagner's Ring, when the

times in slightly different words. That has a certain

make

on the

are given to us in

this habit directly

it

inevitably

artistic effect,

from Schopenhauer,

arguments are often juxtaposed, so

clear reading, the

somewhere

authorial insistence

it is

feels like a spectator at

and one could almost suggest Wagner took
while the aphorisms

be as long as

to

is

necessity of reading his prior work, the essentials of that

numerous

places in

WWR

.

the reader that an acquaintance with

Schopenhauer

tells

both Kant's works and his

own work on

the principle of sufficient reason

first

is

presupposed; in addition, the reader best prepared for Schopenhauer's thoughts
also be familiar with both Plato

10

a

repeated elsewhere. Despite the

preface,

In the

if

for

Taylor, "Introduction,"

p.xi.

and the Indian philosophy found

in the

will

Vedas and the
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Upanishad.

And

finally,

the reader should start with the Appendix

begin at the beginning, and

no chance

to

make

finally reread the

biting fun of

German

on Kant, then

whole work Schopenhauer

philosophers, and professors in particular.

Part of his antipathy stems from his experience as a professor in Berlin,
intentionally scheduled his lectures to coincide with those of Hegel,

was extremely
as

popular.

also loses

when he

who

at the time

Hegel's lecture hall overflowed with eager listeners whereas,

Abendroth notes: "Schopenhauers Vorlesungen waren infolgedessen so wenig

besucht, dass er

mehr

hielt.

dislike of

sie fur die

nachsten vier Semester zwar noch ankiindigte, aber nicht

Es war ein katastrophaler Misserfolg." 11 This only added to his intense

Hegel and

his philosophy.

Fichte

and Schelling are

also the

main

targets of

his scorn:

stamp of honesty and openness so distinctly on their
they are thus in glaring contrast to those of the three notorious
sophists of the post-Kantian period. I am always to be found at the standpoint
of reflection, in other words, of rational deliberation and honest information,
never at that of inspiration, called intellectual intuition or even absolute
thought; its correct names would be humbug and charlatanism. Therefore,
...[M]y writings bear the
face, that

and meanwhile constantly seeing the false and the bad
held in general acceptance, indeed humbug and charlatanism in the highest
12
admiration, I long ago renounced the approbation of my contemporaries.

working

in this spirit,

Schopenhauer views himself

as the true heir to Kant,

whom

the greatest contributor to philosophy in millennia, and

someone who cannot and

1

Abendroth,

p.66.

will

not be understood for

he regards as a genius,

who

many

is

as

for this reason

years.

Schopenhauer

This experience as well as the reception accorded

WWR

obviously took place after the publication of the first edition. I assume that the
extreme bitterness in tone towards the philosophical world were added for the second
edition, where "...the alterations in the first volume. ..nowhere touch what is essential,

but relate to matters of only secondary importance"
12

WWR,

xxi.

Payne footnotes

"charlatan" refers to Hegel.

that

"humbug"

(WWR,

xxi).

refers to Fichte

and Schelling and
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states simply:

cannot see that anything has been done in philosophy between

"...I

[Kant] and me;

therefore take

I

where he

to point out

Kant's contribution

which

I

is

turn, for

first

and an introduction

2.

feels

my

departure directly from him." 13

Kant has

erred, although

valuable beyond measure.
it

to his

method

first

then proceeds

quite clear that in general

to his interpretation of

It is

provides an insight into Schopenhauer's

own

Kant

to

thinking process

of philosophizing.

Schopenhauer, Kant and the agreement

The

making

He

to disagree

thing one notices about Schopenhauer

is

the clarity of his prose.

He

does not build elaborate arguments, made negotiable via complex tables of contents; he
states his opinion in aphorisms.

The Appendix on Kant does not

fit

neatly as does the main body of the work, for here Schopenhauer
specific philosophical claims

precise.

This

which Kant makes, and

not to suggest he

is

required to be so rigorous.

He

is

to this

is

this

form quite

arguing against

end he needs

to

imprecise elsewhere, but rather that he

states his

purpose very

as

be very
is

not

clearly:

view in this Appendix to my work is really only a vindication
have set forth in it, in so far as in many points it does not
agree with the Kantian philosophy, but actually contradicts it. Yet a discussion

What

I

have

of the teaching

thereof

is

in

I

necessary, for evidently

my

line of

from the Kantian, is completely under
14
and starts from it...

One might

receive the impression that

with Kant, for the Appendix finds

little

its

thought, different as

influence,

its

content

is

and necessarily presupposes

Schopenhauer actually disagrees fundamentally
that

is

correct,

but

this

would be

a mistake.

In

taking the time and care to analyze so thoroughly his points of disagreement, at least

13

WWR,

416.

14

WWR,

pp. 416-7.
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Critique of Pure Reason. Schopenhauer
respect, especially in

Hegel,

who

a.

that

shows Kant

comparison with the polemics he

a vast

measure of

blasts at Fichte, Schelling

and

rarely receive the benefit of substantive criticism.

The merit

what he

of the thing-in-itself

.

Schopenhauer begins with the bold claim

finds as Kant's greatest merit

the thing-in-itself, a distinction most other

is

the distinction of the

critics

have found only

phenomenon from
to cause

unnecessary problems. This resonates so strongly with Schopenhauer because of his
contention that the
perception
Fichte

is

intellect

always stands between the individual and a thing, that

not the product of sensation but of understanding. That people

and Schelling

in-itself is "...nothing

tried to assert the absolute identity of the

like

phenomenon and

thing-

but the vapouring of intellectual intuition" 15 and reveals a

complete misunderstanding of Kant's intentions. Schopenhauer interprets Kant as

propounding
the senses

is

in a

new and

original

way

the truths found in Plato, that the world of

not the world of being but only of becoming, and comprehension of the

physical world

is

not knowledge but an

illusion, incidentally a

view which coincides

with that to be found in the Hindu and Buddhist philosophy which impressed

Schopenhauer so

greatly.

Kant himself makes no mention of Plato in terms of

epistemological theory, and one

would think

that even an oblique reference

found in the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena
this in

mind. This lack of

explicit

if

WWR, 419.

would be

he were actively writing with

connection does not disturb Schopenhauer's

conviction that Plato and Kant are operating with the same basic premises.

15

his

He
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generously assumes that the underlying or unconscious intention
results in

an extremely

from Plato

straight path

to

is

the same,

Schopenhauer by means

which

of Kant.

Kant's stroke of genius from Schopenhauer's point of view was to realize that

which

the laws

rule with necessity in existence cannot explain existence

itself,

but are

conditioned by the subject's manner of knowing. His mistake was that he incorrectly

deduced the

thing-in-itself

task to Schopenhauer.

and
7

Kant

failed to

recognize

it

accomplishment was

s

in the will

to

move

itself,

which leaves the

the level of philosophical

debate from realism, from the fleeting phenomenon, to idealism: whereas before Kant

we were

in time,

himself here

become

is

now

time

is

in us.

The danger

a blurring of the lines

was

which Schopenhauer exposes

between idealism and metaphysics,

clearer in the course of this study.

It

to

He

as will

himself says:

therefore reserved for Kant to help the fundamental idealistic view to

obtain the ascendancy in Europe, at any rate in philosophy, a view which
prevails in the
religion.

whole

of

non-Mohammedan

Asia,

and

is

in essence

even that

of

16

Both Schelling and Schopenhauer stand open

to the accusation that they are trying to

bring precisely that back into philosophical knowledge what Kant excluded, namely
metaphysics, under the guise of idealism. This of course raises the vexing problem of

what idealism

is

Kant, the

and which

young

sort

is

Schelling

being discussed.

and Schopenhauer

all

transcendental idealism. This view holds that the world

but that objects out there are empirically
transcendental similarity between
the

same

WWR,

p.424.

world

16

is

for

each of

us.

all

real.

claim to be representing

is

conditioned by the mind,

At the same time, there

humans which guarantees

Kant locates

is

that the

a

phenomenal

this similarity in the transcendental self,
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which gives

transcendental
calling his

look

self starts to

like

closer observation,

some kind

however, the

of universal spirit.

system 'transcendental idealism/ sounds

much more

Schelling, despite

like

an absolute

the unconscious unity, accessible through intellectual intuition, also sounds

idealist, for

like a

Upon

rise to the empirical self.

world

spirit.

inanities put forth

manifestation.

And

as

we

Schopenhauer, for

will see,

by Schelling and Hegel, postulates one

move

In other words, as soon as the

world has been made, the

slide

down

to

an

all

his criticism

will of

about the

which everything

idealist,

is

a

mind-conditioned

the slippery slope back into the sea of

metaphysics begins. The ultimate explanation of

all

things

is

referred to as

'transcendental self/ 'universal spirit/ or 'will/ terms which can be interpreted as other

names

for 'God.'

his success

is

Kant recognizes

debatable,

and

this

danger and actively

tries to skirt

it;

his theory of the beautiful relies specifically

the level of

on

a universal

non-cognitive knowledge.

Schopenhauer's admiration

unbounded but not

for the

scholasticism

is

contribution,

and the concomitant lack

adhere, leaves

room

ideas.

Schopenhauer intends

which has been poorly

philosophy, one cannot

some

himself,

which

said

fail

first

lesser

minds could

produces "strange and

adherents try to make sense from his

from that which
of his

is

simply nonsensical. While

own

in the reading

but to be impressed by aspects of his

of the murkier claims that Kant makes.

Schopenhauer

in turn

which

to untangle the strands of confusion, to separate that

Schopenhauer has some peculiar ideas

at

of a simple system to

less clear-thinking

final defeat of

Precisely the enormity of Kant's

uncritical.

for significant error,

monstrous" ideas as Kant's

Kantian revolution and the

A

he gives the
criticism,

critical

which

strike

remarkably clear and precise writer

finds justified fault with Kant's style:
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...Kant's exposition is often indistinct, indefinite, inadequate,

obscure.

This obscurity

is

certainly to be excused in part

and occasionally
by the difficulty of the

and the depth of the ideas. Yet whoever is himself clear to the bottom,
and knows quite distinctly what he thinks and wants, will never write
indistinctly, never set up wavering and indefinite concepts, or pick up from
foreign languages extremely difficult and complicated expressions to denote

subject

such concepts, in order to continue using such expressions afterwards, as Kant
took words and formulas from earlier, even scholastic, philosophy. 17

Schopenhauer complains that

and Schelling among many
to

swathe

this obscurity

lesser

known

gave Kant's successors free

"scribblers"

made ample use

He

their meaninglessness in obscure phraseology.

license: Fichte

of this privilege

continues to vent his

spleen on his rivals with the following comment: "But the greatest effrontery in
serving

up sheer nonsense,

in scrabbling together senseless

and maddening webs

words, such as had previously been heard only in madhouses, appeared in

whose works

are to be a "lasting

monument

Schopenhauer never wastes an opportunity
philosophers just mentioned,

what he considers

it is

German

of

to

remarkable

stupidity."

18

of

Hegel..."

While

heap withering scorn on the three

how

similar

some

the worst excesses of Schelling and Hegel, as

of his

we

own

ideas are to

will see

when we

consider the main body of the work.

Schopenhauer

symmetry and the

locates the source of

most

of the difficulties in Kant's love of

architectonic form of his work,

and continuously points

to the

foolishness of such an approach, in particular the deduction of the categories which:
fearful Procrustean bed on to which he violently forces all
and everything that occurs in man, shrinking from no
world
things in the
violence and disdaining no sophism in order merely to be able to repeat
...later

become the

everywhere the symmetry of that

17

WWR, 428-9.

18

WWR, 429.

1

9

WWR,

430.

table.

19
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Schopenhauer discounts eleven
the source of

phenomena. The other

all

failure to distinguish

marks the

of the categories, upholding only that of causality as

serious mistake

between knowledge

of perception

starting point for the real difference

which Kant makes

and

Ls

his

abstract knowledge.

This

between Schopenhauer and Kant.

Before digging into the heart of the matter, though, Schopenhauer details the
inconsistencies to be found in Kant's use of terminology,

such as 'rules/

'principles,'

at different places,

7

'understanding' and 'concept

and often seem

The deeper problem behind
different terms has

apparent lack of

of

an

object, of

been the focus of

its

distinction

Schopenhauer

is

are defined differently

be arbitrarily distinguished from one another.

attention, rather

sufficient, consistent consideration

nature of a subject and the
as far as

to

itself

central concepts

this lack of investigation is that the distinction

reason and so forth also

reflection,

where such

is

to be

than the terms themselves. This

about the nature of perception,

found in questions concerning the nature

from a representation, about the nature

like.

between

of existence, the

For although Kant located objectivity in the subject,

concerned, the exact nature of an object or a subject

is

never

satisfactorily investigated.

b.

The problem

initially finds

itself,

that

it

of the subject

and

of the nature of perception

curious, given Kant's distinction

Kant never properly concluded that

existence of a subject,

nor unconditionally.

and that an

He

object, as

locates this

after

Schopenhauer

between phenomenon and

all

objects are

mere phenomenon,

for

thing-in-

dependent on the
exists neither in itself

problem in the confusion between the

second editions of Critique of Pure Reason,

which he only discovered long

.

Schopenhauer finds the

first

first

and

edition,

having been acquainted with the extant version,
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which was the second

in a non-contradictory manner.

between 1787 and
ungenuine

text."

Kant found

1738,

20

and

edition, to be clear

The second

by contrast

Whereas

is "...a

a great

concise,

edition,

and

to express Kant's idealism

which

is

the only one in print

mutilated, spoilt, and, to a certain extent

number

of

Kant scholars hold the position that

his first edition to be unsatisfactory, thereby necessitating a rethinking of

the problems he

is

trying to solve,

and that the second edition contains the most

important insights, Schopenhauer takes the opposite view, and in addition finds the

worth

true

in the Transcendental Aesthetic; he labels the Transcendental Analytic

confusing, obscure and inconsistent. While no one claims that the Transcendental
Analytic

most

is

a

model of

clarity

and consistency,

it

nevertheless contains

of Kant's

original thinking.

Schopenhauer

locates the

problem with the deduction of the

Kant7 s assumption that empirical perception, and sensation
external cause.

it

some

Kant proves the a

in our intellect

and giving

it

priori

thing-in-itself in

in general,

must have an

nature of the law of causality, thereby placing

a subjective origin; sensation

and

all

empirical

perception also remain on a subjective foundation. This clearly points, according to

Schopenhauer, to the impossibility of bringing
subjectivity as the thing-in-itself.

The only way

outside the realm of our representations
the will, for the will

is

Schopenhauer does, thus

WWR

20

/

435.

in-itself of

the

in

is

something independent of

to

to introduce self-consciousness,

Rosenkranz, to reprint the

credits himself

Kant

7

s

is

and thereby

of course,

what

faulty deduction.

This

our phenomenon. This

"correcting" this error of

Schopenhauer

account for something that

is,

is

with convincing the editor, Professor

first edition (in 1838).
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considered in detail

what

later;

is

important to keep in mind here

praise of Kant's recognition that every

Schopenhauer
is

given to

us,

detriment of content.

this to

He

Schopenhauer's

a thing-in-itself.

problem in Kant's claim that the object

finds a real

and holds

phenomenon has

is

of perception

be an example of Kant's concentration on form to the

maintains that Kant never sufficiently explains

perception enters our consciousness, or

how knowledge

how

empirical

of the world originates in us.

Neither objects nor representation are given to us, states Schopenhauer. The only
thing that

we

...only

receive from outside

is

a sensation in the sense-organ:

by the application of the understanding (i.e., of the law of causality), and
and time, does our intellect convert this

of the forms of perception, of space

mere sensation into a representation. This representation now exists as object
and time, and cannot be distinguished from the latter (the object)

in space

except in so far as

we

ask about the thing-in-itself; in other respects

identical with the object.

The mistake which Kant makes

is

to attribute to

knowledge

both receptivity of impressions, through which the object
concepts, through

knowledge

which

it is

it is

21

thought.

22

By

contrast,

is

of empirical perceptions

given,

and spontaneity

of

Schopenhauer maintains that

of perceptions requires neither concepts nor thinking; animals are capable

of representations but not of thinking, something for

which Kant cannot account. By

bringing thinking into perception, Kant lays the groundwork for the confusion of
intuitive

and

abstract knowledge;

he also

fails to offer

perceptions enter our head, other than that they are

The problem

WWR, 438-9.

^ee

somehow

in Kant's claim that the understanding

by prescribing the laws

21

an explanation

CPR, A50,B74.

a priori,

is

that nature

is

perceptible

is

for

how

"given" to us.

the lawgiver of nature

and not an

abstraction; the
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understanding would therefore have

to

be a faculty of perception. However, Kant also

claims that objective succession and the coexistence of objects
of experience are not

sensuously apprehended, but are apprehended by the understanding, thus
enabling
nature to become possible. This leads to the contradiction that the understanding

both a faculty of perception and of abstract thought; Schopenhauer sees in

is

this

contradiction the reason for the obscurity of language which prevails, especially in
the

Transcendental Logic.

monumental machine
categories, syntheses

What Schopenhauer

finds

most peculiar

is

that despite the

that Kant postulates as the faculty of knowledge, with

and so

forth, there

external world except to say that

it is

is

no

real

its

attempt to explain perception of the

given to us, in fact that

it is

given through the

object.

From Schopenhauer
thinking.

Thinking

is

7

s

point of view, perceptions are not given reality by our

only related indirectly to objects through concepts, but the

objects always remain perceptible.

Kant

errs in that he:

themselves to thinking, in order thus to make experience
on the understanding, yet without letting
the understanding be a faculty of perception. In this connexion, he certainly
distinguishes perceiving from thinking, but he makes particular things the
object sometimes of perception and sometimes of thinking. But actually they
...ascribes the objects

and the

objective world dependent

are only the object of perception; our empirical perception
just because

different

it

is

at

once objective,

comes from the causal nexus. Things, and not representations

from them, are

directly

its

object.

23

Individual things are perceived by the senses and in the understanding, whereas

thinking has to do with universal concepts without perceptibility, after which the
results of thinking

23

WWR,443.

can be applied

to individual things.

The

act of perception

is

based

229

on

empirical reality,

makes

on experience,

repeatedly, perception

but,

and

major point which Schopenhauer

this is a

comes about

by the application of knowledge of the causal nexus, the sole function of
the understanding, to the sensation of the sense. Accordingly, perception is
...only

really intellectual,

As a

result,

concern of

and

Kant postulates

this is just

what Kant

denies.

24

a three-fold division: the representation,

sensibility; the object of representation,

which

is

beyond knowledge. For Schopenhauer, the middle

a distinction

without

which

is

step

unfounded and providing the source

is

thing-in-itself,

on

of Kant's errors.

But

this step, "...the doctrine of the categories as concepts a priori also falls to the

of the thing-in-itself..."

is

2’

Given Kant's commitment

to the architectonic,

to hold

it is

good

clear

not about to abandon the categories. As a result of these errors,

Schopenhauer

states that

concerning the
of the

which

superfluous, resting

ground; for they contribute nothing to perception, and are not supposed

that he

the

is

the concern of the

understanding, thought through the twelve categories; and the
lies

which

law of

it

has been

thing-in-itself

causality.

and

left to

to furnish the

M WWR.

is

to

answer the question

only valid proof of the a priori nature

For Schopenhauer, only the category of causality

other eleven are "...merely blind windows."

two outlooks

him both

26

The

essential difference

that for Kant, there are only concepts of objects,

no

is real;

the

between the

perceptions.

For

Q

for an admirably clear expression
Schopenhauer directs us to the
of this assumption of Kant's which he disagrees with: "To form a cognitive judgement
we may immediately connect with the perception of an object the concept of an object
in general, the empirical predicates of which are contained in that perception. In this
way a judgement of experience is produced. Now this judgement rests on the

443.

foundation of a priori concepts of the synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition
enabling it to be thought as the determination of an Object" (§36).
25

WWR,

444.

WWR,

446.

26
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Schopenhauer, objects

exist primarily

only for perception, and concepts are always

abstractions from the perception.

Schopenhauer dismisses the doctrine

of categories out of hand, but

he regards

the table of judgments as correct. However, his method differs from Kant's, in that

Kant

"...starts

direct

and

from

indirect, reflected

intuitive knowledge."

Schopenhauer

is

27

knowledge, whereas [Schopenhauer]

Kant

measuring the tower

is

start[s]

from

measuring the shadow, whereas

itself,

again as a result of Kant's failure to

separate reflection, or abstract knowledge, from perception, or intuitive knowledge.

Schopenhauer proceeds
purposes

is

to investigate

each

moment

which

of judgment,

our

unnecessary, and then continues with a section by section analysis of CPR.

In nearly every aspect of

7

Kant

s

epistemology which Schopenhauer finds problematic,

the failure to distinguish intuitive from abstract knowledge

the cause of the

is

confusion, along with the concomitant inability to recognize that
objects

for

originally perception

c.

Kant and the work of

art

.

The one other area which

namely the unique function

freedom of the

will,

maintains that he

is

which Kant explores

of the

work

in the Third

merely extending the natural

Kant did not arrive

knowledge

of

and not thinking.

is

topic at hand,

all

of art,

is

is

of interest to the

the possibility of

Antinomy. Schopenhauer

line of

Kant

at a conclusion to his thinking;

I

s

argument:

have merely carried

his

work into effect. Accordingly, what Kant says merely of the human
phenomenon, I have extended to every phenomenon in general which differs
only in degree, namely that their essence-in-itself is something
absolutely free, in other words, a will....
The truth is that on the path of the representation we can never get beyond
resources no thread
the representation; it is a closed whole, and has in its own

from the

^ WWR.

452.

human
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leading to the essence of the thing-in-itself, which is toto genere different from
it.
If we were merely representing beings, the way to the
thing-in-itself would
be entirely cut off from us. Only the other side of our own inner nature can
vouchsafe us information regarding the other side of the being-in-itself of
things.

This

is

I

have pursued

an example of

why

on Kant before turning
where he

many
critical

to

it is

this path.

28

important to

Schopenhauer's

become acquainted with the appendix

first

own

thinking, for

here that he shows

it is

deliberately differentiates himself

from Kant. Schelling,

for example,

others, rarely refers so specifically to

Kant even though he,

too, starts

among

from the

philosophy. Although Schopenhauer's tone at times borders on arrogance, he

must be commended
unfortunately

all

for being clear, precise

too rare

among

and

definite, traits

which are

the philosophers Schopenhauer considers.

He

constantly points out the abuses and castigates the offenders. Schopenhauer states his
objections to Kant with precision,
Schelling,

by

and then consistently maintains

contrast, never states so explicitly

struggles with the master's ideas, as

if

where he

unconvinced by

from Kant, and often

differs

his

own

his position.

point of view. Such

uncertainty never appears in Schopenhauer' s writing.

Schopenhauer has now explained where Kant makes the
concerning the

thing-in-itself,

Schopenhauer,

it is

changes

felt

namely

obvious that causality

in the organs of sense.

origin as the sensations themselves;

Although Kant has forbidden
artificial differentiation

object's

in the application of the

all

is

between the

causality.

of causality thus has as subjective

can therefore never lead

knowledge

law of

mistake

of the thing-in-itself,

object as conditioned

502.

an

to the thing-in-itself.

by making an

by the subject and the

appearance as conditioned by the subject's form of knowledge, he

^WWR,

For

applied a priori, prior to experience, to the

The law
it

fatal

is
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maintaining that the object,
passes through the forms

known

known

a posteriori,

only a

is

a result of the thing-in-itself as

Schopenhauer denies that

priori.

it

it

would

ever be possible to infer the existence of the thing-in-itself from knowledge
of objects.
This seems a rather odd point to make, for Kant has always insisted that the thing-initself

cannot be known. Schopenhauer's

which he holds

doctrine,

thing-in-itself as object,

problem here

real

to be correct, but the proof.

all

the while maintaining

simply transfers the thing-in-itself deep inside

is

not so

much

Kant consistently

the

treats the

unknowable. Schopenhauer

it is

human

and claims

subjectivity

it is

completely different from the world of causality. His reasoning about the thing-inquite different from Kant's, but his belief in

itself is

Schopenhauer

own

will as the

states that the thing-in-itself

concept of freedom, for the

it is

the same.

can only be

known through

will as thing-in-itself is free

from the

principle of sufficient reason,

from necessity, which rules everything in the

phenomenal world. The

is

will

often confused with

phenomenon, thus giving

the delusion of individual unconditioned freedom; this delusion

is

either as

human

an inference from the speculative idea

of

rise to

a result of ordinary

consciousness which has not been enlightened by philosophic thought. Kant
locate the origin of the concept of freedom in

one's

fails to

consciousness, instead placing

an unconditioned cause or as

it

a

presupposition of the categorical imperative. Schopenhauerian freedom springs
directly

fact,

he

from consciousness and
is

is

the manifestation of the will as thing-in-itself. In

so sure of his interpretation of thing-in-itself as

that Kant, too, in his heart of hearts

belief:

"Therefore

I

actually assume,

and despite
though

it

all

will,

he generously

offers

the inconsistencies, shared this

cannot be proved, that whenever Kant
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spoke of the

thing-in-itself,

he always thought

indistinctly of the will in the obscure

depths of his mind." 29

Most

of the appendix

Schopenhauer
covered in
area

is

also touches

much

is

devoted to the Critique of Pure Reason, but

on Kant's

greater detail in the

a useful introduction.

ethical

main

and

aesthetic theory.

text itself,

but a brief

(Vemunft)

to

mean both behaving

sure, this

is

comment about each

Schopenhauer maintains that Kant makes

in the very foundation of his ethical theory, using the
practical reason

To be

same word

a serious error

that denotes

in a rational fashion

and acting

in

good conduct. He adds:
times and all nations and languages have always clearly distinguished the
two, and regarded them as two entirely different things; and so also do all
those even at the present day who know nothing of the language of the
modern school, in other words, the whole world with the exception of a small
handful of German savants. All except these understand by virtuous conduct
and a rational course of life two entirely different things. 30
...all

Despite this misfortunate choice of definitions, Kant's great service to ethical theory
that he freed

it

from the world of experience, from the

happiness as the means to show the good--and
imperative with

its

iron.

test of direct or indirect

this despite

use of the categorical

unconditioned ought, which Schopenhauer considers a

contradiction in terms and as having as

from wooden

Schopenhauer

provides an excellent basis for

is

little

sense as the concept of a scepter

political science,

that virtuous action be calculated coldly

WWR,

30

WWR,

505.

515.

made

of the opinion that the categorical imperative

but

is

worthless as the basis of ethics,

because egoism, desire for well-being, remains the source of the

29

is

and

deliberately

principle.

To demand

from abstract maxims of law

is

as

if

one demanded

genuine work of

on Kant's

effort

that only precisely applied aesthetic rules could result in a

virtue

art:

is,

like genius, to a great extent innate.

Schopenhauer concludes

part,

significance of the ethical content of actions,

Despite the great

Kant never penetrated the

that

which

is

clearly

shown by

real

the "...complete

absurdity of this Kantian view regarding the highest good." 31

Schopenhauer

is

not

much more generous with

his assessment of Kant's

aesthetic theory, although he similarly credits Kant with doing aesthetics the great
service of

removing the investigations of the beautiful from the empirical realm, from

the objective conditions

While others had begun

aesthetic principles in relation to the subject, Kant

investigated the stimulation
object beautiful.

as

first

was

know

Schopenhauer

is

the one

who

is

clearly correct, for to explain the

phenomenon from

solve,

willing to give Kant credit:

31

"He suggested the method

that he did not start

of taste

530.

as far

for this

For Schopenhauer,
itself,

but from the

problem which Kant

is

that one's subjective feeling of beauty

Schopenhauer does not have

WWR,

is

and from statements about others concerning the

namely how one determines

527.

32

from the beautiful

This, of course, misses the heart of the

WWR,

32

is

named judgment

universal.

the effects

the effects, so as to determine the cause accurately. This

Kant's crucial mistake

beautiful.

seriously

the feeling which gave rise to the act of calling an

investigation, paved the way, but otherwise missed the mark."

poorly

first

That Kant's investigations of aesthetic theory took an entirely

subjective direction

one must

itself,

to investigate the universality of

this

trying to

is

actually

problem because he already assumes the
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universal substrate of the

will.

Kant

is

pushed unwillingly

universal foundation, but refuses to admit to

Again in contrast
successful part of Cl

is

in the direction of a

it.

to current scholarship,

Schopenhauer finds that the most

Kant's theory of the sublime, which, he declares, almost

provides a real solution to the problem in terms of method of investigation and the

means

of achieving the method.

example of
expressing

The

critique of teleological

"...Kant's peculiar talent for

it

in

many

idea of that section

is

objectively the case.

judgments

to

particularly

book has come out

Schopenhauer

be odd, and attributes

maladapted

of

33

we

good

a

if

basic

they were

are not justified in assuming that this

and

finds the mixture of aesthetic

it

The

it."

although organized bodies appear to us as

constructed according to a purpose,

is

turning an idea about and about, and

different ways, until a

that,

judgment merely

teleological

to Kant's love of the architectonic,

to the subject matter at

is

which

is

hand.

This appendix provides the reader with a useful guide to Schopenhauer's
starting point with regard to Kant.

convinced of the validity of his
justified,

of his

own

takes valid issue with a
interpretation.

and

criticisms

sometimes apparently based on

advancement

much on

Because of Schopenhauer's

a

of points

however, the case that Schopenhauer

which are undeniably murky and

532.

rest

very

to

how

and representation.

is

the nature of idealism:

a subject-conditioned world, that does not ultimately rely

WWR,

be

solutions, but they are not always

It is,

will

The underlying consideration here

33

easily

Schopenhauer then gives them meaning with respect

he sees the world, namely divided into

assume

one can

misreading of Kant, sometimes on the

personal agenda.

number

style,

is it

on an

possible to

absolute,

and
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that can account for both one's similarity with other beings
as well as the reality of the

external world?

mechanism

Kant avoids answering

this question,

of mental activity in the individual

existence of a transcendental

self,

and

concentrating instead on the

human

being.

His postulate of the

his reference to that self directly in his ethical

theory and indirectly in his aesthetic theory, points to the conclusion one inevitably

draws when

all

the aspects of his system are brought together, namely that there

appears to be a supersensible absolute from which

all

objects

physical presence, as well as their ethical and aesthetic

does not need to struggle with
Kant,

might

who seems
be,

this

problem, for

to hint that every object

has

it is

its

Schopenhauer assumes something that

possibility of

imagining

it

as

some kind

thing-in-itself,

Unlike

whatever that

completely removed from even the

of invisible object,

namely

Kant comes from the world of the Enlightenment, where
the building blocks of

their

framework Schopenhauer

his basic presupposition.

own
is

and beings derive

will.

rational structures are

understanding: with enough insight, even the most

all

complicated, self-referential activities can be taken apart and explained. Neither
Schelling nor Schopenhauer believe

this.

Schelling tries to explain mental activity and

the subject-object relation in terms of self-consciousness and the unconscious which

grounds

it,

assuming an

original blissful unity as the source

opposition in the world. Schopenhauer

is

appendix

is

on

devoted to

agreement with Kant.

all

this irrational, implacable force

criticism,

It

of the manifold

even more extreme, proffering the

inexplicable strivings of the will as the foundation for

things are grounded

and motor

phenomenon:

which has no

all

goal.

activity

and

The

not to elaborating Schopenhauer's points of

makes the task

of following Schopenhauer' s intellectual path
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easier, for the directions are clearly

Schopenhauer' s interpretation of

3.

The world

as representation

The World
devoted
the

to the

as Will

how one

and

will

rise

turn to the main work, to

properly to understand the world.

will

and Representation

and representation

second aspect. Roughly translated,

one can

is

is

world as representation and two

work examines

facts of will

Now we

marked.

in

to the

world as

aspect,

its first

means

this

divided into four books:

that the

first

will.

two

The

are

half of

first

and the second

half in

its

half considers the bare

and representation, whereas the second examines the ways through which
above the absolute necessity, or

consideration of will and representation

is

fate, of

being in the world. The

first

about two thirds as long as the second, and

primarily functions as an introduction to Schopenhauer's epistemological and

metaphysical point of view. In order to see

work

of art

which

is

and the genius

the subject of

as

book

occupying

three, a

how Schopenhauer comes

to regard the

a special place in the hierarchy of the world,

summary

of the

first

two books

is

necessary.

The

fourth book, which will only be reviewed briefly, reflects the moral sphere, the world
of action.

Paradoxically, Schopenhauer's goal here

permanently remove oneself from
religious solution.

Art,

this

will,

to explore

how one

can

world, a problem which has an essentially

although capable of

through the turmoil of the

is

letting us glimpse the truth of the

can function only as a temporary balm.

world

238
a.

i.

Representation

The

subject-object relationship

simple sentence: "The world
his

is

is

my

.

Schopenhauer begins

representation."

idealism: only in reference to the subject

that everything

which

exists for

already seen, Schopenhauer believes that

is

Kanf s

the Vedantic outlook, and finds

the

The one

certain truth

as object in relation to a subject.

first

mistake

which seems misplaced. Schopenhauer

principle, a criticism

work with

This standpoint clearly reveals

the world there.

is

knowledge

34

his

no contradiction between

to neglect this

is

is

consciously following

empirical reality and

transcendental ideality. In order to understand fully this compatibility, one must
that the world

is

not only one's representation, but also one's

neither of the above but an object-in-itself

problem shared by

all

is

phantom

systematic explanations of the world

always presupposes something of which
that the will

is "...the

we

lies

essential difference

for

causality.

The subject and

the object

lie

that the beginning

One must

is

easier to start

understand

object of

which we

§1, p.3.

§1, p.4.

is

the

from

intangible.

object

bounded by

is

that the former

space, time

a priori in the consciousness of the subject, the discovery of

Schopenhauer's principle of

WWR,

A

and

object limit each other reciprocally, for the boundaries of

to Kant.

35

it is

between the subject and the

outside of space and time, whereas the latter

m WWK,

35

the other side of the coin from representation, but the latter

something graspable than from something completely

The

of a dream."

is

know

will; a reality that is

are not yet aware.

chosen point of departure. This makes good sense,

As

sufficient

are a priori conscious.

which

is

due

reason denotes these boundaries of the

Representations are divided into two basic
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sorts: intuitive

and

abstract.

Intuitive representations

embrace the

entire world of

experience; abstract representations are to be found in concepts, and only

human

beings are capable of them. Space and time, in accordance with Kant's discovery, are

unique in that they can be both thought in the abstract and
the properties of space and time are

known

a priori, as

directly perceived.

Since

independent of experience,

experience must be thought of as dependent on them. Consequently, Schopenhauer
considers pure time and space, the universal forms of intuition which Kant discovered,
as a special class of representations.

Equally important, however:

the quality of time and space that the principle of sufficient reason, which
determines experience as the law of causality and of motivation, and thought as
the law of the basis of judgments, appears in them [time and space] in quite a
special form, to which I have given the name ground of being. In time this is
the succession of its moments, and in space the position of its parts, which
36
reciprocally determine one another to infinity.
...is

Time

as constant succession

is

an ongoing present, a continual boundary between past

and future which, apart from the consequences

Space also has only relative existence; everything that

unreal.

which
flux,

of their contents, are

is

exists in time

to say everything subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason,

endless becoming. Since the entire world of representation

principles of time

Matter
matter

is

is

and space,

it

is

and space,
is

eternal

determined by the

can never be the truth behind existence.

the perceptible form of the unity of time and space, which

means

that

the combination of succession and position, the forms of time and space,

respectively,

under the constraints

nothing but causality:

36

empty and

WWR,

§3, p.7.

"...cause

and

of the principle of sufficient reason.

effect are the

Matter

whole essence and nature

is

of matter;
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being

its

is its

meaning and
and

time,

The mutual

acting.

reciprocal limitation of time

necessity to the principle of sufficient reason,

overcoming

duration, to matter.

their inherent opposition to

and space gives both

which

in turn unites space

each other and giving

rise to

Since the object in general exists only for the subject, and each

special class of representations exists for a special faculty of

knowledge

in the subject,

the "...subjective correlative of matter or of causality, for the two are one and the same,
is

the understanding.. ..To

understanding^]" 38 The
actual world.

necessary.

know

causality

is

the sole function of the

manifestation of the understanding

first

The perception

of objects

is

is

perception of the

immediate, non-reflective, not abstract, and

The pure understanding, by uniting space and time

into matter, converts

the sense-data of the eye, hand, ear into the perception of objects; the world of

representation exists only through the understanding. Schopenhauer maintains that
this interpretation of the

Hume's

experience, perception

is

first

demonstrated through the dependence of

postulates that

we

which successfully

refutes

Hume

is

similar,

but there

all

is

experience on

it.

a crucial difference.

Kant

perceive sense impressions in a subjective time order, which in turn

reorganized by the understanding according to a rule into an objective time order:

the

all

the

presupposes the causal law: the a priori character of

itself

Kant's refutation of

is

is

Instead of claiming that knowledge of the causal law results from

skepticism.

causality

world of perception

mechanism
see the

same

of our

object

objective time order

37

WWR,

^ WWR,

§4, p.9.

§4, p.ll.

mind

is

what determines

when we

objective time order, the fact that

we

look at a house. As soon as something receives

by the understanding,

it

also

is

recognized in a concept. This

is

.
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Schopenhauer's main point of contention.

He

maintains that in order for a sense

perception to be perceived, the law of causality has already been invoked, for the

perception of matter

is

nothing but the perception of

Kant and Schopenhauer' s view with respect

causality.

The net

result of

both

to the principle of sufficient reason

appears to be the same. Kant says:
This rule, by which

we

determine something according to succession of time, is,
under which an event invariably and necessarily follows is to
be found in what precedes the event. The principle of sufficient reason is thus
that the condition

the ground of possible experience, that is, of objective knowledge of
appearances in respect of their relation in the order of time. 39

For Schopenhauer, the principle of sufficient reason
experience; the difference

second

later

lies in

Kant's view, perception

and

moment

than Schopenhauer does, giving

Schopenhauer views perception

object

the

at the

is

the

its

law

is

is

also the

ground

of possible

invoked. Kant places

it

a split

rise to the significant difference that

as located in the understanding:

it is

intellectual.

raw material which the understanding shapes

same time designates by means

of a concept.

into

In

an

For Kant, the principle

of sufficient reason covers everything perceptible, thus organizing, or giving the law

to,

nature.

perceive,

ii.

For Schopenhauer, the principle of sufficient reason ensures that

and by perceiving

The coexistence

Schopenhauer

is

create, as

it

based on

false

and transcendental

ideality

existence of the external world,

debates between the dogmatists (both
reality are

were, the material world.

of empirical reality

adamant about the

we

realists

and

assumptions. Perception

idealists)

is

and the

.

and

finds that the

skeptics about

its

the result of causality, but this

is

a mediate
not a relation of cause and effect between subject and object, but between

39

CPR, B246,A201
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and immediate
to be;

it is

object.

The perceived world,

empirically real.

conditioned by the subject;
either

it is

transcendentally ideal.

one or the other way of regarding the world,

then simply be a dream,
realize

we were

is

is

null

dreaming, and

a

If it is

appears

it

always

is

does not have to choose

for they are

mutually inclusive.

ideality denies empirical reality,

and void.
if it is

One

what

just

At the same time, the world of objects

The question whether transcendental

all

as pure causality,

a short dream,

long dream from which

because

life

may

we wake up and
we do

not wake, then

the connections necessary for the principle of sufficient reason are unbroken and

does not matter whether

Schopenhauer adds that

web

of

Maya, the

we

are

awake

in the Indian

simile of a

dream

is

or in a dream, for the result

the same.

view of knowledge of the world, known as the
often used. The continuity

not the rather academic point of whether

waking

is

it

it

is

what

is

important,

takes place in a dreaming state or in a

state.

One's body

knowledge

is

the representation which forms the starting point of the subject's

of the world,

only in the brain, for

all

and the body

knowledge

is

presented as an extended, articulate thing

of a representation of perception in space exists

only through the understanding. Knowledge

is

beings, of a capacity for abstract reasoning, but

Abstract reasoning organizes that which

bring about the understanding

itself.

is

is

characteristic of

all

animal

immediately understood, but

Schopenhauer considers the

thinking unique, because he recognizes that
subject, but

thus not the special domain of

we

start neither

it

human

life.

can never

fruits of his

from the object nor the

from the representation that presupposes both. As

stated, for

him

the
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principle of sufficient reason holds only

between

objects

and never,

as in other

philosophies, between subject and object. 40

Materialism

based on the "fundamental absurdity" that

is

explanation starts from the objective as existing in and of
science

is

based on materialist principle,

entirely satisfactory explanation.

It

it

"...can

never aims

at the

knowing

all

existence of the world depends

on the

is

falls

no

it

object

first

it is.

into as a result of maintaining that the

knowing being and

that the

wholly dependent on the chain of causality which preceded

...finds its

an

inmost nature of the world;

subject supports the existence of the world as the representation that
that one

is

natural

pure materialism impossible; only the existence of the

The contradiction or antinomy

being

all

final goal or give

can never get beyond the representation..."41 The claim that there
without a subject renders

ultimate ground of

Since

itself.

never reach a

its

first

knowing

it:

solution in the fact that, to use Kant' s language, time, space and

do not belong to the thing-in-itself, but only to its appearance or
of which they are the form. In my language, this means that the
objective world, the world as representation, is not the only side of the world,
but merely its external side, so to speak, and the world has an entirely different
42
side which is its innermost being, its kernel, the thing-in-itself.
causality

phenomenon,

To give

a full explanation for the novelty of beginning with the representation,

thereby to

show

for

once and

all

how

and

materialism and Fichtean-style idealism can

never provide an adequate account for the

way

things really are, Schopenhauer

arguably a third way, namely starting from the
Absolute, "...knowable through reason-intuition, which is neither object nor subject,
but the identity of the two" (§7, p.26). The heavy sarcasm of his following description,
aimed at Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, leaves the reader in little doubt as to what

^Schopenhauer admits

Schopenhauer
41

WWR,

42

WWR,

that there

is

really thinks of this third

§7, p.28.
§7, pp.30-1.

way.
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repeatedly comes back to the

without an understanding of

will, for

how

this relates to

representation his arguments lack persuasive power.

iii.

Reflection

Schopenhauer

humans

is

first

and

rational

knowledge

.

Before turning his attention to the

discusses the intellectual capacities of

the ability to

reflect,

which

is

human

Unique

beings.

will,

to

a consciousness at a completely different level

than that of sense perception and understanding. Reflection enables one

to live in the

future and the past, not just an ongoing present, and to determine a course of action

based on abstract concepts independent of the present moment. Whereas both

humans and animals

feel,

perceive and will,

speech in particular which marks the
first

humans

in addition think

reflective faculty of reason;

and know.

speech

is

It is

reason's

product and necessary instrument. Whereas the unique function of the

understanding

is

the immediate knowledge of cause and effect as manifested in

perception of the world, the unique function of reason

Concepts can never be demonstrated

is

the formation of the concept.

in experience, for they

can only be

conceived, not perceived. The effects which are produced through them by

human

beings are, however, objects of experience: language, deliberate action, science and the

concomitant

results.

Despite the fundamental difference between concepts and

representations of perceptions, they
as reflection

is

a special kind of

still

stand in a necessary relation to one another;

copy of the original world of perception, so can

concepts be considered representations of representations. To demonstrate what he

means and how concepts

are interrelated with each other,

and

also to

show how one

recognizes the relation of a subject to a predicate by judgment, Schopenhauer treats us
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to a visual explanation

means

which covers

of intersecting spheres.

He

all

the aspects of logic in an intuitive

way by

maintains that:

not necessary to load the memory with these rules [of syllogistic theory],
for logic can never be of practical use, but only of theoretical interest for
philosophy. For although it might be said that logic is related to rational
thinking as thorough-bass is to music, and also as ethics is to virtue, if we take
is

...it

less precisely, or as aesthetics is to art, it must be borne in mind that no one
ever became an artist by studying aesthetics, that a noble character was never
formed by a study of ethics.. .that we do not need to be masters of thoroughbass in order to detect discord. Just as little do we need to know logic in order
to avoid being deceived by false conclusions. But it must be conceded that
thorough-bass is of great use in the practice of musical composition, although
not for musical criticism. 43

it

Logic

is

cumbersome

too

for practical use, for the derivation of the particular case

general rules cannot be compared with what

however, philosophical

and action

interest in that

of the faculty of reason"

judgments and the attainment
In

notes,

and

"...is

of

itself,

reason

feminine in nature;

44

it is

is

a "...special

and thus plays

of certainty in

is

it

immediately

known

knowledge

to us.

It

from

retains,

of the organization

a role in the establishment of

knowledge and

science.

only empty form and, as Schopenhauer quaintly

can give only

considered a pure science of reason because

its

after

45

it

has received."

content

is

Logic can be

not received from

representations of perceptions, but from concepts in general; only abstract knowledge

is

rational

knowledge (Wissen) and

is

conditioned by the faculty of reason. Although

animals have both knowledge of perception and recollection of
capable of imagination, they cannot rationally
fixes in

concepts of reason what

WWR,

§9, p.45.

^ WWR,

§9, p.46.

43

45

WWR,

§10, p.50.

is

generally

know

known

it,

and are therefore

anything. Rational knowledge
in another

way. In other words,
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reason does not extend our knowledge, but merely gives
in the fact that abstract

of

itself,

however,

(Gefuhl),

which

to abstract

it is

is

knowledge can be

fixed, retained

is

as

it is,

but not

lies

and communicated. In and

of reason.

of information

why

value

its

not conceptual and does not belong

In the search for complete understanding, one

bound network

another form;

not necessarily better than immediate perception or feeling

present in consciousness but

knowledge

it

it is

which

must go beyond the

solely gives us rational

so; insight into the

ground

knowledge

surface-

that a thing

is

of being leads us to the latter.

Using mathematics as an example, Schopenhauer claims that Euclid's mistake was that
he remained

in the

appears correct, but

and time are

realm of the

we do

a priori,

not

that:

we

admit that the demonstration of the proof

know why.

It is

Kant

who

finally

shows how space

independent of and unconditioned by the senses, leading

to the

assertion that:

To improve the method

of mathematics,

it is

specially necessary to give

the prejudice that demonstrated truth has any advantage over truth

up

known

through perception or intuition, or that logical truth, resting on the principle of
contradiction, has any advantage over metaphysical truth, which is immediately
46
evident, and to which also belongs the pure intuition of space.

Not only mathematics, but

also science in general, can be

improved by overcoming

prejudice, for truth in science can always be only relative, dependent

one phenomenon
stop

at.. .a

to another: "Every explanation of natural science

qualitas occulta, and thus at something wholly obscure."

on the

this

relation of

must ultimately
47

There are only two things that are inexplicable as phenomenon, that do not
lead back to the principle of sufficient reason but that can lead us to the true ground

46

WWR,

47

§15, p.73.

WWR, §15,

p.80.
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behind such explanations: the principle of

form of

all

sufficient reason itself,

phenomenal explanations, and the

this principle, as will

unlike the sciences,

be seen.

it

thing-in-itself,

at this point that

It is

which provides the

which

is

not bound by

philosophy reveals

its abilities:

presupposes nothing and therefore cannot be dependent on

proofs or principles. The principle of sufficient reason explains relations between

phenomena, but not the phenomena themselves;
task of philosophy

say

is

this is left for philosophy.

The

real

not:

whence

or for

what purpose the world

exists, but merely what the
subordinated to the What, for it already belongs
to the world, as it springs merely from the form of its phenomenon, the
principle of sufficient reason, and only to this extent has meaning and validity.
Indeed, it might be said that everyone knows without further help what the
world is, for he himself is the subject of knowing of which the world is

...to

world

is.

But here the

Why

is

representation, and so far this

would be

But this knowledge is a
The task of philosophy is to
reproduce this in the abstract, to raise to a permanent rational knowledge
successive, variable perceptions, and generally all that the wide concept of
feeling embraces and describes merely negatively as not abstract, distinct,

knowledge

of perception,

rational knowledge.

is

in the concrete.

48

In other words, through philosophy

in

its

entirety.

There

is

true.

one can gain immediate knowledge

in the (individual)

of the world in abstract concepts, in

human

which

all

of the world

consciousness a complete reflection

the parts are in

harmony with one

another, and the true philosopher will comprehend this by recognizing the one in the

many and

the

many

in the one.

This kind of talk sounds dangerously reminiscent of

the claims of Schelling and Hegel, which Schopenhauer finds so absurd. In order to

understand his position more

clearly, or

why

he thinks that what he

very different from their work, he needs to explain the role of the

^WWR,

§15, p.82.

is

doing

will, for

is

only

so
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through the

human

i.

rule

and

action

b.

and

can one understand not only the essence of phenomena but also

will

its

there

is

This brings us to the second book.

Will

The

will as the

key

to

relative order of the

further knowledge.

world

relation to ethics.

phenomenal

existence

Causal connection gives the

appearance of representations in space and time but no

The question which now needs

nothing more than representation.

is), it

.

must be fundamentally

different

If

there

to

is

be explored

something

whether the

is

else,

(and of course

from representation, and consequently the

inner nature of things can never be reached from without. The starting point for
investigation

is

the self as a purely

knowing

world by means of the representation which

subject that

is

is

one's body.

this

nevertheless rooted in the

It is

the

word

'will'

which

gives the subject of knowledge:

own phenomenon, reveals to him the significance and shows
mechanism of his being, his actions, his movements. ...The act of
will and the action of the body are not two different states objectively known,
connected by the bond of causality; they do not stand in the relation of cause
and effect, but are one and the same thing, though given in two entirely
key

...the

him

to his

the inner

different ways, first quite directly,

and then

in perception for the body.

4

Willing and acting are in reality the same thing, but in reflection they appear to be
different; the will

is

a posteriori

can be considered a

knowledge of the

immediate affections of the

will.

will in its

priori

knowledge

49

body

WWR.

is

phenomenon. Knowledge

known

the condition of knowledge of the

§18, p.100.

whereas the body

Pain and pleasure are not representations but are

separated from the body, for the will can only be
acts; the

of the body,

will.

in time

of the will cannot be

through individual

Knowledge

of the will cannot
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be brought under the conditions of the principle of sufficient reason,
but
"...reference of a

judgment

Schopenhauer

will."

is

not a representation at

The truth

of this

we

say, but

what

as

there

is

knowledge

is

is

toto genere different

designated by

in the world does

this different from, say, absolute spirit?

mind

but

all,

namely

as philosophical truth.

Fine and good,
is

50

instead the

to the relation that a representation of perception,

the body, has to that which

therefrom, namely

is

to

slightly different angle,

I

of will, for

it is

never clear

why

understand the phenomenal world. Although the

whole

dissimilar, the idea of this unified

view of the world. So as

will?

to

approach

quote

at

well the nuances of the will and

And how

These are essential questions to keep in

Schopenhauer explores the nature

no other way

he mean by

is

this

he thinks
details are

not so radically different from Schelling's
question of the nature of the will from a

length from Royce's description of

it,

for

it

captures

shows where Schopenhauer diverges from Kant

in

their respective explanations:

sea waves and star clusters and city streets, we should be bound to
think them as in some sort of interconnection, Kant has told us. Only no such
laws of nature can explain why there should be the phenomena there that are

Why, given

thus to conform to law. This

is

capricious.

This

is

due

to

our

common

but

The world of true idealism isn't so much the world of the
and divine self, as it is the world of the deep unreason that lies at the
very basis of all of our natures, of all our common selfhood. ...Let us call this
ultimate nature of ours, which forces us all alike to see a world of phenomena
in the show forms of space and time, simply our own deep common Will. Let
us drop the divine name for it. Will, merely as such, isn't precisely a rational
thing; it's capricious. It wills because it does will; and if it wills in us all to be
of such a nature as to see iust these stars and houses, then see them we must,
5
and there is the end of it.

irrational nature.

rational

50

WWR,

51

§18, p.102.

Royce, p.238.
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We

are faced with

an

irrational

we

has existence only as

world based on the principles of idealism: the world

perceive

it,

and the

and not on transcendental deductions

facts of the

world are based on experience

of absolute spirit, as Hegel has

it,

or

on the

absolute unity of the original pre-conscious oneness of the universe, as Schelling sees
it.

The deepest ground

is

a capricious will that wills in

The world manifests

does.

this caprice, despite

such a fashion just because

our best

efforts to

make sense out

Unlike Schelling' s view, where the attempt to return to the original unity
rise to life, for

Schopenhauer

life is

is

what

it

of

it.

gives

simply a random and voracious desiring with no

goal except the temporary fulfillment of one wish after another.

Schopenhauer
absolutely nothing

we know

claims: "Besides the will

known

ourselves to be

what reason

is

and the representation, there

or conceivable for us."

will,

and yet

all

52

He

forestalls the objection that

He

our imagination?

the reality of the external world

is

It

sceptical sophism, for the sake of appearance,

is

and

only seriously maintained by madmen. In actuality, the

is

tied to

can

fact that

our knowledge

our individuality means that each person ran only be one thing, although she

know

everything

an adequate reason

phenomenon
groundless.

WWR,

else.

to

Since the will

52

they are not

can never be disputed by

proof,

is

exist, that

merely notes that a point of view which denies

theoretical egoism.

used in philosophy only as a

if

other things are merely representations,

there for us to believe that other people actually

just figments of

is

This limitation creates the need for philosophy but

doubt the

lies

body

§19, p.105.

is

reality of the external world.

outside of the realm of sufficient reason, only the

of the will in time

My

is

my

will

is

determined by

become

visible;

this principle; the will itself is

bodies in general are the will in

not
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general become
falls

Schopenhauer does

visible.

back on a very primitive physiognomy

his theory a disservice in that
to

he often

prove his point, sounding positively

medieval and giving a bizarre twist to the not-yet published discoveries
53
of Darwin.

The
self

fact that

or

one has

phenomenon,

feelings,

is

which are the knowledge

the manifestation of

will.

Schopenhauer considers

be concrete, for they are immediately perceived. The

what

is

most immediate

in consciousness.

It is

of the inner nature of

this

one

is

s

feelings to

will is also concrete, since

immediacy, which

,

it is

neither

representation nor concept, that provides one with the key to the whole of nature.

The individual recognizes what

is

immediate in her consciousness as that

will

which

is

also present in other representations:

him to recognize the force that shoots and
vegetates in the plant.. .the force by which the crystal is formed, the force that
turns the magnet to the North Pole. ...as different only in the phenomenon, but
...continued reflection will lead

same according

the

53

"...to

to their inner nature.

the individually modified

will,

54

namely the character

of the individual, there

(WWR

corresponds the individual bodily structure..."
§20, p.108). This is generally put;
later he gives graphic descriptions to prove his point:
Now as a rule, knowledge remains subordinate to the service of the will, as
indeed it came into being for this service; in fact, it sprang from the will, so to
speak, as the head from the trunk.. ..This distinction between man and animal is

outwardly expressed by the difference in the relation of head to trunk. In the
lower animals both are still deformed; in all, the head is directed to the ground,
where the objects of the will lie. Even in higher animals, head and trunk are
still far more one than in man, whose head seems freely set on to the body,
only carried by the body and not serving it. (§33, p.l 77).
It is clear that at the time of writing, Schopenhauer was imbued not only with the
wonders of physiognomy and what one could tell about an individual from face and
body, but also from Goethe's color theory, which he passionately defends against

Newton's
54

(correct) theory.

WWR,

§21, p.l 10.
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Once we have reached
in the world,

this stage of

our reflection

recognizing our affinity with every

will inevitably lead

phenomenon

us on to the thing-in-itself, which

is

the

will:

...the innermost essence, the kernel, of every particular thing and
also of the
whole. It appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the
deliberate conduct of man, and the great difference between the two concerns
only the degree of the manifestation, not the inner nature of what is

manifested.

This realization
criticism,

is

namely

similar to Schelling's intellectual intuition

that

if

you possess

connections, the claim sounds a

ii.

The

thing-in-itself

the result

little bit

will as thing-in-itself

is

it

.

is

and

obvious, but

open

is

if

to the

same

you do not see the

crazy.

Schopenhauer

retains Kant's formulation, but his

not the same as Kant's, for Schopenhauer allows access to

it

through

human

consciousness, or rather, through self-consciousness. Schopenhauer's thing-in-

itself is

not to be inferred, an

immediately; will

is

causality, outside of time

this is

Although

not true.

quantity, but

in fact the thing that

however, quite different from

the world.

unknown

phenomenon,

and space, whereas the

human

Though

will as

we know

will

the will

is

known

best.

The

for the

latter is

is free,

the action

is

is

absolutely and

will as thing-in-itself

former

lies

bound by

called the source of free

...because in self-consciousness the will

also lies in this

is

is,

outside of

the constraints of

and independent

action,

always constrained:

known

directly

and

in

itself,

consciousness the consciousness of freedom. But the

there

fact is

overlooked that the individual, the person, is not will as thing-in-itself, but is
phenomenon of the will, is as such determined. ...Hence we get the strange fact
that everyone considers himself to be a priori quite free, even in his individual

55

WWR,

§21, p.110.
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actions...[b]ut a posteriori

he

is

not

live

out one's

beings, but

human

but

through experience, he finds to

his astonishment that

liable to necessity...

Schopenhauer means that one cannot change one's

In particular,

must

free,

to

is

However, the

fate.

will's activity is

character, that

by no means

limited to

one

human

be found everywhere, from the highly differentiated individuality of

beings to the undeviating universal laws of natural forces. Schopenhauer

always has examples

hand, from the natural world or from

at

human

interactions, to

support his statements, and he rarely loses an opportunity to demonstrate his

knowledge on

a

wide variety

Schopenhauer takes

The forms
subject

to a rule,

and independent from the objects that appear

appearance or phenomenon, Schopenhauer

calls

which they appear can be considered

in

and

from Kant by placing time, space and causality in

his cue

our consciousness according
them; what Kant

of subjects.

object.

one might say

Now

to be the

calls

in

representation.

boundary between

After noting this, Schopenhauer then reveals his bias, or perhaps

his faith:

empty phantoms, but
something, must be the expression
of something, which is not, like themselves, object, representation, something
existing merely relatively, namely for a subject. On the contrary, they must
point to something that exists without such dependence on something that
if

the objects appearing in these forms are not to be

are to have a meaning, they

stands over against

it

as

its

must point

Why

57

contemporaries

rather,

whom

how

does

WWR,

^WWR,

§23, pp.113-4.
§24, p.l 1 9.

this

presupposition differ from those of his

he so virulently attacks? The answer appears

issues of personality than

56

is

.

must they? Or

more on

and on its forms, in other
not a representation, but a thing-in-

essential condition,

words, must point to something that
itself

to

on deep-seated

to be

differences of outlook.

one based

Once

again,

254

Royce provides a succinct explanation of

this point,

and compares Schopenhauer with

Hegel:

For Hegel, self-consciousness is...essentially the longing to be more of a self
than you are. Just so, for Schopenhauer, if you exist you will, and if you will
you are striving to escape from your present nature. It is of the essence of will
to be always desiring a change....Curiously enough, this, which is precisely the
thought that led Hegel to the conception of the absolutely active and
triumphant spirit, appears to Schopenhauer the proof of the totally evil nature
of things.

Whereas Hegel

58

interprets the longing

and unrest among humans

as positive proof of a

higher force, leading us unwittingly to participate in a great end which will justify
the misery of the world, Schopenhauer sees
existence with

lifting

no

optimistic expectation that

The intermediary

and the many phenomena
knowledge
us,

all will

oneself above this grind, not by giving in to

iii.

by

no such

and

of space, time

is

plan.

can one achieve salvation.

it,

.

The equation

of the

the basis of Schopenhauer's world view.

and

Our

one

will, for

are the objectivity of the will do not concern the will at

Schopenhauer has borrowed the idea
borrows another central aspect

all; it

remains

of his philosophy: Plato's Ideas.

It

known

the plurality of things that

of the thing-in-itself from Kant,

to suit his purposes.

will

a priori

causality applies only to the things as they are

not a property of the thing-in-itself or

changes the meaning

faces the daily grind of

be happily resolved. Only by

role of the Platonic Ideas

is

He

all

indivisible.

and he now

Again, he slightly

must be understood

that the

^Royce, pp.259-60. It is perhaps extreme to describe things as "totally evil," for
not think Schopenhauer had quite such a Manichaean outlook. For a detailed
discussion of this, see: Julian Young, "A Schopenhauerian Solution to Schopenhauerian Pessimism," Schopenhauer-Iahrbuch, 68 (1987) 53-69.

I

do

255
objectification of the will has

in

all

many

different grades, although the will itself

is

equally

things:

There is a higher degree of this objectification in the plant than in the stone, a
higher degree in the animal than in the plant; indeed, the will's passage into
visibility, its objectification, has gradations as endless as those between the

and the brightest sunlight... .But as the gradations of its
do not directly concern the will itself, still less is it concerned by

feeblest twilight
objectification

the plurality of the

phenomena

just as completely in

at these different grades. ...The will reveals itself

one oak as

Schopenhauer claims that these grades
Plato's Ideas.

He

elaborates: "...by Idea

the will's objectification, in so far as
60

is

of the objectification of the will are nothing but

I

understand every definite and fixed grade of
thing-in-itself

it is

In other words, this table or this laptop

plurality."

the Idea

59
in millions

is

and

is

therefore foreign to

not an example of the Idea;

the intermediary essence between the particular appearance and the

undifferentiated

will.

61

The introduction

of Platonic Ideas plays a particularly

important role in Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory, as

however, Schopenhauer, needs

to explain

more

we

see in the next book.

First,

precisely the grades of the

objectification of the will.

Universal natural forces are the lowest grade of the
in

common

with

human

conduct, which

is

59

WWR,

60

WWR,

effect,

which

but have

the highest grade, the fact that they are

groundless; these forces are neither cause nor
conditions of cause and

will's objectivity

effect,

but are the pre-supposed

in turn reveal their

own

inner being. The higher

§25, p.128.
§25, p.130.

These are both bad examples, as Schopenhauer would consider the material
which makes up such artificial things the objectification of the will, but not the
examples of the Idea of a
artificial object itself. This includes the famous Platonic
of Ideas.
or chair, which Schopenhauer regards as examples of concepts but not
61

table
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grades of objectification are distinguished by individuality, and the most
prominent

marks

of individuality are to be

maintain that

all is

clearly reserved for

genius).

One

one and one

human

found
is all,

in

human

Although Schopenhauer does

beings.

within this framework the highest place

beings (and

among humans,

the highest place

is

for the

can make generalizations about plants and most animal species,

are determined by their

physiognomy and are completely

however, can only be understood on a case by case

basis,

is

for they

Humans,

predictable.

and even then are not

completely predictable. Schopenhauer defines the relation between the Ideas and the

law of nature as follows:
...every universal, original force of

nature is, in its inner essence, nothing but
the objectification of the will at a low grade, and we call every such grade an
eternal Idea in Plato's sense. But the law of nature is the relation of the Idea
62
to the form of its phenomenon

To imagine

this

hierarchy organically

is

to

imagine a

Ideas are the main branches, and the myriad
twigs, leaves, nuts

and seeds. Only by virtue

tree:

phenomena
of the

life

the will

is

the trunk, the

are the smaller branches,

force being

pumped up from

the trunk, can the branches bring forth the broad spectrum of phenomenal

life.

In

order to see clearly the relationship between the phenomena, and not to confuse the
forces

from which they come, one needs power of judgement. Only with proper

judgment can one broaden one's
experience

is,

however, quite

insight into, say, physics.

To enlarge one's

a different matter.

Schopenhauer's explanation of the different grades of the

will is his version of

Kantian teleology. Since laws of nature are merely the observed rule by which nature

always proceeds, a complete statement about nature would be simply

62

WWR,

§26, p.134.

a catalogue of

.
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facts, a

morphology which

"...enumerates, compares,

and arranges

all

the enduring

forms of organic nature."63 Philosophy, by contrast, considers only the universal;
object in nature

is

the universal forces, the different grades of objectification of the

inner nature of the world. The search for the inner relationship between

which
in

all

is

be found through the realization that one and the same

to

its

forces of inorganic nature

and

all

all

things,

will reveals itself

forms of organic nature, shows Schopenhauer's

self-admitted continuity with Schelling's attempts to uncover the universal: "To

discover this fundamental type has been the main concern, or certainly at any rate the

most laudable endeavour,
all

64

of the natural philosophers of Schelling's school.”

things in the world are the objectivity of the same

inner nature,
fills

it

must be

and therefore

identical in

possible to discover the fundamental type of everything that

Schopenhauer thinks

the forms.

will,

Since

that Schelling's endeavors in this respect are

shared by the ideas represented in the Kabbala, by the Pythagoreans, and by the

Chinese in the

The

I

Ching

objectified will

is

characterized by constant

objectification fights for the matter, space

strife as

each of

and time of another. In

similar to Schelling's postulate that the world

is

composed

of

its

grades of

this sense,

opposing

forces,

it is

which

are trying to attain their original state of repose but cannot, because of their inherent

opposition;

it

differs in that there

universal conflict
creature preys

itself,

63

and

is

WWR,

m WWR,

is

most

on and

is

in different

§27, p.141

§27, p.142.

clearly

is

no

original state of repose for the will.

seen in the animal kingdom, where every living

preyed on by others: "Thus the

forms

This

its

own

nourishment,

till

will-to-live generally feasts

finally the

human

race,

on
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because
At

it

subdues

knowing

manifestations

the others, regards nature as manufactured for

world

this point, the

of the

all

subject.

is

is

no longer mere

With the appearance

almost entirely

"...begets. ..irresolution

lost,

and

and uncertainty."66

but

will,

is

All

knowledge proceeds from the

therefore, despite

itself,

The

respectively.

its

exception

of preserving the species

and

There are

will.

is:

yoke, and, free from

dominated by the
living, (suicide

the will

will itself,

and they are the subject of the next two books,

all

the aims of the will, exist purely for

however, a temporary solution,

is,

means

remains almost completely subordinate to the

as a clear mirror of the world; and this

This

object

is,

individual persons, knowledge can withdraw from this subjection, throw

...in

off

first

also representation, that

replaced by deliberation, which

to the will's objectification as a

this,

65

use."

of reason, the infallibility of the will's

and thus belongs

only two exceptions to

is

own

its

which

will.

for

is

the source of

art.

one must always return

Only by completely renouncing the

itself,

simply

67

to the

will-to-live

world

and yet

still

does not count), can one achieve salvation from the endless striving of
is

the world. This asceticism

is

the subject of the fourth book;

it

can be

described as a religious goal.

It is

Schopenhauer's view of the

operative, that has earned

places

him

and

of the world in

the sobriquet of pessimist.

It is

WWR,

§27, p.147.

66

WWR,

§27, p.152.

WWR,

§27, p.152.

which such

also this

directly in the tradition of the transcendental idealists,

65

67

him

will,

a will

view which

even though,

for

is
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some

reason, this

is

rarely identified with his philosophical outlook 68

Since

.

one

will that appears,

will,

and everything that

the will as the thing-in-itself remains

The difference between such

a will

exists

what

this

might

be.

endless, directionless striving

phenomenon:
nothing

"...this

a

unmoved

grade of objectification of

The goal

which

it

strives,

spirit is that

even

if

of Schopenhauer's will

results in a

permanent

we
is,

it,

and

it is

a

hungry

will.

this

Hence

the latter

are incapable of

by

contrast,

state of restlessness for

springs from the fact that the will must live

exists besides

the

in the middle of constant change.

and a Hegelian absolute

appears to have a positive goal towards which
discerning

is

it is

on

itself,

its

since

arise pursuit, hunting, anxiety

and suffering ."69
Since

all

existence

is

a manifestation of the will,

individuals can be so different from each other.

it

might be puzzling

Schopenhauer accounts

how

for this

by

pointing out that individual character can be regarded as a special Idea, which

corresponds:

...to

a particular act of the objectification of the will.

be his

intelligible character,

phenomenon. The

and

empirical character

68

This act

his empirical character
is

itself

would be

entirely determined

would then

its

by the

intelligible

As Margjtta Dobrileit-Helmich so rightly points out in "Asthetik bei Kant und
Schopenhauer: Ein kritischer Vergleich," Schopenhauer-Tahrbuch, 64 (1983) 125-137:
Die in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts einsetzende kontroverse Diskussion um
Schopenhauers Asthetik miindete in eine generelle Kritik der
Schopenhauerschen Philosophic, die fur eine Verhaltnisbestimmung zur
Kantischen Asthetik unergiebig blieb. Letzteres gilt ebenfalls fur die ab der
zweiten Halfte des 19. Jahrhunderts einsetzende literarische SchopenhauerRezeption, da sie philosophisch allzusehr auf der Oberflache verblieb und
Schopenhauer primar als Vorlaufer Nietzsches, nicht aber als Nachfolger Kants
sah (125).
Although she is referring primarily to Schopenhauer's aesthetics, the same can be said
of other aspects of his philosophy.
69

WWR,

§28, p.154.
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that

is

groundless, that

not subject to the

to say, will as thing-in-itself,

is

principle of sufficient reason...

In other words, every

in-itself

human

and phenomenal

side, so

the in-itself of the world, the
individual

will,

and

human

at

same

being.

being

is

a

microcosm of the world,

has the individual an

will, is

the

same

will

Both the world and the

intelligible

time, nothing but representation.

nothing but endless, aimless

is

when knowledge

enlightens

general ."

71

70

71

WWR,

§27, p.158.

WWR,

§28, pp. 164-5.

it,

what

it

wills

side;

for every

individual are nothing but

Although

appearance of order, an appearance of goal and direction, in
nature of the will

and empirical

which provides the motor

human

has an

for as the will

in

both there

is

an

reality the essential

striving: "...the will

always knows,

here and now, but never what

it

wills in
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B. Part

1.

The Platonic Ideas and the

The rather bleak
representation

is

object of art

picture

which has been painted

not unalleviated misery:

and permanently above the demands
the temporary solution which
the

work

of art.

The

Two

is

it is

third book, as

possible for

of the will.

of interest;

its title

for us of the

it is

one

to rise

world as

will

and

both temporarily

For the purposes of

this

work,

it is

accomplished by the genius through

suggests, concentrates

on

a

remarkable

feature of the second aspect of the world as representation: "The Representation

Independent of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: The Platonic
Art."

The fourth book considers the permanent
To understand properly the

Idea:

The Object

of

solution.

special function of the

work

of art,

it is

essential to

accept Schopenhauer's re-interpretation of the Platonic Ideas and his view of the
genius, a view rooted in the romantic understanding of the genius but pointing in a
different direction.

1

As seen, Schopenhauer's version of the Platonic Ideas places them

^ee Arthur Hiibscher, "Das Genie bei Schopenhauer" Zeitschrift fur Asthetik und
allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft, 18 (1973) 103-126. The essence of the article is summed
up in the following quote:
Mit diesen Forderungen kommt die Romantik in den Umkreis einer
Auffassung des Schonen, die sich von Kant zu Schiller and liber Schelling
weiter zu Hegel verfolgen lasst: Man ist auf hoherer Ebene da angelangt, wo
Gottsched und Baumgarten begonnen haben. Die Kunst gilt als ein
Ausgleichen der Gegensatze in der menschlichen Natur. Eben dies aber war
nicht die Sache, nicht das Ziel Schopenhauers. So sehr er, in der Nahe
Wackenroders und Tiecks, Schlegels und Schellings, die Kunst als eine das
Menschliche steigemde und befreiende Macht empfand, - es ging ihm nicht
um Ausgleichen und Versohnen auf irgendeiner Stufe der Entwicklung: die
Erhebung zum Schonen ist ihm ebenso wie Platon ein Losreissen des
Menschen von der niederen Halfte seines Wesens. Unsere Fahigkeiten sollen
nicht ins Gleichgewicht gebracht werden; eine
iibrigen erhalten (109).

soli die

Vorherrschaft iiber

alle
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between pure

which

will

found

is

and phenomenon; the Ideas provide the form
world of space and time, of

in the

principle of sufficient reason.

all

The Ideas themselves

things subordinate to the

are above that principle,

manifest neither plurality nor change. Individuals as such,

an

a result of

knowledge

Idea,

Only by abolishing

as subjects.

Kant

to

himself as beginning where Kant

A

however,

Kantian idea

is

Reason concerns

a

for

is

left off,

interpretation to the critical theory.

ideas.

individuality in the

and

achieve their form as

knowing

all

their

subject can

object of knowledge. 2

Schopenhauer's relation

special problem,

who

can never attain knowledge of that which gives form to

become an

the Idea

for the plurality,

both

fruitful

and problematic. He sees

bringing the needed and correct

Schopenhauer's entire theory of Ideas

Kant means something quite

different

raises a

when he

refers to

concept of reason:

itself

exclusively with absolute totality in the

employment

of

the concepts of the understanding, and endeavours to carry synthetic unity,
which is thought in the category, up to the completely unconditioned. 3

Reason

is

always striving towards the unconditioned, that which

and ideas provide the means

to chart this territory:

"I

is

beyond knowledge,

understand by idea

a necessary

concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience.

Thus the pure concepts

of reason.. .are transcendental ideas

from the meaning which Schopenhauer gives

2

source for criticism.

summary

This

is

quite different

to Ideas:

As might be surmised, Schopenhauer's appropriation
For a

4
.

of the Ideas

of the problems raised

by the

became a rich
Wolfgang

Ideas, see:

Weimer, Schopenhauer parmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,
3

CPR, B383.

4

CPR, A327.

1982), pp. 80-93.
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Diese transzendentalphilosophische Bestimmung der Idee

Vemunftnotwendigkeit

steht bereits

im

als

Gegensatz zu Schopenhauers
metaphysischer Ableitung der Idee aus dem ganzlich unvemiinftigen Willen
(als adaquater Objektivation). 5

Schopenhauer imposes
the model for

what

is

his interpretation

meant by the

Now

if

for us the will

is

on Kant's

thing-in-itself,

The

similar to Plato's theory of Ideas.

strikten

link

definition of the idea, seeing

and determines that

between them

is

for

him

the thing-in-itself, and the Idea

we

objectivity of that will at a definite grade, then

it is

it

as

very

clear:

the immediate

is

find Kant's thing-in-itself

and

Plato's Idea. ..to be, not exactly identical, but yet very closely related, and
distinguished by only a single modification. The two great paradoxes, just
because, in spite of all inner harmony and relationship, they sound so very
different by reason of the extraordinarily different individualities of their
authors, are even the best commentary on each other, for they are like two

entirely different paths leading to

The

"single modification"

phenomenal world

is

for

goal.

6

which distinguishes them

immediate objectivity of the

been discovered, are

one

thing-in-itself, the will.

is

that the Idea

The

Schopenhauer impossible not

in actuality void

from that which expresses

itself

and empty;

its

is

similarities,

only the

once they have

In both cases, the

to see.

meaning and

reality

borrowed

is

through the phenomena, namely the Idea or the

thing-in-itself.

The apprehension

Schopenhauer

is

trying to depict

of things in the world

is

is

immanent; what

the apprehension which

conscious of the true state of things. This

is

naturally

is

transcendental,

somewhat

which

is

put into

difficult to

words.
Kant's great mistake
thing-in-itself

is

free

from

object-for-a-subject, the

all

for

form,

form of

5

M. Dobrileit-Helmich,

6

WWR,

§31, p.170.

is,

p.130.

all

Schopenhauer, the
it

cannot have

representation.

failure to notice that,

at the

if

same time the form

Strictly

the
of being-

speaking, Kant did not say
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this,

but Schopenhauer nevertheless solves

problem by positing the intermediary

this

existence of the Idea, since the particular thing
will:

"Between

and the

it

objectivity of the

knowledge

will..."

7

is

thing-in-itself the Idea

The Idea

to

is

only an indirect objectification of the

still

stands as the only direct

be understood as providing the form for

of representation in general, of being-object-for-a-subject.

admits that, in actual

fact, Plato

Schopenhauer

and Kant are not talking about the same thing, but the

compelling similarities of the ground of their agreement, the presence of a nonrepresentational form which accounts for the myriad of

him

to postulate that their intentions are the same.

apprehend

we were
itself

particularity

through

its

demands

of the

eternal,

body anchor us

higher grades,
objectified will.

is

it is

All

would be an

in the

unchanging form

Because knowledge

science

is,

existence, leads

our body did not ensure that

we

through concrete individuality, and

capable of apprehending through unclouded knowledge the pure thing-in-

or the pure Ideas, our world

up the

mode, that

If

phenomenal

eternal

world of things, and the dictates of time break

of the Ideas.

in general

belongs to the objectification of the

completely the servant of the

it

really

unchanging present. The

knows about

objects

will;

is

it,

too,

is

will at its

nothing other than

their relationship to

one another;

consequently only differentiated from ordinary knowledge by means of

systematic form. This lends further support to the claim that Schopenhauer
in a completely different enterprise

functioning of the mind; once this

Although

it

from Kant's. Kant's primary concern
is

settled,

he builds his

ethical

can be argued that his ethics and aesthetics are

at

and

is

is

its

engaged

the

aesthetic systems.

odds with his

cognitive grounds, he
epistemology, and are in fact based more on metaphysical than

7

WWR

,

§32, p.175.
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perceives himself as establishing a theory of mind. Schopenhauer
has a different

concern, for a theory of mind per se

wants

to

that this

show how

never his primary

interest.

which we cannot see determines our

From

workings of the mind are not as central

Schopenhauer thinks

and fury but misses the

him

for

that Kant’s elaborate system of

essential point.

He

proposes a

start,

he

The

fact

reality,

but the

as they are for Kant.

knowledge

much

the

entire world.

perceived idealistically of course admits a mind-conditioned

is

details of the

rather,

that

is

is f ull

of

Or

sound

simpler, primarily

metaphysical, theory.

For Schopenhauer,
therefore:

"...is

all

relation has only relative existence.

also a non-being, for...what separates

its

All

being in time

beginning from

its

end

is

simply time, essentially an evanescent, unstable, and relative thing, here called
duration."
that

is

8

Despite this ephemeral quality, time

subordinate to the

will.

Only by tearing

is

the universal form of knowledge

itself free

can the subject escape individuality and become a pure

loses

its

will

and from

will-less subject of

In this condition, the final goal of a time-bound existence,

and whither,

from the

time,

knowledge.

namely the when, where,

meaning, and the what becomes of supreme importance.

Abstract thought, the concepts of reason, are banished from consciousness and we:

whole power of our mind to perception, sink ourselves completely
let our whole consciousness be filled by the calm contemplation of
therein,
the natural object actually present.. .We lose ourselves entirely in this object.. .we
forget our individuality, our will, and continue to exist only as pure subject, as
clear mirror of the object, so that it is as though the object alone existed
without anyone to perceive it, and thus we are no longer able to separate the
9
perceiver from the perception, but the two have become one...
...devote the

and

8

WWR,

9

WWR,

§33, p.176.

§34, p.178.
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In this process of losing oneself in contemplation,
particular thing but the Idea of the thing; at the
particularity

and becomes

knowing goes completely

what becomes known

same

is

not the

time, the viewer also loses her

a pure will-less, timeless subject of knowledge.

This

way

of

against the grain of Kantian rationalism and points to the

influence of the Romantics and of the Eastern mystics on Schopenhauer's world

view.

2.

10

Aesthetic knowledge and the nature of the genius

Kant allows
specifying that

it is

knowledge, as seen in Critique of judgment.

for aesthetic

non-cognitive. Aesthetic knowledge enables one to appreciate the

beautiful in a purely theoretical way.

Schopenhauer follows

very different content. The only kind of knowledge which
relations,

genius.
essential

to

and which reveals the true content

It

exists

phenomena,

but proposes a

independently of

all

work

of

"...is

art,

the

repeats the eternal Ideas apprehended through pure contemplation, the

and abiding element

communicate the truth

firmly

of the

this lead,

embedded

everywhere
the genius

in the

in

all

the

of the Ideas.

demands

phenomena
Science

is

of the world."

11

The aim

incapable of doing this because

of the principle of sufficient reason, but art
7

at its goal, at the truth

is

of art

behind the appearance. Schopenhauer

s

is

it is

is

theory of

highly detailed, more so than that of either Kant or Schelling, although

on Schopenhauer's philosophy, Hubscher
closely
to the Romantic world: "...seine
Schopenhauer
finds four areas which tie
Erhohung der Musik iiber alle anderen Kiinste, seine Auffassung des Genies, sein
Ankniipfen an die mittelalterliche Mystik und sein inniges Verhaltnis zur Weisheit der
Inder." It is the latter in particular which provides "das entscheidende
Bildungserlebnis" for the young Schopenhauer. See A. Hubscher, "Der Philosoph der
10

ln his search for Romantic influence

Romantik,"

n WWR,

p.7.

§36, p.184
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following in their tradition that only genius produces great works of
difference lies in

how

The

the genius operates. For Schopenhauer, the nature of genius

an exceptional

consists in

art.

ability to

engage in contemplation of that which

in a specific object, enabling her access to the Idea.

The

of genius

gift

is

is

universal

thus nothing

but the most complete objectivity:
...genius is the ability to leave entirely out of sight

and our aims, and consequently

willing,

own

our

to discard entirely

interest,

our

own

our
personality

remain pure knowing subject, the clear eye of the world;
and this not merely for moments, but with the necessary continuity and
conscious thought to enable us to repeat by deliberate art what has been

for a time, in order to

apprehended...

The

relation

when one

between

subjectivity

objectivity

can sometimes be confusing, for

has become pure knowing subject, one has attained complete

The pure knowing subject has
remains

and

lost all

objectivity.

consciousness of herself as subject and what

is:

The pure

objectivity of perception,

by virtue of which we know no longer the
its species, [which] is conditioned by

individual thing as such, but the Idea of

the fact that one
objects,

is

conscious no longer of oneself, but only of the perceived
own consciousness has been left merely as the

hence that one's

supporter of the objective existence of those objects.

The pure

will-less

knowledge which

is

gained from an interaction of

genuine knowledge, and not simply knowledge of

above the dominion of the

will.

It is

the genius

achieve this kind of knowledge. Genius

than others; genius enables one

WWR,

12

13

is

relations;

who

§36, pp. 185-6.

WWRII,

§30, p.369.

it is

this sort is

knowledge that

has a predominant capacity

not to be confused with talent: talent

the ordinary person can have, enabling her to think

what

13

rises

to

is

more quickly and accurately

to see a completely different

world by looking more
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deeply into this world. Although the genius has access to the unchanging world of

own

Ideas, in her

life

she

reflects a

constant restlessness, with no chance of finding

calm, driven by the ongoing search for

An
and

of

essential element of

imagination

itself,

is

one

new

who

is

objects to contemplate.

endowed with genius

is

imagination, but in

not proof of genius. 14 The imagination of the ordinary

person deepens insight into the relations between objects

or,

if it is

manifested

creatively, leads to building castles in the air or indulging in self-centered dreaming, for

the ordinary person can only be directed at things which have
life

and

By

will.

above the

contrast, the genius uses imagination to rise

personal experience; imagination extends

"...the

some relevance

to her

reality of

mental horizon of the genius beyond

the objects that actually present themselves to his person, as regards both quality and
quantity."

15

The unusual strength

knowledge of

knowledge

bound

knowledge

of the genius

is

is

in turn

to the ordinary

man

of genius

it is

by the genius leads

communicated through

art.

thus quite different from ordinary knowing, for

As Schopenhauer so

to the principle of sufficient reason.

"Whereas
to the

Ideas; this

of imagination possessed

man

his faculty of

knowledge

is

the sun that reveals the world."

Schopenhauer share the view

that nature

is

a

16

The
it is

poetically puts

lamp that

to

not
it:

lights his path,

Although both Kant and

the source of their inspiration, the

respective results of this process are quite different:

’Schopenhauer's imagination
Einbildungskraft.

is

Phantasie, whereas for Kant it is produktive
lets the genius "...see in things not what

For both, imagination

nature has actually formed, but what she endeavoured to
difference lies in how the attempts of nature are viewed.
15

1

WWR,

6

WWR,

§36, p.187.
§36, p.188.

form..." (§36, p.186).
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Wahrend jedoch

Kant Resultat der Schopfungen des Genies die Schaffung
ist, ist es bei Schopenhauer die Anschauung
und
Darstellung der "idealisierten" Natur, der Dinge als Ideen. Von
einer freien
Produktivitat kann in diesem Sinne bei Schopenhauers Geniebegriff
nicht die
Rede sein, da das Genie kontemplativ an die intuitive Erfassung der Idee
bei

einer anderen" Natur

gebunden

17

ist.

Schopenhauer's genius bores intensively into the inner nature of things; Kant's
sees
different configurations in the material present

Both are active as

world.

a.

Char acteristics

artists creating

of the genius

.

strike

While some of

one as strange.

First

Unlike Kant and Schelling, Schopenhauer

and quirks which one might expect

his observations are perceptive

18

The genius can

also be recognized

whereas the ordinary person

17

M. Dobrileit-Helmich,

is

is

to find

and illuminating, others

and foremost, one marks among geniuses

for mathematics, since the logical procedure entailed

genius.

different versions of the

works.

discusses at length the type of personality
in the genius.

and produces

repugnant

a disinclination

to the artistic

by an abnormal excess of

intellect, for

two-thirds will and one-third intellect, the genius

p.134.

18

Perhaps it is the case that great scientists make good musicians but great
musicians make poor scientists. To prove his point here, Schopenhauer heaps scorn
on the opponents of Goethe's color theory and makes the following bold claim:
Goethe was reproached enough with his want of mathematical knowledge by
the ignorant opponents of color theory. Here, where it was naturally not a
question of calculation and measurement according to hypothetical data, but
one of direct knowledge by understanding cause and effect, this reproach was
so utterly absurd and out of place, that they revealed their total lack of
judgement.. .The fact that even today, nearly half a century after the appearance
of Goethe's color theory, the Newtonian fallacies still remain in undisturbed
possession of the professorial chair even in Germany, and that people continue
to talk quite seriously about the seven homogeneous rays of light and their
differing refrangibility, will one day be numbered among the great intellectual
peculiarities of
P-l 89).

mankind

in general,

and

of the

Germans

in particular (§36,
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possesses the reverse

This leaves the genius unfit to participate normally in the

ratio.

everyday events of the world, the world of the
is

marked by the following

practical person.

Physically, the genius

characteristics:

The fundamental condition is an abnormal preponderance of sensibility over
and reproductive power; in fact, what makes the matter more
difficult is that this must occur in a male body. (Women can have remarkable

irritability

but not genius, for they always remain subjective.) 19

talent,

As already noted, reason
is

is

feminine in nature;

it

can give only after

it

has received.

It

thus clear that reason cannot be a distinguishing mark of the genius. Schopenhauer

continues with his study of the genius by detailing brain shape and weight, as well as
family circumstances. This attempt to be scientific strikes the reader

comparison with Kant and Schelling

First, in

specify the details of person

date

of note that

Schopenhauer

counts.
tries to

one might expect from the genius, thereby descending

from the highly abstract realm
this

it is

on two

in

which the other two remain. Second,

precisely

by

descent into the graspable, Schopenhauer runs the risk of making claims which

him and which can undermine

However,

in

one

area,

his theoretical insights, as already

shown.

Schopenhauer's investigations into the sociology and

psychology of the genius

raises a very interesting question,

and

this is the relationship

between madness and genius.

i.

Genius and madness

irrationality

passion

due

is

to the

19

and

its

.

Schopenhauer devotes much space

relation to genius.

That geniuses are

known

to his discussion of

for outbursts of

not necessarily a result of any weakness in the faculty of reason, but

unusual energy of

WWRII,

§31, p.392.

will

which

resides in the genius: "In such

men

is

the

often
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extremely energetic impression of the perceptive outshines
the colorless concepts so

much
this

that the conduct

no longer guided by the

is

latter,

but by the former, and on

very account becomes irrational ." 20 Consequently, one can well
expect

unorthodox behavior from

a genius,

and Schopenhauer provides us with some

examples. However, often this irrational behavior deteriorates into madness,
and
fascinates Schopenhauer;

madness and the behavior

something Schopenhauer has

clearly studied

memory

sound or

of this

as the

measure

memory ...;" 22

for a

revealed by

it is

either absent or else has

a

of people in insane asylums

and thought about

mad mind. Madness

means

He

is "...the

fictions to create a

false or

is

designates the

broken thread

of a faulty link with the past,

been constructed by means of

which combine with various

21
.

this

which

is

changing relations

confused and distorted view of the

individual's place in the world.

It is

here that the link with genius

is

to

be found. The madperson

is

aware

the present and of particulars in the past, but the connections are inconsistent.

20

WWR,

of

It is

§36, p.190.

21

Again, see Royce, pp.241-4 for his suggestion that Schopenhauer's family
background, as well as his own tendencies, provide the focus for this interest. After
briefly noting the pettier aspects of Schopenhauer's personality, Royce comments:
Specially interesting, however, in Schopenhauer's case,

is

the relation of

contrast between the peevishness of his private temper and the self-controlled

To such a man intellectual work is a
but violent emotion... .His reflection,
therefore, throughout, is a negative self-criticism, a sort of reductio ad
absurdum of the tempestuous natural man (243).
It is perhaps not appropriate to bring in circumstantial aspects of personality to
account for certain philosophical theories, but Schopenhauer himself does this, as
calm and clearness of his

literary style.

blessed relief from the storms of

when he

notes:

one leading to another,
through first occupation. I
only by Kant's feebleness through old age (§62,336).

Kant's whole theory of law

and he attempts
can explain
22

trivial

WWRII,

this

§32, p.399.

is

a strange tangle of errors,

to establish the right to property
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this inconsistency

which Schopenhauer

interprets as the link with the genius:

"...for

he

too leaves out of sight knowledge of the connexion of things, as he neglects that

knowledge

of relations

which

is

knowledge according

reason, in order to see in things only their

Ideas..."

23

to the principle of sufficient

The genius stands before the

constant danger of slipping over the edge of her creative drive into madness. The
strain of contemplation of the Ideas can gradually prize

demands

one loose from the worldly

of the will:

In der aufsteigenden Reihe der

weiter auseinander;

wenn

Lebewesen

treten Intellekt

und

Wille

immer

im Genie seinen hochsten
Grad erreicht, wenn es zu einer volligen Ablosung des Intellekts vom Willen
kommt, dann wird die Vorstellung zwar vollkommen und frei, doch nur unter
dieses Auseinandertreten

der steten Gefahr der Selbstzerstorung....Die Vorstellung zerstort sich selbst,
wenn sie sich ablost vom Willen. So kann die hochste Erkenntnis immer
umschlagen in jene Zerstorung des Erkennens, die mit dem Wort "Wahnsinn"
benannt wird, weil der Wahnsinn im engeren Wortsinn die grauenvollste

Stoning und Zerstorung des Erkennens

24
ist.

For Schopenhauer, the experience of the creative

artist,

the genius, takes place high on

the ladder to salvation, to the complete overcoming of the

have severe consequences

^ WWR,

for the bodily vessel,

even

if

will.

This inevitably can

the genius, unlike the saint,

is

§36, pp. 193-4.

^Otto Poggeler, "Schopenhauer und das Wesen der Kunst,"
philosophische Forschung. 14 (1960) p.365. Poggeler remarks

Zeitschrift fur

at the

beginning of his

essay:

der Kunst willen gehe ich in diesem
Aufsatz dem Gedanken nach, Genialitat und Wahnsinn gehorten zusammen....
In den Titel dieses Aufsatzes liess sich freilich die Formel "Genie und

Nur um

der Frage nach

dem Wesen

an sie zuviel
Titel hatte
Der
des iibelsten wissenschaftlichen Dilettantismus angehangt
wie
falsche Erwartungen erweckt, denn das Thema "Genie und Wahnsinn," so
dem
von
Wahnsinn,
Der
Psychiatrie.
der
Thema
kein
ich es hier behandele, ist
Wortes
des
(p.353).
die Rede ist, ist kein Wahnsinn im strengen Sinne

Wahnsinn"

nicht setzen,

und das schon deshalb

nicht, weil sich
hat.

rarely rooted
That geniuses often suffer is true, but Poggeler maintains that this is
7
psychopathologic grounds, despite Schopenhauer s claims to the contrary.
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not intentionally striving to attain perpetual peace. 25

It is

this lack of

concern with

the material world which accounts for the marked discrepancy which often exists

between the profound

insight into the

and the concomitant lack
duplicitous cheats;

b.

it

The nature

how and why one

character

which

a poet

who

of insight into individual characters

might reveal,

might well be

accounts for the child-like quality of the genius.

of aesthetic pleasure: Ideas versus concepts

nature of aesthetic pleasure
of

human

is

reacts to

point to the discussion.

It is

essential to a philosophy of art, for

an artwork or an object

precisely this aspect

Consideration of the

.

without an account

of beauty there

is

on which Kant centers

not

much

his

exploration of aesthetic feeling. In addition, the meaning of the words "beautiful'' and

"sublime" needs to be examined, for on this turns the effect of an object so designated.
It is

this effect

an object

is

which

is

the subject at hand. For Schopenhauer, access to the Idea of

independent of the principle of
all

people, or else they

one.

If

that

sufficient reason,

would be

they were not capable of

'beautiful'

know

essential for aesthetic sensibility; clearly, this ability to

as incapable of enjoying a

this

work

momentary divestment

and 'sublime' would have no meaning

some people

must be present

for them.

are incapable of aesthetic pleasure, most

the Idea,

in varying degrees in
of art as producing

of personality, the

While

do not

it

fall

words

might be the case

under

this

^Ln the article on "Das Genie bei Schopenhauer," Hiibscher also discusses this
relation between genius and madness, which is found in Democritus, Plato and down
through the centuries. But now something new appears: "Prometheus ist
verschwunden. Das Genie wird mit den Massstaben des Psychiaters gemessen. Ein
krankes Zeitgefiihl ist dem Kranken zugewandt" (121). The suggestion that lack of
sympathy for the "wannsinnige" actions of the genius has destroyed Prometheus is
intriguing.

madness.

And

despite Poggeler,

it

raises the difficult question of

how

to

determine
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category.

Schopenhauer maintains that pleasure produced by contemplation

beautiful arises from

two inseparable constituent

of the

parts: "...knowledge of the object not

as individual thing, but as Platonic Idea,. ..and the self-consciousness of the knower,

not as individual, but as pure, will-less subject of knowledge ." 26 Aesthetic
consciousness

is

marked by the disappearance

of the characteristics of ordinary

consciousness. Ordinary consciousness consists of four essential features: each person
is

an individual

and we place

in a particular

practical

body

in the world; objects

demands on them; we

falsify

experience, subordinating our cognition to the

is

marked by suffering and

anxiety.

27

around us are interesting

how we

demands

perceive ordinary

of the will;

In aesthetic consciousness,

and our existence

we

rise

above the

individualizing aspects of ordinary consciousness and attain an exalted state, in which

the pure subject and the Idea
relations.

a palace."

It is

then

the

all

"...no

longer stand in the stream of time and of

same whether we

see the setting

sun from

all

other

a prison or

from

28

This disinterested contemplation of the Idea
disinterested pleasure

which accompanies

is

reminiscent of Kant's

aesthetic contemplation, but there

is

an

essential difference:

Kants "Interesselosigkeit" bedeutet eine Absage gegeniiber einem begehrenden
Bezug auf das Objekt; Schopenhauers "Willenslosigkeit" dagegen bedeutet
29
Uberwindung einer daseinskonstituierenden metaphysischen Instanz.

WWR,

26

^See

J.

Young, "Schopenhauer on

^ WWR,
29

§38, p.195.

§38, p.197.

M. Dobrileit-Helmich,

p.129.

Art," pp.434-8.
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Kant

is

more concerned with the nature

of the feeling

play of the cognitive faculties. Whereas Kant shows
object of aesthetic interest loosens

which define

all

how

is

produced, with the free

the subject-conditioned

from the rigorous conceptual boundaries

itself

objects, while at the

which

same time remaining

as object,

Schopenhauer

goes behind or beyond the subject-conditioned nature of the object to
to the thing-in-itself as

one can

get.

He

is

no longer

its

Idea, as close

interested in the object as such.

Unlike Kant, he does not give a detailed cognitive description of what happens in the

mind

to

cause aesthetic pleasure; the details of the interaction of the cognitive faculties

are not his concern.
Instead, he follows,

where

aesthetic intuition

this

somewhat

the

same can be

if

is

unwittingly and unwillingly, more in Schelling's path,

something that

hypocritical tendency in

is

beyond words. Schmidt

Schopenhauer

rightly notes

in terms of his theory of genius;

said for his explanation of aesthetic pleasure:

Obwohl Schopenhauer

die idealistische

Anschauung an anderer

Annahme

einer intellektualen

vom

philosophischen Standpunkt aus als
Windbeutelei kritisiert, geht er in seiner Genie-Konzeption gerade von ihr aus.
Genialitat ist ihm nicht mehr ein naturhaftes und subjektivistisch-irrationales
Produzieren wie fur die Sturmer und Dranger, sondem...ein durch intuitive
Stelle

Erkenntnis legitimiertes geistiges Vermogen.

The
is

transition

from seeing the object as object

30

to seeing

it

as Idea

simply the temporary transition, for us, from a world of violent agitation to one of

peace.

The world

of peace, of contemplation of the Ideas, points to the claim that

every single object can be beautiful,
leaves

open the

also

of the opinion that

is

possibility that

all

if it is

rightly perceived.

humans can

most never

attain

it,

Although Schopenhauer

attain this state,

if

only temporarily, he

but remain abandoned to their woe.

^Jochen Schmidt, "Schopenhauer: Genialitat als Fahigkeit zu Erlosender Idealitat
der Welt als Wille und Vorstellung " in Die Geschichte der Genie-Gedankens..., p.486.
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Leaving the

human

lot aside for

now, we turn

to the distinction of Ideas into beautiful

and sublime.

c.

The

beautiful

and the sublime

.

Ideas are the result of perception and are

very different from the apprehension of concepts, which remain

world of the

will.

A

concept

tied to the rational

is:

wholly undetermined within its sphere, determined only
and intelligible only to him who has the faculty of
reason, communicable by words without further assistance, entirely exhausted
...abstract, discursive,

By

by

its limits,

by

its

attainable

definition.

contrast, the Idea,

31

is "...the

adequate representation of the concept," 32

perceptive and absolutely definite even though
individual things.

who

It

can only be

it

represents an infinite

known by one who

Both the beautiful and the sublime are the

the difference

predominance

lies

in

whether the

Schopenhauer places great worth on

More than both Kant and

number

of

is

no longer an individual

as

result of the perception of the Idea;

will-less subject of

in the resulting feeling of pleasure.

purely

has raised herself above willing,

has become a pure subject of knowing, and thus

such.

is

knowledge or the Idea has

This

is

a very subtle distinction, but

it.

Schelling,

Schopenhauer

is

fascinated

by the sublime,

the subjective side of aesthetic pleasure; he interprets the beautiful, the more objective
side of pleasure, as relatively easy to achieve:

Thus what distinguishes the

feeling of the sublime

from that of the beautiful

is

that, with the beautiful, pure knowledge has gained the upper hand without a
struggle, since the beauty of the object, in other words that quality which
facilitate knowledge of its Idea, has removed from consciousness, without

31

WWR,

32

WWR,

§49, p.234.
§49, p.234.
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resistance

and hence imperceptibly, the

will and knowledge of relations that
slavishly serve this will....On the other hand, with the sublime, that state of

pure knowing is obtained first of all by a conscious and violent tearing away
from the relations of the same object to the will which are recognized as
unfavourable, by a free exaltation, accompanied by consciousness, beyond the
will and the knowledge related to it. This exaltation must not only be won
with consciousness, but also be maintained, and it is therefore accompanied by
a constant recollection of the will, yet not of single individual willing, such as
fear or desire, but of human willing in general, in so far as it is expressed
universally through
It is

this state of exaltation

which

its

objectivity, the

human

which Schopenhauer

differentiates the sublime

body. 33

finds so compelling,

from the beautiful.

It is

and

it is

this

the desire to be emotionally

involved, and the overcoming of this desire, which makes the perception of the

sublime more valuable for him; by contrast the beautiful

younger
all

of

sibling.

Schopenhauer gives examples

which occur

What

is,

pale

and wan, the weak

of the different grades of the sublime,

in natural settings, in lonely regions

clouds, stormy seas.

is

of course, important in

with massive rocks, threatening

all

these situations

does not allow personal danger to gain the upper hand, for then the
as to save

its

individual existence.

that something that

is

here that

Young

is

The

will

becomes an object

finds legitimation for his claim that

must, accept the expressiveness of

that

one

will takes over, so

feeling of sublime arises precisely

unfavorable to the

is

from the

fact

of contemplation.

It

Schopenhauer would, indeed

art:

discussion of the sublime implies a general account of how there can be
emotion in art. On this account, expression is a matter of appropriate emotions
being aroused in the spectator, the difference between art, on the one hand,
...the

pornography, on the other, lying in the fact that while
personal, action-prompting emotions are roused by the latter, disassociated,
impersonal emotions are aroused by the former.

and phenomena

33

WWR,

§39, p.202.

like
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Actually, a refinement can be added to this account
of expression in art; the
emotions it arouses are, I think, better described as universal
rather than
merely de-personalized. 34

The

real opposite of

attractive, or as

the viewer

both the sublime and the beautiful

Young has

away from

The

it,

the pornographic, for these

a state of contemplation to

state of the sublime

will; that of

the beautiful

is

is

is

reached by a

one of

free,

what

is

awaken

charming or
the will

and draw

direct involvement. 33

conscious exaltation above the

characterized by the appearance of pure, will-less knowing,

and by the disappearance without opposition

of will from consciousness.

In object,

however, the beautiful and the sublime are

essentially the same, for the object

always the Idea. In both cases,

completely objective, that

timeless subjects of

we become

knowing, and we recognize

is,

is

will-less,

in the object not the individual thing

but the Idea; these must always appear simultaneously in consciousness as the
necessary correlatives of the response to the beautiful. This response
causality, time

^J.
35

and space: the beautiful flower

Young, "Schopenhauer on

Schopenhauer gives

as

I

contemplate

is

lies

outside of

not a specific flower but

Art," p.432.

an example of the charming or

attractive in art the

Dutch

paintings of food, and historical paintings which depict nudity, for they both

still life

excite different kinds of appetites (§40, p.208).

commended

A

few pages

earlier,

however, he has

the Dutch still life
perceptions to the most insignificant objects, and seating] up a lasting monument of
their objectivity and spiritual peace..." (§38, p.197). Young, in his discussion of
paintings for directing "...such purely objective

Schopenhauer's insistence on the disinterested character of aesthetic consciousness,
also finds Schopenhauer's treatment of the 17th century Dutch still-life paintings
problematic.

He

am

told,

footnotes:

however, that his art history is deficient, that such "vanitas" paintings
were intended and understood as deploying the painter' s illusionist skills to
remind the spectator of the illusory, worthless nature of all things of the flesh,
so that, in their proper context, they would not, in fact, have stimulated the
taste buds (Young, "Schopenhauer on Art," P.430, FN7.
I
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the Idea of the flower.

It

could be anywhere, anytime. Because everything

expression of an Idea, everything

is

Every existing thing has an
beautiful.

There

because

facilitates

human

it

being

is,

itself.

Idea,

and thus everything has the

however, one thing that

more

is

why,

in

This

is

because the Idea of the

of his inner nature

is

arts.

we

all

more

being

To know an Idea

is

significant aspects of a thing, rather than

is

other things,

it

a very high grade

beautiful than

the highest aim of

will shortly see,

art all

art."

all

37

other
This

have the

human

explains Schopenhauer's

not to have access to a realm ontologically

from that of representation but instead

distinct

is

human

Schopenhauer' s view, the greatest works of

being as their subject. And, as
hierarchy of the

beautiful than

potential to be

the purely objective contemplation needed to see the Idea: the

and the revelation

explains

an

capable of being considered beautiful. 36

of the will's objectification; consequently, "...man
objects,

is

to concentrate

on the

on the

trivial aspects;

it is

essential

and

to discover the

universal in the particular.

It is

greatest

precisely here

and best known

where Schopenhauer
errors..." of Plato,

poetry in particular. Plato's error
object

which

art

aims

lies

locates the "...source of

namely

his rejection of art in general

in that "...he teaches (Republic,

at expressing, the

one of the

X

and

[601]) that the

prototype of painting and poetry,

is

not the

most insignificant thing admits of
purely objective and will-less contemplation and thus proves itself to be beautiful, is
in
testified by the still life paintings of the Dutch, already mentioned in this connexion
On
attractive.
or
charming
the
condemns
he
where
para. 38" (§41, p.210). This is not
the one hand, Schopenhauer admits that everything, even that which is disgusting or
ugly, can be beautiful; on the other hand, he seems uncomfortable with this

^Here Schopenhauer

inclusiveness,

subject of

notes: "That even the

and continually

objects

when

certain kinds of objects are

made

art.

Orwellian paraphrase that
§41, p.210. This claim leads to the
others.
than
beautiful
beautiful but some are more
37

the

WWR,

all

things are
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Idea but the individual thing."
opposite.

not great

In fact, that

art.

which

underlying
for

Kant

self-referential

it is

element

is

is

be found in the nature of the

human

being:

of the arts
7

Schopenhauer
is

in order.

of the beautiful, arising from the purely

s

view of the redemptive power of

As he has already

knowing

stated,

and the known

subject

the source of aesthetic enjoyment; the intensity of this pleasure in turn

depends on the
of the

this point

not coincidental, but reveals the respective

a survey of his hierarchy of the arts

Idea,

as

will.

In order to understand better

knowledge

human form

moral, for Schelling mythic and for Schopenhauer the breaking free from

The hierarchy

art,

or at least

art,

Kant and Schelling, among many others, share

beliefs in the highest truth to

the world ruled by the

3.

or individual cannot be considered

not entirely arbitrary that Schopenhauer sees the

It is

The

Schopenhauer by contrast maintains the very

is trivial

the highest source of beauty.
of view.

38

differing combinations of the constituent elements.

one over the other

represents.

Matter

itself

is

The predominance

linked to the grade of the will's objectivity

cannot express Ideas; only in the forms and

are exhibited in the representation of perception, the supporter of

which the Idea

qualities

which

is

which

matter, are

the Ideas revealed.

The

different forms of artistic products are ranked according to the grade of the

will's objectivity.

At a low stage of the

will's objectivity is architecture as fine art;

reveals the Ideas of gravity, cohesion, rigidity

and so

literary arts, architecture gives us the thing itself,

^ WWR,

§41, p.212.

forth.

and not

it

Unlike the plastic and

a copy.

The

sister art to
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architecture

maximum

the artistic arrangement of water,

is

which

reveals fluidity, formlessness,

mobility and transparency. The next higher grade, Schopenhauer

determines,

is artistic

horticulture, which, although of limited effect, nevertheless

portrays both the distinctness of the individual and the association and succession of
the whole.

Due

to the capriciousness of weather, this art

presented in landscape painting. Higher

and with

this,

still is

form finds

itself

better

animal painting and animal sculpture,

the objective side of aesthetic pleasure finally takes precedence over the

subjective side,

which

until this point has

the subjective side of pleasure

means

that

been predominant. Again, the dominance

we

are

still

conscious of ourselves, that

of

it is

not so easy to lose ourselves in the object. With the switch to the objective side of
pleasure,

we

are increasingly capable of forgetting our subjective existence in

contemplation of the object.

a.

The human being

as the pinnacle of beauty

.

Historical painting

and

sculpture have as their task the presentation of the Idea in which the will reaches

its

highest degree of objectification, where the objective side of pleasure in the beautiful

completely predominant. Unlike depictions of animals, where what
the species

is

considered to be the most beautiful,

character of the species

now

called

is

same individual so

knowable grade

39

WWR,

man

the

separated from the character of the individual. The former

39

The challenge

of the artist

as to capture the essence of

of the will's

§45, p.220.

characteristic of

the manifestation of

beauty (wholly in the objective sense), but the

character or expression..."
the

"...in

is

most complete

is

latter retains the

to present

human

is

name

is

of

both aspects in

beauty, the highest

objectification, to capture, that

is,

the Idea

2H2
of the

human

being in general expressed in

a particular form.

The

artist

must

recognize the beautiful prior to experience, rather than imitating nature, for
to recognize the beautiful

if

know

she does not already

how

is

she

it?:

We

all recognize human beauty when we see it, but in the genuine artist this
takes place with such clearness that he shows it as he has never seen it, and in
his presentation he surpasses nature. Now this is possible only because we
ourselves are the will, whose adequate objectification at its highest grade is

here to be judged and discovered.
anticipation of
anticipation

is

In fact,

only

in this

way have we an

what nature. ..endeavours to present. In the
accompanied by a high degree of thoughtful

by recognizing

in the individual

nature's half-spoken words.

I

thing

le

its

true genius this
intelligence, so that,

Idea, he, so to speak,

understands

expresses clearly what she merely

stammers.

The
art

anticipation

is

that

is

the Ideal, the Idea in so far as

which supplements what

is

have no

articles

can be

known

work

a priori; the

of

given a posteriori in nature.

That the genius can speak clearly

(manufactured

it

for nature,

and

all

Ideas

Idea, only a concept, but they are

come from nature
composed

of natural

materials) again underscores the kind of creativity present in Schopenhauer's genius:

is

a

the

pre-determined creativity

knowledge

in the

sense that

it

of the Ideas: "Die Phantasie zeigt

schopferischen Konzeption, des Freiwerdens des
wirklich gebildet, sondern das,

the genius

demands

is

not

was

sie

of the will, the realm of

WWK,

41
1

directed solely to

dem Genius

sich

freedom from the

§45, p.222.

lubscher, "Das Genie...", p.117.

in

bemuht
to the

will:

communicating

den Augenblicken der

Intellekts, nicht das,

even though she has rare access

free,

her to the necessity of producing.

4<>

zu bilden

is

it

hat."

11

was

die

Nature

In this sense,

realm above the

precisely this

freedom binds
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Schopenhauer continues

by noting

objectification

general through

through

its

its

beauty

is

on the

will at

highest grade of

its

the suitable manifestation of the will in

phenomenon, so grace

spatial

is

the adequate manifestation

temporal phenomenon, through the movement and position of each

objectified act of will.

most

that, as

his exegesis

distinct

The complete and united combination

phenomenon

of the highest grade of the will.

adds that character, which

is

of beauty

and grace

is

the

Schopenhauer

Finally,

the highest manifestation of the wdll in general,

is

the

third element of the principal object of historical painting.

Throughout Schopenhauer
forms of

art, a

and the world
of

which

is

is

extended discussion on examples of the different

one must bear in mind

in general,

the aim of the

else."

s

discussion heavily laced with his opinion

precede his work as

nothing

7

42

its

artist,

source,

is

of

an Idea in

Plato's sense,

a unity representing a plurality of things in the world,

primary thinking, which

is

example

which must consequently

Although the Idea and the concept share the

Ideas actually are only applicable to concepts.

historical

that: "..the object of art, the depiction

and the knowledge

germ and

on people,

and absolutely

characteristic that each

many

of Plato's examples of

Ideas are the subjects of original and

always figurative; concepts are products of reason and

language, of Ideas under the control of the principle of sufficient reason. The Idea

communicable

conditionally, through

works

of art

measure

works

of art, the noblest production of genius,

WWR,

are

apprehended according

of the viewer's intellectual worth: "For this reason the

to the

42

which

§49, p.233.

must

is

most

excellent

eternally remain sealed books to
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the dull majority of men, and are inaccessible to them."43
Another

way

the difference between the Idea and the concept

original unity

which, through

its

that plurality.

As

art

which only the genius
genuine work of

generations, but

which by means

a result, the concept

but in the service of

in a

that

is

all

is

is

that the Idea

and temporal manifestation, has

spatial

contrast, the concept

is

is

is

fallen into plurality.

By

of reason has reconstructed unity out of

useful

and necessary in

life

and

in science,

barren, the subject matter of imitators. Access to the Idea,

capable of assimilating, transforming and producing, results

art.

Only such works remain

ageless

and speak

too often, are "...received with indifference by their

which they disdained

of expressing

to

all

own

age to

44

to conform..."

43

WWR, §49, p.234. The rest of the paragraph reveals in full detail Schopenhauer's
horror at the awakening of mass society, and it is undeniable that he felt nothing but
scorn and disgust for most of his fellow human beings, seeing them as having only
and not individual character. His separation of those of value from
democratic in the sense that it strikes equally the rich and the poor, the

species character

the masses

is

learned and the ignorant:
ist der grosse Haufen, das profanum volgus, die Masse des niederen,
rohen Volkes. Aber auch von geistigen Pobel ist die Rede, vom literarischen
und philosophierenden Pobel, von Pobelphilosophemen und vom christlichen
Pobel in seiner himmelschreienden Ruchlosigkeit gegeniiber den Tieren
(Hiibscher, "Das Genie...", p.113).
While it is all too easy to profess outrage at Schopenhauer's unrestrained contempt
towards the masses, Poggeler soberly notes:
Schopenhauers Denken ist alles andere als eine pessimistisch-hypochondrische
Grubelei aus der Zeit biirgerliche Dekadenz. Sein Denken.. .ist nicht
untergegangen mit dem 19. Jahrhundert: es stellt auch uns vor die
entscheidenden Fragen, weil es unerbittlich zur Sprache bringt, was aus der
neuzeitlichen Weltauffassung folgt (386).

Pobel: das

^ WWR,

§49, p.236.
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Poetry, in particular tragedy, as the ultimate truth

b.

and symbolism and

allegory

to poetry,

their use in the plastic

which he concludes

and

pictorial arts.

human

highest grade of the will's objectivity, namely the

being.

the lower grades, the plastic and pictorial arts are generally

manner

of

human

he turns

Finally

the art form that best reveals the Idea

is

poetry; because of the complex

Schopenhauer discusses

.

which

is

the

In the presentation of

more

successful than

expression, however, only poetry

can reveal the inner nature of humankind. Our experience

is

the indispensable

condition for understanding both history and poetry, but where history gives us

knowledge

of the individual, the

phenomenon, poetry

gives us

knowledge

of the

Schopenhauer concludes, with true Romantic sentiment that

universal, the Idea.

reminds us of Schelling's claim:
not in the relation, namely the real
be far more accurate and clear in poetry than
in history; therefore, paradoxical as it may sound, far more real, genuine, inner
truth is to be attributed to poetry than to history.. ..he who seeks to know
mankind according to its inner nature which is identical in all its phenomena
and developments, and thus according to its Idea, will find that the works of
the great, immortal poets present him with a much truer and clearer picture
...that

which

is

significant in

unfolding of the Idea,

is

itself,

found

than the historians can ever

to

give.

45

Unlike Schelling, however, Schopenhauer follows such a claim with specific examples
of

what he means and what he does not mean,

so that

we

are not just

left

with the

indefinite sentiment.

After giving

pinnacle of poetic

numerous examples, he comes

art:

to that

which represents the

tragedy, a view also shared by Schelling, although for different

footnote: "It goes without saying
§51, pp.245-6. Schopenhauer adds in a
genuine poet, who is so rare. I
and
great
the
of
that everywhere I speak exclusively
mean no one else; least of all that dull and shallow race of mediocre poets, rhymesters,
at the
and devisers of fables which flourishes so luxuriantly, especially in Germany

WWR,

45

present

time..."
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reasons. Poetry objectifies the Idea of humankind, an Idea which expresses
clearly in highly individual characters.

In tragedy, this reaches a culmination, for

here that the antagonism of the will with

grade of objectivity, and tears
beings

who

are

its

phenomena. What happens

Schopenhauer considers the highest aim
live,

long conflict and suffering,

the aims

completely unfolded at

of

life,

to resolve this situation

the paradoxical giving

the achievement of utter resignation: "Thus

after a

The

itself is

finally

we

renounce

for ever

all

which

which follows when one renounces

represents, for Schopenhauer, the

all

supreme

egoism,
act of a

is

it is

highest

human

what

up the

will-to-

see in tragedy the noblest

realization of the futility of the endless striving of the will,

resignation

is

men,

the pleasures of

then pursued so keenly, or cheerfully and willingly give up

till

its

apart in the unendurable situation of the

itself

most

itself

life

life itself."

and

46

and the complete

the triumph over the will

human

being.

This topic

is

the subject of the fourth book.

c.

one

The unique

last artistic

Schopenhauer

form needs
is

best

music

role of

to

known,

nineteenth century geniuses:

among

the arts, for

objectivity of

listener

essence.

tt

is

Before briefly turning our attention to that book,

be considered: music.

Wagner and

Nietzsche.

not a copy of the Ideas

which are the

It is

his

views on music for which

primarily through the effect they had

Ideas."

47

much more powerful than

Music holds

"...but a

Consequently, the

a

on two other
unique position

copy of the will
effect of

itself,

the

music on the

the effect of other art forms, for music

is

the

The others are only shadows. Schopenhauer then explains the analogy

WWR,

47

it is

.

WWR.

§51, p.253.

§52, p.257.
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between music and Ideas by analyzing the composite
comparison with the different grades

of objectification of the will,

nature (the ground-bass) to the intellectual

he

stresses, this

is

the closest one can

it is

inherent in music, for music
call

life

not to be understood as a

beyond words. But

is

a direct

a complete

and endeavor

come

repetition

copy of the

will itself: "...we

48
will."

and expression

very general concepts, for only in these
inner nature which

is

to

everywhere adequate and

general,

which

is

would wholly correspond

and music

message that

is

is

could just as well

Schopenhauer,

"...is

nothing but

of the inner nature of the world in

possible to obtain a

is it

As

(the melody).

Music expresses the inner being

applicable."

49

could give a detailed and complete explanation of music, that
expresses, this

man

of

to expressing the

through tones. Philosophy, according

and accurate

from inorganic

explanation of music, for music

literal

the world embodied music as embodied

of the world

parts of music through

to the true

view of that

entire

Consequently,
is,

one

if

of the concepts

it

philosophy of the world. Art in

in particular, expresses the elucidation of the visibility of the will,

representation: art

is "...the

play within the play."

50

As long as one

is

a

spectator, actor or producer of the play,

one remains firmly in the grasp of the

will.

Even though contemplation

of the Idea

behind the spectacle provides

from

constant suffering, which

the lot of those

only temporary. Only
to

is

when one becomes

be free of

this suffering,

^ WWR,

§52, pp. 263-4.

49

WWR,

50

WWR,

§52, p.264.
§52, p.267.

who

are the will as

tired of the spectacle,

can one begin to overcome the

will.

it

a respite

objectifies itself,

and wants

it is

in earnest
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4.

The goal

of self denial of the will

This journey

is

aspect of the world as

the subject of the fourth book,
will:

which provides the second

"With the Attainment of Self-Knowledge, Affirmation and

Denial of the Will to Live." Schopenhauer devotes nearly half again
as

any

this topic as to

of the other three books,

the world constantly breaks through. Since

and

aesthetic theory,

I

spend

little

space to

here that his personal view of

specific interest

is

Schopenhauer's

time on this last book. The relationship between

representation and will has already been

our

my

it is

much

made

clear;

now we

learn

how

to

overcome

thereby triumphing over the power of the will and the eternal striving

will to live,

and suffering which

is

the world. Schopenhauer uses this

book

to present his ethical

theory, and raises the age-old question of the relation between freedom and fate; this

deserves a cursory glance.

Because the
while the

will is the thing-in-itself, the

phenomena

means not

to

Schopenhauer

and

is

who

51

this

WWR,

phenomena,

is

it is

free

subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason. To be free

we know what freedom
proud of the

is

phenomenon,

perfectly free to

all

he knows, he

this relationship

as object,

eternity."

is

therefore a

not, but cannot so easily say

fact that, as far as

has adequately explained

necessity: "Everything as

will,

all

be determined by a reason or a consequent; freedom

negative concept:

recent times

is

content of

51

is

is

the

first

what

it is.

person in

between freedom and

absolutely necessary; in itself

The one important exception

it is

to this

That Schopenhauer feels that he is the first philosopher since
Plato genuinely to understand the nature and interaction of a wide variety of thingshe admits Kant's greatness but loses no opportunity to show where he erred-is hard
to overlook, but that he here thinks his explanation of freedom and necessity is the
only clear one is to me surprising. Clear perhaps, if one is convinced that the world is
only representation and will, but no clearer in itself than the explanations given by
§55, p.287.

Kant, Schelling or Hegel.
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absolute determinism

human

is

the

work

being, will can attain

knowledge

of

knowledge

(as

own

its

full

of art, and,

by extension, the creating

self-consciousness,

which

to say,

in the

an exhaustive

inner nature as reflected in the world. Art results from this

does the elimination and self-denial of the

present book). In the

is

artist,

work

will,

the subject of the

of art:

freedom which in other respects, as belonging to the thing-in-itself, can
never show itself in the phenomenon, in such a case appears in this
...the

phenomenon; and by abolishing the essential nature at the root of the
phenomenon, whilst the phenomenon itself still continues to exist in time, it
brings about a contradiction of the phenomenon with itself.. ..all this indicates
only in a general way how man is distinguished from all the other phenomena
of the will

by the

fact that

freedom,

independence of the principle

i.e.,

of

which belongs only to the will as thing-in-itself and
contradicts the phenomenon, may yet in his case possibly appear even in the
phenomenon, where it is then, however, necessarily exhibited as a contradiction
sufficient reason,

of the

even

phenomenon with

man

other beings.
This freedom

is

In this sense not only the will in

itself.

can certainly be called

free,

itself,

but

and can thus be distinguished from

all

52

attained only in the artist

and

individuals are exceptional people; in almost

determined phenomenon of the

in the absolute ascetic.

all

cases the

human

These

being

is

simply the

will's free willing.

Despite the a priori feeling of freedom one might have, reflection on experience

shows

that one's conduct follows with absolute necessity the dictates of one's

character,

combined with motives. The

but these never change the

will itself,

ourselves as quite different from

we

what

are often alarmed at ourselves."

happens

to fate,

WWR,

§55, p.288.

WWR,

§55, p.296.

52

53

but fate

is

53

will

can be affected by motives from without,

and "[ultimately we become acquainted with
a priori

We

we

like to

considered ourselves to be; and then

excuse this by attributing what

nothing other than the endless concatenation of causes
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which marks the phenomenal world; the deeds we commit
our

intelligible character,

control.

and cannot be

Only the genius can

of sufficient reason,

rise

are the manifestation of

attributed to circumstances

above the

and express the pure

Maya, the net

veil of

beyond our

cast

Idea, the absolute truth of

by the

who

or

principle

what we

ideally are but never actually attain.

Schopenhauer's pessimism, which

becomes ever
claims that

fro

all life is

suffering,

all

willing,

54

The

is left

basis of

with boredom:

finest part of life

and which

is

renunciation of the will to

^ WWR,
55

and that the

all

One

attainable

live.

55

is

the pure

It is

is

swings

in fact

need, lack and pain.
like a

its

pendulum

to

ultimate

knowledge which remains foreign

through the work of

This by no

here that he repeatedly

willing

"...life

between pain and boredom, and these two are

constituents."

to

perhaps better referred to as resignation,

clearer in the course of the fourth book.

Take away the pain and one

and

is

means

is

art or

through the

suicide, for suicide, the

doing

§57, p.212.

most useful investigations into this area is Julian Young's "A
Schopenhauerian Solution to Schopenhauerian Pessimism," Schopenhauer-Iahrbuch 68
of the

Young

article with the following explanation:
argue two things. Firstly that, properly understood, the
Schopenhauerian case for pessimism is extremely formidable. Secondly,
however, I shall suggest that the quest for Erlosung, escape from life, is not a
mandatory response to it since there exists a Losung, a life-accepting solution to

(1987) 53-69.

In this essay

introduces his

I

want

to

the problem of pessimism the main ingredients of which are, strangely,

suggested by Schopenhauer himself (53).
builds a convincing argument on both counts. For the person who happily
links Schopenhauer with pessimism, and either dismisses or embraces him, Young
provides a useful guide to what pessimism is not. Since most commentators approach

Young

Schopenhauer from the direction of Nietzsche, instead of considering him in his own
right, one often finds a very distorted image of what Schopenhauer actually said. To
begin with, because Schopenhauer s goal is the achievement of salvation, he is not an
absolute pessismist. With this in mind, there are three main areas of misconception: 1)
Schopenhauer's pessimism is not an "invasion of his philosophy by personal neurosis"
not an articulation of
(53) but rather serves as a useful antidote to despair; 2) It is
but on balance
misery
unalleviated
place
of
misanthropy; 3) The world is not a
7
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away

of the individual

commits suicide
received

it.

wills

phenomena,

life,

and

is

affirms the

dissatisfied

power

who

of the will; the person

with the conditions in which she has

Suicide differs completely from the denial of the will-to-live,
"...which

is

the

only act of freedom to appear in the phenomenon, and hence...the
transcendental
change." 56 By

phenomenon Schopenhauer

contrast to the crystallized

knowledge can the

will

moment

represented by the

appear freely so that

it,

will-to-live.

of art.

The only path

Only through

to salvation

the will, can recognize, and learn to

nature in the phenomenon. Once the

overcome and abolish

work

be mastered, whether fleetingly, as in the work of

permanently, in the denial of the
will

here means the individual herself, in

itself,

will

know,

has attained knowledge of

thereby ending the suffering inherent in

art,

is

or

to let the

own

its

itself, it

itself

inner

can

as

phenomenon.

5.

Philosophy and

art

For Schopenhauer, "[n]ot merely philosophy but also the fine

bottom towards the solution of the problem
life.

for

The question needs
both philosophy and

no, he has not.

He

to be raised

art,

of existence,”

57

arts

the essential

whether Schopenhauer, by

work

at

meaning

setting the

of

same goal

has not reduced the one to the other. The clear answer

is

explains:

the arts speak only the naive and childlike language of perception, not the
abstract and serious language of reflection; their answer is thus a fleeting
...all

image, not a permanent universal knowledge. ...Thus

contains more evil than good.
56

WWR,

57

§69, p.398.

WWRII,

34, p.406.

all

the other arts together
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hold before the questioner an image or picture of perception
and say: "Look
here; this is life!" However correct their answer may be, it
will yet always
afford only a temporary, not a complete and final satisfaction.
For they always
give only a fragment, an example instead of the rule, not the
whole which can
be given only in the universality of the concept. Therefore it is the task
of
philosophy to give for the concept, and hence for reflection and in the abstract,
a reply to that question,
satisfactory for

all

time.

which on

that very account

is

58

permanent and

Art can only present the universal truth in the concrete and particular, whereas

philosophy presents
that of philosophy

is

it

abstractly

is explicit.

related to these arts as

in isolation; the

Schopenhauer explains

wine

access to a higher-level, or

and

is

to grapes."

59
It

wLsdom

of art

is

whereas

implicit,

this metaphorically: "...philosophy

thus appears that philosophy has

more permanent, truth

of existence, but this

is

belied

by

Schopenhauer's further investigations into the nature of philosophy.
Admittedly, art requires
not, for the spectator

spiritual to

its

audience to interact in a

must use her own imagination:

be given directly to the senses;

At the same time, Schopenhauer hints that

cannot be completely

explicit, for

try to explain everything.

In fact,

it

"...the

way

that philosophy does

very best in art

must be begotten by the work of

this, too, is

needed

for philosophy;

the most deadly mistake a philosopher can

and here we return

the difference between art and philosophy

too

is

lies,

to the question of just

the force

which propels the

art."

60

it

make

is

to

where

artist is

perhaps the same as that which guides the philosopher:

What is properly denoted by the name genius is the predominant capacity for
the kind of knowledge described in the two previous chapters ["On Knowledge
of the Ideas" and "On the Pure Subject of Knowing"], from which all genuine
works of the arts, of poetry, and even of philosophy, spring. Accordingly, as

“WWRII,
59

WWRII,

60

WWRII,

34, pp.406-7.

34, p.407.

34, p.408.
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has for its object the (Platonic) Ideas, these being apprehended, however,
not in the abstract but only in perception, the true nature of genius must lie in
the completeness and energy of the knowledge of perception.
this

This leads to the conclusion that there

and the
that of

intellectual

all

is

no

view of the world; there

clear-cut distinction

is

The

artist

philosopher

is

rational truth,

this raises

is

an

how

aesthetic

only the standpoint of the genius and

the others. The difference between the

natural scientist,

between the

the philosopher, even the

artist,

the vision, the perception of Ideas,

is

presented.

remains rooted in the language of perception, whereas the

bound by

the

more

explicit,

and therefore

language of concepts; the subject matter

less able to express

is

the same. But

essential question about the task of philosophy.

faced with the uncertainty as to

how we must

understand

if

In addition,

non-

this is so,

we

are

art:

Woher nehmen

wir iiberhaupt den Massstab, die gute von der schlechten, die
wahre von der unwahren Kunst zu unterscheiden? Wie konnen wir davon
wissen, ob ein Kiinstler wirklich die Idee schaut oder nicht? Wie muss die Idee
iiberhaupt ihrem Wesen nach bestimmt werden? 1st sie wirklich platonische,

oder ist sie das durchaus nicht, jedenfalls nicht
Schopenhauers Philosophic nicht gerade das, was sie
nicht sein will, namlich Metaphysik? Ist die Metaphysik also gar nicht so tot,
62
wie Schopenhauer es behauptet?

zeitlos mit sich identische Idee,

immer?

Despite

all

Ist

schliesslich

claims to the contrary,

it is

hard

to

deny that Schopenhauer has indeed

introduced metaphysics into philosophy, although, similar to Schelling,

it is

re-

a

metaphysics from within, a metaphysics of phenomenology and of the unconscious,
rather than one from without, one directed towards a divine creator.

Schopenhauer's interpretation of the world and of the
diametrically opposite to that of Kant's.

61

WWR

62

II,

31, p.376.

Poggeler, p.379.

The human mind

is,

human

being

for Kant,

is

an order-
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Human

creating organ.

the

mind can be

beings view the world as an organized place; the processes of

CPR

identified, as

demonstrates. Although one cannot

anything about the noumenal realm, Kant

how we

think and

The work

act.

cognitive process, but because

all

clearly believes that

know

imposes the order on

it

of art, the beautiful object, frees the precision of the

minds work in the same way, or

at least should,

one

enjoys a subjective, yet universal, feeling of disinterested pleasure. The response to the
beautiful object

based on a rational foundation, even

is

if

this

response cannot be

completely rationally explained.

Schopenhauer, by contrast, interprets the world as inherently
completely under the dominion of the capricious and rapacious
thing-in-itself, the will

of art enables

Unlike Kant's

not order-producing, but instead assumes an

and phenomenal forms

of disguises

The work

is

will.

irrational,

one

to rise

contemplate the pure Idea, which

is

in

its

restless search for unattainable satisfaction.

above
to

infinite variety

this ceaseless, irrational

motion, to

be found in the calm, tranquil, one might

almost say rational, world of pure form.

Whereas the Kantian work
pleasure in

all

of art produces a universal feeling of disinterested

people, Schopenhauer finds the function of art to be quite different.

Only by becoming absorbed

in the artwork,

by losing one's

individuality,

can the

individual momentarily escape the ceaseless longings of the world as represented

The point

is

not to recognize the positive unity one shares with

to discern the

common

one

is in,

and

rise

above

it.

One then

people, but rather
realizes that

unattainable in the world. Only in the calm contemplation of

absolute truth

is

absolute form,

when

truth, for truth

trap

all

will.

is

the turmoil of particularity and needs

nothing but freedom from the

will.

is left

behind, can one find
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Schopenhauer's outlook on the world
things can and do happen.

who one

this is the

is;

catch a glimpse of

One must

meaning

what we could

existence.

brief interludes of

better people

by teaching us compassion. Since

to the ascetic

life

of the saint,

or badly. Complete

Awareness
will, leads

beings.

of our

it is

to self-interest is

situation,

positive

where we

of art,

how

only the rare individual
lot.

an example

are dominated

we

removed from the

calm can teach us

most of us must cope with our

abandonment

mutual

Through the work

be, as a pure, subject-less being,

chaos of the world. Presumably, these

many

fight a losing battle against the will, against

human

of

not positive, although

is

We

who

can do

this

which we can learn from

a

work

of art.

be

turns

this well

of the latter approach.

by the vagaries

of the

us both to greater self-understanding and to empathy for our fellow

It is

to

human

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The end

of this study brings

beginning about the nature of the

self.

I

some extremely dense

clear exposition of

sections

me back

on Kant and

Schelling.

I

to the questions

which

have presented what

I

posed

I

hope

is

at the

a relatively

theoretical arguments, in particular the

how

have shown

the aesthetic theories of

all

three

thinkers arise from each one's theory of mind combined with their respective beliefs

about the nature of
remains

is

why

human

beings.

The unanswered and

essential question

these three philosophers, as well as a great

number

which

of their

contemporaries and successors, turn to aesthetics as the vehicle by means of which a
satisfactory explanation of the nature of the

Why

do

means, as the

three choose the

grail,

means? To say
question, for

all

that

it

was fashionable
explain

why

placed in such an exalted position.

genius and

art,

at the

addition,

and

fill

this

I

intuits

what

it

time does not sufficiently answer the

work

of art,

were

propose a dual reason for the fascination with
glorification of genius.

who were

vacuum by

which

which can be found through no other

of traditional religious beliefs leaves a void in the

products help

can be found.

the genius and her product, the

and the concomitant

affecting in particular those

self

of art, or the sensibility

the path to a level of insight

fails to

it

work

human

The decreasing influence

meaning structure

of the individual,

considered intellectuals. The genius and her

providing a link with the mysteries of the world. In

in contrast to the present time, in

aspect of their particular society, or illuminate

which most

what

it

artists

means

respond

to

some

to live in that society, the
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idea of the social

was considered

was not

yet quite the

to reflect the

universal standard.

common

currency

very nature of what

Only within the framework

means

it

of

such

essentially religious outlook but lacking a traditional

account for the

feeling, could the

and Schopenhauer (and Hegel)

The work
territory

it is

to

today.

human

framework through which

hear,

why

it

occupies the border

and what we cannot.

of art holds a key to the explanation of

is

to

fully flower.

of art holds such fascination precisely because

being, and this

being, as a

augmented by an

a belief,

something about ourselves and our world which we can learn

a

human

be a

of art

grand systems and the idealism of Kant, Schelling

between what we can see and

The work

The work

who we

in

are, of

It tells

no other

what

Kant, Schelling and Schopenhauer

all

it

us
fashion.

means

to be

turn to the

realm of aesthetics to seek an explanation of the nature of being. The essence of the
nature of the

self is abstract

attempts to analyze

it

and

practically inaccessible to precise formulation.

prove elusive. The artwork, however,

in a mysterious fashion expresses this hidden truth.

agrees that certain works of art are great, which
timeless

art, a

and universal.

monumental

If

is

is

All

a concrete object

Given proof

is

to say that their

which

that everyone

message

is

both

only one could untangle the enigmatic center of the work of

step forward in the introspective preoccupation of self-analysis

would be achieved. Consequently, the

fascinating puzzle of the

meaning

of

life

could

be solved were one to discover the mechanism of the strange power exuded by the

product of genius, the work of

What, however,
topic

own

I

is

art.

the function of

art,

or rather,

what does

have intentionally refrained from discussing, because

right.

it

art

mean? This

requires volumes in

Bearing that in mind, several features are important to consider.

First,

is

its

a

298

none

of the three philosophers

deciding whether a

work

I

of art

are purely discussing whatever

human

have considered are engaged
is

'good' or 'bad/ 'significant7 or 'mere kitsch.'

it is

that

is

a 'great

beings appear to respond universally with

work

of art/

awe and

should but because they do. Second, the subject matter of
of the plastic arts

The change

mode

to

creative activity,

well, there

which

respect, not because they

art

has changed. In terms
to the

and scenes from

to painting landscapes, portraits

inevitably raises a different set of questions that focus the attention not

on another world, but on the world
mimetic

to

refers to Christian religious motifs or reinterprets classical,

primarily Greek, themes.

life

something

They

and painting, the main subject matter from the Middle Ages

Enlightenment either

everyday

in art criticism, in

is

in

which one

lives.

The change from

an expressive one, which places the Romantic genius
acknowledges that

a shift

art

has received a

new

function.

a primarily

at the center of

In literature as

from concentrating on Christian theology and didactic works of

proper behavior to exploring the individual and the society. The character of

this

response, combined with the more personal nature of the subject matter, leads to a
secular sense of

awe towards

the secret of being

human

within the individual.

lies

sufficient clarity of sight, the

The

the creative

it

has become clear that

only one digs deep enough, or gains

mystery can be revealed.

response of

shift in the

If

being, for

how one

reacts to a

work

of art,

which

is

seen in

the three different interpretations given by Kant, Schelling and Schopenhauer,
illuminates a changing self-understanding.

something inexpressible takes place

which

this

experience

nature of the

self.

is

The

Although

all

in the presence of a great

framed reveals a paradigmatic

self is

three acknowledge that

work

of art, the

way

in

shift in the interpretation of the

transformed from a rational, calculable model, a child of
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the Enlightenment, to the visible representation of a collective unconscious or
an
irrational, desiring will.

Schelling

have shown, but they share

and Schopenhauer

a basic

view of the

differ

many

widely on

self as irrational,

points, as

I

whereas Kant

steadfastly interprets the ideal self as rational.
Schelling' s

world,

is

it is

a conscious product of the unconscious intelligence

The self-examining

a positive creation.

search for
for

self,

its

ultimate origin comes to realize that

the creator of logic.

itself

self is a rational creature,

deeper, unconscious source of

its

it

By

Schelling' s self digs ever deeper into

Schopenhauer's

self tries to

escape from

it

contrast, Schopenhauer's self

creation, a manifestation of the will as the will struggles

Whereas

that system can

itself

its

mind

and

rise

and

to discover

above

who

itself.

It

the

a negative

is

or

itself,

explore the

overcome

tries to

is

but in the

can never logically explain

Only by going outside
being.

which

itself.

what

it is,

seeks, in the

contemplation of pure Forms, an antidote to the boredom and suffering of everyday
life

.

For both Schelling and Schopenhauer, the work of art eases the nature of their
respective search by providing a non-intellectual vehicle from

unknown.

It is

a black box, in

which some kind

which

to

probe the

of transference takes place that

cannot be explained, but which enables one to attain a moment of absolute

work

of art

is

the product of genius, and the genius

true nature of the world.
to follow Kant's

method

response

is

is

certainly

The

exceptionally attuned to the

Neither Schelling nor Schopenhauer make a serious attempt
of trying to explain the precise

leads to this response to the

the response

is

truth.

work

of art.

mechanism

That Kant made

commendable, but the elucidation

a

grand

of the

of the

mind

that

effort to analyze

mechanics of the

not half so interesting as what one learns by responding. This

is

the grey
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area which Kant did not wish to enter, for one lands, inevitably, in

noumenal

One

realm.

is

responding

to

some

sort of

something non-rational, and learning

something which can never be considered cognitive knowledge.
This

is

not to suggest that Kant did not

know

spends most of Critique of Aesthetic Judgement” trying

knowledge

that

is

not cognitive. But what

about oneself from
consider both

it,

certainly did,

to explain

knowledge

or

is,

how one

what one

and
can have

learns

he does not discuss. Schelling and Schopenhauer, by contrast,

how one

can have such knowledge and what one can learn from

about oneself. What their views
self,

this

He

this.

reflect

is

it

the growing interest in the nature of the

not as a purely theoretical being, for Kant

is

the duly acknowledged master of this

approach, but as a living object, rooted in the world. They are fascinated by the

underside of the

self,

by

that

which does not seem

rationally explicable.

In a microcosm, this reflects the split that philosophy itself undergoes.
side of philosophy concentrates

on those aspects

explicable, capable of sustaining clear

and

of the

human

distinct analysis.

One

being which appear

The other

side delves into

the mystery of being, whatever that might be, and seeks to explain something which

can barely be put into words. At times, the two sides of

seem

to be

the art

this

rough division hardly

speaking the same language. That Schelling and Schopenhauer both locate

work

as the source of

an expression of deep insight

is

hardly surprising, given

the focus of their respective interests. The relation between art and philosophy
central topic with

which both

language of philosophy

of

them

struggle, for they each

want

is

to use the precise

to capture the veiled truth of art, as did Kant.

By doing

they run the risk of sounding utterly incomprehensible, but the potential reward
invention of an entirely

new

dialect of philosophical language.

a

this,

is

the

301

Schelling

makes the boldest move

pinnacle, depending

it.

The

on one

flash of insight

of being.

outlook, of

all

knowledge, and grounding philosophy in

which philosophy then

Only the work

intellectual intuition.

all,

which one gains through

this flash

It is

s

by placing the artwork

of

aesthetic intuition

tries to explain,

nature of being, from which the

opaque because the

topic

is

He

for the

work

of art

even

life itself,

of this world.

spheres,

philosophy

is

art as

one can do

as

wide as that found in Schelling's treatment.

by

will

darker, but the range

of art (leaving

music

freely relinquishing that

aside), for the

which was

first

is

not

assigns art and philosophy to separate

speaking the naive language of perception, whereas

expressed in the mature language of reflection, he nevertheless hints that

the true philosopher, like the true

all

is

is

because he or she has suddenly understood a truth that

While Schopenhauer

and regards

has been sundered. The language sounds

most perfect form

hero or heroine overcomes the

dearest,

and even more

being by revealing the true

not so radical, and his vision

is

also regards tragedy as the

tragic

of

almost impenetrable.

Schopenhauer's claim

which he reserves

human

human

answers the nature

by means

of art, in particular poetry

specifically tragedy, reveals the true nature of the

at the base or

is

imitate

Philosophy

is

a

artist,

must be inspired by genius. Without

a vision,

and over-explain.

powerful tool for both Schelling and Schopenhauer, but

cannot explain the deepest mystery of the
deciphering this enigma by turning

its

human

subject.

attention to the

It

work

comes
of art

it

closest to

and

its

creator, the

genius, and for this reason both Schelling and Schopenhauer focus on this topic. They

each see the work of

art as

presenting a

moment

of insight into truth, but

both are

almost incapable of providing an example of such an artwork, or of naming someone
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they consider a genius, even though
prototypes.

This

is

work

recognize a great
experience?

How

weak

a serious

of art?

do we,

Is

it

it is

hard to believe that

point of

many

this is for lack of

aesthetic theorists, for

great for everyone?

Is it

all

for example, resolve Kant's claim, that a

answer

this aesthetic theorizing say

is

that

says very

it

about the concrete work of

theory

is

not the same as art

which

to

judge the artworks, but the judgment of them

criticism.

The theory

is

of art/

which

is

another

referred to as a metaphysics from within.

one's reaction to the

work

way

of defining

By analyzing,

of art in terms of the

species,

and

a

the
in

I

of art criticism.

have

is

of truth

field of aesthetics

retains the basic

work

life,

which one

member

of the

self,

and the

relation

manner

as possible,

between the two.

has gone through great changes in the twenty eight

in 1790,

and that

of Schopenhauer's, in 1818, but

it still

form established by Kant. Schelling and Schopenhauer share with

Kant the same elementary
everyday

possible,

concomitant insight into the nature of being. These insights, in

the nature of the world and the

years between Kant's

called a

at times

insofar as this

mute moment

is

the criteria by

what could be

what

of taste

fact that aesthetic

domain

turn, enable the philosopher to attempt to explain, in as precise a

The

to

The unavoidable

experiences, one gains an insight into oneself as an individual and as a

human

one

and music? What

tries to establish

Schopenhauer and Schelling are primarily engaged

'phenomenology

judgment

art?

but the reason has to do with the

little,

is

a purely personal

a subjective yet universal response, with his awful taste in poetry

does

how

belief that there is

an

ideal realm, distinct

which can best be reached through the

that realm signifies,

and how one can

attain

from the one

aesthetic experience.

knowledge or awareness

of

it,

of

But what
points to
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the great differences between each one's fundamental beliefs both about the world
and

about what

means

it

As Kant

to

be a

human

carefully explains, aesthetic

primary interest

account for the

to

is

He

beautiful, appear to be universal.

judgment
that

all

to

being.

judgment

fact that aesthetic

are basically alike, for each

transcendental

judgments of

taste, of

Kant's

what

is

proposes a theory of mind which allows a

be both subjective and universal, but

minds

a subjective judgment.

is

is

this inevitably leads

him

imply

to

but an empirical example of the

In the presence of a beautiful object, one comes closest to

self.

attaining a state of pre-cognitive awareness, because the primary functions of thinking
are released from the absolute determination

one

he never

clear that

rational,

rules their actions.

he

be interested in the nature of the feeling of pleasure,

to

specifically defines 'pleasure,'

is

assuming everyone knows what

only willing to countenance a pleasure that

One

non-emotional pleasure.

intellectual

way.

It is

as

if

that

is

the experience

is

how one knows

cool,

removed,

that the object

itself.

is

law be the guiding

points

him towards

result,

he appears

light of his philosophical thought.

is

As

I

be

at cross

distant: a

purposes with himself.

lets his belief in

have shown, Kant

him

He imposes

to the latter.

is

As

a precise pattern

a feeling that will not necessarily let itself be bent into this shape.

impressive, but not entirely convincing.

learns from

absolutely neutral, or moral; his theory

the former, but his underlying beliefs bring

to

It is

truly beautiful.

What one

the beauty of the moral law, for Kant consistently

incapable of deciding whether pure beauty

on

is

it is.

responds to a beautiful object in a purely

Kant's concept of beauty invokes the idea of an end in

this

In this state,

completely disinterested pleasure.

feels

Kant does not appear
for

which

The outcome

is

a
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Schelling and Schopenhauer both take the Kantian model as
their starting
point.

Their method and basic Weltanschauung, are, however, completely
different

from Kant7 s as well as from each other. Despite

their differences, there are remarkable

points of similarity in their conclusions, reflecting both their view that the
world in

which they

live is

fragmented and alienating, and

the ancient Greeks had, which has been
in the sense that

it is

self

is,

for Schelling, a dialectical construct.

lost its original

phenomenal

in

objects.

can try to think

its

which the

self is

The advantage

way back

way

It

has

as

itself

it

engaged mirrors the

that the self has

to the original unity.

times of the French Revolution, even those

reach this insight by

whereas

radical

view

for

is

that,

self

tries to

life

However,

who have

force

when

for a

separated

pays for

unite

its

which

its

divided

is

in

all

properly trained,

it

reflecting the egalitarian

not been so trained might also

In the presence of a great

of aesthetic intuition.

everyone has the capability of recognizing

somehow been

wholeness. The

individuality by being in perpetual opposition with

The struggle

oneself,

more

escape from oneself.

at best

from the ground of being and has

parts.

wholeness, a truth that

Schelling presents the

more dynamic. One can produce

Schopenhauer, one can

The

lost.

a longing for

moment

work

of art,

the original wholeness from

which one has been irrevocably sundered.
7

Despite Schelling

organon of philosophy,

s

own

as he

later

had so

admission that the work of

is

insightful.

pushing back the

cannot be the true

optimistically stated in his youthful work, his

attempt to uncover the mystery of the
reasons,

art

human

subject, without resorting to theological

Schelling maintains that by exploring one's unconscious, by

barriers of

what one knows, so

as to reach that

moment

of original

separation, one learns certain truths, not only about oneself but also about the world.
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Schelling enthusiastically carries out this task,
belief in

human

beings,

and

his

showing us how

which marks European thought

Descartes through Kant, the

way

the

filter

can be done. His

optimism in the face of the unknown,

he locates the mystery of the entire world inside every
in the belief structure

it

human

great.

That

human mind shows

the change

in the 19th century.

From

being has been regarded as providing in some

through which the external world

world as such. Schelling views the

is

human

source; the very structure of cognition has

is

determined: there

being not so

become

much

is

no

objective

as the filter but as the

self-referential.

1

Schelling envisions the ground of being as inert intelligence, the basic stuff of

the universe.

what

Only the human mind

this intelligence

is,

stuff of the universe,

capable of returning to an understanding of

and the mind does

Schopenhauer has

intuition.

is

this

a similar equation.

through either

He

and regards the human mind

of understanding, but also,

and more importantly,

intellectual or aesthetic

postulates the will as the basic

as the only

organ capable not only

of transcending this primordial

substance.

Schopenhauer' s view of the world
Schelling

7

s.

more grim than

that of either Kant's or

This might just be due to a quirk of temperament, but undoubtedly family

circumstances played a formative
political effects of the

Napoleon

is

role, as

Royce has suggested. In addition, the

expansion of Prussia and the world -changing actions of

affected Schopenhauer, as they affected

Moscow. Psychological and

all

Europeans between Paris and

geo-political explanations offer

an easy dismissal of

this

pessimistic outlook, but Schopenhauer's vision of the will, ceaselessly wanting,

]

I

do not mean

more wide-spread than it was,
Hegel, on European philosophers in the

to suggest that absolute idealism

is

but the influence of Schelling, and especially
latter 19th and 20th centuries is undeniably far-reaching.
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incapable of satisfaction, pure desire without a final goal, reveals a completely

image of the

was

human

being.

a cold lack of interest.

century began did

it

explanation for the

Schopenhauer

Only

appear that

way

not a flattering picture, and the

It is

initial

reception of

capable,

moment

if

it

might provide an accurate, or

things were.

at least instructive,

Wagner's and Nietzsche's

Later,

also served to focus attention

on

this

interest in

darker view of the world.

She can achieve

of peace.

Schopenhauerian

Schopenhauer

will

is

this

through

letting

both positive and negative. In

refers to as

subject around,

it

it is

pure

objectivity,

go of herself as a subject and

phenomenal form,

to control

itself.

caught in

this

which

is

its

it

and

object,

work

of art.

non-phenomenal

what there

the truth of the universe, because there

differentiates itself into subject

itself in a

that she

is

only fleetingly, of escaping this world of eternal desire and attaining a

losing herself in contemplation of the pure Form, expressed in a

Once

it

as the great social upheavals of the nineteenth

Schopenhauer maintains that the one consolation an individual has
is

new

is

is

when

which occurs when

there

will.

is

no

it.

manifests

it

itself

Everything in the world, with the rare exception of the

what

role,

nothing besides

turns into a rapacious beast, devouring

raging torrent of

The

as

it

seeks

saint, is

Only by transcending the phenomenal form

of

the will, and attaining the realm of Ideas, can one understand the true nature of both

phenomenal being and

of the other side of the will.

Kant, Schelling and Schopenhauer are
there

is

all idealists,

a dual structure to the world: the empirical world,

and share the

and the world behind the

appearances in which the true meaning of the empirical world
attain

it.

All three

belief that

resides,

if

only

we

could

view the artwork as connecting these two worlds. Their opinions
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diverge over

how

the artwork bridges the gap, and

what can be found

in the ideal

world.

Kant

Although he

the

is

strictest,

of

some

clearly has

work has been devoted

or perhaps most systematic, of these philosophers.

to

ideas about the structure of the ideal world, his

banishing metaphysical speculation from philosophy. That

which we can have no concrete knowledge cannot be

discourse.

If

we cannot

for philosophy.

This

is

to its universality: his

for

rationally consider something, then

a universal

then be merely subjective

way

beliefs.

by which

to feel,

not a proper subject

he

We

trivializes

otherwise,

human

these responses, for they would

he

this rule,

can grant him

this reflects Kant's basic belief

is

He cannot do

to prescribe the rules of proper

As Kant breaks

that these are legitimate exceptions.

and of the world, and

it is

Kant's basic premise, but he makes two conspicuous exceptions

behavior, or the appropriate

understood that

a subject for rational

moral theory and his aesthetic theory.

without recourse to

life's

this,

states that

he

not,

is

but only in so far as

about the nature of the

human

it is

being

not the absolute standard that he implies.

Kant's thought represents the fork in the road. Schelling, Schopenhauer and

most continental philosophers go down one
go down the other. Kant

is

tom between

and they propose answers

level,

of view,

Kant has

essentially

way

human
what

for

done the same,

essence, their response to Kant's difficulties
a rationale for the

the world

is

most Anglo-American philosophers

the two. Schelling and Schopenhauer

candidly admit that one cannot understand

another

side;

all

is

behavior without recourse to

this level

could be.

From

the while saying he has not.

that

it

would be

is built.

In

hypocritical to propose

without bringing in one's basic

underlying belief structure on which the rationale

their point

beliefs, for

it is

this
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For Kant, the universal applicability of the moral law
structures his works

which do not deal
is

explicitly

with the mind. Even his analysis of the cognitive process

so constituted as to allow for a transcendental or

later postulate a universal

his belief that there

is

a

noumenal realm, so

moral standard. Schelling

dynamic opposition

in

all

7

s

that he can

foundation turns out to

things,

on

rest

which has been caused by

the loss of the wholeness of the original ground of being. The
ceaseless attempt to

overcome

this opposition

becomes the

called a collective unconscious.

are

all

will's

Schopenhauer's philosophy

physical manifestations of the

endless desiring, and the

accounts for the

life-force, evil

basis for the mythic explanation of

will,

human

which

is all

reflects the

that there

is

what can be

view that we

in the world.

The

being's rare attempts to transcend the will,

and good. From the point of view of each of these

philosophers, without the respective explanations of the moral, the unconscious and
the will, one cannot justify either the material world or the nature of the

human

being.
In these concluding pages,

I

have explained

why

it is

that the

work

of art,

and

aesthetic theory in general, gained such a place of prominence in the thought of

German

philosophers around the turn into the 19th century.

It is

not coincidental that

the examination of the subject-object relationship, which characterizes most
philosophical thought of the Enlightenment, undergoes a decisive shift in

The attempt

focus.

to formulate a clearly defined explanation of the nature of the self in

relation to the world gives

moment

its

of truth

way

which can illuminate the mystery

Through an examination
Schopenhauer,

I

to a search for a hidden, inarticulate,

of the

human

unconscious

self.

of the aesthetic theory of Kant, Schelling

have shown the

radical

change

and

in the perception of the nature of the
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self

which has taken place between 1790 and

The

1818.

self

begins as a child of the

Enlightenment, becomes a repository of Romantic hopes, and ends as the

fully

formed

precursor of the theories of will and the unconscious, to be developed by Nietzsche

and Freud. The

special relationship

reveals both this change

philosophers

writers

and

this literary

between the

beliefs

self

and

a

work

of art

about the world held by the three

have considered.

I

It is

exists

and the underlying

The era which defines the
thought.

which

a time of

subject of this

changing worlds, and

poets, particularly in

is

work
a

is

one of the

tremendously

richest in

fertile

European

period for

Germany. Schelling and Schopenhauer

are steeped in

environment, which clearly plays a role in their fascination with artworks.

Unfortunately,

I

have not had the time or space

to

examine the

artistic

movement

or

the concomitant political and social changes, and instead, have had to isolate

philosophy from
aesthetics,

I

its

larger context.

have been able

Nevertheless,

to present

I

hope

that

by concentrating on

an overview of the changing attitudes towards

the nature and aims of the philosophic enterprise and to show, by a comparison of

Kant, Schelling and Schopenhauer,

how

the changes in their belief structures surfaces

in their respective interpretations of the self
of aesthetic theory.

and world, as

reflected in their treatment
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